Ottawa, Ontario, October 18, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] The applicant is an inmate at the Fenbrook Medium Security Institution (Fenbrook) located in Gravenhurst, Ontario. Fenbrook has implemented a privatized Inmate Purchasing Service wherein inmates may purchase merchandise from Gravenhurst Home Hardware (Home Hardware) at retail prices. When an inmate purchases an item not regularly stocked by Home Hardware, Home Hardware purchases the item from another retailer and sells it to the inmate with a 20% mark-up for general merchandise and with a 10% mark-up for hobbycraft goods. Fenbrook is the only federal penitentiary at which inmates must pay a mark-up on retail goods purchased for their own use. Other institutions employ an officer who purchases retail goods ordered by the inmate, without charging the inmate any mark-up for the service.
[2] The applicant seeks a declaration that the contract between the Correctional Service of Canada (the CSC) and Home Hardware constitutes a violation of section 74 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and a conspiracy under subsection 45(1) of the Competition Act to the extent that it grants Home Hardware the exclusive right to market its products to Fenbrook’s inmates and charge them a mark-up for doing so.
[3] On May 28, 2004, the Fenbrook Inmate Welfare Committee (the Inmate Committee), of which the applicant is a member, submitted a first level group grievance challenging the decision to charge mark-ups on items purchased by inmates. In its 44-page presentation, the Inmate Committee described its concern that Home Hardware had charged a 10% mark-up on all non-stocked hobbycraft items and a 20% mark-up on all other non-stocked items. This practice, the Inmate Committee argued, contravened Fenbrook’s contract with Home Hardware, which required that Home Hardware attempt to negotiate with suppliers for wholesale prices so that it could sell the items to the inmates at a normal retail price. If wholesale prices were not possible, Home Hardware would charge a mark-up to cover its costs, and the mark-up was to be negotiated semi-annually between Home Hardware and Fenbrook. The Inmate Committee described a feeling among the inmate population of frustration and powerlessness resulting from what it perceived as a forced monopoly by Home Hardware.
[4] The Inmate Committee’s first level grievance was denied. On June 21, 2005, the applicant submitted a second level grievance. On August 23, 2005, the applicant filed with the Court a Notice of Application for judicial review. Subsection 81(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations provides that a grievance review must be deferred where an offender decides to pursue a legal remedy for the offender’s grievance in addition to the internal grievance procedure until a decision is rendered on the alternate remedy or the offender abandons it. On July 5, 2005, the applicant was advised that his second level grievance had been deferred accordingly.
Legislation
[5] The legislation relevant to this application is as follows:
1. the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
2. the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34;
3. the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20;
4. the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, S.O.R./92-620;
5. the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46; and
6. the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
The relevant excerpts of these statutes and regulations are set out in Appendix “A” to these Reasons.
Issues
[6] This application raises the following issues:
1. Did the applicant bring the application out of time?
2. If the applicant did not bring the application out of time, did the applicant fail to exhaust adequate alternate remedies?
3. Did the CSC fail to consult with inmates when deciding to allow Home Hardware to charge mark-ups to inmates?
4. Does the Court have jurisdiction to determine whether the CSC violated subsection 45(1) of the Competition Act?
5. Is the CSC’s decision to allow Home Hardware to charge mark-ups to inmates contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
Analysis
[7] The respondent, in its oral argument, first addressed the two substantive issues, which the Court has considered below. Then, a second counsel for the respondent raised significant procedural objections to the Court assuming jurisdiction because this application is brought out of time and because the applicant failed to exhaust adequate alternative remedies. I will first address the two procedural objections.
Procedural Issues
Issue No 1: Did the applicant bring the application out of time?
[8] With respect to the first procedural objection, the respondent argues that this application for judicial review has been brought out of time and that the Court accordingly has no jurisdiction to review the CSC’s decision allowing Home Hardware to charge mark-ups to Fenbrook’s inmates. Subsection 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act provides as follows:
|
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURT [...] Application for judicial review 18.1 [...] Time limitation (2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected by it, or within any further time that a judge of the Federal Court may fix or allow before or after the end of those 30 days.
|
COMPÉTENCE DE LA COUR FÉDÉRALE [...] Demande de contrôle judiciaire 18.1 [...] Délai de présentation (2) Les demandes de contrôle judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première communication, par l'office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire qu'un juge de la Cour fédérale peut, avant ou après l'expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder. |
[9] Under cross-examination on January 23, 2006, the applicant stated that the CSC’s decision to allow mark-ups was communicated to him in April 2003:
Q. And when did you personally find out that CSC would be charging a markup?
A. When I arrived here.
Q. And what year was that?
A. That would have been April, 2003.
Accordingly, subsection 18(2) of the Federal Courts Act requires that the applicant file an application for judicial review by May 2003. The Notice of Application was filed on August 23, 2005.
