Federal Court Decisions

 

 

Date: 20061031

Docket: DES-4-01

Citation: 2006 FC 1316

BETWEEN:

MAHMOUD ES-SAYYID JABALLAH

Applicant

and

 

THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

AND IMMIGRATION

Respondents

 

 

REASONS FOR ORDER

LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.

 

[1]        These reasons address the issue of the court’s jurisdiction to continue a detention review under section 83 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) in circumstances where, before the conclusion of the section 83 detention review, a determination that the Ministers’ security certificate in relation to Mr. Jaballah is reasonable (the certificate determination) is rendered.

 

[2]        The Ministers and Mr. Jaballah take the position that the section 83 detention review can continue to its conclusion because the issues in relation to the section 83 hearing are not rendered moot by the certificate determination.  Alternatively, they submit that it is possible for the detention review to continue under subsection 84(2) of the IRPA, but only if a constitutional exemption is granted from the 120 days prescribed by that subsection.  In the absence of the constitutional exemption, the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed directly to a detention review under subsection 84(2).

 

[3]        I conclude that, when the certificate determination is rendered, the court’s jurisdiction to continue a detention review under section 83 is extinguished.  Jurisdiction to proceed directly to a detention review under subsection 84(2) exists only if the court grants a constitutional exemption from the 120 days prescribed by the subsection.  For reasons that will become apparent, I make no determination, at this time, whether a constitutional exemption is warranted on the facts of this case.

 

Background

[4]        Mr. Jaballah’s case has resulted in many hearings and proceedings that are well documented in various decisions of the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal.  For present purposes, there is nothing to be gained by reciting the history.  The facts and a chronology of the proceedings to date are extensively reviewed in the Reasons for Order of Mr. Justice MacKay in Re. Jaballah 2006 FC 1230.  Reference should also be had to Re. Jaballah 2006 FC 115, F.C.J. No. 110.  In the latter decision, because Mr. Jaballah, a foreign national, had remained in detention for more than 4 years without judicial review of the appropriateness of the detention continuing, he was granted, pursuant to subsection 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), a constitutional exemption from the application of subsection 82(2) of the IRPA (mandatory detention for a foreign national who is the subject of a security certificate).

 

[5]        Justice MacKay conducted a detention review and dismissed the application for release.  On August 17, 2006, Mr. Jaballah applied for a review of his detention pursuant to subsection 83(2) of the IRPA.  The public hearings in relation to the detention review began on October 2, 2006.  Prior to the conclusion of the hearing, the certificate determination (that the Ministers’ security certificate was reasonable) was rendered.  I requested submissions from counsel regarding the impact and implications of the certificate determination in relation to the section 83 hearing.  The submissions and the reasons for my conclusion with respect to the issue are contained in the paragraphs that follow.

 

The Submissions

[6]        The Ministers submit, and Mr. Jaballah concurs, that section 83 constitutes a rule “that is concerned with when detention reviews for permanent residents (and in this case Mr. Jaballah) begin”.  The section is not concerned with the termination of the review.  It is asserted that the two triggers mandated by section 83  the expiration of six months since the previous detention review and no determination as to the reasonableness of the certificate  were met when Mr. Jaballah’s detention review began. There is nothing contained in the IRPA and no legal authority to suggest, if the certificate determination is rendered while a section 83 detention review is in progress, that the detention review is thereby terminated.

 

[7]        It is jointly suggested that, in the normal case, the reasons for detention under section 83 (the person is a danger or is unlikely to appear) survive a finding that the certificate is reasonable.  Similarly, an individual who may have been released on conditions will not be detained merely because a determination that the certificate is reasonable is rendered.  In relation to the latter situation, Mr. Jaballah refers to the Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 and the fact that its provisions mandate that a person released on bail be detained when a committal order is made.  No similar provision is found in the IRPA.

 

[8]        In sum, the contention of all parties is that the issues in relation to a section 83 detention review are not rendered moot by virtue of the certificate determination, unless the certificate is quashed.  That is not the situation here.

 

[9]        Alternatively, all agree that it is open to the court to continue a section 83 detention review under subsection 84(2) of the IRPA.  However, this avenue is available only if a constitutional exemption, from the operation of the prescribed 120 days from the date of the certificate determination, is granted.

