Date: 20180502
Docket: A-448-16
Citation: 2018 FCA 85
[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
| CORAM:
|
PELLETIER J.A.
GAUTHIER J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
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| BETWEEN:
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| ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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| Appellant
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| and
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| CHRISTIANE ALLARD, MARIE-ANDRÉE FREDETTE, HÉLÈNE GAGNON,
MEHDI HADDOU, ALAIN LAJOIE, SONJA LAURENDEAU, JULIE NAGEL,
DANIEL PERRON, FRANCE PROVOST, MARIE-CLAUDE SIMARD,
HÉLÈNE SOUCY AND GENEVIÈVE TOUPIN
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| Respondents
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Hearing held at Ottawa, Ontario, on January 9, 2018.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 2, 2018.
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
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GLEASON J.A.
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| CONCURRED IN BY:
|
PELLETIER J.A.
GAUTHIER J.A.
|
Date: 20180502
Docket: A-448-16
Citation: 2018 FCA 85
| CORAM:
|
PELLETIER J.A.
GAUTHIER J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
|
| BETWEEN:
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| ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
|
| Appellant
|
| and
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| CHRISTIANE ALLARD, MARIE-ANDRÉE FREDETTE, HÉLÈNE GAGNON,
MEHDI HADDOU, ALAIN LAJOIE, SONJA LAURENDEAU, JULIE NAGEL,
DANIEL PERRON, FRANCE PROVOST, MARIE-CLAUDE SIMARD,
HÉLÈNE SOUCY AND GENEVIÈVE TOUPIN
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| Respondents
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEASON J.A.
[1]
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Federal Court (Leblanc, J.) in Allard v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2016 FC 1235, in which the Federal Court set aside a decision in a classification grievance rendered by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (the CFIA) and, rather than referring the classification grievance back for re-determination, undertook the task of determining the appropriate classification for the position in question.
[2]
For the reasons set out below, I am of the view that the Federal Court erred in setting aside the decision under judicial review and in taking the unusual step of determining the classification applicable to the subject positions. I would therefore allow this appeal.
I.
Facts
[3]
A review of the facts is necessary to put the issues in this appeal into context.
[4]
The respondents are veterinarians and, at the relevant times, were employees of the CFIA. The CFIA is a “separate agency”
under sections 11 and 11.1 of the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11. Pursuant to its enabling statute, the CFIA possesses the authority to classify its employees’ positions (the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, S.C. 1997, c. 6, s. 13).
[5]
In exercise of this authority, the CFIA developed a classification standard for its veterinarians. The standard in question sets out five factors against which positions are evaluated, namely, nature of the work, complexity of the work, professional responsibility, management responsibility and impact of recommendations and activities. For each factor, the classification standard establishes six potential levels and includes benchmark positions corresponding to several levels. The benchmarks are used to compare the duties of a subject position in order to validate the placement of the position at one of the six levels in the standard.
[6]
In addition to the standard, the CFIA also developed a classification grievance process that allows employees to challenge their position’s classification. Under that process, classification grievances are referred to a classification committee, which is typically comprised of a classification specialist, a manager familiar with the work of the subject position and another individual knowledgeable in the application of classification standards. The process before the classification committee is non-adversarial. The employee or his or her representative may make submissions to the committee, and the committee may also seek information from a representative of the employer familiar with the work of the grieved position. Where this is done, the employer’s representative is prohibited from advocating for a particular result. These discussions are typically held in the absence of the other party. In the event that the committee’s discussions with the employee, or his/her representative or the employer reveal new information deemed significant by the committee, such information must be communicated to the other party. The committee is required to produce a report that summarizes the parties’ positions and sets out its detailed reasons. That report, if accepted by the CFIA’s Vice-President, Human Resources, establishes the classification for the subject position.
[7]
In addition to the foregoing, the collective agreements between the CFIA and its employees’ bargaining agents allow employees to file a different sort of grievance to challenge their position’s description. These grievances may be referred to adjudication before an adjudicator of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board (the PSLREB).
