Federal Court Decisions

 

 

Date: 20130709

Docket: T-828-09

Citation: 2013 FC 764

Toronto, Ontario, July 9, 2013

PRESENT:    The Honourable Mr. Justice Hughes

 

 

BETWEEN:

	IMAD HERMIZ
		Plaintiff
	and
	HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
		Defendant

 

           REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

 

[1]               This is an appeal from an Order of Prothonotary Aalto dated March 19, 2013 made following a trial of a simplified action wherein it was determined that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover from the Defendant general damages in the amount of $20,000.00, and costs. For the reasons that follow, I have determined that the appeal will be allowed and the action dismissed.

 

[2]               The Plaintiff Hermiz had been imprisoned for manslaughter and was out on day parole. He had secured a job and was working. During this time, it was alleged that a person or persons visited the home of the wife of a man who had been incarcerated in the same living area (range) within the prison as the Plaintiff.  This man still remained in prison. It is alleged that the wife was asked to smuggle a package containing drugs into the prison while visiting her husband. The wife refused and reported the incident to her husband who reported it to a Prison Intelligence Officer. That Officer advised a Parole Officer (Correctional Service Canada or CSC Officer) supervising the Plaintiff’s parole of this incident. This Officer spoke by telephone to the wife who gave him a different version of the events, placing them several months earlier. This Officer, in consultation with his supervisor, revoked the Plaintiff’s day parole. The Plaintiff was returned to prison. He lost his job. Two months later the matter was reviewed by the Parole Board of Canada and the Plaintiff’s day parole was restored.

 

[3]               The Prothonotary, in the decision under appeal, indexed as 2013 FC 288, determined that the Correctional Service Canada (CSC) officers handling this case involving the Plaintiff had the honest belief that they were acting in the best interests of society, and that there was no misfeasance by these CSC officers. However, he found that the Plaintiff was entitled to damages for false imprisonment and, in any event, was entitled to damages for negligence of investigation. He fixed damages at $20,000.00. On this appeal liability is at issue but the quantum of damage, if liability is upheld, is not at issue.

 

[4]               Plaintiff’s (Respondent’s) Counsel, at paragraph 8 of his Memorandum, accepted the statement of facts as set out at paragraphs 4 to 16 of the Defendant’s (Appellant’s) Memorandum filed on this appeal, but only as far as they go. These facts are:

 

4.         Mr. Hermiz was sentenced on March 7, 2007 for a conviction of manslaughter for stabbing a man at a hotel party. In provincial custody he incurred charges or convictions related to drugs.

 

5.         On October 7, 2007, Mr. Hermiz was transferred to Fenbrook Medium Institution (FMI). On December 20, 2007, Mr. Hermiz was moved to a living area (a “range”) of up to 9 inmates, one of whom was Jason Bolan.

 

6.         On May 20, 2008, Mr. Hermiz was released on a conditional release known as “day parole” to St. Leonard’s Peel Community Residential Facility (CRF) in Toronto and placed under the supervision of community parole officer Hamza Al-Baghdadi (“PO Al-Baghdadi”).

 

7.         On June 19, 2008, Jason Bolan met with FMI Security Intelligence Officer Holly Goldthorp (SIO Goldthorp) to discuss his wife visiting the institution on June 22, 2008. Mr. Bolan advised that he had been stabbed the previous day because he refused to assist in bringing drugs to FMI.

 

8.         Mr. Bolan told SIO Goldthorp that Imad Hermiz had appeared on his wife’s doorstep with a package for her to deliver to FMI. Mrs. Bolan had described the individual who appeared on her doorstep and Mr. Bolan recognised Mr. Hermiz from the description. Mr. Bolan also advised that Mr. Hermiz had been close to the individuals who had just assaulted him in relation to the same plot to import drugs.

 

9.         SIO Goldthorp investigated the allegations and found that Mr. Bolan and Mr. Hermiz had lived on the same range together for six months immediately before Mr. Hermiz’s release on parole. She discovered no basis for an ulterior motive, observed that Mr. Bolan appeared legitimately concerned for his wife’s safety and that he was assuming a significant risk to his life by publicly informing on a fellow offender.