 

[10]      The Ministers prefer that the matter be continued and determined under section 83 of the IRPA, notwithstanding the intervention of the certificate determination, on the basis of the general principle that, where the court has properly assumed jurisdiction over a matter, an explicit and express provision is required to extinguish that jurisdiction.  Referring to the principles of statutory interpretation, the Ministers contend that continuing under section 83 and making a determination, in accordance with the criteria contained within that section, provides the least anomalous and the least tortuous path.  The route to get to subsection 84(2) is a drastic one.  The fact that the court is confronted with circumstances that the IRPA did not contemplate does not justify departing from the procedure that would apply in the normal course. 

 

[11]      Moreover, according to the Ministers, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the IRPA if the court, having heard the evidence that has been given during the section 83 review, did not continue the hearing to its completion.  Additionally, in the absence of specific statutory authorization, it would be inharmonious with the statutory purpose to import the evidence into a “transformed” or “converted” subsection 84(2) proceeding.  To do so would produce an absurd result and violate the basic tenet of statutory interpretation that absurdity is to be avoided.  Last, the Ministers claim that Mr. Jaballah’s right to a detention review should not be extinguished because of the timing of an event which is beyond his control.

 

[12]      As for Mr. Jaballah, while he agrees that the issues arising out of a section 83 detention review are not rendered moot by the issuance of the certificate determination, he views the jurisdictional issue somewhat differently.  He concedes that if the clear language of subsection 84(2) applies, the court is without jurisdiction to proceed.  However, in the circumstances of this matter, there is good reason not to await the passage of 120 days.  Grounds (including the prohibition against removal to Egypt) exist upon which to argue that a constitutional exemption from the 120 days ought to be granted in this matter.

 

Issue

[13]      The sole issue is whether the court has jurisdiction to continue and conclude a detention review under section 83 of the IRPA in circumstances where a certificate determination (that the Ministers’ security certificate is reasonable) is rendered during, but prior to completion of, the section 83 proceeding.

 

Relevant Statutory Provisions

[14]      The applicable statutory provisions are attached to these reasons as Schedule”A”.  For ease of reference, sections 82, 83 and 84 of the IRPA are reproduced here.

 

 

Analysis

[15]      The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly articulated the proper approach to statutory interpretation. In R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 (Jarvis), at paragraph 77, the Supreme Court directed that “one is to seek the intent of Parliament by reading the words of the provision in context and according to their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme and the object of the statute”.  The stated principle was supported by specific reference to the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688; E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2^nd ed.1983), at p. 87.  The approach was confirmed again, in the context of immigration law, in Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539, 2005 SCC 51 at paragraph 8 (Medovarski).

 

[16]      This search for parliamentary intent, in my view, constitutes an exercise in ascertaining, in accordance with the noted principle, what Parliament set out to accomplish.  It is not an exercise in adopting a construction that the parties, or the court for that matter, might prefer when the intent of Parliament is evident.  Put another way, the preferred view of the parties or the court is not to be substituted for that of Parliament.

 

[17]      The impugned provisions are found in Part 1 (Immigration to Canada), Division 9 (Protected Information – Examination on Request by the Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) of the IRPA.  The objectives of the IRPA, in the context of immigration, are found in subsection 3(1) of the Act.  The Supreme Court, in Medovarski at paragraph 12, stated that the IRPA objectives indicate an intent to prioritize security (paragraph 12).  Reference to paragraph 3(1)(h) of the IRPA reveals an intent to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society.  Paragraph 3(1)(i) pertains to promoting international justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks. 

 

[18]      Permanent residents, prior to a certificate determination, are entitled to a review of detention (subsection 83(2)).  Foreign nationals may, after a certificate determination, apply for a review of detention if removal has not been effected within 120 days (subsection 84(2)). Judicial interpretation unequivocally holds that the detention reviews operate in different contexts.  Those differences are delineated in the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal in Charkaoui (Re), [2004] F.C.R. 451, 2003 FCA 407 (Charkaoui) and Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 142, 2005 FCA 54 (Almrei).

 

[19]      Section 83, specifically subsection 83(3) deals with preventive detention while subsection 84(2) is concerned with removal: Charkaoui at paragraph 21.  Different tests are employed in determining whether an individual should be released.

 

[20]      The subsection 83(3) test is founded primarily and almost exclusively on grounds of national security during the process leading to the adjudication on the security certificate.  The other ground is the likelihood of the individual not appearing at a proceeding or for removal: Almrei at paragraphs 34 and 35 (my emphasis).

