Federal Court Decisions

 

 

 

Date: 20070531

Docket: T-1593-06

Citation: 2007 FC 559

Ottawa, Ontario, May 31, 2007

PRESENT:     The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore

 

 

BETWEEN:

AHMAD SAEED ABDULLAH AL-GHAMDI

Applicant

and

 

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Respondent

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

 

OVERVIEW

[1]            Are children of foreign diplomats, born in Canada, Canadian citizens, simply by birth? Canadian legislation and international law clearly indicate a negative response.

 

[2]            As specified by both parties, this case is the first of its kind to challenge the constitutionality of the Citizenship Act, R.S. 1985, c. C-29, in respect of children of foreign diplomats, born in Canada.

[3]            While the conditions of the Applicant’s birth are immutable, his status as a child of a foreign diplomat or an equivalent and as a person enjoying diplomatic immunity, are not characteristics that would normally be considered as having suffered historical discrimination.

 

[4]            Viewed in context, it is clear that the requirements of paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act, do not offend section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Schedule B, Part I to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982 c. 11 (Charter). In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, the Court explains that the purpose of section 15 is not to eliminate all forms of distinction at law but rather to prohibit certain kinds of distinction that violate essential human dignity.

(4) In general terms, the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

 

[5]            The only individuals covered in paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act are children of individuals with diplomatic status. These are individuals who enter Canada under special circumstances and without undergoing any of the normal procedures. Most importantly, while in Canada, they are granted all of the immunities and privileges of diplomats; it is untenable to maintain that the treatment could offend their “essential human dignity” viewed in this context.

 

[6]            In addition, because the conditions as set out in paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) reflect the standards of international law, they meet the requirements of being demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

[7]            As any other foreign national, the Applicant can apply for permanent residence pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA), and once the residency obligations as set out in section 5 of the Citizenship Act are met, request to become a citizen.

 

INTRODUCTION

[8]            This is a judicial review of a decision by Passport Canada to deny the Applicant a passport on the basis that he is not a citizen as was required by the Canadian Passport Order, SI/81-86.

 

[9]            The Applicant is not a Canadian citizen since, at the time of his birth in Canada, his father was a foreign diplomat or an equivalent. In accordance with paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act, children born of foreign diplomats do not acquire citizenship by birth on Canadian soil.

 

[10]        The Applicant has previously been issued a passport in error and has even been erroneously advised that he is a Canadian citizen by birth on Canadian soil. None of these circumstances can change the fact that he is not, as a matter of law, a citizen of Canada and therefore not entitled to a Canadian Passport.

 

BACKGROUND

[11]        The Applicant, Mr. Ahmad Saeed Abdullah Al-Ghamdi, was born in Montréal, Canada on September 5, 1988. He is the son of Saeed Abdullah Al-Ghamdi and Hind Saeed Al-Ghamdi.

[12]        From November 1987 to October 2003, the Applicant’s father represented his country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the International Civil Aviation Organization and in that capacity, enjoyed Diplomatic status.

 

[13]        From 1994 to 2000, the Applicant attended school in Canada up to the 6^th grade, before moving back to Saudi Arabia with his mother.

 

[14]        From 2000 to 2006, the Applicant spent every summer vacation in Canada.

 

[15]        In August 2003, the Applicant’s parents applied for his first Canadian Passport by presenting his birth certificate as proof of his Canadian citizenship.

 

[16]        On August 11, 2003, the Passport Application form filed by the Applicant’s parents clearly asked whether the Applicant is a Canadian citizen, to which the Applicant’s father made the incorrect statement that he is a Canadian citizen. The Applicant was then issued a passport on the basis of the erroneous response on the application form.

 

[17]        From August 2003 to July 2006, the Applicant traveled the world with a Canadian passport. On June 6, 2006, the Applicant received a letter from the Canadian Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, confirming his Canadian citizenship.

 

[18]        On July 24, 2006, the Applicant’s passport was stolen in London, England. He returned to Canada with a Quebec issued birth Certificate as proof of his Canadian citizenship.

 

[19]        On July 26, 2006, the Applicant made a declaration of a stolen passport. On August 1, 2006, the Applicant applied for a replacement passport at the Montréal Passport office. His application was refused the same day as he was told he was not entitled to a Canadian passport because he was not a Canadian citizen.