[10] The Federal Court of Appeal held in Krause v. Canada, [1999] 2 F.C. 476, that the 30 day time limit for bringing an application for judicial review under subsection 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act does not apply where there is no specific decision or order being challenged but rather an ongoing course of allegedly illegal conduct. In this case, the Applicant sought declarations that the CSC violated subsection 45(1) of the Competition Act and section 74 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. Such declarations would have the effect of preventing the CSC from continuing its alleged ongoing course of illegal conduct per Krause. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the time limit under subsection 18.1(2) would not apply.
Issue No. 2: Did the applicant fail to exhaust adequate alternate remedies?
[11] With respect to the second procedural objection, the respondent argues that the Court ought not to review the CSC’s decision in 2000 to contract with Home Hardware for purchase procurement services on the basis that the applicant has not exhausted adequate alternative remedies before seeking a judicial review.
[12] The applicant argues that, where the legality of the CSC’s decision is in question, it is naïve to expect the grievance commissioner to vindicate the inmates’ position since doing so would be admitting illegal activity. Forcing the inmates to exhaust options in a flawed system, it is argued, is forcing inmates disaffected by the CSC’s allegedly unlawful act to endure more illegality until the matter is eventually brought to Court.
[13] I agree with the respondent’s submissions that the proper course is for the applicant to follow the statutorily-mandated grievance process. In this regard, I adopt the statements of Mr. Justice Rothstein (as he then was) in Giesbrecht v. Canada (1998), 148 F.T.R. 81 at 84, [1998] F.C.J. No. 621 (QL) at paragraph 10:
On its face, the legislative scheme providing for grievances is an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review. Grievances are to be handled expeditiously and time limits are provided in the Commissioner’s Directives. There is no suggestion that the process is costly. If anything it is less costly than judicial review and more simple and straightforward. Through the grievance procedure an inmate may appeal a decision on the merits and an appeal tribunal may substitute its decision for that of the tribunal appealed from. Judicial review does not deal with the merits and a favourable result to an inmate would simply return the matter for redetermination to the tribunal appealed from.
[Emphasis added]
[14] Accordingly, I would dismiss the application for failure to exhaust alternate remedies. If the Applicant seeks to challenge the manner in which his grievance issues have been decided, he may bring an application for judicial review of the third level grievance decision.
Substantive Issues
[15] If I am incorrect in concluding that this application must fail for failure by the applicant to exhaust adequate alternate remedies, I would dismiss the application on its merits for the reasons below.
Issue No. 3: Did the CSC fail to consult with inmates when deciding to allow Home Hardware to charge mark-ups to inmates?
[16] The applicant submits that the CSC breached its duty under section 74 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to provide inmates with the opportunity to contribute to the decision of the CSC that Home Hardware would be permitted to charge a mark-up on retail goods purchased by the inmate population. Section 74 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act provides:
|
General — Living Conditions [...] Inmate input into decisions 74. The Service shall provide inmates with the opportunity to contribute to decisions of the Service affecting the inmate population as a whole, or affecting a group within the inmate population, except decisions relating to security matters. |
Conditions de detention [...] Participation aux décisions 74. Le Service doit permettre aux détenus de participer à ses décisions concernant tout ou partie de la population carcérale, sauf pour les questions de sécurité. |
[17] Counsel for the respondent has referred the Court to extensive evidence from senior CSC officers at Fenbrook that the Fenbrook Inmate Committee was extensively consulted about this practice. There is a memo in the evidence from the Chair of the Inmate Committee, dated May 8, 2000, to the Assistant Warden expressing the inmates’ concern that they have to pay a mark-up over the advertised price for retail items. In the Affidavit of William Gladue, the Assistant Warden at Fenbrook, Mr. Gladue details the many dates on which he met the Inmate Committee to consult about their concerns with the Home Hardware contract.
