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Date:20251106

Docket: IMM-17254-24

Citation: 2025 FC 1785

Vancouver, British Columbia November 6, 2025

PRESENT: Madam Justice Azmudeh

BETWEEN:

HAIJUN ZHANG WEI ZHOU

Applicants

and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicants seek an order to set aside a decision by an Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada officer (Officer) cancelling the Applicants’ Canadian temporary resident visas (TRV) and concluding the Applicants are inadmissible to Canada for misrepresentation, contrary to section 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. This judicial review is granted for the following reasons.

[2] The Applicants are a married couple and citizens of China. In or around June or July 2023, they hired an agent in China to help them obtain TRVs. Their application was approved in August 2023. They entered Canada as visitors in September 2023. The Applicant husband later obtained a work permit in February 2024, but the Applicant wife returned to China in July 2024.

[3] On August 21, 2024, while her visa was still valid and she had no reason to think that she faced a problem, the Applicant wife attempted to return to Canada but was denied boarding the plane. The agent at the airport advised her that there was a problem with her visa.

[4] The next day, on August 22, 2024, the Applicant wife went to the Canadian consulate in Shanghai (Consulate) to inquire about her visa’s status. The consulate staff advised her that on July 24, 2024, they sent an email to the email address affiliated with the TRV file from the previous year. The Applicant wife double-checked their email addresses and that of the consultant who helped the husband with his work permit. The Applicant wife then contacted the original agent affiliated with the TRV who then located the Consulate’s email.

[5] The Consulate’s email to the Applicant’s previous agent on July 24, 2024 was a procedural fairness letter (PFL), advising that it believed the Applicants had provided fraudulent banking information. The email provided them 10 days to reply. When the Applicants learnt of it, they were out of time. They still provided a response on August 29, 2024.

[6] The Officer’s notes indicated that they made a final decision not only to revoke the Applicants’ TRVs, but also that they had become inadmissible due to misrepresentation pursuant to section 40(1) of IRPA. The Officer rendered the decision ten minutes before the GCMS logged the receipt of the Applicants’ response to the PFL on August 30, 2024. As a result of this inadmissibility, the Applicants face a five-year ban on entering Canada.

II. Decision

[7] I grant the Applicant’s judicial review because I find the Officer made their decision in a procedurally unfair manner.

III. Standard of Review and Issues

[8] The only issue before this Court is whether the decision was reached in a procedurally fair manner.

[9] While the parties initially disagreed on the standard of review, they both ultimately submitted that the standard of review for procedural fairness is correctness, which is a non-deferential standard. The right question is for the reviewing court to ask whether a fair and just process was followed “with a sharp focus on the nature of the substantive rights involved and the consequences for an individual” (Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [CPR]).

[10] Consequently, when an application for judicial review concerns procedural fairness and a breach of the principles of fundamental justice, the question that must be answered is not necessarily whether the decision was “correct.” Rather, the reviewing court must determine whether, given the particular context and circumstances of the case, the administrative decisionmaker’s process was fair and gave the parties concerned the right to be heard, as well as a full and fair opportunity to be informed of the evidence to be rebutted and to have their case heard (CPR at para 56; Inneh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 953 at para 10).

[11] Mr. Justice Régimbald has recently articulated this principle in Nguyen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1617 at paragraph 11:

the reviewing court must be satisfied of the fairness of the procedure with regard to the circumstances (Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 215 at para 6; Do v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 927 at para 4; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [Canadian Pacific Railway]). In Canadian Pacific Railway, the Federal Court of Appeal noted that trying to “shoehorn the question of procedural fairness into a standard of review analysis is … an unprofitable exercise” (at para 55). Instead, the Court must ask itself whether the party was given a right to be heard and the opportunity to know the case against them, and that “[p]rocedural fairness is not sacrificed on the altar of deference” (Canadian Pacific Railway at para 56).

IV. Analysis

A. Did the Officer reach their decision in a procedurally fair manner?

(1) Material facts

[12] The record is unequivocal about the following facts upon which I base my decision:

• a)The Applicants obtained their TRVs in August 2023 with the help of an agent whose contact information was on file. As can be seen on their affidavit, the relationship was limited to the transaction to obtain the TRV. Once the TRV was issued, Applicants did not stay in touch with the agent. The Respondent neither pointed me to any authority nor did they argue that the Applicants had a duty to keep in touch with their agent, or that they had a duty to keep their contact information updated with Canadian officials after their visas were issued;

• b)The Consulate in effect reopened the case on July 24, 2024 when they sent an email to the agent whose information was on the TRV file from a year ago. The email was a PFL which advised that the Applicants had 10 days from the date of the letter to reply to the Officer’s concerns;

• c)At no time did the Officer ensure that the Applicants, whose TRV applications were finalized when their visas had already been issued, were aware that their application was reopened before sending the PFL;

• d)On August 21, 2024, the Applicant wife learned of a potential visa problem at the airport for the first time. She went to the Consulate the next day (on August 22, 2024) and located the email. The Applicants replied a week later on August 29, 2024;

• e)The Officer found the Applicants inadmissible for misrepresentation on August 30, 2024, only 8 days after the Consulate learned about the wife’s surprise with the letter. A mere 10 minutes after the final decision was made, the consulate logged the receipt of the Applicants’ reply to the PFL in their system. They chose not to reopen the file to consider the Applicant’s reply.

