Tax Court of Canada Judgments

Docket: 2003-521(EI)

BETWEEN:

MARC BÉGIN,

Appellant,

and

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,

Respondent. [OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

____________________________________________________________________

Appeal heard on December 1, 2003, at Québec, Quebec.

Before: The Honourable Justice Pierre Archambault
Appearances:
Counsel for the Appellant:	Marlène Jacob
Counsel for the Respondent:	Simon-Nicolas Crépin

____________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

Mr. Bégin's appeal is allowed. Mr. Bégin held insurable employment from July 10, 2000, to September 30, 2001, and his insurable earnings during that period amounted to $55,908.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 21st day of December 2004.

"Pierre Archambault"

Archambault J.

Translation certified true

on this 21st day of February 2005.

Jacques Deschênes, Translator

Citation: 2004TCC707

Date: 20041021

Docket: 2003-521(EI)

BETWEEN:

MARC BÉGIN,

Appellant,

and

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,

Respondent.

[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Archambault J.

[1]      Pursuant to subsection 103(1) of the Employment Insurance Act ("the Act"), Marc Bégin appeals a decision rendered by the Minister of National Revenue ("the Minister") on January 24, 2003, under subsection 93(3) of the Act. The decision states that Mr. Bégin did not hold insurable employment from January 1 to May 31, 2002 ("the second relevant period") because there was no employer-employee relationship between him and Université Laval during this period. Mr. Bégin contests the Minister's decision, not only in relation to the second relevant period, but in relation to the period commencing July 10, 2000, and ending December 31, 2001 (the "first relevant period"), as well.[1]

[2]      In light of the controversy regarding the relevant periods, it is important to go over the periods prior to the decision of January 24, 2003. The Minister's decision pertains to an appeal based on section 91 of the Act. Mr. Bégin instituted the appeal on November 14, 2002, in response to a ruling made under section 90, on October 28, 2002, by an officer authorized by the Minister ("the authorized officer"). According to that ruling, Mr. Bégin did not hold insurable employment during the first[2]and second relevant periods [TRANSLATION] "because no service was rendered during these periods." The authorized officer also established that there were [TRANSLATION] "415 insurable hours for the period of July 10 to September 30, 2001, and $12,795.52 in insurable earnings for the above period."[3] Based on paragraph 2(3)(b) of the Insurable Earnings and Collection of Premiums Regulations ("the Regulations"), he decided not to include in the insurable earnings an amount of $76,000 paid pursuant to an out-of-court settlement [TRANSLATION] "because the amount was paid as damages stemming from the loss of your employment."   

[3]      However, since Mr. Bégin's request was only made to the authorized officer on August 30, 2002,[4] the officer granted [TRANSLATION] "a right of appeal solely in relation to the period of January 1 to May 31, 2002" based on subsection 90(2) of the Act.

[4]      In his appeal to the Minister dated November 14, 2002, Mr. Bégin contested not only the authorized officer's ruling regarding the insurability of his employment for the period of July 10, 2000, to May 31, 2002 ("the initial relevant period"), but also the [TRANSLATION] "non-insurability of the $76,000 received from the payor as a final settlement."[5] Nonetheless, the Minister's decision dated January 24, 2003, pertains only to the first question.

[5]      In the Notice of Appeal filed in this Court, Mr. Bégin reiterates that the relevant period contemplated in his appeal is the initial relevant period. Moreover, he submits that he was under an employment contract with Université Laval during that entire period. For his part, the Minister submits that (i) the Court has no jurisdiction over the first relevant period; (ii) as far as the second relevant period is concerned, Mr. Bégin performed no services for Université Laval because the contract had ended on October 1, 2001; and (iii) the $76,000 that Mr. Bégin received from Université Laval does not constitute insurable earnings under the Regulations.

Facts

[6]      The Minister's decision was based on certain factual assumptions set out in paragraphs 9(a) through (l) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. At the hearing, Mr. Bégin's counsel admitted to all of these paragraphs except paragraph (l). I reproduce paragraphs 9(a) through 9(k) below:

[TRANSLATION]

(a)         The appellant was employed by the payor as a lecturer since 1981. Effective October 1, 1985, he was in charge of performance at the Faculty of Music.