[8]
At the relevant times, the respondents all occupied the position of “Area Program Specialist, Regulatory Veterinary Science”
. The CFIA developed a lengthy and detailed description for this position, which sets out the principal responsibilities associated with the position. Generally speaking, incumbents are charged with acting as a specialist in one or more veterinary specialities and are tasked with providing leadership in respect of their specialities within each CFIA operational centre. The work description, however, also recognizes that certain tasks may be performed at the national or international level, such as representing the CFIA in international or bilateral negotiations [translation] “relating to Canadian policies and programs concerning zoosanitary requirements and food safety”
.
[9]
The CFIA classified the respondents’ position at Level 3 under the classification standard, but the position was close to the upper threshold, with certain factors being evaluated at Level 4. The classification of the position has long been the subject of dispute between the CFIA, the incumbents and their bargaining agent, with the incumbents and their bargaining agent asserting that the position ought to be classified at Level 4 and the CFIA maintaining that Level 3 is the proper classification.
[10]
In 2010, the then incumbents in the position filed a first classification grievance. Before the classification committee charged with hearing the first grievance, it became apparent that the description for the position was in dispute, as representatives for both parties alleged that the work description did not accurately reflect the work performed by the incumbents. In their submissions, managers and supervisors described what they claimed the incumbents did, and in some instances indicated that the tasks performed were of lesser significance than the work description contemplated. The first classification committee questioned its authority to alter the contents of a work description, but then went on to consider the evidence tendered and concluded that the grieved position was properly classified at Level 3.
[11]
The employees sought judicial review of that decision. In Allard v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2012 FC 979 (Allard 1), the Federal Court (de Montigny, J.) set the decision aside. In so ruling, the Federal Court applied the correctness standard of review and concluded that the first classification committee had exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the content of the work description, thereby usurping the role of a PSLREB adjudicator. The Federal Court also held that in so doing the first classification committee had violated the grievors’ procedural fairness rights as the committee had “[modified] the content of the applicants’ work description without giving them the opportunity of being heard by an arbitrator”
(at para. 38).
[12]
The Federal Court noted the following at paragraph 40 of its reasons in Allard 1:
[…] a careful reading of the Committee’s reasons under the headings “Nature of the Work”, “Complexity of the Work” and “Professional Responsibility” shows that the Committee was clearly influenced by the comments of the supervisors and managers, according to whom several of the applicants’ duties and key activities are performed at the regional or provincial levels and not at the international level. Not only did this perception cause the Committee to implicitly rewrite the work description, but it was also one of the main reasons that the Committee rejected the benchmark positions and the two relativity positions proposed by the union representative. In doing so, the Committee ignored the wording of the work description, which states in several places the national and even international nature of the duties and responsibilities described, relying instead on the testimony of the supervisors and managers that the duties were performed regionally or provincially.
[13]
Thereafter, the content of the work description was reviewed by the parties and, following further discussion, they concurred that the existing work description was accurate. The classification grievances were then referred to a differently-constituted classification committee for re-consideration.
[14]
As before the first committee, only two factors were in play before the second committee, namely, the nature and the complexity of the work required by the position. A representative of the respondents’ bargaining agent made written and oral submissions to the committee to highlight instances where the incumbents performed work at the national or international level. The committee did not seek further clarification from the employer as one of the committee members was familiar with the work required of the position.
II.
The decision of the classification committee
[15]
On July 6, 2015, the classification committee released its unanimous report, which was endorsed the next day by CFIA’s Vice-President, Human Resources. In its report, the classification committee determined that both disputed factors should be evaluated at Level 3 and therefore maintained the CFIA’s classification of the position. In so holding, the classification committee reviewed the arguments advanced by the respondents’ representative and provided a detailed rationale for its conclusion, comparing the position to several benchmarks in the classification standard.
