Date: 20211115
Dockets: A-260-20 (Lead)
A-261-20
A-262-20
Citation: 2021 FCA 218
CORAM:
|
WEBB J.A.
MACTAVISH J.A.
LEBLANC J.A.
|
BETWEEN: |
MATHEW MCNEELEY, KENNETH CHAPMAN and JOHN A. BAKER |
Appellants |
and |
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN |
Respondent |
Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on September 27, 2021.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on November 15, 2021.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: |
WEBB J.A. |
CONCURRED IN BY: |
MACTAVISH J.A. LEBLANC J.A. |
Date: 20211115
Dockets: A-260-20 (Lead)
A-261-20
A-262-20
Citation: 2021 FCA 218
CORAM:
|
WEBB J.A.
MACTAVISH J.A.
LEBLANC J.A.
|
BETWEEN: |
MATHEW MCNEELEY, KENNETH CHAPMAN and JOHN A. BAKER |
Appellants |
and |
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN |
Respondent |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WEBB J.A.
[1] These appeals arise because the appellants believed that the rules applicable to the distribution of shares from a trust to employees of a corporation would be those rules applicable to prescribed trusts as defined in section 4800.1 of the Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C., c. 945 (the Regulations). The Minister of National Revenue (the Minister), however, reassessed the appellants on the basis that the rules applicable to employee benefit plans, as defined in the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (the Act), determined the tax implications arising from the distribution of shares by the trust.
[2] The appellants’ appeals to the Tax Court of Canada were dismissed (2020 TCC 90).
[3] For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss these appeals.
[4] These appeals were consolidated, with A-260-20 as the lead appeal. These reasons will apply to all of the appeals. The original of these reasons will be placed in A-260-20 and a copy will be placed in each of the other files.
I. Background
[5] In 2005, Patricia Baker contributed $210 to settle the “Desire2Learn Employee Stock Trust”
(the D2L Employee Trust). The beneficiaries of the D2L Employee Trust are the employees of D2L Corporation (D2L). D2L was founded by Patricia Baker’s son, John Baker, who is one of the appellants. The D2L Employee Trust acquired 2,950 class B common shares of D2L for $10.
[6] The D2L Employee Trust subsequently transferred the shares of D2L to D2L Holdings Inc. (D2L Parent) for the same number and class of shares of D2L Parent. On the amalgamation of D2L Parent with a numbered company, the D2L Employee Trust acquired 3,705,344 non-voting class B common shares of the amalgamated company, which retained the name D2L Holdings Inc.
[7] On the same day that the amalgamation occurred, the D2L Employee Trust distributed 3,356,415 of its shares to various beneficiaries. In particular, 2,317,109 shares were distributed to John Baker and 71,772.18 shares were distributed to Kenneth Chapman. Later in 2012, the D2L Employee Trust distributed its remaining 348,929 shares to 227 beneficiaries. This distribution included a distribution of 707.66 shares to Mathew McNeeley and 50,384.96 shares to John Baker. The fair market value of the shares at the time of the first and second distribution was $8.415 per share.
[8] The D2L Employee Trust and the beneficiaries proceeded on the basis that, for the purposes of the Act, the D2L Employee Trust was a prescribed trust as defined in section 4800.1 of the Regulations and that it would be a trust for the purposes of section 107 of the Act. The D2L Employee Trust filed the election contemplated by subsection 107(2.001) of the Act in relation to the distributions to the beneficiaries (other than the first distribution to John Baker). As a result, other than the first distribution of shares to John Baker, the D2L Employee Trust and its beneficiaries filed their tax returns on the basis that subsection 107(2.1) of the Act applied to the distributions of shares to the beneficiaries.
[9] Assuming that subsection 107(2.1) of the Act was applicable, the D2L Employee Trust reported a capital gain arising as a result of the deemed disposition of the shares, in the amount equal to the difference between the fair market value of such shares and the adjusted cost base of such shares. The taxable capital gain was one-half of the capital gain. The D2L Employee Trust allocated such taxable capital gains to the beneficiaries.
[10] For the first distribution of shares to John Baker, the D2L Employee Trust and John Baker filed their tax returns on the basis that subsection 107(2) of the Act applied, i.e. the D2L Employee Trust was deemed to have disposed of these shares for an amount equal to the adjusted cost base of these shares to the D2L Employee Trust, and John Baker was deemed to have acquired them at a cost equal to this same amount.