[18] The applicant submits that these consultations were not meaningful because Fenbrook had already entered into the contract with Home Hardware. With respect, the Home Hardware contract provides for a semi-annual negotiation of the rate of mark-up, so the input from inmates could be considered as the contract is continually renegotiated.
[19] The Court is satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the CSC received regular input from the inmates about their concerns with the privatized inmate purchasing service. Accordingly, the CSC has not breached its duty to consult under s. 74 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.
Issue No. 4: Does the Court have jurisdiction to determine whether the CSC violated subsection 45(1) of the Competition Act?
[20] The second substantive issue is that the applicant seeks a declaration that the Correctional Service of Canada conspired with Home Hardware to restrain competition in violation of subsection 45(1) of the Competition Act. The respondent argues that the Federal Court has no jurisdiction to declare that a person has violated a criminal statute, particularly based on affidavit evidence in the context of a judicial review.
[21] The respondent relies on subsection 67(3) of the Competition Act as authority for its position:
|
PART VII OTHER OFFENCES [...] Procedure Procedure for enforcing punishment 67. [...] Jurisdiction of courts (3) No court other than a superior court of criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the Criminal Code, has power to try any offence under section 45, 46, 47, 48 or 49.
|
PARTIE VII AUTRES INFRACTIONS [...] Procédure Choix de l’inculpé 67. [...] Compétence des tribunaux (3) Nul tribunal autre qu’une cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle, au sens du Code criminel, n’a le pouvoir de juger une infraction visée à l’article 45, 46, 47, 48 ou 49.
|
[22] The Criminal Code, in turn, defines a “superior court of criminal jurisdiction” as follows:
|
INTERPRETATION 2. In this Act, [...] “superior court of criminal jurisdiction” means (a) in the Province of Ontario, the Court of Appeal or the Superior Court of Justice, (b) in the Province of Quebec, the Superior Court, (c) in the Province of Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court, (d) in the Provinces of New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Court of Appeal or the Court of Queen’s Bench, (e) in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Newfoundland, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal, (f) in Yukon, the Supreme Court, (g) in the Northwest Territories, the Supreme Court, and (h) in Nunavut, the Nunavut Court of Justice;
|
DÉFINITIONS ET INTERPRÉTATION 2. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. [...] « cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle » a) Dans la province d’Ontario, la Cour d’appel ou la Cour supérieure de justice; b) dans la province de Québec, la Cour supérieure; c) dans la province de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard, la Cour suprême; d) dans les provinces du Nouveau-Brunswick, du Manitoba, de la Saskatchewan et d’Alberta, la Cour d’appel ou la Cour du Banc de la Reine; e) dans les provinces de la Nouvelle-Écosse, de la Colombie-Britannique et de Terre-Neuve, la Cour suprême ou la Cour d’appel; f) au Yukon, la Cour suprême; g) dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest, la Cour suprême; h) dans le territoire du Nunavut, la Cour de justice du Nunavut.
|
[23] The Criminal Code’s exhaustive definition, which is incorporated by reference in the Competition Act, does not include the Federal Court. Given the combined effect of section 67 of the Competition Act and section 2 of the Criminal Code, the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to try offences under section 45 of the Competition Act. The proper venue for prosecuting such an offence is a provincial superior court included within the Criminal Code definition.
[24] Accordingly, the Court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the CSC breached section 45 of the Competition Act with respect to conspiring or agreeing with another person to lessen competition.
Issue No. 5: Is the CSC’s decision to allow retailers to charge mark-ups to inmates contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
[25] The applicant also made a Charter argument, which the Court has determined it cannot consider on this application record. The applicant argued that the CSC’s decision to allow retailers to charge mark-ups to inmates is discriminatory in its effect on Inuit inmates at Fenbrook and therefore contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The thrust of his argument is that, since Fenbrook uniquely offers special programming for Inuit offenders, the imposition of a mark-up on purchases including hobbycraft items has a disproportionately adverse effect on Inuit inmates at Fenbrook in violation of the equality guarantee under section 15 of the Charter. The applicant did not raise this issue in his Notice of Application and provided no evidence or analysis supporting his claim under subsection 15(1). Nor has the applicant suggested that he personally suffers from discrimination, as he is not Inuit. The Court cannot render a decision on a Charter issue without a proper record on which to adjudicate the claim. Accordingly, the Court cannot consider the applicant’s challenge of the CSC’s decision based on equality grounds.