 

[21]      The focus and key element of the subsection 84(2) test is whether the individual will be removed within a reasonable time.  It is only when there is evidence that removal will not take place within a reasonable time that it is necessary to consider whether release would pose a danger to national security: Almrei at paragraphs 33 and 35.

 

[22]      Under section 83, the onus is on the Ministers to satisfy the criteria contained in subsection 83(3) whereas in subsection 84(2), the onus is on the applicant.  I acknowledge that this particular factor is more theoretical than practical, as noted by Mr. Justice Létourneau in Almrei, at paragraph 41.

 

[23]      No appeal lies with respect to a judge’s decision of a section 83 detention review: Charkaoui at paragraph 33.  A right of appeal does exist in relation to a decision of a judge on a subsection 84(2) application: Almrei at paragraph 38.

 

[24]      Both subsection 83(3) and subsection 84(2) share the common element of danger to national security.  I omit any reference regarding danger to the safety of any person because the Ministers do not allege that Mr. Jaballah is a danger to the safety of any person.  However, the “danger” is at the forefront of the subsection 83(3) inquiry while removal is the central question under subsection 84(2).

 

[25]      Having regard to the objects of the IRPA with respect to immigration, the context of the Act in which the impugned provisions are located (the referral to the Federal Court of a certificate stating that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security) and the wording of those provisions (according to their grammatical and ordinary sense), I conclude that Parliament’s intent was to provide discrete proceedings, employing distinct and different tests with respect to reviews of detention.  Subsection 83(3) reviews precede the certificate determination.  Subsection 82(4) reviews, absent removal within a reasonable time, follow the certificate determination.  I am also of the view that the court lacks jurisdiction to apply the criteria contained in subsection 83(3) once the certificate determination is rendered.

 

[26]      There is no doubt that the simplest solution is to “finish what was started”.  The Ministers’ argument for doing so is founded on two premises:

(1)               Mr. Jaballah is to be treated as if he were a permanent resident; and

(2)               a detention review, in progress under subsection 83(3) in relation to a permanent resident, would continue to its conclusion notwithstanding the intervention of the certificate determination.

 

[27]      Mr. Justice MacKay granted Mr. Jaballah a constitutional exemption from subsection 82(2), which mandates detention for foreign nationals, for the sole purpose of detention review.  He did not determine that Mr. Jaballah was to be treated as a permanent resident or was to be accorded any rights otherwise accruing to permanent residents.

 

[28]      More importantly, in my view, it is highly doubtful that a section 83 detention review for a permanent resident who is in detention could continue, rather than terminate, in the face of the certificate determination.  Section 81 of the IRPA provides that a certificate (determined to be reasonable) is conclusive proof that the permanent resident or the foreign national named in it is inadmissible and that the certificate determination constitutes a removal order that may not be appealed against and that is in force without the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an admissibility hearing.  In these circumstances, as in the case of a foreign national, the emphasis necessarily shifts to removal.  

 

[29]      Indeed, in Almrei at paragraph 47, the Federal Court of Appeal specifically stated that the permanent resident’s detention is the subject of constant judicial supervision and protection until a determination is made on the reasonableness of the certificate (my emphasis).  It also stated that the law appears to be silent on the question of the judicial examination of the detention of a permanent resident after the certificate has been found to be reasonable.  In the “conclusion” segment of its reasons, the Federal Court of Appeal referred to a number of operational difficulties posed by the IRPA.  The final sentence of its conclusion reads “[f]inally, Parliament should indicate what remedy is available to a permanent resident who is detained and who will not be removed from Canada within a reasonable time”.  It seems to me that this statement constitutes a clear indication that resort to a section 83 detention review is not an option.

 

[30]      The basis upon which the Ministers and Mr. Jaballah argue that the criteria in section 83 should continue to apply, following the certificate determination, is not clear to me.  For the Ministers, counsel appears to assume that, for a permanent resident, it would be so.  No justification is advanced for that conclusion.  Mr. Jaballah’s analogy to the Extradition Act is not helpful because it relates to an individual who has been released rather than one who has been detained.

 

[31]      It makes no sense to me, once the certificate determination is made, that the test for release from detention in relation to a permanent resident would be any different than that for a foreign national, particularly when regard is had to subsection 84(1), which permits the Minister, on application by a permanent resident or a foreign national, “to order their release from detention to permit their departure from Canada”.  The pivot around which the release provisions turn is the certificate determination.  There are provisions for release before the certificate determination (subsection 83(3)) and provisions for release after the certificate determination (subsection 84(2)).  The noted Federal Court of Appeal jurisprudence, which is binding upon me, extensively canvasses the distinctions between the provisions.  I do not see any basis upon which the court can pursue a detention review under subsection 83(3) once the certificate determination is rendered.