[11] Mathew McNeeley and Kenneth Chapman sold their shares to a numbered company owned by John Baker. John Baker transferred the shares that he received on the first distribution to the numbered company for shares of that company and filed the election under subsection 85(1) of the Act, electing for proceeds of disposition equal to the adjusted cost base of these shares. John Baker sold the shares that he received on the second distribution to the numbered company. Since the D2L Employee Trust recognized the capital gain arising on the second distribution of shares to John Baker, his adjusted cost base of these shares was equal to the fair market value of these shares.
[12] The net result of these distributions and filings, for the purposes of the Act, was:
(a)Mathew McNeeley reported a taxable capital gain equal to one-half of the amount by which the fair market value of the shares distributed to him exceeded the adjusted cost base of such shares, and he claimed a corresponding capital gains deduction under subsection 110.6(2.1) of the Act;
(b)Kenneth Chapman reported a taxable capital gain equal to one-half of the amount by which the fair market value of the shares distributed to him exceeded the adjusted cost base of such shares, and he claimed a corresponding capital gains deduction under subsection 110.6(2.1) of the Act; and
(c)John Baker did not include any amounts in his income as a result of the first distribution of shares to him and his transfer of these shares to his numbered company, and he reported a taxable capital gain equal to the taxable capital gain realized by the D2L Employee Trust in relation to the second distribution of shares to him.
[13] The Minister reassessed the appellants to delete the taxable capital gain that each appellant had reported and to include in each appellant’s income an amount equal to the fair market value of the shares distributed to such appellant, on the basis that the distributions of these shares were payments from an employee benefit plan. For John Baker, the Minister included an amount in his income for both the shares distributed to him as part of the first distribution and the second distribution.
[14] The appellants filed notices of objection and subsequently appeals to the Tax Court of Canada.
II. Decision of the Tax Court
[15] The Tax Court Judge found that the D2L Employee Trust was an employee benefit plan as defined in subsection 248(1) of the Act. He then found that since the D2L Employee Trust was an employee benefit plan it could not also be a prescribed trust as defined in section 4800.1 of the Regulations. Therefore, the rules related to payments from employee benefit plans were the applicable rules to determine the amounts to be included in the appellants’ income.
[16] John Baker also raised an additional argument that the distributions of shares to him should not be considered to be distributions from an employee benefit plan, on the basis that he did not receive these shares as an employee of D2L. The Tax Court Judge found that it was possible to have a distribution from an employee benefit plan that would not be included in income under paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act but that John Baker had failed to establish that he had received the shares otherwise than as an employee.
[17] As a result, the appeals were dismissed.
III. Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
[18] The key statutory provisions to which reference will be made in these reasons are paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act, subsections 107(2), (2.001) and (2.1) of the Act, the definition of a trust in subsection 108(1) of the Act and the definition of an employee benefit plan in subsection 248(1) of the Act. Reference will also be made to section 4800.1 of the Regulations. These provisions are reproduced in the Appendix following these reasons.
IV. Issues and Standards of Review
[19] The main issue in these appeals is whether the provisions of the Act related to an employee benefit plan will apply to the D2L Employee Trust and the appellants, or whether the rules related to the taxation of a prescribed trust will apply.
[20] Additional issues arise for John Baker:
(a)do the rules related to an employee benefit plan contemplate that a particular payment from such an arrangement may not be included in income under paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act; and
(b)if so, did the Tax Court Judge err in finding that John Baker had not satisfied the requirements for the distributions of shares to him to not be included in his income under paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act?
[21] The interpretation of statutory provisions is a question of law for which the standard of review is correctness. The standard of review for any findings of fact or mixed fact and law is palpable and overriding error (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33).
V. Analysis
A. The D2L Employee Trust Satisfies the Requirements to be an Employee Benefit Plan and a Prescribed Trust
[22] The D2L Employee Trust was an employee benefit plan as defined in subsection 248(1) of the Act:
•it was an arrangement;
•Patricia Baker made a contribution to the D2L Employee Trust and she did not deal at arm’s length with the employer (D2L); and
•payments were to be made from the D2L Employee Trust to or for the benefit of employees of D2L.
