Date: 20251030

Docket: IMM-21222-24

Citation: 2025 FC 1747

Toronto, Ontario, October 30, 2025

PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon

BETWEEN:

RABIB ALI

Applicant

and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The applicant, Rabib Ali, seeks judicial review of a decision rendered on October 31, 2024 [IAD Decision] by the Immigration Appeal Division [IAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. In that decision, the IAD dismissed Mr. Ali’s appeal of a decision dated March 18, 2024 [IRCC Decision] rendered by a Migration Officer of the High Commission of Canada in London, who refused the application for permanent residence of his son, Muzamil Hassan [Mr. Hassan], made under the sponsorship class pursuant to section 13 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] and Division 1 of Part 7 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR]. The IRCC Decision also found Mr. Hassan inadmissible to Canada for a period of five (5) years pursuant to paragraphs 40(1)(a) and 40(2)(a) of the IRPA for providing a digitally altered police certificate in support of his permanent residence application.

[2] Mr. Ali submits that the IAD erred in its consideration of the humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] grounds in support of his appeal, given that Mr. Hassan is his only child who remains in Pakistan. Mr. Ali further claims that the IAD erred in its materiality analysis of the misrepresentation and failed to duly consider the innocent mistake exception which, he says, is applicable to his son’s case. The Minister responds that the IAD Decision is reasonable and that Mr. Ali’s arguments “plainly seek a reweighing of the evidence” with respect to both the misrepresentation finding and the H&C assessment.

[3] For the following reasons, Mr. Ali’s application for judicial review will be dismissed. I am sympathetic to Mr. Ali’s situation but, considering all the circumstances and the evidence that was before the IAD, I am unable to conclude that the IAD Decision is unreasonable. I appreciate that, because of the misrepresentation finding, the consequences of the IAD Decision lead to a harsh and unfortunate result for the family. However, since no recent and genuine police certificate was provided to the IAD — even though Mr. Ali was given every opportunity to do so —, I cannot identify any shortcomings in the reasons of the IAD Decision that would warrant the Court’s intervention.

II. Background

A. The factual context

[4] Mr. Ali is a Pakistani national and permanent resident of Canada since September 2021. He acquired his permanent resident status after being sponsored by his second wife, a Canadian citizen. In November 2020, in his own permanent resident application, Mr. Ali was required to provide police certificates for his non-accompanying family members of age eighteen years and older. Mr. Hassan was twenty years old at the time and Mr. Ali thus provided the Respondent, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [Minister], a police certificate for Mr. Hassan, signed, numbered 1382/PAL, and dated November 30, 2020 [Signed 2020 Police Certificate]. Mr. Hassan is the oldest of Mr. Ali’s three children from his previous marriage.

[5] Since acquiring his permanent resident status, Mr. Ali has been trying to sponsor his children, including Mr. Hassan. In January 2022, Mr. Ali applied as a sponsor for Mr. Hassan and his two siblings altogether. This application was returned to Mr. Ali as a separate application needed to be filed for each accompanying child. In July 2022, separate applications were thus filed on behalf of his three children. However, those applications were deemed incomplete and returned. In January 2023, Mr. Ali once again filed applications to sponsor his children. The permanent resident applications of the other two children of Mr. Ali were successful and I understand that they are now in Canada with Mr. Ali. However, Mr. Hassan’s application was refused. At the time of his permanent resident application in January 2023, Mr. Hassan was a student and residing in the city of Kohat, in Pakistan.

B. The IRCC Decision

[6] Around November 2023, the Minister had concerns about whether Mr. Hassan met the definition of a dependent child within the meaning of section 2 and paragraph 117(1)(b) of the IRPR, since he was more than 22 years old at the time of the application. A procedural fairness letter [PFL] was issued. Although Mr. Hassan did not meet the definition of a dependent child, the Minister determined that there were sufficient H&C considerations to overcome the definition of the IRPR. Among those were the facts that Mr. Hassan met the definition of a dependent child at the time the first permanent resident application was filed and that the separation of Mr. Hassan from Mr. Ali and his biological siblings “would cause undue hardship” and “would not be in the spirit of family reunification under IRPA.” The Minister thus continued reviewing Mr. Hassan’s application.