(b)         On May 27, 1997, the payor renewed the appellant's employment contract for a five-year term commencing June 1, 1997, and ending May 31, 2002.

(c)         As of June 1, 1997, his annual salary under the contract was $53,353.

(d)         On or about February 29, 2000, the appellant was suspended from his position with pay.

(e)         On or about May 30, 2000, the payor suspended the appellant without pay for the period of July 10, 2000, to July 10, 2001.

(f)          On February 26, 2001, following this suspension, the appellant sued the payor in Superior Court for damages in the amount of $99,197.33, including $54,153 in loss of remuneration.

(g)         On October 1, 2001, the payor terminated the appellant's employment definitively.

(h)         The appellant received remuneration from the payor for the period of July 10 to September 30, 2001.

(i)          The appellant filed a complaint against the payor with the Commission des normes du travail for unjust and wrongful dismissal.

(j)          On March 19, 2002, the appellant and the payor, through their respective counsel, came to an agreement in principle for the full and final settlement of all disputes and claims.

(k)         On March 25, 2002, the Labour Commissioner confirmed the agreement between the parties.

[7]      Several documents were tendered at the hearing, including the agreement of March 19, 2002 ("theMarch 2002 agreement") between Mr. Bégin and Université Laval. Mr. Bégin only signed the agreement on May 30, 2002, and the person representing Université Laval only signed it on June 10, 2002. The most relevant passages are paragraphs 2 and 3, which I reproduce here:

[TRANSLATION]

2.          The Employee recognizes that his employment ended on October 1, 2001, as any employment relationship with the University was definitively terminated on October 1, 2001;

3.          The University shall pay the Employee a total of $76,000 as severance pay and for loss of salary, and the Employee acknowledges that this amount is sufficient and reasonable. The reimbursement of lost salary covers the period[s] of July 10, 2000, to July 10, 2001, and October 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002. The amount is payable as follows:

3.1.       In accordance with section 46 of the Employment Insurance Act, the University shall pay the Receiver General for Canada, out of the $76,000 mentioned above, the requisite repayment of the overpayment of benefits received by the Employee;

3.2.       The University shall then pay the balance to the Employee as follows:

i.           $30,000 shall be paid into an appropriate retirement vehicle, as a retiring or departure allowance, based on the instructions given in this regard by the Employee or his counsel upon presentation of the applicable income tax waiver forms, and this amount shall be paid after the University receives the instructions and forms;

ii.           In order to enable the employee to request a special tax calculation, the Employer shall complete and provide the Employee with a Canada Customs and Revenue Agency Statement of Qualifying Retroactive Lump-Sum Payment;

iii.          The residual amount, subject to the usual tax and statutory deductions, shall be remitted to the Employee no more than 15 working days after the amount payable to the Receiver General for Canada has been paid;

[Emphasis added.]

[8]      Mr. Bégin testified about the circumstances that led him to sign this agreement, which establishes October 1, 2001, as his termination date. He said he signed the agreement solely to satisfy a request by Université Laval, which told him that it would be too complicated to have the trustee of the Université Laval pension fund recalculate the retirement benefits to which Mr. Bégin would be entitled upon retirement. On October 1, 2002, Université Laval definitively terminated Mr. Bégin's employment, and he said the university was unable to see how it could revisit the consequences of the termination of the employment contract.

[9]      It should be mentioned that, in addition to the $76,000, an amount of $24,000 was paid as liquidated legal costs and as compensation for the harm that Mr. Bégin said his reputation suffered following the suspension and premature termination of his employment contract. After the March 2002 agreement was signed, the Université Laval's lawyers issued certain documents on July 17, 2002, including a Record of Employment (ROE) prepared by their client. The ROE is dated July 11, 2002, and indicates July 10, 2002, as the first day worked and September 30, 2001, as the final pay period ending date. The ROE reports 415 hours of insurable employment and $12,795.52 in total insurable earnings.[6]

[10]     Although he received pay for the period commencing in July 2001 and ending on September 30, 2001, Mr. Bégin testified that he received no instructions from Université Laval regarding the preparation of his course.