 

[20]        On August 2, 2006, the Applicant’s counsel wrote to the Ottawa Passport office to request a review of the decision taken by the officer at the Montreal office.

 

[21]        On August 24, 2006, the Applicant’s counsel received a letter from the Ottawa Passport office confirming the August 1, 2006 decision not to issue a passport.

 

[22]        On September 5, 2006, the Applicant applied for judicial review of the decision of the Passport office, on the basis that paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act violate the right to equal benefit of the law under section 15 of the Charter and constitutes an infringement to the jurisdiction accorded to the Provinces by The Constitution Act, 1867, namely subsection 92(13) (Property and Civil Rights in the Province).

 

 

 

ISSUES

[23]           (1)        Did Passport Canada err in refusing to issue a Canadian passport to the Applicant on the basis that he was not a Canadian citizen?

(2)        Does the fact that the Applicant was erroneously issued a Canadian passport on August 11, 2003 entitle him to Canadian citizenship or a new passport?

(3)        Does subsection 3(2) of the Citizenship Act infringe on a Province’s exclusive jurisdiction under subsection 91(13) of The Constitution Act?

(4)        Does subsection 3(2) of the Citizenship Act offend section 15 of the Charter? If yes, is it justified under section 1 of the Charter?

(5)        Does subsection 3(2) of the Citizenship Act offend section 7 of the Charter? If yes, is it justified under section 1 of the Charter?

 

ANALYSIS

            The Passport Office Decision

[24]        The issuance of passports is a matter falling within the Crown Prerogative. (Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol. 1, Loose-Leaf Ed. Scarborough Ont: Carswell, 1997 at section 1.9.)

 

[25]        Passports in Canada are issued in accordance with the Canadian Passport Order.

 

[26]        Subsection 4(2) of the Canadian Passport Order stipulates that “No passport shall be issued to a person who is not a Canadian citizen under the Act.” “Act” is defined at section 2 of the Canadian Passport Order as “the Citizenship Act”.

 

[27]        The Citizenship Act states that children born of foreign diplomats or an equivalent in Canada are not entitled to Canadian citizenship:

 

[28]        As it appears from the record, the Applicant’s father was a foreign diplomat or an equivalent at the time of the Applicant’s birth in Canada and therefore he is not entitled to Canadian citizenship under the Citizenship Act.

 

[29]        It is not possible to acquire Canadian citizenship by any other means except in accordance with the Citizenship Act. (Solis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 407 (QL).)

 

[30]        Contrary to the Applicant’s submission, a letter from the government erroneously stating that he is a citizen, or the fact that he had been previously granted a Canadian passport on the basis of representations that he was a Canadian citizen, cannot have the effect of granting him Canadian citizenship.

 

[31]        An administrative error cannot change requirements prescribed in law. In Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Inland Industries Ltd., [1974] S.C.R. 514, Justice Louis-Philippe Pigeon, found:

…However, it seems clear to me that the Minister cannot be bound by an approval given when the conditions prescribed by the law were not met.

 

(Reference is also made to Granger v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration Commission), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 141.)

 

[32]        There is, therefore, no issue as to whether the Applicant’s citizenship has been legally removed since he never obtained Canadian citizenship in accordance with the Citizenship Act.

 

[33]        Moreover, since he is not a Canadian citizen, he is not entitled to a Canadian passport under the Canadian Passport Order and Passport Canada made no error in refusing to issue him a passport.

 

[34]        Consequently, none of the criteria under subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act, 1985, c. F-7, permitting this Court to intervene in Passport Canada’s decision have been met.

 

Legitimate expectation

[35]        Even assuming that the Applicant previously held a Canadian passport could give rise to a legitimate expectation, it is well established in Canadian law that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot create substantive rights, only procedural ones.

[36]        In a recent decision, this Court summarized the state of the law in Canada:

[30]      It is well to bear in mind that in the U.K., the doctrine of legitimate expectations creates substantive and procedural rights whereas in Canada the Supreme Court has limited the principle to the protection of procedural rights. (Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 2001 SCC 41, [2001] S.C.J. No. 43 (QL) This Court is therefore constrained by the more limited application in this country of the principle of legitimate expectation.

 

(Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General) (F.C.), [2007] 2 F.C.R. 218, [2006] F.C.J. No. 888 (QL).)

 

 

[37]        The Applicant has always known the case to be met and has been given the opportunity to satisfy the requirements of the Canadian Passport Order.