[16]
More specifically, the committee held that the grieved position was more similar to benchmark position 5, Veterinary, Infectious Diseases, at Level 3, than to the higher-rated benchmark positions that the respondents’ representative alleged were similar. In reaching this conclusion, the committee focused on the nature of the tasks required for the various positions, concluding that the higher-rated positions possessed greater responsibility. The committee also noted that the work of the higher-rated positions was often performed at the national level, whereas the respondents’ responsibilities were at the regional level.
III.
The decision of the Federal Court
[17]
In the decision under appeal, the Federal Court followed the decision in Allard 1 and applied the correctness standard to conclude that the committee had once again disregarded certain aspects of the work description and had therefore violated the grievors’ procedural fairness rights. The Federal Court held as follows:
[37] […] the Committee made the same error as its predecessor in ignoring the wording of the work description, something it could not do without usurping the role of a work description content grievance arbitrator, thus breaching the principles of natural justice because this meant that it was short-circuiting the procedure set out in the collective agreement and the Agency’s policies for discussing the accuracy of the content of a work description.
[18]
After determining that the decision of the classification committee ought to be set aside, the Federal Court then moved on to consider the appropriate remedy. Noting that the choice of remedy is a discretionary decision, the Court considered it appropriate to settle the classification of the subject position in light of the length of time the matter had been at issue, what the Court viewed as the CFIA’s failure to comply with the Court’s order in Allard 1 and the Court’s own views as to the appropriate classification for the position. The Federal Court noted as follows:
[54] […] the Agency has already had a second chance to rule on the classification grievance filed by the applicants, but made the same errors as it did the first time. I would also point out that the dispute opposing the parties involves only two of the five evaluation factors established by the Classification Standard. Following the decision rendered in [Allard 1] and the decision that I am rendering today, the evaluation of the two factors at issue has in both cases been decided, for all intents and purposes, on the basis of considerations that the Committee, and the committee that dealt with the 2010 Grievance before it, could not cite without overstepping its jurisdiction.
[55] If we exclude these considerations, I tend to think that the evidence on record leads to a foregone conclusion, that the Kind of Assignments and/or Complexity of Work factors must receive a numeric difficulty score of 4.
[19]
The Federal Court declined to address the respondents’ contention that the classification committee had violated the respondents’ procedural fairness rights in relying on the knowledge of one of its members of the work performed by incumbents in the grieved position.
IV.
Issues
[20]
This appeal raises the following issues:
1. Did the Federal Court err in applying the correctness standard of review after mischaracterizing the nature of the decision made by the classification committee and finding an excess of jurisdiction or breach of procedural fairness?
2. Was the decision made by the classification committee reasonable?
3. Did the classification committee violate the respondents’ procedural fairness rights in relying on the knowledge of one of its members of the work performed by incumbents in the grieved position?
V.
Discussion
[21]
We turn now to examining these issues and begin with the standard of review.
A.
Did the Federal Court err in applying the correctness standard of review after mischaracterizing the nature of the decision made by the classification committee?
[22]
In an appeal such as this, in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada in Agraira v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 (Agraira), this Court must ascertain whether the Federal Court chose the appropriate standard of review, and, if it did not do so, apply the proper standard and review the classification committee’s decision under that standard. In other words, this Court is required to step into the shoes of the Federal Court and re-conduct the requisite judicial review analysis: Agraira at paras. 46–47.
[23]
I believe that the Federal Court erred in determining that the classification committee’s decision was reviewable on correctness and that the interpretation provided by the committee resulted in a breach of the grievors’ procedural fairness rights. The standard of review that the Federal Court ought to have applied is the deferential standard of reasonableness.
[24]
A classification committee is a specialized labour decision-making body. It is trite law that decisions of specialized labour decision-makers, made within the scope of their jurisdiction, are reviewable under the deferential standard of reasonableness (or previously under the standard of patent unreasonableness), as the Supreme Court of Canada has held for over half a century (see, for example, Service Employees’ International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Association et al., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382 at pp. 388–389, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 6; C.U.P.E. v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 at pp. 233, 26 N.R. 341; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at paras. 7 and 26, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 SCC 59 at paras. 31 and 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 616; Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 at para. 15, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 770).