Conclusion
[26] For the foregoing reasons, this application must be dismissed. However, as indicated at the hearing, the Court understands why the applicant and the other inmates at Fenbrook are concerned that they must pay a mark-up on some of their personal retail purchases, unlike inmates at every other federal institution. The inmates’ concern is compounded by the fact that they earn very little for working in the penitentiary and thus have little disposable income.
[27] There will be no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ADJUDGES AND DECLARES that:
This application for a declaration is dismissed.
APPENDIX “A”
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
|
Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. |
Droits à l'égalité Égalité devant la loi, égalité de bénéfice et protection égale de la loi 15. (1) La loi ne fait acception de personne et s'applique également à tous, et tous ont droit à la même protection et au même bénéfice de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race, l'origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l'âge ou les déficiences mentales ou physiques. |
2. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34
|
PART VI OFFENCES IN RELATION TO COMPETITION 45. (1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person (a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any product, (b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of a product or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof, (c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of a product, or in the price of insurance on persons or property, or (d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding ten million dollars or to both. Idem (2) For greater certainty, in establishing that a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement is in contravention of subsection (1), it shall not be necessary to prove that the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement, if carried into effect, would or would be likely to eliminate, completely or virtually, competition in the market to which it relates or that it was the object of any or all of the parties thereto to eliminate, completely or virtually, competition in that market. Evidence of conspiracy (2.1) In a prosecution under subsection (1), the court may infer the existence of a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement from circumstantial evidence, with or without direct evidence of communication between or among the alleged parties thereto, but, for greater certainty, the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof of intent (2.2) For greater certainty, in establishing that a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement is in contravention of subsection (1), it is necessary to prove that the parties thereto intended to and did enter into the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement, but it is not necessary to prove that the parties intended that the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement have an effect set out in subsection (1). Defence (3) Subject to subsection (4), in a prosecution under subsection (1), the court shall not convict the accused if the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement relates only to one or more of the following: (a) the exchange of statistics; (b) the defining of product standards; (c) the exchange of credit information; (d) the definition of terminology used in a trade, industry or profession; (e) cooperation in research and development; (f) the restriction of advertising or promotion, other than a discriminatory restriction directed against a member of the mass media; (g) the sizes or shapes of the containers in which an article is packaged; (h) the adoption of the metric system of weights and measures; or (i) measures to protect the environment. Exception (4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement has lessened or is likely to lessen competition unduly in respect of one of the following: (a) prices, (b) quantity or quality of production, (c) markets or customers, or (d) channels or methods of distribution, or if the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement has restricted or is likely to restrict any person from entering into or expanding a business in a trade, industry or profession. Defence (5) Subject to subsection (6), in a prosecution under subsection (1) the court shall not convict the accused if the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement relates only to the export of products from Canada. Exception (6) Subsection (5) does not apply if the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement (a) has resulted in or is likely to result in a reduction or limitation of the real value of exports of a product; (b) has restricted or is likely to restrict any person from entering into or expanding the business of exporting products from Canada; or (c) has prevented or lessened or is likely to prevent or lessen competition unduly in the supply of services facilitating the export of products from Canada. (d) [Repealed, R.S., 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.), s. 30] Defences (7) In a prosecution under subsection (1), the court shall not convict the accused if it finds that the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement relates only to a service and to standards of competence and integrity that are reasonably necessary for the protection of the public (a) in the practice of a trade or profession relating to the service; or (b) in the collection and dissemination of information relating to the service. Exception (7.1) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of an agreement or arrangement between federal financial institutions that is described in subsection 49(1). Exception (8) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement that is entered into only by companies each of which is, in respect of every one of the others, an affiliate. [...]
PART VII OTHER OFFENCES [...] Procedure for enforcing punishment 67. [...] Jurisdiction of courts (3) No court other than a superior court of criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the Criminal Code, has power to try any offence under section 45, 46, 47, 48 or 49.
|
PARTIE VI INFRACTIONS RELATIVES À LA CONCURRENCE 45. (1) Commet un acte criminel et encourt un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans et une amende maximale de dix millions de dollars, ou l’une de ces peines, quiconque complote, se coalise ou conclut un accord ou arrangement avec une autre personne : a) soit pour limiter, indûment, les facilités de transport, de production, de fabrication, de fourniture, d’emmagasinage ou de négoce d’un produit quelconque; b) soit pour empêcher, limiter ou réduire, indûment, la fabrication ou production d’un produit ou pour en élever déraisonnablement le prix; c) soit pour empêcher ou réduire, indûment, la concurrence dans la production, la fabrication, l’achat, le troc, la vente, l’entreposage, la location, le transport ou la fourniture d’un produit, ou dans le prix d’assurances sur les personnes ou les biens; d) soit, de toute autre façon, pour restreindre, indûment, la concurrence ou lui causer un préjudice indu. Idem (2) Il demeure entendu qu’il n’est pas nécessaire, pour établir qu’un complot, une association d’intérêts, un accord ou un arrangement constitue l’une des infractions visées au paragraphe (1), de prouver que le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement, s’il était exécuté, éliminerait ou éliminerait vraisemblablement la concurrence, entièrement ou à toutes fins utiles, sur le marché auquel il se rapporte, ni que les participants, ou l’un ou plusieurs d’entre eux, visaient à éliminer la concurrence, entièrement ou à toutes fins utiles, sur ce marché. Preuve de complot (2.1) Lors d’une poursuite intentée en vertu du paragraphe (1), le tribunal peut déduire l’existence du complot, de l’association d’intérêts, de l’accord ou de l’arrangement en se basant sur une preuve circonstancielle, avec ou sans preuve directe de communication entre les présumées parties au complot, à l’association d’intérêts, à l’accord ou à l’arrangement, mais il demeure entendu que le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement doit être prouvé hors de tout doute raisonnable. Preuve d’intention (2.2) Il demeure entendu qu’il est nécessaire, afin d’établir qu’un complot, une association d’intérêts, un accord ou un arrangement constitue l’une des infractions visées au paragraphe (1), de prouver que les parties avaient l’intention de participer à ce complot, cette association d’intérêts, cet accord ou cet arrangement et y ont participé mais qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de prouver que les parties avaient l’intention que le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement ait l’un des effets visés au paragraphe (1). Défense (3) Sous réserve du paragraphe (4), dans des poursuites intentées en vertu du paragraphe (1), le tribunal ne peut déclarer l’accusé coupable si le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement se rattache exclusivement à l’un ou plusieurs des actes suivants : a) l’échange de données statistiques; b) la définition de normes de produits; c) l’échange de renseignements sur le crédit; d) la définition de termes utilisés dans un commerce, une industrie ou une profession; e) la collaboration en matière de recherches et de mise en valeur; f) la restriction de la réclame ou de la promotion, à l’exclusion d’une restriction discriminatoire visant un représentant des médias; g) la taille ou la forme des emballages d’un article; h) l’adoption du système métrique pour les poids et mesures; i) les mesures visant à protéger l’environnement. Exception (4) Le paragraphe (3) ne s’applique pas si le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement a réduit ou réduira vraisemblablement et indûment la concurrence à l’égard de l’un des sujets suivants : a) les prix; b) la quantité ou la qualité de la production; c) les marchés ou les clients; d) les voies ou les méthodes de distribution, ou si le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement a restreint ou restreindra vraisemblablement les possibilités pour une personne d’entrer dans un commerce, une industrie ou une profession ou d’accroître une entreprise commerciale, industrielle ou professionnelle. Défense (5) Sous réserve du paragraphe (6), dans des poursuites intentées en vertu du paragraphe (1), le tribunal ne peut déclarer l’accusé coupable si le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement se rattache exclusivement à l’exportation de produits du Canada. Exception (6) Le paragraphe (5) ne s’applique pas si le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement, selon le cas : a) a eu pour résultat ou aura vraisemblablement pour résultat une réduction ou une limitation de la valeur réelle des exportations d’un produit; b) a restreint ou restreindra vraisemblablement les possibilités pour une personne d’entrer dans le commerce d’exportation de produits du Canada ou de développer un tel commerce; c) a empêché ou diminué la concurrence indûment dans la fourniture de services visant à promouvoir l’exportation de produits du Canada, ou aura vraisemblablement un tel effet. d) [Abrogé, L.R. (1985), ch. 19 (2e suppl.), art. 30] Moyens de défense (7) Dans les poursuites intentées en vertu du paragraphe (1), le tribunal ne peut déclarer l’accusé coupable s’il conclut que le complot, l’association d’intérêts, l’accord ou l’arrangement se rattache exclusivement à un service et à des normes de compétence et des critères d’intégrité raisonnablement nécessaires à la protection du public : a) soit dans l’exercice d’un métier ou d’une profession rattachés à ce service; b) soit dans la collecte et la diffusion de l’information se rapportant à ce service. Exception (7.1) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à un accord ou à un arrangement visé au paragraphe 49(1) lorsque cet accord ou arrangement a lieu entre des institutions financières fédérales. Exception (8) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à un complot, une association d’intérêts, un accord ou un arrangement intervenu exclusivement entre des personnes morales qui, considérées individuellement, sont des affiliées de chacune des autres personnes morales en question.
PARTIE VII AUTRES INFRACTIONS [...] Choix de l’inculpé 67. [...] Compétence des tribunaux (3) Nul tribunal autre qu’une cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle, au sens du Code criminel, n’a le pouvoir de juger une infraction visée à l’article 45, 46, 47, 48 ou 49. |
3. Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20
|
General — Living Conditions [...] 74. The Service shall provide inmates with the opportunity to contribute to decisions of the Service affecting the inmate population as a whole, or affecting a group within the inmate population, except decisions relating to security matters. [...]
Grievance Procedure 90. There shall be a procedure for fairly and expeditiously resolving offenders’ grievances on matters within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, and the procedure shall operate in accordance with the regulations made under paragraph 96(u). 91. Every offender shall have complete access to the offender grievance procedure without negative consequences.
|
Conditions de detention [...] 74. Le Service doit permettre aux détenus de participer à ses décisions concernant tout ou partie de la population carcérale, sauf pour les questions de sécurité. [...]
Griefs 90. Est établie, conformément aux règlements d’application de l’alinéa 96u), une procédure de règlement juste et expéditif des griefs des délinquants sur des questions relevant du commissaire. Accès à la procédure de règlement des griefs 91. Tout délinquant doit, sans crainte de représailles, avoir libre accès à la procédure de règlement des griefs.
|
4. Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, S.O.R./92-620
5. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46
|
INTERPRETATION Definitions 2. In this Act, [...] “superior court of criminal jurisdiction” means (a) in the Province of Ontario, the Court of Appeal or the Superior Court of Justice, (b) in the Province of Quebec, the Superior Court, (c) in the Province of Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court, (d) in the Provinces of New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Court of Appeal or the Court of Queen’s Bench, (e) in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Newfoundland, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal, (f) in Yukon, the Supreme Court, (g) in the Northwest Territories, the Supreme Court, and (h) in Nunavut, the Nunavut Court of Justice;
|
DÉFINITIONS ET INTERPRÉTATION Définitions 2. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. [...] « cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle » a) Dans la province d’Ontario, la Cour d’appel ou la Cour supérieure de justice; b) dans la province de Québec, la Cour supérieure; c) dans la province de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard, la Cour suprême; d) dans les provinces du Nouveau-Brunswick, du Manitoba, de la Saskatchewan et d’Alberta, la Cour d’appel ou la Cour du Banc de la Reine; e) dans les provinces de la Nouvelle-Écosse, de la Colombie-Britannique et de Terre-Neuve, la Cour suprême ou la Cour d’appel; f) au Yukon, la Cour suprême; g) dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest, la Cour suprême; h) dans le territoire du Nunavut, la Cour de justice du Nunavut. |
6. Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7
|
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURT [...] Application for judicial review 18.1 [...] Time limitation (2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected by it, or within any further time that a judge of the Federal Court may fix or allow before or after the end of those 30 days. |
COMPÉTENCE DE LA COUR FÉDÉRALE [...] Demande de contrôle judiciaire 18.1 [...] Délai de présentation (2) Les demandes de contrôle judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première communication, par l'office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire qu'un juge de la Cour fédérale peut, avant ou après l'expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder. |
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1455-05
STYLE OF CAUSE: STEVEN OLAH v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: October 12, 2006
APPEARANCES:
|
Mr. John Hill
|
|
|
Mr. Matthew Sullivan Ms. Susan Keenan
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
|
John Hill Toronto, ON
|
|
|
John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada
|