 

[38]        In advising the Applicant of its decision, Passport Canada provided sufficient information for the Applicant to know its reasons: namely, that the Applicant is not a Canadian citizen.

 

[39]        The explanation as to why the Applicant is not a Canadian citizen is immaterial to the decision to deny him a passport. As this information is not relevant to the decision, it was not required to be contained in the office’s decision.

 

[40]        Indeed, even today, if the Applicant provides evidence that he is a Canadian citizen, and assuming that he meets all the other requirements prescribed under the Canadian Passport Order, Passport Canada would issue him a passport.

 

[41]        Beyond procedural rights, none of the facts in this matter give rise to any legal claim by the Applicant to either Canadian citizenship or a Canadian passport.

Constitutional Issues

Separation of Powers

[42]        Contrary to the Applicant’s assertions, neither the Citizenship Act, nor the Canadian Passport Order, nor Passport Canada’s decision in this matter touches on the Province of Quebec’s jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

 

[43]        Pursuant to subsection 92(13) of the Constitution Act, the Provinces have the exclusive authority to make laws in accordance with “Property and Civil Rights in the Province”. Under this authority, the Province’s Registrar of Civil Status issues birth certificates.

 

[44]        A birth certificate is an authentic document that proves the information recorded on it, namely, the person’s name, their sex, their place and date of birth and their parental affiliation.

 

Sections 107 and 115 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64

[45]        The validity of the Applicant’s birth certificate is not contested in this matter and the facts of which it makes proof are not called into question.

 

[46]        There is no legal basis for the Applicant’s claim that a birth certificate as such grants any rights. A birth certificate is proof of a set of facts which may be themselves the condition on which other rights are granted.

 

[47]        The Applicant’s birth certificate does no more than evidence the circumstances of his birth in Canada. It does not confer upon him any rights. For the vast majority of individuals born in Canada, a birth certificate is sufficient to establish citizenship because the Citizenship Act and its predecessor (Canadian Citizenship Act, chapter C-19 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970) grants citizenship to most every individual born in Canada; however, this provision does not apply to the Applicant because he is the child of a foreign diplomat falling within the exception of subsection 3(2) of the Citizenship Act.

 

[48]        Citizenship is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction in accordance with the preamble of section 91 and subsection 91(25) of the Constitution Act:

Canadian Citizenship is a relatively recent concept, established for the first time by federal statute in 1947. It is clear that citizenship is a matter coming within the legislative authority of the federal Parliament…

 

(Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol. 2, Loose-Leaf Ed. Scarborough Ont: Carswell, 1997, at paragraph 34.1(d).)

 

[49]        In Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd., [1951] S.C.R. 887, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that this was one of the basic tenets of the Constitution Act, 1867:

… The first and fundamental accomplishment of the constitutional Act was the creation of a single political organization of subjects of His Majesty within the geographical area of the Dominion, the basic postulate of which was the institution of a Canadian citizenship. Citizenship is membership in a state; and in the citizen inhere those rights and duties, the correlatives of allegiance and protection, which are basic to that status.

The Act makes no express allocation of citizenship as the subject-matter of legislation to either the Dominion or the provinces; but as it lies at he foundation of the political organization, as its character is national, and by the implication of head 25, section 91, "Naturalization and Aliens", it is to be found within the residual powers of the Dominion: Canada Temperance case [[1946] A.C. 193 at 205], at p. 205. Whatever else might have been said prior to 1931, the Statute of Westminister, coupled with the declarations of constitutional relations of 1926 out of which it issued, creating, in substance, a sovereignty, concludes the question.

 

            Subsection 3(2) of the Citizenship Act in respect to section 15 of the Charter

[50]        The Applicant contends that the decision is invalid because it depends essentially on the application of subsection 3(2) of the Citizenship Act and that this provision offends section 15 of the Charter.