 

10.       SIO Goldthorp called PO Al-Baghdadi the same day to advise of the information concerning Mr. Hermiz. Shortly thereafter she sent a report of the information she had received to PO Al‑Baghdadi.

 

11.       PO Al-Baghdadi telephoned Mrs. Bolan to discuss the allegations. Mrs. Bolan sounded nervous, uncomfortable, and unwilling to cooperate with the investigation into the incident. She indicated that it was dark and the three individuals who attended at her house were wearing heavy coats. She also indicated that the visit took place three months prior, contrary to the information provided by her husband. PO Al-Baghdadi found that Mrs. Bolan was being vague and that her behaviour was consistent with a witness recanting an earlier statement due to a fear of retaliation.

 

12.       PO Al-Baghdadi held a case conference with his supervisor, parole officer supervisor Phil Schiller (“POS Schiller”) to determine whether this information created an increased risk to the community. Upon reviewing the plaintiff’s profile and the information received, a warrant of suspension of parole and apprehension was issued.

 

13.       On June 23, 2008, PO Al-Baghdadi held a post-suspension interview with Mr. Hermiz. PO Al-Baghdadi found that the plaintiff was not credible. Furthermore, Mr. Hermiz admitted to being involved with drugs at FMI.

 

14.       Later that day, PO Al-Baghdadi and POS Schiller held a second case conference to consider cancelling the suspension of Mr. Hermiz’s day parole. They decided to wait for further information which might require a second post-suspension interview. No new information was received and a transfer warrant moving Mr. Hermiz to Kingston Penitentiary Temporary Detention Unit was issued on July 4, 2008.

 

15.       PO Al-Baghdadi requested that institutional parole officer Jennifer Leplant interview Mr. Hermiz at Kingston Penitentiary Temporary Detention Unit regarding his suspension. At that time Mr. Hermiz denied being involved with drugs at FMI, contrary to his statement to PO Al-Baghdadi.

 

16.       A recommendation to revoke Mr. Hermiz’s day parole was prepared for the PBC (Parole Board of Canada) on July 11, 2008. An addendum to this recommendation was prepared on July 15, 2008. On September 9, 2008, the PBC cancelled the suspension of Mr. Hermiz’s day parole.

[5]               The factual findings of the Prothonotary are not seriously disputed. From the agreed facts recited above and the findings of the Prothonotary and the records in this case, the essential facts are these:

 

•         Hermiz (the Plaintiff) was released from a federal prison while serving his sentence and placed in a halfway house on day parole.

 

•         Hermiz secured a job as a labourer in a brass fittings establishment.

 

•         A person who had been a range-mate of Hermiz, Bolan, was still in prison and was stabbed.

 

•         Bolan was interviewed the day after the stabbing by a Security Intelligence Officer. He told the Officer that he feared for his wife’s safety because she told him in a recent telephone conversation that she had been visited at home by certain persons who asked her to smuggle drugs into the prison when she was visiting her husband. She said that she refused. Bolan believed that the stabbing incident was related to the visit to his wife. Bolan told the Security Officer that, from the description given to him by his wife, one of the persons who visited her was Hermiz.

 

•         The Security Officer reported this conversation to the Parole Officer supervising Hermiz’ parole.

 

•         The Parole Officer phoned Bolan’s wife and questioned her about the visit. The wife appeared to be reluctant to talk; she said that the incident took place some three months earlier in the winter, that the persons were wearing coats and that she could not identify any of them.

 

•         The Parole Officer formed the opinion that the wife was attempting to recant her earlier message given to her husband and that the earlier message was the true version.

 

•         The Parole Officer met with his supervisor; they discussed the situation. They determined that Hermiz’s day parole should be revoked, which it was.

 

•         The Parole Officer met with Hermiz some three days later after he had been returned to prison. Hermiz denied that he had ever visited Bolan’s wife or that he had asked her to smuggle drugs. Hermiz did admit, however, to consuming drugs while in prison.

 

•         Hermiz remained in prison but initiated proceedings to reinstate his day parole.