[11]     The documents attached to the letter from Université Laval dated July 17, 2002, include Form T1198F (Exhibit A-7H), "Statement of Qualifying Retroactive Lump-Sum Payment." The form pertains to the $76,000 paid by Université Laval and states how a part of the amount is allocated. $21,839 was allocated to the year 2000 and $35,317 was allocated to the year 2001, for a total of $57,156.[7] Based on the information in the letter of May 10, 2004, one can conclude that the $35,317 for 2001 is broken down as follows: $23,836 (191 x $124.79) for the period of January 1 to July 10, 2001, and $11,481 (92 x $124.79) for the period of October 1 to December 31, 2001. It can be added that Université Laval paid $30,000 of the $76,000 directly into Mr. Bégin's RRSP as a "retiring allowance" (see the letter of June 17, 2002, by Université Laval (Exhibit A-7B, E, F and G)).

[12]     The documents tendered as evidence include a letter dated October 3, 2000, in which Mr. Bégin's demand that Université Laval to pay their client $54,802 in damages for loss of salary and $6,000 for loss of benefits. More specifically, the demand letter urged the following:

[TRANSLATION]

You are in default and must pay our client the sum of one hundred and five thousand eight hundred and two dollars ($105,802) for the following damages:

Loss of salary and other benefits under the contract:	$60,802
Moral damages:	$15,000
Exemplary damages:	$15,000
Damage to reputation	$15,000
TOTAL:	$105, 802

         

                                                                             [Emphasis added.]

[13]     There was also an action commenced by Mr. Bégin against Université Laval on February 26, 2001. In the action, Mr. Bégin asked the Superior Court to order Université Laval to pay him $99,197.33 in damages. Paragraphs 49 and 50 of the originating process states as follows:

          [TRANSLATION]

49         The following damages were caused by the actions of Université Laval:

► Loss of earnings:	$54,153
► Fringe benefits:	$6,044.33
► Legal fees:	$9,000
► Moral damages:	$5,000
► Damage to reputation	$10,000

50         Since the violation of the right is malicious, grossly negligent and intentional, the plaintiff is entitled to seek exemplary damages in the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);

                                                                             [Emphasis added.]

[14]     In addition, Mr. Bégin commenced a recourse under section 124 of the Act respecting labour standards on September 21, 2001.

Analysis

The Court's jurisdiction over the first relevant period

[15]     Counsel for the respondent submits that this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether Mr. Bégin held insurable employment during the second relevant period. He relies on subsection 90(2) of the Act, which states that a request by any person other than the Commission must be made before June 30 following the year to which the question relates.[8] In this instance, the request was only made on August 30, 2002.   

[16]     If the authorized officer, to whom the request of August 30, 2002, was made, had only made a ruling with regard to the second relevant period, I would have been inclined to agree with the submission of counsel for the respondent. However, when the officer made his ruling on October 28, 2002, he did not limit himself to the second relevant period. He also ruled with regard to the entire initial relevant period. Specifically, he found that Mr. Bégin held insurable employment for the period of July 10 to September 30, 2001. In my opinion, the officer had jurisdiction to rule on the first relevant period by reason of section 94 of the Act,[9] which provides that nothing in sections 90 to 93 restricts the authority of the Minister to render a decision on the Minister's own initiative, under Part IV of the Act, subsequent to the date contemplated in subsection 90(2). On an initial reading, one might believe that the authorized officer referred to in section 90 of the Act and the Minister referred to in sections 91 and 94 are two separate persons and consequently, that the power described in section 94 is conferred only on the Minister (and not on the authorized officer). However, the powers conferred by sections 90, 91 and 94 are always conferred on officers authorized by the Minister.

[17]     The best way to understand this administrative arrangement is to compare it to the arrangement for the administration of the Income Tax Act ("the ITA"). The ITA confers on the "Minister" the power to assess the tax payable by a taxpayer (section 152 of the ITA) but, in practice, this administrative act is carried out by an official (an auditor) authorized by the Minister. When a taxpayer wishes to contest the assessment, he may "serve on the Minister a notice of objection" and "the Minister shall . . . reconsider the assessment and vacate, confirm or vary the assessment or reassess" (subsections 165(1) and (3) of the ITA). In practice, this administrative act is carried out by another officer (an appeals officer) authorized by the Minister. In administering the Act, the authorized officer contemplated in section 90 is an auditor and the authorized officer under section 91 is an appeals officer. All of these authorized officers act on the Minister's behalf. Thus, the Minister is the one who issues the rulings contemplated by sections 90 and 91 of the Act. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the authorized officer was not limited to the second relevant period in the instant case.[10] He could make a ruling with regard to the first relevant period.