[23] The exceptions to the definition of an employee benefit plan, as set out in paragraphs (a) to (e) of this definition, are not applicable to the D2L Employee Trust.
[24] The D2L Employee Trust also satisfied the requirements for a prescribed trust as set out in paragraph 4800.1(a) of the Regulations:
•it was a trust maintained primarily for the benefit of employees of D2L;
•one of the main purposes of the D2L Employee Trust was to hold shares of the capital stock of D2L Holdings; and
•D2L Holdings did not deal at arm’s length with D2L.
[25] While the definitions of employee benefit plan and prescribed trust overlap in this case, they do not completely overlap. It is possible to create an employee benefit plan that is not a prescribed trust and vice versa.
B. Which Rules Govern – Paramountcy of the Act
[26] Whether the tax consequences will be determined based on the D2L Employee Trust being an employee benefit plan or a trust that is a prescribed trust is the main issue in this appeal. If the D2L Employee Trust is treated as a trust for the purposes of section 107 of the Act, the rules relied upon by the appellants in filing their tax returns and reporting their income as they did would be applicable.
[27] However, the definition of a trust in subsection 108(1) of the Act stipulates that a trust, for the purposes of various sections (including section 107 of the Act), does not include an employee benefit plan. Therefore, if the D2L Employee Trust is an employee benefit plan for the purposes of the Act, the provisions of section 107 of the Act (on which the appellants rely) are not applicable as the D2L Employee Trust would not be a trust for the purposes of section 107 of the Act. The payments made from the D2L Employee Trust to the appellants will be included in their income under paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act in the amount equal to the fair market value of the shares transferred to them.
[28] The appellants rely on the decision of Justice Strayer in Minister of National Revenue v. Chrysler Canada Limited, 92 D.T.C. 6346, [1992] 2 C.T.C. 95 (F.C.T.D.). In that case, the Court was faced with a potential conflict between the stock option rules in section 7 and the employee benefit plan rules. However, in that case, the conflict arose as a result of the wording of provisions in the same statute. In this case, the definition of an employee benefit plan is in the Act while the qualifications for a trust to be a prescribed trust are set out in the Regulations.
[29] In Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, at page 38, Justice La Forest, writing on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada, confirmed that regulations (which are subordinate legislation) cannot conflict with their parent legislation:
The basic principles of law are not in doubt. Just as subordinate legislation cannot conflict with its parent legislation (Belanger v. The King (1916), 54 S.C.R. 265), so too it cannot conflict with other Acts of Parliament (R. & W. Paul, Ltd. v. Wheat Commission, [1937] A.C. 139 (H.L.)), unless a statute so authorizes (Re Gray (1918), 57 S.C.R. 150). Ordinarily, then, an Act of Parliament must prevail over inconsistent or conflicting subordinate legislation. However, as a matter of construction a court will, where possible, prefer an interpretation that permits reconciliation of the two. ...
[30] In this case, it is not possible to reconcile the two provisions as they apply to the D2L Employee Trust. The D2L Employee Trust fulfills both the requirements to be an employee benefit plan and a prescribed trust. The tax consequences for the D2L Employee Trust and the appellants are significantly different based on the classification of the D2L Employee Trust as an employee benefit plan or a prescribed trust. However, since the definition of an employee benefit plan is set out in the Act and since the definition of a prescribed trust is set out in the Regulations, the paramountcy of the definition of an employee benefit plan in the Act must govern. Otherwise, the Act would be amended by the Regulations if an arrangement, such as the one in this appeal, is not an employee benefit plan as defined in the Act because it is also a prescribed trust as defined in the Regulations.
[31] Parliament could have provided that a prescribed trust is not an employee benefit plan. Paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition of an employee benefit plan exclude a number of arrangements and trusts from the definition of an employee benefit plan. In particular, paragraph (e) refers to a prescribed arrangement, which is defined in section 6800 of the Regulations. If Parliament had also intended to exclude prescribed trusts from the definition of an employee benefit plan, a reference to a prescribed trust could have been added to paragraph (e) or as a separate paragraph.
C. Which Rules Govern – Submission Based on Paragraph (a.1) of the Definition of a Trust
[32] The appellants submit that the prescribed trust rules should govern based on the wording of paragraph (a.1) of the definition of a trust in subsection 108(1) of the Act. Section 107 will only apply to trusts as defined in subsection 108(1) of the Act. The definition of a trust provides that a number of different trusts will not be included as a trust as defined in this subsection.