 

[51]        The Supreme Court in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, sets out a three part test to determine whether a statute offends subsection 15(1) of the Charter:

[110]    A number of recent decisions in this Court have emphasized a "purposive" interpretation of s. 15(1) equality rights Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497; Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203; Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, 2000 SCC 28; and Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 2000 SCC 37. These decisions were not available at the time this case was dealt with by the courts of British Columbia. It is now clearly established that the analysis proceeds in three stages with close regard to context. At the first stage the claimant must show that the law, program or activity imposes differential treatment between the claimant and others with whom the claimant may fairly claim equality. The second stage requires the claimant to demonstrate that this differentiation is based on one or more of the enumerated or analogous grounds. The third stage requires the claimant to establish that the differentiation amounts to a form of discrimination that has the effect of demeaning the claimant's human dignity. The "dignity" aspect of the test is designed to weed out trivial or other complaints that do not engage the purpose of the equality provision. In Law, supra, the Court stated, at para. 51:

It may be said that the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

 

[52]        In applying the test, it is essential to consider the context in which the provision occurs. In this case, the appropriate context is provided by the norms of international law, the Foreign Mission and International Organizations Act, S.C. 1991, c. 41 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, (Vienna, 18 April 1961), CTS1966/29.

 

[53]        In Principles of Public International Law, 5^th ed., Clarendon Press; Oxford (1998), at pages 391-393, Professor Ian Brownlie explains:

The two main principles on which nationality is based are descent form a national (jus sanguinis) and the fact of birth within state territory (jus soli)…

 

…Of particular interest are the special rules relating to the jus soli, appearing as exceptions to that principle, the effect of the exceptions being to remove the cases where its application is clearly unjustifiable. A rule which has very considerable authority stipulated that children born to persons having diplomatic immunity shall not be nationals by birth of the state to which the diplomatic agent concerned is accredited. Thirteen governments stated the exception in the preliminaries of the Hague Codification Conference. In a comment on the relevant article of the Harvard draft on diplomatic privileges and immunities it is stated: ‘This article is believed to be declaratory of an established rule of international law’. The rule receives ample support from legislation of states and expert opinion. The Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930 provides in Article 12: ‘Rules of law which confer nationality by reasons of birth on the territory of a State shall not apply automatically to children born to persons enjoying diplomatic immunities in the country where the birth occurs.’

 

In 1961 the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities adopted an Optional Protocol concerning Acquisition of Nationality, which provided in Article II: ‘Members of the mission not being nationals of the receiving State, and members of their families forming part of their household, shall not, solely by the operation of the law of the receiving State, acquire the nationality of that State’. Some states extend the rule to the children of consuls, and there is some support for this from expert opinion…

The first stage of the section 15 analysis

[54]        The requirements of paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act do impose differential treatment between the Applicant and others with whom he may fairly claim equality.

 

The second stage of the section 15 analysis

[55]        To attract the application of section 15 of the Charter a distinction must be based on one of the grounds enumerated in that section or must be said to be “analogous” to the enumerated list.

 

[56]        The distinction in the instant case is based on the application’s status as the child of a foreign diplomat or an equivalent. This is manifestly not one of the enumerated grounds and therefore section 15 can only apply if it established that the characteristic can be said to be analogous.

 

[57]        The Applicant contends that the characteristic relied on falls within the analogous grounds because it is immutable.

 

[58]        Although immutability of the characteristic is a strong indicator, immutability on its own is not necessarily sufficient. The Courts have recognized that the hallmark of the analogous grounds is that they protect a “discrete and insular minority or a group that has been historically discriminated against”.

 

[59]        Thus, while the conditions of the Applicant’s birth are immutable, his status as a child of a foreign diplomat or an equivalent and as a person enjoying diplomatic immunity, are not characteristics that would normally be considered as having suffered historical discrimination.

 

The third stage of the section 15 analysis 

[60]        Even if this Court were to conclude that the characteristic of diplomatic status was analogous to the enumerated grounds, it is clear that the distinction does not offend the third stage of the section 15 analysis.

 

[61]        The exception under paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act does not have the effect of “demeaning the claimant’s dignity.”

 

[62]        Diplomats and their children enjoy an extraordinary array of privileges under the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act which incorporates by reference several provisions of the Vienna Convention, including the following:

 

[63]        It is precisely because of the vast array of privileges accorded to diplomats and their families, which are by their very nature inconsistent with the obligations of citizenship, that a person who enjoys diplomatic status cannot acquire citizenship:

 

[64]        Viewed in context, it is clear that the requirements of paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act do not offend section 15 of the Charter. In Law, above,  the Court explains that the purpose of section 15 is not to eliminate all forms of distinction at law but rather to prohibit certain kinds of distinction that violate essential human dignity.