[18]     In my opinion, once the authorized officer decided to make a ruling concerning the first relevant period, and the person concerned decided to appeal the ruling to the Minister under section 91 of the Act, the period contemplated by the authorized officer's ruling was the relevant period for the purposes of the section 91 appeal. The ruling under appeal was that of the authorized officer, and it applied not only to the second relevant period, but to the first relevant period as well. The fact that the Minister (appeals officer) improperly failed to examine the first relevant period does not deprive this Court of its right of review with regard to that period.[11]

[19]     In conclusion, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Bégin's appeal, not only with regard to the second relevant period, but with regard to the first one as well.

Did Mr. Bégin hold insurable employment during the first and second relevant periods?

[20]     Counsel for Mr. Bégin submits that the employment contract, which Université Laval renewed on June 1, 1997, for a period of five years ending May 31, 2002, was in force for that entire period. In her submission, the fact that Université Laval paid compensation equivalent to the entire salary that Mr. Bégin was entitled to receive under that employment contract supports her argument that Université Laval paid him a salary until May 31, 2002. In her view, the fact that section 2 of the March 2002 agreement stipulated that Mr. Bégin's employment contract ended on October 1, 2001, merely had the effect of specifying Mr. Bégin's potential pension plan rights.

[21]     I am unable to subscribe to this view. Firstly, nowhere is it stated that the clause applies only to pension plan matters. If the parties had intended to stipulate this, it would have been easy to do. In fact, the contrary is true: the provision is broad is scope, stating clearly and without reservation that the employee recognizes that his employment ended on October 1, 2001, Moreover, the ROE prepared by Université Laval, and sent to the Department of Human Resources Development Canada, is consistent with the agreement because it states that the last day of work was September 30, 2001. The parties to the March 2002 agreement agreed that the employment had ended, as stated in the letter of October 1, 2001, in which the vice-rector, human resources, unilaterally terminated Mr. Bégin's contract. Consequently, as of that date, there was no longer an employment contract between Université Laval and Mr. Bégin.

[22]     In fact, the demand letter that Mr. Bégin sent, and the action commenced in Superior Court, demand "damages", not unpaid "salary" or "remuneration." They do not require the payment of moneys due under the employment contract, i.e. salary, but rather "damages" in an amount equal to what Mr. Bégin would have been paid if the employment contract had not ended, and other "damages" for harm suffered. The idea that the Superior Court might set aside the notice of termination of employment and order Mr. Bégin reinstated in his duties was not under discussion. Thus, he could not have held insurable employment at the university starting October 1, 2001 (the date on which the contractual employment relationship between the parties ended) and during the entire second relevant period. However, since the employment contract only ended on October 1, 2001, there was an employment contract between the parties from July 19, 2000, to October 1, 2001, and, in fact, the authorized officer properly determined that Mr. Bégin held insurable employment from July 10, 2001, to September 30, 2001.[12]

[23]     The unpaid salary resulting from Mr. Bégin's suspension without pay was ultimately remitted under the March 2002 agreement. All the conditions necessary to the existence of an employment contract were present at that time: services, remuneration and an employer-employee relationship. In point of fact, the services, which began in June 1997 under the last employment contract, were suspended at the employer's request effective February 29, 2000, but Mr. Bégin was available to perform them. I will come back to this issue under the next heading.

Amount of insurable earnings

[24]     Under section 90 of the Act, a person may request that an authorized officer make a ruling with regard, inter alia, to the amount of any insurable earnings (paragraph 90(1)(c) of the Act). In his ruling of October 28, 2002, the authorized officer determined that, based on paragraph 2(3)(b) of the Regulations, the $76,000 paid under the settlement was excluded from insurable earnings [TRANSLATION] "because it was paid as damages stemming from the loss of your employment." As the respondent himself acknowledges, Mr. Bégin appealed this ruling. The Minister improperly failed to decide this question in his decision of January 24, 2003. It is therefore appropriate for this Court to decide it.