 

•         Some three months later, the Parole Board of Canada, as a result of the proceedings initiated by Hermiz, reinstated his day parole. The Board concluded:

 

As a result the Board has decided that, in light of the absence of reliable and persuasive information regarding the allegations that led to your suspension, risk for re-offence has not become undue and risk remains manageable in the community. As such, the suspension of your day parole release is cancelled.

 

•         Hermiz found another job with a different company and has been was working satisfactorily.

 

•         Hermiz initiated this action for damages alleging three grounds for damages, misfeasance of office, false imprisonment and negligence of investigation.

 

•         The Prothonotary dismissed the claim for misfeasance but found liability for false imprisonment and negligence of investigation. He awarded damages of $6,000.00 for false imprisonment and $14,000.00 for negligence of investigation.

 

THE PROTHONOTARY’S CONCLUSION AS TO THE FACTS

[6]               The Prothonotary concluded at paragraph 65 of his Reasons that the incident giving rise to the suspension of parole was based on an unsubstantiated allegation founded in hearsay that was not in any way corroborated.

 

[7]               The shortcomings of the Parole Officers’ investigations were set out at paragraphs 66 and 67 of the Prothonotary’s Reasons:

 

[66]     The parole officers were faced with a situation in which allegations of wrongdoing by Mr. Hermiz were made.  No real attempt was made to determine the accuracy of the allegations and particularly no attempt was made to consider reviewing the log book at the home where Mr. Hermiz was residing or consulting with the staff regarding Mr. Hermiz’s conduct.  A review of the log book may have assisted in determining the veracity of Mr. Hermiz’s denials of involvement.  No steps were taken to obtain confirmation of Mr. Bolan’s story until after the suspension was made.

 

[67]     The parole officers had several options available to them.  They could have had Mr. Hermiz confined to the home for a brief period while investigations were conducted.  They also had an option under the CCRA, s. 135(3)(b), within 30 days to cancel the suspension as they did not obtain any concrete evidence of Mr. Hermiz’s involvement in the incident with Mrs. Bolan.

 

[8]               The Prothonotary further enumerated what he perceived to be the shortcomings of the investigations at paragraph 78:

 

[78]     In the circumstances, as argued by Mr. Hermiz, she could have taken additional reasonable steps to ensure the information was accurate.  Such steps might have included:

 

 

a.         Telephoning Mrs. Bolan to determine if her version of events matched those of Mr. Bolan;

 

b.         Checking the telephone log to verify when Mr. Bolan spoke to his wife;

 

c.         Checking whether the descriptions of the individuals alleged to have visited Mrs. Bolan matched Mr. Hermiz;

 

d.         Checking inmates to determine if one had a wound consistent with Mr. Bolan’s story.  The evidence at trial did not identify any inmate with a wound as described by Mr. Bolan (see Tab 37 of Joint Book of Documents); or,

 

e.         Checking inconsistencies in Mr. Bolan’s story regarding the place and time of the stabbing.

[9]               He concluded at paragraph 88 of his Reasons that the Officers were overzealous but not recklessly indifferent or wilfully blind:

 

[88]     Based on the evidence I am of the view that the CSC Officers were overzealous in their response to Mr. Bolan’s story which resulted in causing harm to Mr. Hermiz.  The officers could and should have taken additional steps as noted above to confirm the veracity of the allegations against Mr. Hermiz.  However, they did not have an actual intention to harm Mr. Hermiz but knew such harm would be the result of their decision.  They were not, on the basis of my assessment of their demeanour and evidence, recklessly indifferent or wilfully blind to Mr. Hermiz’s circumstances.  They had an honest belief that they were acting in the best interests of society and the protection of the public.

 

[10]           He repeated his findings as to overzealousness at paragraph 99:

 

[99]     Thus, the question is whether the CSC Officers exercised their discretion reasonably in all of the circumstances.  As stated above, in my assessment of the evidence and the demeanour of the witnesses they were overzealous in their response to the uncorroborated story of Mr. Bolan and failed to take reasonable steps to inquire into and determine whether Mr. Hermiz was involved in the incident.  There was no evidence that Mr. Hermiz had visited Mrs. Bolan and indeed the evidence appeared to exonerate Mr. Hermiz if the visit had occurred three months prior to Mr. Bolan being stabbed.

