Date: 20041021
Docket: A-703-02
Citation: 2004 FCA 360
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
NADON J.A.
BETWEEN:
NANCY GOULET
Appellant
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
and
THE TAX COURT OF CANADA
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondents
Hearing held at Montréal, Quebec on October 21, 2004.
Judgment from the bench at Montréal, Quebec on October 21, 2004.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: NADON J.A.
Date: 20041021
Docket: A-703-02
Citation: 2004 FCA 360
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
NADON J.A.
BETWEEN:
NANCY GOULET
Appellant
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
and
THE TAX COURT OF CANADA
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the bench at Montréal, Quebec on October 21, 2004)
[1] We all consider that this application for judicial review should be dismissed. We were not persuaded that Judge Archambault of the Tax Court of Canada erred when he concluded that the applicant did not hold insurable employment with 2959-5154 Québec Inc. (the business).
[2] After a painstaking review of the evidence and consideration of the parties' respective arguments, Judge Archambault concluded that the employment held by the applicant resulted from a "sweetheart deal" the purpose of which was to enable her husband Paul St-Louis, an employee of the business as manager, director and chief of accounting, to split his employment income and allow the applicant to be eligible for employment insurance benefits.
[3] Before reaching this conclusion, Judge Archambault had to weigh contradictory testimony, in particular that of the applicant and her husband and that of Maurice Gallant, the sole shareholder in the business, and Jules Gélinas, an employee of the business responsible for operations.
[4] According to the version of the facts presented by herself and Mr. St-Louis, the applicant held regular employment with the business, whereas according to the version of Messrs. Gallant and Gélinas she did not hold any such employment, simply a sweetheart deal.
[5] At paragraphs 11 to 23 of his reasons, Judge Archambault explained in detail why he felt that the applicant's employment did not constitute insurable employment. In particular, the judge explained why he could not accept the version of events offered by the applicant and her husband as to the nature of her employment and the duties she allegedly performed for the business.
[6] In the Court's opinion the judge, after concluding that the version of the facts submitted by the applicant and her husband was in no way credible, had no alternative but to reach the conclusion which he did. He saw and heard the witnesses and based his findings of fact on his assessment of the testimony. The applicant was not able to persuade this Court that Judge Archambault's conclusion as to her credibility resulted from any error by him.
[7] In such circumstances, the fact that the applicant may actually have worked for her husband was of no relevance to the insurability of her employment for the business, which is what Judge Archambault had to decide.
[8] The applicant's argument that the decision by Judge Archambault was void as it was rendered over 90 days after the hearing is without merit. In our opinion, only appeals brought under the Income Tax Act and the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act are subject to the 90-day deadline.
[9] First, subsections 18(1) and (2) and 18.3(1) provide for the application of sections 18.1 to 18.28 only to appeals brought under the Income Tax Act and the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act. Consequently, subsection 18.22(1), which provides that judgment shall be rendered on appeals referred to in section 18 not later than 90 days after the day on which the hearing is concluded, only applies to appeals brought under the two aforesaid Acts, which is not the case with the appeal at bar.
[10] Secondly, subsection 18.29(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Act indicates the sections which apply to appeals, like the one at bar, brought pursuant to Part IV of the Employment Insurance Act. Subsection 18.29(1) does not include within its scope subsection 18.22(1), which requires that judgment be rendered within 90 days after the day on which the hearing is concluded.
[11] Consequently, there can be no question that the 90-day deadline mentioned in subsection 18.22(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Act is of no application whatever to proceedings brought under Part IV of the Employment Insurance Act.
[12] For these reasons, the applicant's application for judicial review will be dismissed with costs.
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"M. Nadon" |
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J.A. |
Certified true translation
Jacques Deschênes, LLB
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-703-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: NANCY GOULET
Appellant
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
and
THE TAX COURT OF CANADA
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondents
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: October 21, 2004
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: (DÉCARY, LÉTOURNEAU AND NADON JJ.A.)
DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: NADON J.A.
APPEARANCES:
Benoît Roberge FOR THE APPLICANT
Alain Gareau FOR THE RESPONDENTS
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Dunton, Rainville, S.E.N.C. FOR THE APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENTS
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec