Date: 20251112

Docket: IMM-5693-24

Citation: 2025 FC 1815

Ottawa, Ontario, November 12, 2025

PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Turley

BETWEEN:

VLADIMIR POPOV

Applicant

and

THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicant sought Ministerial Relief, in December 2008, pursuant to former subsection 34(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], in response to a report issued under subsection 44(1) of the IRPA [Section 44 Report], alleging inadmissibility to Canada based on his prior membership in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti [KGB]. In February 2024, the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] recommended that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness [Minister] deny the Applicant’s request because it was not satisfied that the Applicant’s presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest. The Minister accepted the CBSA’s recommendation. The Applicant seeks judicial review of the Minister’s denial of relief dated March 5, 2024 [Ministerial Relief Decision].

[2] In my view, the Ministerial Relief Decision suffers from the very same flaws identified by Justice Roy in Al Yamani v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2022 FC 1276 [Al Yamani 2022]. While the Minister repeatedly states that the Applicant’s evidence and submissions about his conduct since coming to Canada in 1995 were considered, the decision itself reflects no meaningful engagement with that evidence. The Minister further fails to explain why the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Applicant’s continued presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest. This lack of justification renders the decision unreasonable. The application is granted, and the Applicant’s Ministerial Relief application is remitted for redetermination.

II. Background

[3] The Applicant, a citizen of Russia, arrived in Canada in August 1995, on a six-month visitor visa. A week after arriving, he contacted the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and disclosed his membership in the KGB between 1972 to 1991.

[4] In November 1995, the Applicant made a refugee claim. The Refugee Protection Division concluded that the Applicant had established a well-founded fear of persecution based on his political opinion: Transcripts of the Refugee Protection Division proceedings held on March 17, 1997 at 71, Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] at 275. He was thus granted Convention Refugee status.

[5] The Applicant applied for permanent residence in August 1997. This application is currently still pending. The CBSA interviewed the Applicant in May 1998. A Section 44 Report was subsequently issued in August 2008, alleging that the Applicant was inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA due to his membership in the KGB: Section 44 Report, CTR at 367–368. The matter was referred to the Immigration Division [ID] for an admissibility hearing in October 2008: Referral under subsection 44(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, CTR at 371.

[6] In December 2008, the Applicant applied for Ministerial Relief under former subsection 34(2) of the IRPA, asserting that his presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest: Letter dated December 3, 2008, CTR at 372. At the Applicant’s request, the ID adjourned his admissibility hearing sine die in January 2009 so that he could pursue his request for Ministerial Relief: Immigration Division, Reasons and Decision dated January 9, 2009, CTR at 393. The Applicant made further submissions on his Ministerial Relief application in March 2009.

[7] In January 2018, an immigration officer, in considering the Applicant’s 1997 permanent residence application, found there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was inadmissible to Canada on security grounds due to his former KGB membership. They requested that the Applicant provide humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] submissions. In response, Applicant’s counsel provided lengthy submissions in April 2018: Letter dated April 18, 2018, CTR at 448–1092.

[8] In September 2018, Applicant’s counsel requested that the Applicant’s application for Ministerial Relief be expedited given the lengthy delays. He asked that his request for relief be determined based on the H&C submissions filed in April 2018: Letter dated September 27, 2028, CTR 445–446.

[9] The CBSA disclosed a draft recommendation (in the form of a Briefing Note) to the Applicant in December 2019, recommending that Ministerial Relief be denied. The Applicant was given an opportunity to provide submissions in response. In September 2020 and January 2021, the Applicant provided a voluminous amount of evidence and submissions: Letter dated September 14, 2020, CTR at 1270–2078; Letter dated January 8, 2021, CTR at 2084–2146.

[10] The CBSA’s Briefing Note was eventually submitted to the Minister for decision in February 2024. On March 5, 2024, the Minister accepted the CBSA’s recommendation and concluded that he was not satisfied that the Applicant’s presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest. Consequently, relief under subsection 34(2) of the IRPA was denied: Ministerial Relief Decision at 61, CTR at 62.

III. Issues and Standard of Review

[11] The Applicant challenges the Ministerial Relief Decision on grounds of procedural fairness and reasonableness. With respect to the latter, he argues that the Minister failed to conduct a reasonable national interest analysis.

