Date: 20050215
Docket: T‑1159‑04
Citation: 2005 FC 246
Montréal, Quebec, February 15, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE JOHANNE GAUTHIER
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
JOCELYN HOTTE
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Jocelyn Hotte is an inmate at the Port-Cartier Institution where he is serving a life sentence. Upon his arrival at the Regional Reception Centre located in Ste-Anne-des-Plaines, he asked [translation] “to be placed” in Pavilion A, the institution which in his opinion was the least restrictive and which gave him the easiest access to his family.
[2] After this request was refused and he was transferred to Port-Cartier on January 30, 2003, Mr. Hotte filed many grievances, including one to dispute his placement at Port-Cartier (V30A0010374) and another to correct the content of the report by his case officer because it contained incorrect information (V30A0010240). A final decision by the third level was made on June 20, 2003, dismissing these two grievances.[1] No application for judicial review was filed against those decisions.
[3] On November 20, 2003, Mr. Hotte filed a complaint against the Correctional Service Canada (CSC) pursuant to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S. 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA). The CSC then disputed that the Canadian Human Rights Commission should decide that complaint, arguing that it should be dismissed under paragraphs 41(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the CHRA because Mr. Hotte did not exhaust the grievance procedures and did not avail himself of the remedy provided under section 18 of the Federal Courts Act, S.C. 1985, c. F-7, section 1; as am. by S.C. 2002, c. 8, s. 14 (FCA) (see Appendix A).
[4] On May 31, 2004, the Commission, ratifying its investigator’s recommendation on that issue, decided that it would rule on the complaint.
[5] This is an application for judicial review of that decision by the Commission.
[6] In his application and in his memorandum, the Attorney General had raised many errors involving the application of paragraphs 41(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the CHRA (see Appendix A) as well as a breach of the rules of natural justice by the Commission because it did not send the CSC all the communications between Mr. Hotte and the investigator.
[7] At the hearing, the applicant informed the Court that he would not argue all of these issues and that finally the Court had only to decide one issue, i.e. the issue of the Commission’s jurisdiction to decide a complaint, the substance of which is – in his opinion – the lawfulness of the SCS’s decision to transfer Mr. Hotte to Port-Cartier, or the issue of the decisions dismissing the grievances, issues which are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Federal Court pursuant to section 18 of the FCA. For the applicant, it is clear that Mr. Hotte is attempting to have that or those decisions by a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the FCA reviewed and set aside. A collateral attack of such a kind should not be allowed (Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63).
[8] Before examining the merits of the argument raised by the applicant, the Court must first determine whether this application for review is premature and whether it would be appropriate to intervene at this preliminary stage of the complaint process under the CHRA.
[9] There has not yet been an investigation and the report submitted to the Commission, only a summary and analysis of the brief submissions made by the two parties.
[10] According to the procedure provided under the CHRA, the Commission should – after the investigation and pursuant to section 44 of the CHRA (see Appendix A) – again decide those issues, specifically the issue of jurisdiction under paragraph 41(1)(c).
[11] To date, the Commission has not made a final decision on any substantive right of the parties. On that point, I would add that the Commission cannot allow a complaint. At the very most, if after the investigation it believes the complaint is justified, it can ask the Human Rights Tribunal to inquire into the complaint.
[12] The Federal Court of Appeal and the Federal Court have pointed out on many occasions that the courts should avoid intervening before the investigation has been completed in order to avoid inter alia unnecessary delays in processing complaints and decisions which may later become unnecessary, (Bell Canada v. Canada Telephone Employees Assn., [2000] F.C.J. No. 1094, confirmed by the Court of Appeal [2001] F.C.J. No. 705, Bell Canada v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, [1999] 1 F.C. 113 (C.A.) (QL) and more generally, MIL Systems, a division of Davie Industries Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada), [2000] F.C.J. No. 79 (C.A.) (QL)).
[13] Finally in Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, Brown and Evans, volume 1, chapter 3, the authors state at page 3-61:
And third, courts now generally defer a determination of an allegation that an administrative decision-maker has no jurisdiction over a matter or has breached the duty of fairness until the administrative process is complete. Not only does this avoid fragmentation of the issues and possibly unnecessary litigation, but it also permits the reviewing court to have the benefit of a complete record and, through the tribunal’s reasons for decision, its “expertise.” As well a court may be relunctant to decide a question of statutory interpretation before findings of fact have been made to provide a concrete context for an answer.