[25]
Thus, the reasonableness standard is presumed to apply to decisions like that of the classification committee. Indeed, classification matters are among the most specialized and arcane issues that a labour tribunal may be called upon to determine. Classification decisions have accordingly been consistently reviewed under the reasonableness standard by this Court, and, apart from this case, also by the Federal Court (see, for example, Gladman v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 109 (Gladman) at para. 30; Morrisey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FC 345 (Morrisey) at paras. 15, 16, aff’d on standard of review by 2018 FCA 26 at para. 12; McEvoy v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 164 (McEvoy) at para. 17, 465 N.R. 384; Roopnauth v. Canada (National Revenue), 2016 FC 1307 at para. 18; Bourdeau v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1089 at paras. 30 and 31; Peck v. Parks Canada, 2009 FC 686 at para. 17; Beauchemin v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2008 FC 186 at paras. 19–23).
[26]
In light of the above, the presumption that the reasonableness standard of review applies in this case can only be rebutted if one of the four exceptions recognized in the Supreme Court’s case law applies. The presumption can be rebutted where the issue under review involves (1) a constitutional question (other than an issue of whether the exercise of discretion violates the Charter or does not respect Charter values); (2) a question that is of central importance to the legal system and outside the decision-maker’s specialized area of expertise; (3) the determination of the respective jurisdiction of two or more competing administrative tribunals; or (4) a so-called “true”
question of jurisdiction or vires, although the existence of this fourth factor has been questioned in some of the Supreme Court’s case law (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras. 54, 58–61, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 at paras. 30–34, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57 at paras. 35 and 39, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 615; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 at para. 46, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3; Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47 at paras. 22–26, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293).
[27]
None of these four exceptions applies in this case. The only potentially applicable exceptions are the latter two, involving consideration of whether the classification committee exceeded its jurisdiction and usurped the duties of a PSLREB adjudicator. However, I do not believe that it is possible to so characterize the classification committee’s decision and find that the Federal Court erred in holding otherwise.
[28]
More specifically, the classification committee did not purport to re-write the respondents’ work description but merely interpreted the existing description in light of the evidence. It then determined where the position should be classified under the classification standard. This is precisely what all classification committees are tasked with doing.
[29]
Thus, the task undertaken by the classification committee was fundamentally different from that which would have been undertaken by a PSLREB adjudicator in a grievance challenging a work description. The PSLREB adjudicator would be tasked with re-writing the work description (or ordering the employer to do so) in the event of a finding that the description did not accurately reflect what the incumbents were doing. This is not the analysis that the classification committee undertook.
[30]
In holding that the classification committee exceeded its jurisdiction and usurped the role of a PSLREB adjudicator because it ignored certain parts of the work description, the Federal Court effectively imported into the review of the classification committee’s decision the long-discarded concept of preliminary or collateral matter. Under this notion, a reviewing court brands as jurisdictional (and thus reviewable under the correctness standard) any preliminary or collateral matters a tribunal is required to address as part of the inquiry remitted to it under a statute or the collective agreement. In 1979, in C.U.P.E. v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, the Supreme Court of Canada eschewed this approach, noting that courts should “not be alert to brand as jurisdictional, and therefore subject to broader curial review, that which may be doubtfully so”
(at p. 233). The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed that the preliminary or collateral matter approach ought not to be followed (Quebec (Attorney General) v. Guérin, 2017 SCC 42 at para. 32, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 3).
[31]
I therefore see no excess of jurisdiction on the part of the classification committee in this case. Were I to determine otherwise and find there to have been a jurisdictional error, any classification decision would be reviewable on correctness whenever the reviewing court disagrees with the way in which a classification committee interpreted a work description. Such an idea would be untenable. Rather, the appropriate inquiry involves asking whether the committee reasonably interpreted the work description and reasonably concluded that it should be rated at Level 3.