 

[11]           At paragraphs 106 and 107 he repeated this theme:

 

 [106]  The evidence upon which the parole officers acted, as I have found, and as observed by the PBC, was neither reliable nor persuasive.  Thus, as noted, the PBC decision is admissible and should be given some weight but is not finally determinative of the issues in this case.

 

[107]   More could and should have been done before the precipitous act of suspending parole was taken.  The parole officers were in a sufficiently proximate relationship to Mr. Hermiz.  They failed to take steps which were easily available to them and therefore were negligent in the conduct of their duties.  Malice is not required for this tort so the fact the parole officers believed they were acting to protect society does not answer their negligence.  The various steps that could have been taken are noted above.  Suffice it to say the parole officers’ conduct did not meet the standard of reasonableness when all of the evidence is considered.

 

ISSUES

[12]           Only the Crown has appealed from the Prothonotary’s decision. In addition to a general assertion that the Prothonotary erred in fact and law, the Crown raises the following allegations of error:

 

•         error in finding imprisonment was not justified;

 

•         error in finding that Canada owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff; and

 

•         error in identifying and applying the standard of care.

 

[13]           At the hearing, the Crown argued that the essential determination to be made is whether the investigations conducted by the Parole Officers before revoking Hermiz’ day parole fell short of the standard required in such circumstances.

 

DUTY OF THE COURT ON AN APPEAL FROM A PROTHONOTARY WHO MADE A DETERMINATION FOLLOWING A TRIAL

 

[14]           It must be remembered that the Prothonotary has reviewed the evidence which comprises the Affidavits of Hermiz, the two Parole Officers, and the Security Intelligence Officers; and a number of documents introduced by agreement. Each of the affiants was cross-examined in Court before the Prothonotary.

 

[15]           This is not an appeal of a determination of a motion. This is not a judicial review. Justice Mandamin has correctly identified the standard of review of a Prothonotary’s decision in an action in McMaster v Canada, 2009 FC 937, at paragraphs 20 and 21:

 

[20]     The Prothonotary’s decision in this case is a decision on the substantive merits of the action.  It is, stated simply, a judgment rendered after a trial, albeit a simplified one.  As such the decision is subject to the standard of review set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33.

 

[21]     In Housen, Justice Iacobucci and Justice Major writing for the Supreme Court of Canada found with regard to an appeal of a trial judge’s findings the standard of review on a question of law is correctness.  On findings of fact, they stated, “…where the issue on appeal involves the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence as a whole, it should not be overturned absent palpable and overriding error.” Housen at para 36.  Finally, when the application of facts to that legal test is the subject of review, they held the more stringent standard of review applies.  That is, when the question involves mixed fact and law, it should not be overturned absent palpable and overriding error.

 

[16]           There are no material facts in dispute. The question is, given these facts, whether the conduct of the investigation, or the lack thereof, by the Parole Officers gives rise to liability on the part of the Crown. The Prothonotary concluded that it did. This is a question of law to be reviewed on the basis of correctness.

 

STANDARD OF CARE

[17]           Whether the issue is false imprisonment, where the critical issue is justification, or whether the issue is failure to investigate properly, the issue is whether the Parole Officers exercised the appropriate standard of care in the carrying out of their duties.

 

[18]           The Prothonotary made a thorough review of a number of authorities dealing with the fact that a duty of care does exist between peace officers such as a policeman and a person under investigation. The leading authority is that of the Supreme Court in Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 SCR 129, where it was held that, having regard to expert evidence at trial, the police, while not perfect in their investigations, the investigations did not fall below the expected standard at the time.

 

[19]           In Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD, [2007] 3 SCR 83, the Supreme Court, in dealing with an appeal on a motion to strike, considered the balance between statutory duties of the Children’s Aid Society in having a duty of care to the child and a duty of care to the child’s family and determined there was no duty of care to the family.

 

[20]           In River Valley Poultry Farms Ltd v Canada (Attorney General) (2009), 95 OR (3d) 1, the Ontario Court of Appeal held, based on an examination of the relevant statute, that the Canada Food Inspection Agency did not owe a duty of care to a poultry farmer whose flock was destroyed.