[7] In January 2024, the Minister was concerned that Mr. Hassan might have submitted a fraudulent police certificate. It is unclear from the record when this other police certificate, signed, numbered 1855/PAL, and dated January 23, 2023 [Signed 2023 Police Certificate], was submitted to the Minister. But the officer reviewing the file noted that the Signed 2020 Police Certificate (previously submitted in support of Mr. Ali’s own permanent resident application) and the Signed 2023 Police Certificate were identical except for the date of issuance which seemed to have been modified, with the same paper creases, stamps, and signatures. Another PLF was therefore issued in this respect.

[8] In response, counsel for Mr. Ali and Mr. Hassan provided the Minister with a letter dated February 2024 allegedly issued by the Office of the District Police Officer of Kohat [DPOK Letter] indicating that the Signed 2023 Police Certificate was “correct and genuine.”

[9] Upon review, the officer concluded that the Signed 2023 Police Certificate showed “clear indicators of being digitally modified,” and that the date and certificate number of the Signed 2023 Police Certificate were typed whereas samples showed that these elements are usually handwritten. Moreover, a visual comparison of the Signed 2020 Police Certificate and the Signed 2023 Police Certificate showed identical photo, staple location, stamp placement, and district police officer [DPO] signature. However, open sources consulted by the officer revealed that the DPO had changed multiple times between 2020 and 2023 and as such, it was “highly unlikely” that the same DPO would have been able to sign both police certificates.

[10] The officer concluded that they were not satisfied that the Signed 2023 Police Certificate was genuine and that a police certificate is relevant and material to assess an applicant’s admissibility under the IRPA. The officer further concluded that by submitting a fraudulent document, Mr. Hassan had directly misrepresented material facts relating to a relevant matter that could have induced an error in the administration of the law, per paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA. A refusal letter was sent, and Mr. Hassan was found inadmissible to Canada for a period of five (5) years pursuant to paragraph 40(2)(a) of the IRPA.

C. The IAD Decision

[11] Mr. Ali filed an appeal of the IRCC Decision to the IAD pursuant to subsection 63(1) of the IRPA. Before the IAD, Mr. Ali conceded that the refusal was valid in law and that the Signed 2023 Police Certificate was not genuine but asked the IAD to allow the appeal on H&C grounds, considering that the misrepresentation was “entirely innocent.”

[12] The IAD first determined that the seriousness of the misrepresentation and the lack of remorse were negative considerations. Since Mr. Ali admitted that the Signed 2020 Police Certificate had been improperly altered for resubmission in support for the permanent resident application of his son, the IAD gave no weight to the DPOK Letter stating the opposite and provided by the same agent in Pakistan. In support of the appeal, Mr. Ali filed yet another police certificate, which was unsigned, numbered 310/PAL, and dated January 30, 2023 [Unsigned 2023 Police Certificate], but the IAD also gave it no weight because there was no sign that it was ever submitted to the Pakistani police. The agent who obtained the inauthentic Signed 2023 Police Certificate provided an affidavit in support of the appeal and testified at the hearing that given the unavailability of the DPO and time constraints, he decided to amend himself the previous certificate with a new date, without Mr. Hassan’s knowledge. It is also this agent who provided the DPOK Letter. For the IAD, it was difficult to understand why Mr. Hassan returned to the same agent who gave him an inauthentic police certificate to obtain a verification document that “is also more likely than not inauthentic.”

[13] On the onset of the hearing, the IAD identified the main issue of concern: the fact that Mr. Hassan has not provided evidence that he submitted a request for a police certificate after 2020, and that he does not have a current, valid police certificate. The IAD noted that admitting a foreign national to Canada without a police certificate could post a danger to the public or to the security of Canada. The IAD also gave counsel for Mr. Ali the opportunity to make an application for permission to file late evidence — i.e., a genuine police certificate — but no such application was made.

[14] The IAD concluded that “a very high level of H&C considerations” would be required to overcome the negative considerations linked to the filing of an inauthentic police certificate and the absence of a valid and genuine police certificate on file before the IAD. It determined that an assessment of the H&C factors listed in Canada (Attorney General) v Ribic (FCA), 2003 FCA 246 [Ribic] did not warrant special relief in the case at hand. The IAD noted that Mr. Hassan had never lived in Canada and had no current Canadian establishment and that no minors were directly affected by the IRCC Decision. The IAD found that Mr. Hassan was born and raised in Pakistan, is well established in Pakistan where he speaks the language, is familiar with the culture, received his education in that country, and has family support there since his uncles, grandfather, cousins, and mother remain in the country. Despite recognizing that one of the objectives of IRPA is family reunification in Canada (paragraph 3(1)(d) of the IRPA), the IAD found that Mr. Ali has not established that failure to have Mr. Hassan join him would cause hardship to either of them. They were together in Dubai at the time of the hearing and have been in constant communication in the past years. No country condition documents were filed, and Mr. Hassan did not submit that he has ever been at risk in Pakistan.