[32]
It follows from the foregoing that the classification committee did not breach the respondents’ procedural fairness rights in the manner the Federal Court suggested, since the committee did not usurp the function of a PSLREB adjudicator. The fact that there was no breach of procedural fairness is clearly illustrated by the respondents’ response to the question of whether they would still have had concerns if they had been given an opportunity to comment on a draft of the classification committee’s report. The answer to this question is a resounding “yes”
as the respondents take issue with the way in which the committee understood the work description. However, this is a question concerning the merits of the committee’s decision and not a matter of procedure. Therefore, procedural fairness was not breached and the applicable standard of review to the decision of the classification committee is reasonableness. In sum, this classification committee made precisely the same sort of decision that all such committees are mandated to make, and, in accordance with the well-established case law, its decision is to be reviewed on reasonableness.
B.
Was the decision made by the classification committee reasonable?
[33]
Now to the issue of whether the classification committee’s decision was reasonable. As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Dunsmuir, the hallmarks of a reasonable decision are that it is transparent, intelligible and justified and that it falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law (at para. 47).
[34]
Where an administrative tribunal provides reasons, the criteria of transparency and intelligibility primarily concern the quality of the reasons given. Here, these twin requirements are easily met as the classification committee provided comprehensive, logical and well-explained reasons.
[35]
Similarly, the classification committee’s decision meets the requirements of justification as there was more than ample basis for the committee to have reached the conclusions it did in respect of the two factors at issue in the classification grievance. There were a number of similarities between the grieved position and the benchmark found to be the most similar by the committee, namely, benchmark position 5, Veterinary, Infectious Diseases, at Level 3. The appellant has helpfully noted some of these similarities in the tables provided at paragraphs 30 and 31 of its memorandum (which I have reproduced in the Appendix to these reasons).
[36]
Nor was it unreasonable for the committee to conclude that the grieved position was fundamentally different from the higher-rated positions considered by the respondents’ representative due to the national scope of the latter. Contrary to what the respondents assert, the committee did not ignore those portions of the work description which indicated that the respondents might be called upon to perform tasks at the national level. According to the committee, the position was primarily one that required the incumbents to act at the regional level. That is very apparent from the position overview provided in the work description:
[translation]
The Area Program Specialist generally has the greatest amount of expertise in his or her field of specialization in a given Area (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario or West) and is recognized as the single source of authoritative information within the Area for that field.
[Emphasis added.]
[37]
In addition, several other excerpts from the work description underscore the regional focus of the grieved position. Once again, the appellant has helpfully set out some of these instances in the table at paragraph 32 of its memorandum (which I have also included in the Appendix to these reasons).
[38]
In light of the foregoing, it was in no way unreasonable for the committee to conclude as it did. It therefore follows that the Federal Court erred in setting aside the classification committee’s decision.
C.
Was it a breach of procedural fairness for the committee to have failed to consult with the employer?
[39]
Let us turn now to the last issue raised by the respondents, namely, whether their procedural fairness rights were breached because the classification committee relied on the knowledge of the grieved position possessed by one of the committee members. According to the respondents, this is not allowed because the classification grievance process prohibits an employer’s representative from advocating for a particular outcome if the committee chooses to consult the employer. The respondents contend that, similarly, the classification committee member with knowledge of the grieved position could not decide the grievance on the basis of this knowledge and that the committee should have consulted with the employer to do so.
[40]
In my view, there is no merit to this argument. The CFIA’s classification grievance process provides that, normally, a classification committee should be comprised of a classification specialist, a manager familiar with the work of the subject position and a person knowledgeable about the application of classification standards. The only purpose of including such requirements is to ensure that the committee has the requisite knowledge to decide the grievance. Therefore, the committee fully complied with the process developed by the CFIA.