 

[32]      I reject the submission that the court should continue under section 83 because of the evidence that has been heard during the course of the proceeding.  No reason has been stated as to why that evidence would not form part of the record under subsection 84(2) if a constitutional exemption from the 120 days prescribed by the subsection were granted.  Should a constitutional exemption not be granted, it remains open to the parties to consent, or to request, that the evidence be read in as evidence on the subsection 84(2) proceeding.

 

[33]      For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the court does not have jurisdiction, after a certificate determination is rendered, to continue a section 83 detention review under the IRPA.

 

[34]      The remaining issue is whether Mr. Jaballah ought to be granted a constitutional exemption from the 120 days prescribed by subsection 84(2).  The parties were not prepared to make submissions on this issue at the hearing.  On the request of counsel, I agreed to postpone submissions in relation to this issue pending determination of the jurisdictional issue with respect to section 83 and to receive the submissions in written form.  Since Mr. Jaballah’s liberty is at stake, I presume that counsel are prepared to proceed expeditiously in this regard.  Unless counsel request otherwise (in which case a teleconference with counsel and the court will be convened), counsel for Mr. Jaballah shall serve and file written submissions in relation to the issue of a constitutional exemption not later than November 8, 2006.  Counsel for the Ministers shall serve and file responsive submissions not later than November 14, 2006 and counsel for Mr. Jaballah shall serve and file reply submissions not later than November 17, 2006.

 

[35]      My final observation  having heard, reviewed and considered the submissions of all parties as well as the orders giving rise to this proceeding  is that, on the facts of this case, the court’s jurisdiction to initiate a second section 83 detention review is arguable. 

.

 

 

“Carolyn Layden-Stevenson”

Ottawa, Ontario

October 31, 2006

 

 

SCHEDULE “A”

to the

Reasons for order dated October 31, 2006

in

MAHMOUD ES-SAYYID JABALLAH

and

 

THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

AND IMMIGRATION

 

DES-4-01

 

 