[15] The IAD recognized that the level of H&C considerations required could have been lowered if Mr. Hassan had complied with the IRPA requirement for a police certificate. However, this had not been done at the date of the hearing before the IAD, leaving the serious misrepresentation “not resolved.” Despite Mr. Ali arguing that the misrepresentation was entirely innocent because he hired the agent in good faith and was unaware that the Signed 2023 Police Certificate was not genuine, the IAD found that obtaining and submitting to the Minister a second document — i.e., the DPOK Letter — from the same unreliable source did not reflect due diligence on his part. Relying on decisions from this Court, the IAD noted that paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA about misrepresentation includes those made by a third party without the knowledge of the applicant. The IAD found that Mr. Ali and Mr. Hassan had a duty to enquire and be satisfied of the authenticity of the documents before submitting them to the Minister, and that this was not done.

[16] The IAD concluded that given the significance of the misrepresentation and the continued non-compliance as of the date of the hearing on an issue related to public safety and to the security of Canada, the bar was set high to overcome those concerns with H&C considerations. In the case at hand, the IAD concluded that there were insufficient H&C considerations to warrant special relief, and dismissed the appeal.

D. The standard of review

[17] The Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in judicial reviews of the merits of administrative decisions (Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 at para 35 [Pepa]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [Mason]), unless the circumstances lend themselves to the application of one of the recognized exceptions to this presumption (Canadian Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers v Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30 at para 28; Vavilov at paras 33–64, 69–72).

[18] The parties and I agree that the standard of reasonableness applies to decisions from the IAD with regards to sponsorship applications, including in cases where the IAD decided not to grant special relief based on H&C considerations (Ashiq v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 978 at paras 8–9; Brar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 289 at paras 13–14, 31; Khan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 105 at paras 9–10; Patel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 394 at paras 4, 18 [Patel]; Wang v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 705 at paras 15–16 [Wang]; Semana v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1082 at para 18 [Semana]).

[19] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Pepa at para 46; Mason at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility” (Vavilov at para 99, citing notably Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74).

[20] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (Pepa at paras 46–47; Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” (Vavilov at para 13).

[21] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence (Mason at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with an administrative decision maker’s factual findings (Vavilov at paras. 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; Doyle v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 237 at para 3).

[22] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” (Vavilov at para 100).

III. Analysis

A. The legislative framework

[23] An immigration officer granting a visa must generally be satisfied that an applicant meets the requirements of the IRPA (subsection 11(1) of the IRPA). Because one of the IRPA’s objectives is the reunification of families (paragraph 3(1)(d) of the IRPA), a foreign national may be selected as a member of the family class based on their relationship with a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident (subsection 12(1) of the IRPA). The requirements for the selection of permanent residents based on family reunification are provided in the IRPR.

[24] Under this process, the Canadian citizen or permanent resident is the family sponsor and becomes the person in charge of the family class immigration applications (Somodi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 288 at para 12 [Somodi]). The family sponsor is the person vested with the rights and responsibilities created by the family class program, including the right to initiate and conduct the legal proceedings needed to assert his or her rights, either before the IAD or before this Court (Somodi at para 27). As such, when a foreign national is the subject of a negative decision with respect to their permanent resident application, only their sponsor has a right to appeal that decision to the IAD (subsection 63(1) of the IRPA; Somodi at para 12; Ortiz v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1254 at para 5 [Ortiz]). The family sponsor challenges the visa officer’s decision on his or her behalf but to the benefit of the foreign national (Somodi at para 21). The foreign nationals themselves cannot appeal to the IAD (subsection 63(1) of the IRPA). When applicable, the sponsor must also exhaust their right of appeal to the IAD before applying for judicial review (Somodi at para 22; Ortiz at para 6).

[25] When there is a finding of misrepresentation, like in the case at hand, the sponsor can only appeal the visa officer’s decision to the IAD if the foreign national in question is their spouse, common-law partner, or child (subsection 64(3) of the IRPA). On appeal, the IAD may consider H&C factors but only if it finds that the foreign national is a member of the family class and that the sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of the IRPR (section 65 of the IRPA).