[12] There is no dispute that the merits of a Ministerial Relief decision are subject to the reasonableness standard of review: Selvakumaran v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1223 at paras 30–32; [Selvakumaran]; Abdulimiti v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1960 at para 18 [Abdulimiti]; Al Yamani 2022 at paras 58–60.

[13] A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [Vavilov]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 8 [Mason]. A decision should only be set aside if there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” such that it does not exhibit the requisite attributes of “justification, intelligibility and transparency”: Vavilov at para 100; Mason at paras 59–61.

[14] As set out below, I find that the Ministerial Relief Decision is unreasonable for its lack of justification. There is no need to consider the Applicant’s procedural fairness arguments.

IV. Analysis

A. Governing legal framework

[15] The Applicant is alleged to be inadmissible to Canada on security grounds under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA for his past membership in the KGB:

[16] When the Applicant’s Ministerial Relief application was submitted, the governing legislative provision was former subsection 34(2) of the IRPA. In accordance with that provision, notwithstanding inadmissibility under subsection 34(1), an applicant could remain in Canada if the Minister was satisfied that their presence would not be detrimental to the national interest:

[17] Generally, a finding of inadmissibility is made before Ministerial Relief is requested. However, subsection 34(2) of the IRPA does not require that an inadmissibility finding be made before Ministerial Relief is sought: Shahzad v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1245 at para 14; Hassanzadeh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 902 at para 28. In this case, the Applicant requested Ministerial Relief after a Section 44 Report alleging inadmissibility on security grounds had been issued but before any such finding had been made by the ID. Indeed, the Applicant’s inadmissibility hearing was adjourned sine die by the ID until his Ministerial Relief application was determined.

[18] An applicant bears the onus of satisfying the Minister that their continued presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest: Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para 43 [Agraira]; Abdulimiti at para 21; Hameed v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1353 at para 24 [Hameed]; Al Yamani v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 381 at para 69 [Al Yamani 2007].

[19] As the Supreme Court made clear, the term “national interest” in subsection 34(2) of the IRPA is not synonymous with the terms “national security” and “public safety”: Agraira at para 85. As a result, in determining whether a person’s continued presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest, the Minister is required to consider “more than just national security and whether the applicant is a danger to the public or to the safety of any person”: Agraira at para 82. In that vein, “a broad range of factors may be relevant to the determination of what is in the ‘national interest’, for the purposes of s. 34(2)”: Agraira at para 87. This includes personal characteristics that are relevant in assessing whether an individual is a threat to the security of Canada: Agraira at para 84.

[20] Where the Minister adopts the CBSA’s recommendation on a Ministerial Relief application, the CBSA’s Briefing Note constitutes the Minister’s reasons: Abdulimiti at para 21; Al Yamani 2022 at paras 72, 75; Hameed at para 25; Al Yamani 2007 at para 52.

B. The Ministerial Relief Decision is unreasonable

[21] The overarching error in the Ministerial Relief Decision is the failure to engage with and assess the Applicant’s evidence and arguments. As Justice Roy held, in Al Yamani 2022, in accordance with Vavilov, “it does not suffice to summarize arguments made and then state a peremptory conclusion, because that does not assist in understanding the decision made and its rationale”: Al Yamani 2022 at para 68. This is precisely what was done here.

[22] Significantly, of the 62-page Ministerial Relief Decision, 40 pages are devoted to simply outlining the “elements considered” including the Applicant’s evidence and submissions. The “assessment” portion of the decision is 15 pages and focusses, for the most part, on the factors that support denying Ministerial Relief namely the Applicant’s “admitted long-term, active, and informed role with the KGB”: Ministerial Relief Decision at 54, CTR at 55. Like in Al Yamani 2022, the Minister’s assessment “reads as a charging document for [the Applicant’s] past membership” in the KGB: Al Yamani 2022 at para 50.

[23] The Ministerial Relief Decision refers to other factors including the Applicant’s expressed commitment to democratic values and human rights, his cooperation with Government of Canada officials, his lack of a criminal record in Canada, and his exemplary conduct and work history in Canada. There is, however, no engagement with nor assessment of this evidence. In each instance, after setting out that the evidence was “considered” or “taken into account”, there is simply a conclusory statement that the evidence is insufficient to overcome the predominant national security and public safety considerations.