[14] It is true that in Musée des beaux-arts du Canada v. Alliance du Canada, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1863, I agreed to decide a jurisdictional issue in the context of an application for review of a decision made under section 41(1). In that matter, the answer to the question raised – i.e. the concurrent jurisdiction of the Commission and a grievance arbitrator – was in my opinion obvious as it had already been the subject of at least two decisions by our Court. The parties and the Commission had the opportunity to fully argue that issue before a decision was made and they agreed that the issue should be decided at this stage. There was no grey area regarding the substance of the dispute involving the parties before the grievance arbitrator and the substance of the complaint before the Commission.
[15] In Canada Post Corporation v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1997] F.C.J. No. 578, Rothstein J.,[2] then in trial division, had stated that the Court should not intervene in such jurisdictional issues at the stage of a decision to deal with the complaint pursuant to subsection 41(1) unless it is clear and beyond doubt that the Commission is without jurisdiction to deal with the complaint before it. That same reasoning was adopted more recently by the Court in Lower St. Lawrence Pilots v. Bouchard, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2170[3] at paragraph 42.
[16] Barring exceptional circumstances (which includes a clear lack of jurisdiction), the Court will not intervene at this stage.
[17] In his complaint, Mr. Hotte states:
Based on the above, I believe that I was the victim of harassment and discrimination;
- The uncalled for comments and the hurtful insinuations directed at me regarding my mental state. Those unnecessary and defamatory remarks should never have been made.
- The absence of medical problems as a CONDITION PRECEDENT to providing services, facilities or accommodations in Pavilion A. This unjustified condition precedent was not at all relevant to my situation and caused serious prejudice.
- I was handled differently with prejudicial treatment (many losses at all levels), by being deprived and disadvantaged with respect to my lawful right of access to Pavilion A. There was nothing establishing that my placement in that sector was substantially impossible. Decision-making authority seems to be short on objectivity. The evidence of discrimination is so obvious in this matter that no objective person from Correctional Service Canada could fail to see it.
[18] The parties agree that if we take into account only the CHRA, the Commission probably has the jurisdiction to deal with (“statuer”) on this complaint since Mr. Hotte is alleging a breach of sections 5 and 14 of the CHRA, that this breach occurred in Canada and that the CHRA applies to the CSC. Whether or not there were such discriminatory acts are questions of fact which may be determined by the Commission and, if need be, by the Human Rights Tribunal.
[19] Therefore, according to the Attorney General, the jurisdiction problem arises only when we consider the CHRA in light of section 18 of the FCA and the principle stated in Weber v. Ontario Hydro [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, as recently applied in Quebec (A.G.) v. Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223, 2004 SCC 40 (Charette) and in Quebec Procureur Général v. Charest, [2004] J.Q. 13504 (C.A.).
[20] The applicant argues that the simple fact that Mr. Hotte is attacking the CSC’s placement policy on the basis of discrimination does not strip the Federal Court of its exclusive original jurisdiction since in the FCA Parliament did not distinguish applications for judicial review based on a ground involving such human rights issues from those which are not.[4]
[21] The respondent for his part submits that the interpretation proposed by the Attorney General makes no sense since it would remove from the complaint process provided in the CHRA a significant portion of the scope of that Act’s application.
[22] Further, the respondent, relying on another decision by the Supreme Court on the same day as Charette, supra, i.e. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et du droit de la jeunesse) v. Quebec (A.G.), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 185, 2004 SCC 39 (Morin), submits that the substance of his complaint before the Commission is not whether the policy had been applied in a discriminatory fashion, but rather whether the CSC’s policy is in itself discriminatory.
[23] He states that a simple reading of these two decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada shows that even if determining the substance of the complaint or the litigation before the Commission seems to be a simple issue at first glance, this is not the case.
[24] According to the respondent, it is clear upon reading subsection 41(1) of the CHRA that Parliament wanted to confer to the Commission jurisdiction that was concurrent with other remedies existing under other federal statutes.