[26] The IAD can either allow the appeal or dismiss it (section 66 of the IRPA). To allow an appeal, the IAD must be satisfied that the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and fact, that a principle of natural justice has not been observed, or that, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, sufficient H&C considerations warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case (subsection 67(1) of the IRPA). In the latter case, the appeal need not to have been filed by the Minister (paragraph 67(1)(c) of the IRPA). If it allows the appeal, the IAD can set aside the original decision and substitute its own determination or refer the matter to the decision maker for reconsideration (subsection 67(2) of the IRPA).

B. The IAD Decision is reasonable

[27] At the outset, I acknowledge that this is an unfortunate case. However, the sympathy of a case is not the benchmark against which a reviewing court can decide to intervene or not. Reasonableness is, and it remains the standard that I am required to apply in the circumstances, no matter how harsh it may look to Mr. Ali and Mr. Hassan (Kaur v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 757 at para 57). Thus, and while I have some sympathy for Mr. Ali and Mr. Hassan, my only role is to determine whether the IAD Decision dismissing the appeal is reasonable or not based on the principles guiding judicial review by this Court.

[28] Mr. Ali challenges the reasonableness of the IAD Decision on two grounds. First, he claims that the IAD erred in its analysis of the misrepresentation. Second, he submits that the IAD’s consideration of the H&C factors was unreasonable given that Mr. Hassan is his only child remaining in Pakistan. Each argument will be dealt with in turn.

(1) The misrepresentation finding

[29] On the misrepresentation finding pursuant to paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA, Mr. Ali submits that the IAD erred in its materiality finding and failed to consider the honest and innocent mistake exception.

[30] Counsel for Mr. Ali first argues that while there is no such indication in paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA, a misrepresentation finding necessarily requires an intention to misrepresent facts. He maintains that Mr. Hassan did not have the intention to misrepresent facts by submitting the Signed 2023 Police Certificate to the Minister, as he did not know and had no reason to believe that it had been altered by the agent. As such, he says, it was an innocent and honest mistake.

[31] With respect, and as rightly pointed out by the Minister, this is entirely inconsistent with the established case law. This argument has been routinely rejected by this Court. I do not dispute that the misrepresentation of Mr. Hassan might have been unintentional, but there is no requirement that a misrepresentation be intentional, deliberate, or negligent, neither within section 40 of the IRPA nor in the jurisprudence on the matter (Rouamba v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1680 at para 44 [Rouamba]; Liu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1253 at para 10; Del Pilar Capetillo Mendez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 559 at para 20; Bains v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 57 at para 63). I also do not dispute that Mr. Hassan may have been unaware that the Signed 2023 Police Certificate provided by the agent had been altered. However, and as noted by the IAD, the Court has consistently held that the broad wording of section 40 of the IRPA encompasses misrepresentations even if made by another party without the knowledge of the applicant. Thus, I find that Mr. Hassan’s case is captured by section 40 of the IRPA.

[32] Mr. Ali also submits that the IAD failed to consider the innocent exception mistake. Such an exception was explained as follows by Justice Luc Martineau in Appiah v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1043 at paragraph 18:

The innocent misrepresentation exception is narrow and shall only excuse withholding material information in extraordinary circumstances in which the applicant honestly and reasonably believed he was not misrepresenting a material fact, knowledge of the misrepresentation was beyond the applicant’s control, and the applicant was unaware of the misrepresentation. Some cases have applied the exception if the information given in error could be corrected by reviewing other documents submitted as part of the application, suggesting that there was no intention to mislead. Courts have not allowed this exception where the applicant knew about the information, but contended that he honestly and reasonably did not know it was material to the application; such information is within the applicant’s control and it is the applicant’s duty to accurately complete the application.

[Citations omitted.]

[33] It is true that in certain circumstances, the failure of a decision maker to consider the innocent error exception can be a reviewable error. However, it is only where an error has been deemed unintentional that the decision maker must consider whether or not the error was not only honest but reasonable in order to determine if the innocent error exception applies (Rouamba at paras 45–46; Falsafi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1458 at paras 33–34 [Falsafi]; Pal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 502 at para 26; Malik v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1004 at paras 35–36; Takhar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 420 at para 21; Alalami v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 328 at para 16).