 

[21]           In Turner v Halifax (Regional Municipality) (2009), 274 NSR (2d) 304, the Trial Judge, on a motion for summary judgment, determined that a claim for negligence against the Crown for actions against a parole officer was a claim that had no real chance of success. This was based on two grounds. On the first, the Judge held that there was no duty of care owed by a Parole Officer and, in any event, the evidence failed to support of breach of that duty.

 

[22]           The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Turner (2009), 283 NSR (2d) 239 declined to comment as to whether there was a duty of care and upheld the Trial Judge in holding that the evidence failed to demonstrate a basis for a claim.

 

[23]           In Tsoutsoulas v Canada (Attorney General), [2006] OTC 256, Justice Wright of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that Correctional Services Canada did not owe a duty of care to a person injured by a person out on parole and that, in any event, the Parole Officers acted reasonably.

 

[24]           I agree with the finding by the Prothonotary, particularly based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hill, supra, that a duty of care existed as between the Parole Officers and the parolee, Hermiz, in this case.

 

[25]           The next determination is whether the Parole Officers were negligent in the exercise of their duty towards the Plaintiff. I note that in Hill, supra, the Court, at trial, received expert evidence as to the standards expected at the time of an investigating police officer. There is no such evidence here.

 

[26]           In Syl Apps and River Valley, the Court arrived at its determination based on an examination of the relevant jurisprudence. In Turner, the Court proceeded upon on agreed statement of facts. In Tsoutsoulas, the Court made a simple finding of no negligence.

 

[27]           In the present case, the Court must consider whether the Parole Officers were “overzealous” in revoking the Plaintiff’s day parole on conflicting evidence respecting the wife’s story given to her husband, clearly hearsay, and the story given to the Parole Officer, believed to be false by the Officer. The decision to revoke day parole was made by a senior Parole Officer in consultation with that Parole Officer, without first interviewing the Plaintiff. That interview took place three days later. The Officers did not change their decision that day parole was to remain revoked. Some three months later that decision was reversed by the Parole Board.

 

[28]           The statutory scheme of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992 c 20 (CCRA) in force at the time, June 2008, must be examined. The purpose of the correctional system is set out in section 3:

 

 

[29]           Section 4(a) of that Act states that the protection of society is the paramount consideration, section 4(d) requires the least restrictive measures to be used, section 4(e) provides that offenders retain the rights and privileges of all members of society, except those necessarily removed and section 4(g) provides that decisions be made in a forthright and fair manner.

 

[30]           Section 24(1) requires that all reasonable steps be taken by the Service to ensure that the information it uses is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible:

 

[31]           As stated by Justice Mosley in Tehrankari v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 332, at paragraph 24, “all reasonable steps” does not mean an exhaustive investigation.

 

[32]           There is therefore a tension between what is expressed in sections 3 and 4 of the CCRA that is, a tension between a duty to the public and a duty to an offender. However, section 4(a) is clear, the duty to the public is paramount.

 

[33]           The CCRA provides, in section 135, a process for the manner in which supervision of parole is conducted and a review of the suspension. I set out portions of that section:

 

 

[34]           In effect, discretion, i.e. “may” is given by sub-section 137(1) to the Officer in revoking parole. That Officer must review the case (30 days) and the Board shall review the case (90 days). All of these reviews were conducted here.

 

[35]           The Commissioner’s Directive 715-3, in place at the time, provides in Sections 7 to 12 a procedure to be followed by a Parole Officer in changing conditions of parole (such as revoking) which includes holding a case conference with a supervisor and informing the offender. There is no requirement that the offender be informed before parole is revoked:

 

7. Information collected from significant contacts will normally be gathered through an in-person interview.

 

8. The Parole Officer, Correctional Officer II/Primary Worker may, in consultation with the Manager, Assessment and Interventions/Correctional Manager: a. update or confirm the content of a previous Community Assessment normally through telephone contact, or b. request or complete a new Community Assessment

 

9. As part of the information gathering process, the decision to conduct a Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) check should be made on a case by case basis. When deemed necessary, the Parole Officer will obtain written consent from the community contact using the Consent CPIC Clearance Request (CSC/SCC 1279-01).

 

10. The contact will be informed of the purpose of the CPIC and that participation is voluntary. However, a refusal could impede the Parole Officer's ability to determine whether the contact is an appropriate support for the offender.

