Docket: A-54-24
Citation: 2024 FCA 170
CORAM:
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BOIVIN J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
HECKMAN J.A.
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BETWEEN: |
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HONG ZHOU |
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Applicant |
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and |
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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Respondent |
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Heard by online videoconference hosted by the Registry on October 8, 2024.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on October 23, 2024.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: |
GLEASON J.A. |
CONCURRED IN BY: |
BOIVIN J.A. HECKMAN J.A. |
Date: 20241023
Docket: A-54-24
Citation: 2024 FCA 170
CORAM:
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BOIVIN J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
HECKMAN J.A.
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BETWEEN: |
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HONG ZHOU |
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Applicant |
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and |
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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Respondent |
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEASON J.A.
[1] The applicant seeks to set aside the decision of the Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division (the Appeal Division) in H.Z. v. Canada Employment Insurance Commission, 2023 SST 1104. In that decision, the Appeal Division dismissed an appeal from the earlier decision of the Social Security Tribunal of Canada General Division (the General Division) in H.Z. v. Canada Employment Insurance Commission, 2022 SST 273.
[2] The respondent has consented to this application for judicial review being granted but advances a somewhat different basis for intervention from that advanced by the applicant.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I would allow this application for judicial review on the basis proposed by the respondent and would remit the applicant’s appeal to the Appeal Division for redetermination in accordance with these reasons. I would also award the applicant the all-inclusive sum of $1000.00 in costs as I conclude that she has been largely successful in her application, the ultimate aim of which was to correct the notices of overpayment she received.
I. Background and Decisions of the General and Appeal Divisions
[4] The provisions applicable to this application relate to entitlements to employment insurance (EI) benefits and employment insurance emergency response benefits (EI ERB) and are set out in the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 (EI Act) and the Employment Insurance Regulations, S.O.R./96-332 (EI Regulations). The relevant provisions are numerous and complex and are therefore set out in the Appendix to these reasons.
[5] In her submissions, the applicant referred to certain of the Interim Orders, promulgated under subsection 153.3(1) of the EI Act that enacted some of the EI ERB provisions. The portions of the Interim Orders the applicant relies on have been incorporated into the EI Act. Many of these provisions apply retroactively; others were in force at the relevant time and apply by their terms to Ms. Zhou’s situation. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer only to the provisions in the EI Act and the EI Regulations.
[6] At the times relevant to this application, the applicant resided in the United States but worked in Windsor, Ontario. She was initially laid off on a temporary basis on April 10, 2020, after having worked for her employer since 2011. The applicant’s employer issued her a record of employment (ROE), and she applied for EI benefits.
[7] The Employment Insurance Commission (the Commission) initially established a benefit period, commencing April 12, 2020, for the applicant during which it found she was entitled to regular EI benefits for 36 weeks. The Commission applied subsection 55(7) of the EI Regulations to determine the length of the benefit period. This provision applies to commuters, like the applicant, who live outside Canada in a state contiguous to Canada and work in Canada. Under subsection 55(7) of the EI Regulations, the maximum benefit period for regular EI benefits for commuters is 36 weeks. The Commission found that the applicant was entitled to the maximum 36-week benefit period because she had more than the required 1820 hours of insurable employment during her qualifying period.
[8] It appears that the applicant received 36 weeks of regular EI benefits.
[9] The applicant’s employer put her back on the payroll before the end of her 36-week benefit period and paid her eight weeks termination pay, over the period from October 26, 2020 to December 18, 2020. The applicant’s employer advised the applicant that she was permanently laid off and issued the applicant a second ROE on February 19, 2021.
[10] The applicant made a second claim for EI benefits in February 2021, and the Commission established a second benefit period, commencing on January 31, 2021. It found that the applicant was entitled to an additional 12 weeks of regular EI benefits in her second benefit period. In making this calculation, the Commission determined that the applicant had 320 hours of insurable employment in accordance with her second ROE and was entitled to a one-time additional credit of 300 hours under section 153.17(1) of the EI Act. This resulted in the applicant having a total of 620 hours of insurable employment, which, in turn, entitled her to 12 weeks of regular EI benefits in her second benefit period.
[11] The applicant was eventually paid 12 weeks of regular EI benefits in respect of her second benefit period.
[12] The applicant questioned the Commission’s determination on her second claim, arguing that she was entitled to 50 weeks of regular EI benefits in respect of the second benefit period. The Commission disagreed with the applicant and determined that, as a commuter who resided in the United States, subsection 55(7) of the EI Regulations applied to establish her second benefit period.
[13] However, the Commission went on to determine that there had been an error in respect of the applicant’s first claim for benefits. It concluded that she ought to have received EI ERB and not regular EI benefits. EI ERB was payable at the maximum rate of $500 as opposed to $573 per week that the applicant had received, and was payable for the maximum number of weeks outlined in section 153.11 of the EI Act.
