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Federal Court of Appeal

Cour d'appel fédérale


 

Date: 20110920

Docket: A-34-11

Citation: 2011 FCA 261

 

CORAM:       SHARLOW J.A.

                        LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.A.                      

                        STRATAS J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

INTERACTIVE SPORTS TECHNOLOGIES INC.

Appellant

and

 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

 

 

 

Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on September 20, 2011.

Judgment delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on September 20, 2011.

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:                        LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.A.

 

 


Federal Court of Appeal

Cour d'appel fédérale


 

Date: 20110920

Docket: A-34-11

Citation: 2011 FCA 261

 

CORAM:       SHARLOW J.A.

                        LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.A.                      

                        STRATAS J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

INTERACTIVE SPORTS TECHNOLOGIES INC.

Appellant

 

and

 

 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

 

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on September 20, 2011)

 

LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.A.

[1]               The appellant manufactures and sells golf simulators. It appeals from the judgment of Madam Justice Simpson of the Federal Court (the judge) (2010 FC 1296) dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Trade-marks (the Registrar). The Registrar refused to register the trademark HIGH DEFINITION GOLF (the Mark) because it was clearly descriptive of the character of the appellant’s wares.

[2]               On its appeal to the Federal Court, the appellant filed new evidence. The judge determined that the new evidence was neither substantial nor significant and that it would not have materially affected the Registrar’s decision, which the judge found to be reasonable. The judge rejected the appellant’s contention that the immediate impression conveyed by the Mark was a precision learning tool that analyzed a user’s swing. Rather, the judge found it was reasonable for the Registrar to conclude that the Mark referred to a golf simulator that incorporated high definition technology. The clearly descriptive character or quality of the Mark precluded its registration.

 

[3]               Despite the capable submissions of Mr. McKay, we are of the view that the appeal must be dismissed. The appellant has not demonstrated any error of principle or law or any palpable and overriding error warranting our intervention. We are in agreement with the judge’s decision for the reasons that she gave.

 

[4]               The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

 

 

"Carolyn Layden-Stevenson"

J.A.


FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

 

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

DOCKET:                                                                  A-34-11

 

AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE SIMPSON OF THE FEDERAL COURT, DATED DECEMBER 16, 2010, IN DOCKET NO. T-1097-09.

                                                                                               

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                                  INTERACTIVE SPORTS

TECHNOLOGIES INC. v. THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

CANADA

 

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                                            Toronto, Ontario

 

DATE OF HEARING:                                              SEPTEMBER 20, 2011

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF

THE COURT BY:                                                      (SHARLOW, LAYDEN-STEVENSON & STRATAS JJ.A.)

                                                                                               

DELIVERED FROM THE

BENCH BY:                                                               LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.A.

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Kenneth McKay

 

FOR THE APPELLANT

 

Jacqueline Dais-Visca

Abigail Browne

FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

LOWMAN ASHTON AND MCKAY LLP

Toronto, Ontario

FOR THE APPELLANT

 

 

MYLES J. KIRVAN

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

 

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