[24] The following two examples illustrate the Minister’s approach of stating that the Applicant’s evidence or arguments were considered, but deemed insufficient:

(i) The CBSA has considered Mr. Popov’s assertions that he has now distanced himself from the KGB and its goals. His expressed commitment to democratic values and human rights and freedoms, including through his claimed refusal to participate in KGB-led anti-government coups in Russia in 1991 and 1993, as well as through his cooperation with GOC officials and publicly exposing the activities of the KGB and sharing criticism of Russian President Putin at risk to his own safety, have also been taken into account. The CBSA is of the opinion, however, that these factors are not sufficient to overcome the other predominant national security and public safety considerations of this case – in particular, Mr. Popov’s admitted long-term, active, and informed role with the KGB, as described above.

[Emphasis added]

Ministerial Relief Decision at 54, CTR at 55.

(ii) The CBSA has also duly considered Mr. Popov’s other statements regarding his activities and establishment from his arrival in Canada to the present, including his statements to the effect that: he has learned English and established himself in his community; his wife and son are leading “exemplary lives” in Canada; they file their taxes; they support a variety of community non-profit organizations; and he, his wife and son purchased a home in 2006. The supporting documents and letters of support he submitted in this respect have also been taken into account.

Nonetheless, the CBSA is of the opinion that these factors are not sufficient to establish that Mr. Popov’s presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest in light of the predominant national security and public safety concerns in this case – in particular, his prior voluntary, informed, high-level, dedicated role in the KGB for 19 years, through which he personally recruited over 30 KGB informants and engaged in various activities which would have benefitted the KGB as a whole – an agency notorious for its violent tactics, engagement in anti-Western espionage, including against Canada, and brutal suppression of Soviet dissidents. […]

[Emphasis added]

Ministerial Relief Decision at 60, CTR at 61.

[25] The Minister is correct when he states that he is “entitled to ascribe more weight to some factors over others”: Ministerial Relief Decision at 57, CTR at 58. That said, this does not mean that the Minister can simply, as was done here, baldly conclude that personal factors do not outweigh the “predominant national security and public safety concerns”: Ministerial Relief Decision at 60, CTR at 61. I agree with Justice Roy that “[m]erely stating those redeeming features and personal characteristics will not suffice”: Al Yamani 2022 at para 79.

[26] It was incumbent on the Minister to “come to grips with the considerable body of evidence put forward by [the Applicant]”: Al Yamani 2022 at para 67, citing Al Yamani 2007 at para 86. Here, the Applicant submitted a voluminous amount of evidence and submissions concerning his life after the KGB. In particular, he specifically addressed his disassociation from the organization and expressed regret over his past involvement. He publicly condemned the KGB — publishing two books that exposed its operations, delivering multiple public speaking engagements, and appearing in interviews on television and digital platforms. These relevant and significant factors are not meaningfully engaged with in the Ministerial Relief Decision.

[27] The purpose of subsection 34(2) of the IRPA is that “in spite of the inadmissibility, the Minister is to consider whether he is satisfied that the presence of [the person] in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest” [emphasis added]: Al Yamani 2022 at para 52. In this case, the Minister’s assessment relies solely on the Applicant’s past membership in the KGB, despite that membership having ended more than 33 years before the decision was rendered. The Minister never contends with the significant and countervailing fact that the Applicant’s membership is very dated.

[28] It is not suggested that the passage of time is, in and of itself, determinative that the Applicant’s continued presence will not be detrimental to Canada’s national interest, but it is a relevant factor that should at the very least be considered: Al Yamani 2022 at paras 50, 52, 70, 77, 79, 81. This is particularly the case given that the “predominant national security and public safety concerns” cited by the Minister exclusively relate to the Applicant’s former membership in the KGB. There is no explanation how these factors are in jeopardy now, over 34 years after the Applicant left the KGB: Al Yamani 2022 at para 57. The Applicant is now a 78-year-old man, who has been living in Canada for over 30 years. These are relevant factors that ought to have been included in the Minister’s analysis.

[29] In their written submissions, the Respondent argued that this case was distinguishable from Al Yamani 2022 and consistent with many decisions of the Court upholding denials of Ministerial Relief: Respondent’s Further Memorandum of Argument at para 71. In oral submissions, Respondent’s counsel referred to Al Yamani 2022 as “an outlier”. I disagree.

[30] Notably, the decisions relied upon by the Respondent in their written submissions (cited at footnote 92 of the Respondent’s Further Memorandum of Argument) all pre-date Al Yamani 2022 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov. This is significant because the basis for overturning the Ministerial Relief decision in Al Yamani 2022 was that the Minister’s reasoning failed to meet the requirements for a reasonable decision following Vavilov. As Justice Roy explained: “In Vavilov, the Court gave new prominence to the need for decision makers to not only reach a reasonable outcome, but also the reviewing court will be concerned with the decision-making process” [emphasis added]: Al Yamani 2022 at para 59.