[33] Paragraph (a) of the definition of a trust in subsection 108(1) provides that a trust listed in this paragraph, which includes an employee benefit plan, will not be a trust as defined in this subsection. Paragraph (a.1) provides a description of certain trusts that are also excluded from the definition of a trust. The opening words of paragraph (a.1) are the words upon which the appellants focus:
a trust (other than a trust described in paragraph (a) or (d), a trust to which subsection 7(2) or (6) applies or a trust prescribed for the purpose of subsection 107(2)) ...
[34] The appellants submit that because this paragraph carves out prescribed trusts from those to which it would otherwise apply, all prescribed trusts are to be included as trusts for the purposes of the definition of a trust. Therefore, in their submission, the rules as set out in section 107 will apply even though an employee benefit plan is not a trust as provided in paragraph (a) of the definition of a trust.
[35] However, the words to which the appellants refer only carve out or exclude certain trusts from the application of paragraph (a.1). This does not mean that a prescribed trust is reinstated as a trust. There are a number of trusts that are excluded under paragraph (a) of the definition of a trust. One such trust is an employee life and health trust. Applying the appellants’ interpretation, an employee life and health trust would also be reinstated as a trust, since it is also included in the exception to the application of paragraph (a.1) as it is a trust described in paragraph (a). This cannot be a proper interpretation of the effect of this provision.
[36] The exclusion of prescribed trusts from the application of paragraph (a.1) means that a prescribed trust will not be excluded from the definition of a trust as a result of the application of paragraph (a.1). The same trust, however, will be excluded from the definition of a trust if it is a trust described in paragraph (a) (or in any of the other paragraphs of the definition of a trust).
[37] The exclusion from the application of paragraph (a.1) for a prescribed trust cannot result in the D2L Employee Trust (which is excluded from the definition of a trust under paragraph (a) since it is an employee benefit plan) being reinstated as a trust on the basis that it is a prescribed trust.
D. Conclusion for the Appeals of Mathew McNeeley and Kenneth Chapman
[38] As a result, I would dismiss the appeals for Mathew McNeeley and Kenneth Chapman.
E. Additional Argument for John Baker
[39] An additional argument was raised by John Baker. The Tax Court Judge found that, as a result of the definition of an employee benefit plan in subsection 248(1) of the Act, it would be possible for certain payments out of or under an employee benefit plan to not be included in income under paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act. However, since the Tax Court Judge found that John Baker had failed to establish that he would qualify within this exception, the amounts were included in his income as payments from an employee benefit plan.
[40] I do not agree with the interpretation as adopted by the Tax Court Judge.
[41] In determining whether a particular arrangement is an employee benefit plan, one of the conditions as set out in the definition of an employee benefit plan is related to the payments that are made under this arrangement:
... under which one or more payments are to be made to or for the benefit of employees or former employees of the employer or persons who do not deal at arm’s length with any such employee or former employee (other than a payment that, if section 6 were read without reference to subparagraph 6(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 6(1)(g), would not be required to be included in computing the income of the recipient or of an employee or former employee) ...
[42] A particular arrangement is an employee benefit plan if one or more payments are to be made to or for the benefit of employees or former employees. In determining whether this condition is satisfied, any payment that would not be included in income, if section 6 were read without reference to subparagraph 6(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act, is excluded. Subparagraph 6(1)(a)(ii) of the Act provides that a benefit received or enjoyed under a retirement compensation arrangement, an employee benefit plan or an employee trust will not be included in income as a benefit from employment under paragraph 6(1)(a). This subparagraph does not require amounts to be included in income. Rather it excludes certain amounts from being included in income under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act. Paragraph 6(1)(g) provides that all amounts received under an employee benefit plan will be included in income. Therefore, the excluded payments for the purposes of the definition of an employee benefit plan are payments that would only be included in income as amounts received from an employee benefit plan.
[43] In my view, the reference to the exclusion of certain payments in determining whether an arrangement is an employee benefit plan means that each payment to be made from a particular arrangement is examined to ascertain whether such payment is an excluded payment or not. If all of the payments are excluded payments, the arrangement is not an employee benefit plan. If, however, the arrangement includes at least one payment that is not an excluded payment, the arrangement is an employee benefit plan.