(4) In general terms, the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

 

 

[65]        The only individuals covered in paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act are children of individuals with diplomatic status. These are necessarily individuals who enter Canada under special circumstances and without any of the normal procedures. Most importantly, while in Canada, they are granted all of the immunities and privileges of diplomats; it is untenable to maintain that the treatment could offend their “essential human dignity” viewed in this context.

 

Section 7 of the Charter

[66]        Section 7 of the Charter requires that the Applicant demonstrates that there exists a real or imminent deprivation of life, liberty, security of the person, or a combination of these interests. (R v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417.)

 

[67]        The only consequence of the impugned provision is that the Applicant is not entitled to Canadian citizenship by virtue of his birth.

 

[68]        There is no evidence that this situation puts the Applicant at any risk.

[69]        There is no evidence that the Applicant is not a citizen of his parents’ country, Saudi Arabia, or that if he is not a citizen that he is not entitled to apply for citizenship.

 

[70]        Indeed, it seems particularly unlikely that the children of diplomats would not be entitled to the citizenship of their home countries when they are born abroad as a result of their parent’s service to the country from which the diplomatic post was received.

 

[71]        The burden of proof to establish a deprivation of liberty falls to the Applicant and he has not met it.

 

[72]        Even if the Applicant were to establish that he is not entitled to citizenship in his home country, it is not paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act that would be the source of the restriction in his liberty.

 

Subsection 3(2) of the Citizenship Act in respect of sections 15 or 7 of the Charter in relation to section 1 of the Charter

 

[73]        The analysis under section 1 of the Charter proceeds in four steps:

(1)        The government must demonstrate that the impugned rule advances an important objective;

(2)        That there is a rational connection between the measure and the objective;

(3)        That the means chosen minimally impairs the rights at stake;

(4)        That there is proportionality between the restriction and the objective.

(R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.)

[74]        The objective of paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act is to ensure that citizenship is not accorded to someone who is immune from almost every obligation of citizenship (e.g. paying taxes and respecting criminal law). This is manifestly an important objective.

 

Rational connection between the measure and the objective

[75]        In an effort to ensure that no citizen is immune from the obligations of citizenship, denying citizenship is tightly connected to the objective.

 

[76]        The only other alternative would be not to grant immunity to the children of individuals with diplomatic status. This would violate long standing tradition in international law and interfere with the exercise of the Crown’s prerogative over international affairs.

 

[77]        It is not necessary that the government demonstrate that the means chosen is the least impairing imaginable. It is only necessary that “the law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives”. Where this is the case “the courts will not find it overbroad merely because they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement.” (Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827.)

 

Proportionality in respect of the restriction and the objective

[78]        In measuring the proportionality of the restriction and the objective, it is important to recognize paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) only have the effect of denying Canadian citizenship. Although Canada cannot control sovereign foreign states and be certain that children born of every foreign diplomat will be entitled to citizenship in their home country, it is nonetheless, reasonable to assume that most would be and therefore paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) treat these children no differently than every other citizen born in their parents’ home country.

 

[79]        As any other foreign national, the Applicant can apply for permanent residence pursuant to the IRPA, and once the residency obligations as set out in section 5 of the Citizenship Act are met, request to become a citizen.

 

[80]        In addition, because the conditions as set out in paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) reflect the standards of international law, it meets the requirements of being demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

 

CONCLUSION

[81]        For all of the above reasons, this applicant’s application for judicial review is dismissed.

 

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT ORDERS that

 

1.                  The Applicant’s application for judicial review be dismissed;

2.                  Recognizing, as agreed by both parties, that this case is the first of its kind to challenge the constitutionality of paragraphs 3(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizenship Act, the Court orders that no costs be imposed.

 

 

“Michel M.J. Shore”

FEDERAL COURT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

 

DOCKET:                                          T-1593-06

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                          AHMAD SAEED ABDULLAH AL-GHAMDI

                                                            v. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                                                            AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

 

 

 

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                    Montreal (Quebec)

 

DATE OF HEARING:                      May 14, 2007

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:       SHORE J.

 

DATED:                                             May 31, 2007

 

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Me Lucrèce M. Joseph	FOR THE APPLICANT
Mr. Alexander Pless	FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

LUCRÈCE M. JOSEPH Montreal (Quebec)	FOR THE APPLICANT
JOHN H. SIMS, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada	FOR THE RESPONDENT