[14] The conversion of the applicant’s regular EI benefits to EI ERB benefits resulted in a $73 overpayment every week until the end of the applicant’s EI ERB benefit period. The Commission wrote off this amount.
[15] The Commission also backdated the applicant’s second claim for benefits to cover the regular EI benefits the applicant had received over the period from October 4, 2020, the day after her EI ERB benefit period ended, to June 12, 2021, which overlapped with the second benefit period that it had previously established. The Commission thus voided the second benefit period and backdated the second claim to October 4, 2020. The Commission established a 36-week regular benefit period for regular EI benefits from October 4, 2020 to June 12, 2021.
[16] The applicant asked the Commission to reconsider its decision, but it declined to do so. The applicant then appealed to the General Division.
[17] The General Division found that the applicant’s first claim was correctly converted from regular EI benefits to EI ERB pursuant to paragraph 153.1310(c)(i) of the EI Act. It also held that the applicant met the eligibility requirement for EI ERB set out in paragraph 153.9(1)(b) of the EI Act since she had made a claim for benefits on or after March 15, 2020.
[18] The General Division further held that the applicant would not be entitled to 50 weeks regular EI benefits under her second EI claim but, rather, only to a maximum of 36 weeks as a commuter. It declined to address the issue of when the second benefit period should have started or to decide how many weeks of benefits the applicant was entitled to receive in respect of her second claim because it concluded that the Commission’s voiding of the applicant’s second claim was not properly before the General Division.
[19] The applicant sought and was granted leave to appeal the General Division’s decision to the Appeal Division.
[20] In its decision on the merits of her appeal, the Appeal Division upheld the General Division’s determination that the applicant’s first claim was properly an EI ERB claim largely for the same reasons as the General Division gave.
[21] As concerns her second claim, the Appeal Division concluded that the General Division erred in failing to address the propriety of the Commission voiding and backdating the applicant’s second claim. It concluded that the Commission should not have backdated the second benefit period to October 2020 because it had no authority to do so in light of the provisions in subsection 10(6) of the EI Act.
[22] The Appeal Division accordingly held that the applicant’s second benefit period commenced on January 31, 2021, during which commuter benefits were payable. The Appeal Division found that the applicant was not entitled to the maximum 36-week benefit period since she only had 620 hours of insurable employment in the applicable qualifying period. The Appeal Division derived this number from the 320 hours shown on the applicant’s second ROE as well as the additional credit of 300 hours available under section 153.17(1) of the EI Act. Consequently, the Appeal Division found that the applicant was entitled to 12 weeks of benefits under her second claim.
[23] The forgoing decisions resulted in the applicant receiving multiple notices to remit differing amounts as overpayments of benefits under the EI Act.
II. Issues
[24] By virtue of section 58 of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act, S.C. 2005, c. 34, the Appeal Division may interfere with a decision of the General Division in a case involving EI if the General Division:
(a)failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b)erred in law in making its decision, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; or
(c)based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.
[25] This Court may interfere with a decision of the Appeal Division if the Appeal Division denied a party procedural fairness or if its decision is unreasonable: see Page v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 169, 483 D.L.R. (4th) 742 at para. 45; Sjogren v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 157 at para. 6.
[26] Three issues arise on this appeal, namely whether the Appeal Division reasonably determined that:
the applicant’s first claim should be converted to an EI ERB claim;
the Commission should reinstate the applicant’s second claim, with a commencement date of January 31, 2021; and
the applicant was entitled to only 12 weeks of regular EI benefits in respect of her second claim.
[27] I note that neither party has suggested that the Commission erred in establishing two benefit periods for the applicant in the unusual circumstances of her case. Indeed, counsel for the respondent confirmed that there were properly two benefit periods in light of the timing of the applicant’s claims and interplay between the EI ERB and regular EI benefit provisions in the EI Act and EI Regulations.
III. Analysis
[28] I find that the Appeal Division’s decision on the first two of the foregoing issues was reasonable but that its decision on the third issue, limiting the period of regular EI benefits to only 12 weeks on her second claim, was unreasonable.
A. Did the Appeal Division reasonably conclude that the applicant was entitled to EI ERB as opposed to regular EI benefits in respect of her first claim?
[29] Turning more specifically to the first issue, the applicant argues that she was not entitled to EI ERB by virtue of paragraph 153.9(1)(a) of the EI Act because she was not a Canadian resident and that she ought to have received 36 weeks of regular EI benefits under her first claim. She contends that it was unreasonable for the Appeal Division to conclude otherwise.
[30] I disagree.