(2) Did the Officer need to notify the Applicants that the case was reopened through the PFL?

[13] The jurisprudence on the Officer’s duty to notify the Applicants of their concerns regarding their concerns has developed in cases with an outstanding application before the officer. In those cases, as the Respondent pointed out, once an officer can prove that they have sent the notice, there is a presumption that the visa applicant has received it. Receipt of a fax or e-mail at the applicant's or consultant's provided number typically fulfills this requirement, and normally, here, a received PFL would have constituted sufficient notice. Factors such as equipment malfunctions or consultant errors are generally not sufficient to rebut the presumption (Pravinbhai Shah v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 207 at para 9 [Pravinbhai Shah]; Sawnani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 206 at para 7 [Sawnani]; Katebi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 813 at para 17).

[14] The Applicant may rebut the presumption that they have received the communication by “demonstrating with credible evidence that the communication was not received” (Wu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 554 at para 7, citing Chandrakantbhai Patel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 900 at para 33; Patel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 856 at para 16; Ghaloghlyan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1252 at para 8).

[15] Thus, in some cases, the Court is satisfied that the communication problem preventing the applicant from replying was such that the applicant was deprived of the opportunity to respond (Abboud v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 876 at para 15 [Abboud]). In Abboud, the officer had received two automated replies (Abboud at paras 15). Justice Tremblay-Lamer found that these replies “should have raised doubts in the officer’s mind that the communication had failed” (Abboud at para 15).

[16] Similarly, in this case, the fact that the TRVs were issued and the Applicants reasonably understood that the file was closed should have reasonably alerted the Officer that the Applicants may not have received notice. Given the extremely prejudicial consequences to the applicant, the officer should have given them the opportunity to provide the required document.

[17] More importantly, all of the Respondent’s cases are readily distinguishable. In every case, the applicant had a pending application with Canadian immigration officials and they were therefore reasonably expected to be reachable (Pravinbhai Shah at para 2; Sawnani at para 2).

[18] However, in this case, the TRV process was finalized when the visas were issued, so there is no reasonable expectation that the Applicants would stay in touch with Canadian immigration officials a year later. The Officer proactively reopened the Applicants’ case without notice. I asked the Respondent to refer to any cases that could establish that the Applicants remained responsible to keep their contact information updated after their applications are finalized, and to refer to any cases on an officer’s responsibility after an application is finalized. The Respondent pointed me to neither.

[19] I also disagree with the Respondent that it is irrelevant whether there is an outstanding application before the Officer. The difference goes to the heart of procedural fairness. Procedural fairness is not a technical requirement that is satisfied with an out-of-context checklist, in this case the letter sent off to the last-known address of a closed file. Rather, it is a fundamental principle that protects individuals from the arbitrary exercise of public power. It ensures that those affected by an administrative decision have a meaningful opportunity to know the case to be met and to respond before their rights or interests are affected. Where a public official, such as the Officer, reopens a concluded matter without notice to the affected party, that opportunity is entirely denied. Such conduct strikes at the very heart of fairness.

[20] In this case, the Officer could have remedied the matter when the Applicants replied to the Officer’s concern within 10 days of notice. Even after the Officer made the decision, once it came to their attention 10 minutes later that the Applicants had replied, they could have reopened the matter. Instead, they let the unfair decision stand. In the circumstances, this Court must interfere.

[21] Given that the Officer unusually reopened the case without notice and the resulting confusion around the ten-day deadline, when this case is redetermined, the applicants may file a complete response to the Officer’s concerns.

V. Conclusion

[22] For the foregoing reasons, the Application for Judicial Review is granted.

[23] There is no question to be certified.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-17254-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that

1. The application for Judicial Review is granted. This matter is sent back to the visa post for redetermination by a different officer.

2. The Applicants may file a new response for the redetermination.

3. There is no question for certification.

blank	"Negar Azmudeh"
blank	Judge

 

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

	Docket:	IMM-17254-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:		ZHANG HAIJUN ET AL. v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:		UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AT VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA
DATE OF HEARING:		NOVEMBER 4, 2025
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT:		AZMUDEH J.
DATED:		NOVEMBER 6, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Gabriel Chand	For The APPLICANTs
Albulena Qorrolli	FOR RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Chand & Company Law Corporation Vancouver, British Columbia	For The Applicants
Department of Justice Canada Vancouver, British Columbia	For The Respondent