[41]
In addition, the respondents’ procedural fairness entitlements fall in the lower zone of the spectrum, as this Court has previously determined (Gladman at para. 40; McEvoy at paras. 20–21; Chong v. Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at paras. 12–14 (Chong), 162 F.T.R. 85 (F.C.A.)). Such entitlements nonetheless do include the right to be informed of any prejudicial facts that arise and to respond to such facts (Gladman at paras. 39–40; McEvoy at para. 21; Chong at paras. 13–14).
[42]
In this case, nothing suggests that the classification committee possessed or relied on any facts that were unknown to the respondents. Counsel for the respondents could not point to any such fact, and nothing of the sort appears in the record. I therefore conclude that the respondents’ rights to procedural fairness were not breached in the classification grievance process.
D.
A few comments about the remedy chosen by the Federal Court
[43]
While the foregoing is sufficient to dispose of this appeal, I believe it important to briefly comment on the Federal Court’s chosen remedy.
[44]
As the Federal Court noted, a reviewing court may order a remedy at its discretion and, where applicable, direct a particular outcome (Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Lebon, 2013 FCA 55 at paras. 11–15, 444 N.R. 93). However, the option of directing an administrative tribunal on how to decide an issue within its jurisdiction can only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. In Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Rafuse, 2002 FCA 31, 286 N.R. 385, this Court noted as follows at paragraph 14:
[14] While the directions that the Court may issue when setting aside a tribunal’s decision include directions in the nature of a directed verdict, this is an exceptional power that should be exercised only in the clearest of circumstances […].
[45]
While it is impossible to fully categorize what such circumstances are, generally speaking, this type of discretion should only be exercised when there is only one possible reasonable outcome open to the decision-maker. Where, like here, the issues are highly factual and require significant specialized expertise, a reviewing court should be hesitant to conclude that there is only one outcome. Indeed, the respondents can point to no case where this Court or the Federal Court has settled the classification of a subject position. Rather, every time a decision of a classification committee has been set aside, the matter has been referred back to the committee for redetermination (see, for example, Morrisey, 2018 FCA 26 at para. 23; Canada (Attorney General) v. Gilbert, 2009 FCA 76 at paras. 23–24, 388 N.R. 59; Kohlenberg v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FC 414 at paras. 88, 91; Boucher v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 546 at paras. 27–29).
[46]
Consequently, the remedy chosen by the Federal Court was not appropriate.
VI.
Proposed disposition
[47]
In light of the foregoing, I would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court and, making the decision that the Federal Court ought to have made, dismiss the respondents’ application for judicial review. I would award the appellant its costs before this Court and the Federal Court. The parties have agreed that costs, before both Courts, be fixed at $3,500, all inclusive. I agree that this sum is appropriate in the circumstances and would therefore award these costs.
“Mary J.L. Gleason”
J.A.
“I agree.
J.D. Denis Pelletier J.A.”
“I agree.
Johanne Gauthier J.A.”
Appendix
Translation of table at paragraph 30 of the appellant’s memorandum:
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Translation of table at paragraph 31 of the appellant’s memorandum:
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Translation of table at paragraph 32 of the appellant’s memorandum:
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD
| DOCKET:
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A-448-16
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| STYLE OF CAUSE:
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA v. CHRISTIANE ALLARD ET AL.
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| PLACE OF HEARING:
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Ottawa, Ontario
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| DATE OF HEARING:
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january 9, 2018
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| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
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GLEASON J.a.
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| CONCURRED IN BY:
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PELLETIER J.a.
GAUTHIER J.A.
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| DATED:
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MAy 2, 2018
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APPEARANCES:
| Sean F. Kelly
Zorica Guzina
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for the appellant
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| Lise Leduc
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FOR THE RESPONDENTS
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Nathalie G. Drouin
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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FOR THE appelLant
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| Goldblatt Partners LLP
Ottawa (Ontario)
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FOR THE RESPONDENTS
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