[25]     First of all, subsection 2(1) of the Act defines insurable employment as follows:

"insurable earnings" means the total amount of the earnings, as determined in accordance with Part IV, that an insured person has from insurable employment;

[26]     In Part IV, entitled "Insurable Employment and Collection of Premiums", paragraph 108(1)(g) describes the Minister's power, with the approval of the Governor in Council, to make regulations "for defining and determining earnings . . . and the amount of insurable earnings of insured persons and for allocating their earnings to any period of insurable employment."
The relevant provisions are found in section 2 of the Regulations.

2(1)       For the purposes of the definition "insurable earnings" in subsection 2(1) of the Act and for the purposes of these Regulations, the total amount of earnings that an insured person has from insurable employment is

(a)         the total of all amounts, whether wholly or partly pecuniary, received or enjoyed by the insured person that are paid to the person by the person's employer in respect of that employment, and

(b)         the amount of any gratuities that the insured person is required to declare to the person's employer under provincial legislation.

2(2)       For the purposes of this Part, the total amount of earnings that an insured person has from insurable employment includes the portion of any amount of such earnings that remains unpaid because of the employer's bankruptcy, receivership, impending receivership or non-payment of remuneration for which the person has filed a complaint with the federal or provincial labour authorities, except for any unpaid amount that is in respect of overtime or that would have been paid by reason of termination of the employment.

2(3)       For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), "earnings" does not include

(a)         any non-cash benefit, other than the value of either or both of any board or lodging enjoyed by a person in a pay period in respect of their employment if cash remuneration is paid to the person by their employer in respect of the pay period;

(a.1)      any amount excluded as income under paragraph 6(1)(a) or (b) or subsection 6(6) or (16) of the Income Tax Act;

(b)         a retiring allowance;

(c)         a supplement paid to a person by the person's employer to increase worker's compensation paid to the person by a provincial authority;

(d)         a supplement paid to a person by the person's employer to increase a wage loss indemnity payment made to the person by a party other than the employer under a wage loss indemnity plan;

(e)         supplemental unemployment benefit payment made under a supplemental unemployment benefit plan as described in subsection 37(2) of the Employment Insurance Regulations; and

(f)         a payment made to a person by the person's employer to cover the waiting period referred to in section 13 of the Act, or to increase the pregnancy, parental or compassionate care benefits payable to the person under section 22, 23 or 23.1 of the Act if the payment meets the criteria set out in section 38 of the Employment Insurance Regulations.

[27]     An analysis of all these provisions discloses that an employee can only derive insurable earnings from insurable employment. Moreover, the insurable earnings must actually have been received, subject to a few exceptions, including cases where the earnings are unpaid because of the employer's bankruptcy or receivership, or where the employee has filed a complaint with the federal or provincial labour authorities.

[28]     Since there is no evidence in the record that Université Laval had a valid reason to terminate the employment contract before the expected term, it could be required to pay damages for the breach of the employment contract. The total of the amounts of $11,481 (92 x $124.79) for the period of January 1 to May 31, 2001, and $18,844 (151 x $124.79) for the period of January 1 to May 31, 2002, must be considered damages in respect of a loss of employment, and such damages constitute a "retiring allowance" within the meaning ascribed to that term in subsection 1(1) of the Regulations made under the Act:

1. (1) The definitions in this subsection apply in these Regulations.

"retiring allowance" means an amount received by a person

(a)         on or after retirement of the person from an office or employment in recognition of the person's long service, or

(b)         in respect of a loss of an office or employment of the person, whether or not received as, on account or in lieu of payment of, damages or pursuant to an order or judgment of a competent tribunal. (allocation de retraite)

[Emphasis added.]

[29]     Consequently, the portion of the $76,000 that is attributable to the period subsequent to September 30, 2001, namely $30,325, does not constitute insurable earnings.

[30]     As for the portion of the $76,000 attributable to the period preceding October 1, 2001, namely $45,675 ($76,000 - $30,325), it must be regarded as unpaid salary to which Mr. Bégin was entitled. The March 2002 agreement shows that Université Laval acknowledged, at least implicitly, that it had not followed the appropriate procedure to take the necessary disciplinary measures in response to the complaint filed against Mr. Bégin, and therefore had to pay Mr. Bégin the salary to which he was entitled under the employment contract during the period when "the employment relationship between Université Laval and [its employee] continued to exist."[13] If it had had a valid reason to suspend him without pay from July 10, 2000, to July 10, 2001, Université Laval would not have had to pay Mr. Bégin his salary. Hence, the March 2002 agreement acknowledged that Mr. Bégin was entitled to the "lost salary" for that period.