[31] The Respondent further relies on two recent decisions where the denial of Ministerial Relief was upheld by this Court: Selvakumaran and Abdulimiti. In each of those cases, the Minister’s denial was based on factors beyond the applicant’s past membership in a terrorist organization. In contrast, in this case, the only reason for denying relief was the Applicant’s past involvement in the KGB.

[32] In Selvakumaran, Ministerial Relief was not only denied based on the applicant’s past membership in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka but, also, on the credibility of his evidence. The Minister concluded that the applicant’s “inconsistent and contradictory statements” also weighed against granting relief because “[t]he integrity of Canada’s immigration system depends on individuals complying with their legal obligation to be truthful in their dealings with Canadian officials”: Selvakumaran at paras 22, 50. The applicant’s untruthfulness was thus “considered negative to the national interest”: Selvakumaran at para 51.

[33] Similarly, in Abdulimiti, the applicant’s past conduct was not the sole consideration. In addition to the applicant’s past membership in the East Turkestan Liberation Organization [ETLO], his inconsistent narratives weighed against him: Abdulimiti at paras 11, 12, 26. Significantly, the applicant had initially told Canadian immigration officials that he intended to continue his membership in the ETLO in Canada: Abdulimiti at para 12.

[34] For these reasons, I am allowing the application. As in Al Yamani 2022, the critical flaw in this case lies in the Minister’s failure to engage with the Applicant’s evidence and submissions concerning the relevant factors. While the Minister exercises “considerable discretion in making his decision under subsection 34(2)”, in the Vavilov era, “[r]easons matter”: Al Yamani 2022 at para 80. The Minister must provide reasons for denying relief that are justified, transparent, and intelligible. Mere recitation of what factors were considered in denying relief is not enough.

C. Costs are not justified

[35] In immigration matters, costs awards are exceptional: Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 at para 68. Section 22 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22, provides that no costs shall be awarded on applications for leave and judicial review except for “special reasons”. The threshold for demonstrating “special reasons” is high: Mamut v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1593 at para 128 [Mamut]; Ghaddar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 946 at para 45; Almuhtadi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 712 at para 56 [Almuhtadi]; Taghiyeva v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1262 at para 17 [Taghiyeva].

[36] The Court has found “special reasons” in instances where one party has acted in a manner that may be characterized as unfair, oppressive, improper, or actuated by bad faith: Sachdeva v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1522 at para 69; Almuhtadi at para 56; Taghiyeva at paras 17–23.

[37] Whether an award of costs is justified turns on the particular facts of each case: Mamut at para 128. Here, the Applicant requested an award of costs in the Applicant’s Further Memorandum but made minimal submissions. In written submissions, Applicant’s counsel simply referred to “the unfairness and documented desire to wait out the Applicant’s pocketbook and the unexplained and unjustified delay in rendering a decision”, relying on the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Ndungu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FCA 208: Applicant’s Further Argument at para 114.

[38] At the hearing of the judicial review application, Applicant’s counsel made no submissions about costs. Without further arguments about the “special reasons” to award costs on the facts of this case, and the specific amount requested, I decline to award any costs: Anquilero v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 140 at para 42.

V. Conclusion

[39] Based on the foregoing, I find that the Ministerial Relief Decision is unreasonable. The application for judicial review is granted and the matter is remitted for redetermination.

[40] The parties did not propose any questions for certification, and I agree that none arise in this case.

 

JUDGMENT in IMM-5693-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The application for judicial review is granted.

2. The Applicant’s request for Ministerial Relief is remitted for redetermination.

3. No costs are awarded.

4. There is no question for certification.

“Anne M. Turley”

 

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-5693-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:	VLADIMIR POPOV v THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PLACE OF HEARING:	HELD BY WAY OF VIDEOCONFERENCE
DATE OF HEARING:	oCTOBER 6, 2025
judgment and reasons:	TURLEY J.
DATED:	NOVEMBER 12, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Erin C. Roth	For The Applicant
Jocelyne Mui	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Edelmann & Co. Barristers and Solicitors Vancouver, British Columbia	For The Applicant
Attorney General of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia	For The Respondent