 

11. The completed Consent CPIC Clearance Request (CSC/SCC 1279-01) will be forwarded to the Security Intelligence Officer and/or police to verify whether the contact is known to police or identify the existence of a criminal record.

 

12. The existence of a criminal record does not eliminate the individual as a potential source of support. Additional factors need to be taken into consideration such as the nature, number, recency of convictions, and their degree of relevance to the offender's reintegration.

 

[36]           Given that where there is a tension in the CCRA between the duties to the public and the offender, the duty to the public is paramount. The CCRA and the Commissioner’s Directive provide for procedures to be followed in the case of revoking a parole. Those procedures were followed here.

 

[37]           The Parole Officer had to process the information given by the Security Intelligence Officer. That Officer’s report classified the information received from Boland as to the visit his wife received as “Believed Reliable”, which is consistent with Commissioner’s Directive 568-2, section 20:

 

 

 

[38]           The Parole Officer did contact the wife, whose story as told to him was believed by that Officer to be evasive, and an attempt to recant the early story given to her husband.

 

[39]           Hermiz was not interviewed at the time. There was no Policy Directive that he be interviewed before his day parole was revoked.  When he was interviewed three days after the revocation he admitted to being part of the prison drug culture, but denied being a person who had visited the wife. He invited an inspection of the halfway house’s log book to back up his story. Hermiz was not believed by the Officer, and the log book was believed by the Officer to be unreliable.

 

[40]           Did this conduct fall below the standard of care? It is for the Plaintiff to establish that the Parole Officer’s actions fell below the expected level. There is no expert evidence on this point. This is no case law except for Turner, supra, at the trial level only and that Court found that there was no duty of care let alone evidence to support lack of care.

 

[41]           Here the Parole Officers followed the required procedure. A Review Board reviewed their decision within 90 days.  That Board, while reversing their decision did not say that the Officers failed in exercising a proper level of care.

 

[42]           I find that the Plaintiff has not established that the Parole Officer’s actions fell below the expected standard of care. Therefore both the unlawful imprisonment and the negligence actions fail.

 

[43]           I make a further finding in respect of causation as to damage. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the damage claimed was caused by the acts of the Parole Officer. The Plaintiff was employed at the time that his parole was revoked, but there is no evidence as to what his employer did. Did the employer fire him, suspend him, temporarily suspend him, or what? There is no evidence as to what happened. We do know that Hermiz was hired by a different employer after his day parole was reinstated. An inference can be drawn that Hermiz would have remained with his first employer, but that is only an inference. Evidence should have been led by the Plaintiff as to causation; it was not.

 

[44]           As to false imprisonment, Hermiz was imprisoned for three days (over a weekend) before he was interviewed and the decision to revoke day parole confirmed. No basis for damages has been established by the Plaintiff, it is conjecture.

 

[45]           Therefore, I will allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Prothonotary and dismiss the action.

 

[46]           As to costs, Hermiz has asked for $10,000.00 if successful; the Crown has asked for a like amount. I find that amount to be excessive in the circumstances and will award costs in the sum of $1,000.00 to the Crown.

JUDGMENT

 

FOR THE REASONS ABOVE:

 

THIS COURT ADJUDGES that:

 

1.                  the appeal is allowed;

 

2.                  the Prothonotary’s decision dated March 19, 2013 is set aside;

 

3.                  the action is dismissed; and

 

4.                  the Defendant is entitled to costs fixed at $1,000.00.

 

 

 

"Roger T. Hughes"

 

 

 

 

 

 

FEDERAL COURT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

DOCKET:                                         T-828-09

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                        IMAD HERMIZ v HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

 

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                  Toronto, Ontario

 

DATE OF HEARING:                    June 27, 2013

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

AND JUDGMENT:                         HUGHES J.

 

DATED:                                            July 9, 2013

 

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

John L. Hill	FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Shain Widdifield	FOR THE DEFENDANT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

John L. Hill Barrister & Solicitor Cobourg, Ontario	FOR THE PLAINTIFF
William F. Pentney Deputy Attorney General of Canada	FOR THE DEFENDANT