[31]     Consequently, since the employment relationship between Université Laval and Mr. Bégin continued to exist during this period, and since Université Laval implicitly acknowledged that it could not justify a suspension without pay, Mr. Bégin was entitled to his salary, and that is what he received from the university. Although the amount corresponding to this salary was paid after the employment terminated, it was not paid "by reason of the termination of the employment" but rather, "in respect of that employment" because it corresponded to the unpaid salary for the period preceding the termination of employment.

[32]     For his part, counsel for the respondent submits that Mr. Bégin did not hold insurable employment during the first relevant period because he did not perform services for the payor during that period. Counsel relies on two decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal, namely Élément v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1996] F.C.J. No. 718 (QL), and Forrestall v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1638 (QL), in which it was held that a person who is not working and is not obtaining a salary does not hold insurable employment within the meaning of paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (now paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Act. In my opinion, both decisions apply here, but only in relation to the second relevant period, because the amounts that Université Laval paid in respect of that period constitute damages, as there was no longer any employment contract because Université Laval had terminated it unilaterally effective October 1, 2001. Since no order was issued to set aside this decision made by Université Laval, the employment contract ended.

[33]     However, Université Laval's wrongful suspension of Mr. Bégin for a certain period prior to October 1, 2001, did not have the effect of terminating the employment contract. Far from it. Consequently, the amounts that Université Laval paid Mr. Bégin in respect of the period prior to October 1, 2001, constitute salary that Université Laval owed Mr. Bégin.

[34]     The fact that he did not perform services prior to October 1, 2001, does not establish that there was no employment contract. In fact, the Federal Court of Appeal recognized this in Université Laval, supra. What is more, the Court confirmed that there can be insurable earnings without services. As Décary J.A. stated at paragraph 17 of the decision:

17       The mere fact that subsection 2(3) of the Regulations, which deals with situations in which the insured person does not perform any services contains all of these items, is sufficient to reject the employer's legal argument that there can be no insurable earnings within the meaning of the Regulations where no services are performed.

[35]     I subscribe fully to the analysis of Décary J.A. The fact that someone is receiving his salary while on vacation and not working does not mean that there is no employment contract and that the vacation pay does not constitute earnings. The same can be said of a salary that a person on sick leave receives from his employer, as it was held in Université Laval.

[36]     Naturally, where an employer terminates the employment contract and pays moneys in respect of periods subsequent to the termination, the contract no longer exists. Consequently, the moneys paid cannot constitute salary.

[37]     Since Mr. Bégin held insurable employment until October 1, 2001, he held insurable employment during the first relevant period. In addition, the pay that he received in 2002, and is attributable to the period prior to October 1, 2001, is salary and therefore constitutes insurable earnings within the meaning of the Regulations. As mentioned above, the amount of these insurable earnings for the first relevant period is $55,908, calculated as follows:

$21,839	-	July 10 to December 31, 2000
$23,836	-	January 1 to July 10, 2001
$10,233	-	July 11 to September 30, 2001
$55,908

[38]     For all these reasons, Mr. Bégin's appeal is allowed. Mr. Bégin held insurable employment from July 10, 2000, to September 30 2001, and his insurable earnings during that period amounted to $55,908.[14]

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 21st day of October 2004.

"Pierre Archambault"

Archambault J.

Translation certified true

on this 21st day of February 2005.

Jacques Deschênes, Translator

CITATION:

2004TCC707

COURT FILE NO.:

2003-521(EI)

STYLE OF CAUSE:

Marc Bégin and MNR

PLACE OF HEARING:

Québec, Quebec

DATE OF HEARING:

December 1, 2003

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:

The Honourable Justice Pierre Archambault

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

October 21, 2004

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Marlène Jacob

For the Respondent:

Simon-Nicolas Crépin

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For the Appellant:

Name:

Marlène Jacob

Firm:

Proulx Ménard Millard Caux Québec, Quebec

For the Respondent:

Morris Rosenberg Deputy Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Canada

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