[34] Here, the IAD found that even if it was to accept that Mr. Hassan was subjectively unaware that the documents provided to him by the agent were not genuine, both he and Mr. Ali had a duty to enquire into the matter and satisfy themselves that the documents were authentic before submitting them to the Minister. This is consistent with the case law: applicants must review their application and ensure the completeness and veracity of the information and documents before signing it (Falsafi at para 31; Haque v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 315 at para. 15–16). Because applications to enter Canada are determined largely on the statements and evidence provided by applicants, there is a public interest in ensuring that applicants are truthful and give clear and straight statements to those charged with assessing these applications (Rouamba at para 18; Adepoju v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 438 at para 33; see also Wang at para 64).

[35] The IAD further determined that Mr. Hassan failed to exercise due diligence to ensure the authenticity of the documents presented to the visa post. The IAD held that obtaining and submitting to the Minister a second fraudulent document — the DPOK Letter — from the same agent after receiving the PFL did not constitute due diligence. Having concluded that Mr. Hassan did not exercise due diligence in providing false and misleading evidence on two occasions, it was unnecessary for the IAD to explicitly address the innocent mistake exception (Falsafi at para 32). Further, the IAD found not credible Mr. Hassan’s claim that he was unaware of the irregularities, given that he was an educated adult at the time.

[36] Reading the Decision holistically and contextually in light of the record (Vavilov at para 97), it is evident that the IAD concluded that Mr. Hassan did not fall within the very narrow scope of the innocent and honest mistake exception. Despite the harsh result for the family, I cannot find any shortcoming in that conclusion.

[37] Moreover, I am satisfied that the IAD reasonably concluded that the misrepresentation was material and provided an intelligible explanation for this finding. The IAD noted that one of the IRPA’s objectives is to protect public safety and maintain the security of the Canadian society (paragraph 3(1)(h) of the IRPA). On multiple occasions, the IAD emphasized that admitting a foreign national to Canada without a valid and genuine police clearance certificate could pose a danger to the public or to the security of Canada. I agree with the Minister that a misrepresentation — including the submission of altered documents — concerning a person’s criminal history is highly material to the determination of their admissibility to Canada (see for example Chung v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 896 at para 33).

[38] Counsel for Mr. Ali adds that the “IAD member with his speculation and subjective belief considered Applicant’s son a criminal.” With respect, this statement is a plain mischaracterization of the IAD Decision. Contrary to this assertion (repeated by counsel for Mr. Ali at the hearing before this Court), nothing in the IAD Decision would lead any reasonable person to draw the conclusion that Mr. Hassan was deemed to be a criminal. I further observe that, conversely, neither Mr. Ali nor his counsel provided the IAD with any evidence to prove that Mr. Hassan has a clean criminal record other than the 2020 Signed Police Certificate dated from several years ago. In other words, while the IAD did not find that Mr. Hassan was a criminal, it was unable to conclude that he was not one, as Mr. Ali failed to provide the required evidence to that effect.

[39] In conclusion, I cannot detect any shortcoming in the IAD’s assessment of the materiality of the misrepresentation or in its consideration of the honest and innocent mistake exception.

(2) The weight of H&C factors

[40] Turning to the H&C factors, Mr. Ali submits that the IAD wrongly applied the factors set out in Ribic. With respect, I do not agree.

[41] Despite an inadmissibility finding, the IAD can exercise its discretion to allow an appeal if it is satisfied that, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, there are sufficient H&C considerations to warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case (paragraph 67(1)(c) of the IRPA; Li v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 FC 1235 at para 15 [Li 2019]).

[42] In conducting its H&C analysis, the IAD must consider the Ribic factors, endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3 (Li 2019 at para 16; Wang at para 18). In the context of misrepresentation, as noted in the IAD Decision, these factors include the seriousness of the misrepresentation, the applicant’s remorse, the length of time spent in Canada, the degree to which the applicant is established in Canada, the applicant’s family in Canada, the impact on the family that denial of admission would cause, including the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, the support available to the applicant in the family and the community, and the degree of hardship that would be caused to the applicant if denied entry to Canada (Li 2019 at para 16; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Li, 2017 FC 805 at paras 21–22 [Li 2017]). These factors are non-exhaustive, and the weight accorded to each varies with the circumstances (Li 2019 at para 16; Wang at para 18). Granting special relief under paragraph 67(1)(c) of the IRPA has been described as exceptional and discretionary in nature and, as a result, the Court must give considerable deference to the IAD (Li 2019 at para 17; Li 2017 at para 19; Wang at para 17, 19, 29; Semana at paras 15, 17). Indeed, balancing the Ribic factors is a qualitative rather than a quantitative exercise (Wang at para 19).