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27   76. The definitions in this section apply in this Division. “information” means security or criminal intelligence information and information that is obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, from the government of a foreign state, from an international organization of states or from an institution of either of them.   “judge” means the Chief Justice of the Federal Court or a judge of that Court designated by the Chief Justice.     77. (1) The Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness shall sign a certificate stating that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality and refer it to the Federal Court, which shall make a determination under section 80.   (2) When the certificate is referred, a proceeding under this Act respecting the person named in the certificate, other than an application under subsection 112(1), may not be commenced and, if commenced, must be adjourned, until the judge makes the determination. 78. The following provisions govern the determination: (a) the judge shall hear the matter; (b) the judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the information on which the certificate is based and of any other evidence that may be provided to the judge if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person; (c) the judge shall deal with all matters as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of fairness and natural justice permit; (d) the judge shall examine the information and any other evidence in private within seven days after the referral of the certificate for determination; (e) on each request of the Minister or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness made at any time during the proceedings, the judge shall hear all or part of the information or evidence in the absence of the permanent resident or the foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person; (f) the information or evidence described in paragraph ( e) shall be returned to the Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and shall not be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if either the matter is withdrawn or if the judge determines that the information or evidence is not relevant or, if it is relevant, that it should be part of the summary; (g) the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall not be included in the summary but may be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if the judge determines that the information or evidence is relevant but that its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person; (h) the judge shall provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with a summary of the information or evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, but that does not include anything that in the opinion of the judge would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person if disclosed; (i) the judge shall provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with an opportunity to be heard regarding their inadmissibility; and (j) the judge may receive into evidence anything that, in the opinion of the judge, is appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court of law, and may base the decision on that evidence.     79. (1) On the request of the Minister, the permanent resident or the foreign national, a judge shall suspend a proceeding with respect to a certificate in order for the Minister to decide an application for protection made under subsection 112(1).   (2) If a proceeding is suspended under subsection (1) and the application for protection is decided, the Minister shall give notice of the decision to the permanent resident or the foreign national and to the judge, the judge shall resume the proceeding and the judge shall review the lawfulness of the decision of the Minister, taking into account the grounds referred to in subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act.     80. (1) The judge shall, on the basis of the information and evidence available, determine whether the certificate is reasonable and whether the decision on the application for protection, if any, is lawfully made.   (2) The judge shall quash a certificate if the judge is of the opinion that it is not reasonable. If the judge does not quash the certificate but determines that the decision on the application for protection is not lawfully made, the judge shall quash the decision and suspend the proceeding to allow the Minister to make a decision on the application for protection.   (3) The determination of the judge is final and may not be appealed or judicially reviewed.     81. If a certificate is determined to be reasonable under subsection 80(1), (a) it is conclusive proof that the permanent resident or the foreign national named in it is inadmissible; (b) it is a removal order that may not be appealed against and that is in force without the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an admissibility hearing; and (c) the person named in it may not apply for protection under subsection 112(1).     82. (1) The Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a permanent resident who is named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1) if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the permanent resident is a danger to national security or to the safety of any person or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal.     (2) A foreign national who is named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1) shall be detained without the issue of a warrant.     83. (1) Not later than 48 hours after the beginning of detention of a permanent resident under section 82, a judge shall commence a review of the reasons for the continued detention. Section 78 applies with respect to the review, with any modifications that the circumstances require.   (2) The permanent resident must, until a determination is made under subsection 80(1), be brought back before a judge at least once in the six-month period following each preceding review and at any other times that the judge may authorize.   (3) A judge shall order the detention to be continued if satisfied that the permanent resident continues to be a danger to national security or to the safety of any person, or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal     84. (1) The Minister may, on application by a permanent resident or a foreign national, order their release from detention to permit their departure from Canada.   (2) A judge may, on application by a foreign national who has not been removed from Canada within 120 days after the Federal Court determines a certificate to be reasonable, order the foreign national’s release from detention, under terms and conditions that the judge considers appropriate, if satisfied that the foreign national will not be removed from Canada within a reasonable time and that the release will not pose a danger to national security or to the safety of any person.   85. In the case of an inconsistency between sections 82 to 84 and the provisions of Division 6, sections 82 to 84 prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.

Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, L.C. 2001, ch. 27   76. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente section. « juge » Le juge en chef de la Cour fédérale ou le juge de cette juridiction désigné par celui-ci.   « renseignements » Les renseignements en matière de sécurité ou de criminalité et ceux obtenus, sous le sceau du secret, de source canadienne ou du gouvernement d’un État étranger, d’une organisation internationale mise sur pied par des États ou de l’un de leurs organismes.     77. (1) Le ministre et le ministre de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile déposent à la Cour fédérale le certificat attestant qu’un résident permanent ou qu’un étranger est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée pour qu’il en soit disposé au titre de l’article 80.   (2) Il ne peut être procédé à aucune instance visant le résident permanent ou l’étranger au titre de la présente loi tant qu’il n’a pas été statué sur le certificat; n’est pas visée la demande de protection prévue au paragraphe 112(1). 78. Les règles suivantes s’appliquent à l’affaire : a) le juge entend l’affaire; b) le juge est tenu de garantir la confidentialité des renseignements justifiant le certificat et des autres éléments de preuve qui pourraient lui être communiqués et dont la divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d’autrui; c) il procède, dans la mesure où les circonstances et les considérations d’équité et de justice naturelle le permettent, sans formalisme et selon la procédure expéditive; d) il examine, dans les sept jours suivant le dépôt du certificat et à huis clos, les renseignements et autres éléments de preuve; e) à chaque demande d’un ministre, il examine, en l’absence du résident permanent ou de l’étranger et de son conseil, tout ou partie des renseignements ou autres éléments de preuve dont la divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d’autrui; f) ces renseignements ou éléments de preuve doivent être remis aux ministres et ne peuvent servir de fondement à l’affaire soit si le juge décide qu’ils ne sont pas pertinents ou, l’étant, devraient faire partie du résumé, soit en cas de retrait de la demande; g) si le juge décide qu’ils sont pertinents, mais que leur divulgation porterait atteinte à la sécurité nationale ou à celle d’autrui, ils ne peuvent faire partie du résumé, mais peuvent servir de fondement à l’affaire; h) le juge fournit au résident permanent ou à l’étranger, afin de lui permettre d’être suffisamment informé des circonstances ayant donné lieu au certificat, un résumé de la preuve ne comportant aucun élément dont la divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d’autrui; i) il donne au résident permanent ou à l’étranger la possibilité d’être entendu sur l’interdiction de territoire le visant; j) il peut recevoir et admettre en preuve tout élément qu’il estime utile — même inadmissible en justice — et peut fonder sa décision sur celui-ci. 79. (1) Le juge suspend l’affaire, à la demande du résident permanent, de l’étranger ou du ministre, pour permettre à ce dernier de disposer d’une demande de protection visée au paragraphe 112(1).   (2) Le ministre notifie sa décision sur la demande de protection au résident permanent ou à l’étranger et au juge, lequel reprend l’affaire et contrôle la légalité de la décision, compte tenu des motifs visés au paragraphe 18.1(4) de la Loi sur les Cours fédérales.     80. (1) Le juge décide du caractère raisonnable du certificat et, le cas échéant, de la légalité de la décision du ministre, compte tenu des renseignements et autres éléments de preuve dont il dispose.   (2) Il annule le certificat dont il ne peut conclure qu’il est raisonnable; si l’annulation ne vise que la décision du ministre il suspend l’affaire pour permettre au ministre de statuer sur celle-ci.   (3) La décision du juge est définitive et n’est pas susceptible d’appel ou de contrôle judiciaire.                                       81. Le certificat jugé raisonnable fait foi de l’interdiction de territoire et constitue une mesure de renvoi en vigueur et sans appel, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de procéder au contrôle ou à l’enquête; la personne visée ne peut dès lors demander la protection au titre du paragraphe 112(1).     82. (1) Le ministre et le ministre de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile peuvent lancer un mandat pour l’arrestation et la mise en détention du résident permanent visé au certificat dont ils ont des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’il constitue un danger pour la sécurité nationale ou la sécurité d’autrui ou qu’il se soustraira vraisemblablement à la procédure ou au renvoi.   (2) L’étranger nommé au certificat est mis en détention sans nécessité de mandat.                     83. (1) Dans les quarante-huit heures suivant le début de la détention du résident permanent, le juge entreprend le contrôle des motifs justifiant le maintien en détention, l’article 78 s’appliquant, avec les adaptations nécessaires, au contrôle.   (2) Tant qu’il n’est pas statué sur le certificat, l’intéressé comparaît au moins une fois dans les six mois suivant chaque contrôle, ou sur autorisation du juge.     (3) L’intéressé est maintenu en détention sur preuve qu’il constitue toujours un danger pour la sécurité nationale ou la sécurité d’autrui ou qu’il se soustraira vraisemblablement à la procédure ou au renvoi.     84. (1) Le ministre peut, sur demande, mettre le résident permanent ou l’étranger en liberté s’il veut quitter le Canada.   (2) Sur demande de l’étranger dont la mesure de renvoi n’a pas été exécutée dans les cent vingt jours suivant la décision sur le certificat, le juge peut, aux conditions qu’il estime indiquées, le mettre en liberté sur preuve que la mesure ne sera pas exécutée dans un délai raisonnable et que la mise en liberté ne constituera pas un danger pour la sécurité nationale ou la sécurité d’autrui.     85. Les articles 82 à 84 l’emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles de la section 6.

 

 

 

FEDERAL COURT

 

NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

 

DOCKET:                                          DES-4-01

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                          MAHMOUD ES-SAYYID JABALLAH

                                                            v.

                                                            THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

                                                            and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                                                            AND IMMIGRATION

 

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                    Toronto, Ontario

                                                            Ottawa, Ontario

 

DATES OF HEARING:                    September 18, 19 and 28, 2006

                                                            October 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

                                                            October 10, 11, 12, 13,

                                                            October 17, 18, 19, 20, 23 and 26, 2006

 

REASONS FOR ORDER:               LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.

 

DATED:                                             October 31, 2006

 

 

APPEARANCES:   Ms. Barbara Jackman Mr. Paul Copeland Mr. John Norris   Mr.  Donald MacIntosh Mr. David Tyndale Ms. Mielka Visnic Mr. Michael William Dale Mr. Marcel Larouche

FOR THE APPLICANT           FOR THE RESPONDENTS

 

 

 

 

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

Jackman & Associates Toronto, Ontario   Ruby, Edwardh Toronto, Ontario   Copeland, Duncan Toronto, Ontario	FOR THE APPLICANT
John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada	FOR THE RESPONDENTS