[44] It is important to note that this is part of the definition of an employee benefit plan and, therefore, part of the criteria to be examined to determine whether a particular arrangement satisfies this definition. It is not a taxing provision. Paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act dictates the amount to be included in income as a result of a payment under an employee benefit plan. This paragraph provides that all amounts received from an employee benefit plan are to be included in the income of the recipient. There is no exception in paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act for any payment that, “if section 6 were read without reference to subparagraph 6(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 6(1)(g), would not be required to be included in computing the income of the recipient or of an employee or former employee”
.
[45] The interpretation proposed by the appellants and adopted by the Tax Court Judge would mean that there would be different arrangements – one under which payments from the D2L Employee Trust will be included in income under paragraph 6(1)(g) and another where payments from the D2L Employee Trust would not be included in income under this paragraph.
[46] The definition of an employee benefit plan does contemplate that a portion of an arrangement may not be an employee benefit plan, as the closing words of the first part of the definition (immediately before paragraphs (a) to (e)) state: “but does not include any portion of the arrangement that is ...”
.
[47] Therefore, if part of the arrangement is a trust or arrangement described in paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition of an employee benefit plan, then such part will not be an employee benefit plan. In effect, there will be two arrangements – the part that is an employee benefit plan and the portion that is a trust or arrangement as described in paragraphs (a) to (e).
[48] While the appellants and the Tax Court Judge contemplated an interpretation of the definition of an employee benefit plan that would result in the arrangement being subdivided into two parts, the basis for the subdivision as found by the Tax Court Judge is not in any of paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition of an employee benefit plan. None of these paragraphs contemplate a separation of the employee benefit plan into separate arrangements based on whether a payment would not be included in income if section 6 were read without reference to subparagraph 6(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act.
[49] The arrangement as embodied in the D2L Employee Trust is an employee benefit plan. There is no dispute that the payments made by the D2L Employee Trust to Mathew McNeeley and Kenneth Chapman are not excluded payments for the purposes of the definition of an employee benefit plan.
[50] No portion of this arrangement is excluded from the definition of an employee benefit plan as a result the application of paragraphs (a) to (e) of this definition. Therefore, there is only a single arrangement. Under paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act, all amounts received by a taxpayer out of or under an employee benefit plan are included in computing the income of that taxpayer from an office or employment. Therefore, all the amounts received by John Baker from the D2L Employee Trust are included in his income as employment income.
[51] As a result, I would dismiss John Baker’s appeal.
VI. Conclusion
[52] I would dismiss the appeals with one set of costs payable in relation to John Baker’s appeal.
“Wyman W. Webb”
J.A.
“I agree |
Anne L. Mactavish J.A.” |
“I agree |
René LeBlanc J.A.” |
APPENDIX
The following are the current versions of the provisions of the Income Tax Act reproduced below. While some of these provisions were amended after the taxation year in issue in these appeals, the amendments are not material to the issues raised in these appeals.
Paragraph 6(1)(g) of the Act
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Subsections 107(2), (2.001) and (2.1) of the Act
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Definition of “Trust” in Subsection 108(1) of the Act
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Definition of “Employee Benefit Plan” in subsection 248(1) of the Act
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Section 4800.1 of the Regulations (Prescribed Trusts)
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FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENTS OF THE TAX COURT OF CANADA
DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 2020, CITATION NO. 2020 TCC 90
DOCKET:
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A-260-20 (Lead), A-261-20 and A-262-20 |
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STYLE OF CAUSE:
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MATHEW MCNEELEY ET AL. v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN |
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PLACE OF HEARING:
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Toronto, Ontario
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DATE OF HEARING:
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September 27, 2021
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
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WEBB J.A.
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CONCURRED IN BY:
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MACTAVISH J.A. LEBLANC J.A. |
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DATED:
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NOVEMBER 15, 2021 |
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APPEARANCES:
Chia-yi Chua Douglas A. Cannon Anu Koshal |
For The Appellants |
Lindsay Tohn |
For The Respondent |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
McCarthy Tétrault LLP Toronto, Ontario |
For The Appellants |
A. François Daigle
Deputy Attorney General of Canada |
For The Respondent |