[43] Here, the IAD found that the failure to provide a current and authentic police certificate was a negative consideration and that as such, a “very high” level of H&C considerations was required to overcome the seriousness of the misrepresentation. The IAD admitted that the required level of H&C could have been lowered if Mr. Hassan had complied with the IRPA and provided a police certificate as of the date of the hearing.

[44] Again, I find no shortcoming in that assessment. Paragraph 67(1)(c) of the IRPA specifies that for the IAD to allow an appeal, there must be sufficient H&C considerations that warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case. It was thus open for the IAD to require Mr. Ali and Mr. Hassan to meet a higher threshold for H&C factors in a case where there has been a serious misrepresentation, even more so when the misrepresentation has not been resolved at the time of the hearing. This is in line with the case law. The Court has consistently held that it is reasonable for the IAD to require the H&C considerations be commensurate with the seriousness of the deficiency to counterbalance it (Ouedraogo v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 FC 310 at para 27; see also Patel at para 12; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Doss, 2021 FC 623 at para 20; Li 2017 at para 31; Thavarasa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 625 at para 20; McCurvie v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 681 at para 52; Qureshi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 238 at paras 20–21).

[45] Mr. Ali asserts that “this is an ideal case” for the Ribic factors to warrant the IAD to grant the appeal. This argument is meritless. As indicated above, considerable deference in owed to the IAD’s assessment and weight given to H&C factors. In my view, it was reasonably open for the IAD to conclude that Mr. Hassan’s misrepresentation, his failure to provide a valid and genuine police certificate to the IAD, his lack of establishment in Canada, the availability of community support in Pakistan, and the absence of significant hardship resulting from maintaining the status quo collectively amounted to insufficient H&C considerations to overcome the seriousness of the misrepresentation and his continued non-compliance with the requirements of the IRPA. The evidence amply supports the IAD’s conclusion in that respect.

[46] I agree with the Minister that, in the end, Mr. Ali and Mr. Hassan are essentially dissatisfied with how the IAD weighed the H&C factors. However, on judicial review, it is not the Court’s role, absent exceptional circumstances, to reweigh the evidence (Vavilov at para 125).

C. The failure to provide the IAD with a valid and genuine police certificate

[47] I make one final comment. In my opinion, counsel for Mr. Ali failed to properly address the elephant in the room: the fact that a valid and genuine police certificate for Mr. Hassan was never provided to the IAD on appeal, nor before this Court on judicial review. At the beginning of the hearing, the IAD identified this as being a particular issue of concern. The IAD also gave counsel the opportunity, at the end of the hearing, to make an oral application for permission to file late evidence (IAD Decision at paras 3, 10). For unknown reasons, counsel for Mr. Ali did not seize this opportunity.

[48] I want to make clear that, despite the statements to the contrary repeatedly made by counsel for Mr. Ali at the hearing before the Court, the IAD Decision itself and the audio recording of the hearing before the IAD make it abundantly clear that Mr. Ali and his counsel were given the opportunity to correct the misrepresentation but nonetheless decided not to file any authentic police certificate. In fact, as ably mentioned by counsel for the Minister, Mr. Ali and his counsel asked the IAD — and surprisingly, this Court — to grant permanent residence to a person whose admissibility has not been established. This cannot be acceptable.

[49] One can only speculate what the outcome before the IAD would have been had Mr. Ali provided the IAD with a valid and genuine police certificate for Mr. Hassan or taken the opportunity to make an application to file such evidence at a later stage. However, one thing for sure, Mr. Ali only has himself or his counsel to blame for omitting to provide the required authentic police certificate for his son.

IV. Conclusion

[50] For all these reasons, Mr. Ali’s application for judicial review is dismissed. I find the IAD Decision to be reasonable considering the record.

[51] There are no questions of general importance to be certified.

JUDGMENT in IMM-21222-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. This application for judicial review is dismissed, without costs.

2. There is no question of general importance to be certified.

“Denis Gascon”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-21222-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:	RABIB ALI v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING:	OCTOBER 22, 2025
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	GASCON J.
DATED:	OCTOBER 30, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Mubashir Rizvi	For The Applicant
David Knapp	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

M.H.R. LAW FIRM PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION Mississauga, Ontario	For The Applicant
Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario	For The Respondent