[31] As the Appeal Division noted in its decision, paragraph 153.9(1)(a) of the EI Act is not the only provision of relevance. By virtue of the combined effect of section 153.1310, paragraphs 153.9(1)(b), 153.5(2)(b), and subsection 153.5(3) of the EI Act, the benefits the applicant received, which were originally assessed as regular EI benefits under Part I of the EI Act, are deemed to have been EI ERB. Moreover, the Appeal Division reasonably applied subsections 153.8(1), (5) and (6) of the EI Act to end the applicant’s EI ERB benefit period on October 3, 2020.
[32] Thus, the Appeal Division reasonably concluded that the applicant was entitled to EI ERB in respect of her first benefit period and that it ended on October 3, 2020.
B. Did the Appeal Division reasonably conclude that the Commission should reinstate the applicant’s second claim to provide a commencement date of January 31, 2021?
[33] The provisions governing benefit periods for regular EI claims are set out in section 10 of the EI Act. The authority of the Commission to cancel benefit periods is circumscribed by subsection 10(6) of the EI Act. Where benefits have been paid out to a claimant in respect of a benefit period, the Commission may cancel a benefit period only with the consent of the applicant.
[34] Here, benefits were paid out to the applicant in respect of her second benefit period. She did not agree to cancel it in favour of establishing a new benefit period starting October 4, 2020, in the way the Commission proposed. In light of the limitation on the Commission’s authority set out in subsection 10(6) of the EI Act, it was reasonable for the Appeal Division to have concluded that the Commission could not cancel the applicant’s second benefit period, commencing January 31, 2021, in favour of a revised one commencing October 4, 2020.
C. Did the Appeal Division reasonably conclude that the applicant was entitled to only 12 weeks of regular EI benefits in respect of her second claim?
[35] The applicant argues that the Appeal Division ought to have found that she was entitled to 50 weeks of regular EI benefits under her second claim by virtue of section 12 of the EI Act, which she alleges establishes a 50-week benefit period applicable to her second claim. She contends that subsection 12(2.1) of the EI Act establishes the number of weeks of benefits available and that, as she does not fall into the exception set out in subsection 12(2.2), she is entitled to 50 weeks of benefits and that it was unreasonable for the Appeal Division to conclude otherwise.
[36] I disagree.
[37] As the respondent correctly asserts, subsections 12(2.1) and 12(2.2) of the EI Act must be read in context and do not overtake other more specific provisions in the EI Act and EI Regulations. These include subsection 55(7) of the EI Regulations, which set out the benefit periods applicable to commuters, like the applicant.
[38] I accordingly conclude that it was reasonable for the Appeal Division to determine that subsection 55(7) of the EI Regulations applied to the applicant and that she was not entitled to a 50-week benefit period in respect of her second EI claim.
[39] That said, the Appeal Division unreasonably limited the applicant’s second benefit period to only 12 weeks. In reaching this conclusion, the Appeal Division unreasonably ignored subsection 153.18(1) of the EI Act, which extends the benefit periods of those who received EI ERB by 28 weeks, the maximum period in respect of which EI ERB was payable. The respondent concedes that if the proper calculations had been made, the applicant would have been entitled to a second benefit period of 36 weeks in respect of her second EI claim.
[40] In light of this concession, I conclude that the Appeal Division unreasonably found that the applicant was entitled to a 12, as opposed to a 36-week, benefit period in respect of her second EI claim.
IV. Proposed Disposition
[41] I would allow this application, set aside the decision of the Appeal Division, and remit the applicant’s appeal to the Appeal Division for redetermination in accordance with these reasons.
[42] The applicant has been required to pursue this matter through several levels of appeal, and has received varying answers from the authorities charged with administering the EI Act. This has required her to expend monies as well as time and effort. She seeks the amount of $3000.00 to compensate her as costs. I find this to be excessive in light of the fact that the applicant has represented herself and the required disbursements were minimal. She also took some steps in the pursuit of this application that may have led to some delay. However, she was ultimately largely successful in cancelling the notices of overpayment she received. I would therefore award her costs in the fixed all-inclusive lump sum amount of $1000.00.
“Mary J.L. Gleason”
J.A.
“I agree. |
Richard Boivin J.A. |
“I agree. |
Gerald Heckman J.A.” |
APPENDIX
Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23
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Employment Insurance Regulations, S.O.R./96-332
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FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET:
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A-54-24 |
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STYLE OF CAUSE:
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HONG ZHOU v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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PLACE OF HEARING:
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OTTAWA, ONTARIO |
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DATE OF HEARING:
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October 8, 2024 |
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
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GLEASON J.A.
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CONCURRED IN BY:
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BOIVIN J.A. HECKMAN J.A. |
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DATED:
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OCTOBER 23, 2024
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APPEARANCES:
Hong Zhou |
ON HER OWN BEHALF |
Andrew Kirk |
For The Respondent |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Shalene Curtis-Micallef Deputy Attorney General of Canada |
For The Respondent |