[25] In its written submissions to the investigator and to the Commission, the CSC does not refer to Weber, supra, or to any other case law, simply referring to the text of those sections 18 and 18.1 of the FCA. On that point, it is appropriate to point out that the Commission’s decision was written before Charette, Morin, and Charest, supra.
[26] Mr. Hotte did not present any arguments on this issue to the Commission, either.
[27] In her analysis, the investigator does not address the impact of section 18 of the FCA on the Commission’s jurisdiction under paragraph 41(1)(c). Further, she discusses the impact of this remedy in light of paragraph 41(1)(b), i.e. whether this remedy is one where the the complaint could be more appropriately dealt with initially, or at all stages.[5]
[28] In its decision dated May 31, 2004, the Commission states:
[TRANSLATION]
Paragraph 41(1)(a) of the Canadian Human Rights Act does not apply to the this case;
· The complainant availed himself of proceedings provided under another federal statute, in this case the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, and did so unsuccessfully;
· The power of the Federal Court under section 18 of the Federal Courts Act, is not such that the complaint could be appropriately dealt with in accordance with paragraph 41(1)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, but rather by way of judicial review; and
· The Commission has the jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the complaint, which is the case here.
[Emphasis added.]
[29] Considering the content of the submissions and of the report before the Commission, the Court does not really know whether the Commission considered the principle proposed in Weber, supra, in the context of its analysis pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(c) and, if so, what reasoning led it to decide as it did.
[30] At the hearing, the Court also did not have the opportunity to consider the Commission’s submissions since its motion to intervene was dismissed long before the hearing. We can determine therefrom that in the context of that motion, the Commission and the Court probably did not realize that the application for judicial review raised a “new” issue which could have a significant impact on the Commission’s jurisdiction and on the application of the scheme provided under the CHRA.
[31] The parties confirmed that the argument presented by the applicant had never been considered before, even though the FCA and the CHRA have coexisted for more than 30 years and that Weber, supra, was decided 10 years ago. The applicant submits that in light of Charette, supra, and Charest, supra, the Commission’s lack of jurisdiction is still clear today.
[32] The Court cannot agree with this position. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Morin, in each case that the principle of Weber, supra, is applied, Parliament’s intention must be identified by analysing, inter alia, the two statutory schemes at issue. In the cases referred to by the applicant, the courts did not have to analyse the specific provisions of the CHRA or those of the FCA.
[33] At paragraph 11 of Morin, supra, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, speaking for the majority, indeed stated that “[d]epending on the legislation and the nature of the dispute, other tribunals may possess overlapping jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, or themselves be endowed with exclusive jurisdiction”. To interpret the words “exclusive original jurisdiction” or “compétence exclusive” of section 18 of the FCA, the Court shall apply the principles of interpretation stated at page 87 of Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed., Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
[34] The parties did not make any submissions on that point. The Court notes however that as the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Puerto Rico v. Hernandez, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 228, pages 232-233, and Martineau v. Matqui Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, at paragraph 16, in enacting sections 18 and 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.10 (2nd Supp.) (see Appendix A), Parliament was indicating its intention to transfer the superintending power over federal boards, commissions or other tribunals from the provincial courts to the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal.
[35] Several years later, in 1976, by enacting the Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c.33, Parliament chose to give the Commission the discretion to determine whether it should deal with (“devait statuer”) on a complaint even when it had provided other remedies under other federal statutes. In fact, it states at section 33:
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33. Subject to section 32, the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed with it unless in respect of that complaint it appears to the Commission that
. . .
(b) the complaint
(I) is one that could more appropriately be dealt with, initially or completely, according to a procedure provided for under an Act of Parliament other than this Act, (ii) is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, [Emphasis added.]
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33. Sous réserve de l’article 32, la Commission doit statuer sur toute plainte dont elle est saisie à moins qu’elle estime la plainte irrecevable dans les cas où il apparaît à la Commission
...
b) que la plainte
(i) pourrait avantageusement être instruite, dans un premier temps ou à toutes les étapes, selon des procédures prévues par une autre loi du Parlement,
(ii) n’est pas de sa compétence, [Je souligne]
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These provisions are essentially the same as subparagraphs 41(1)(b)(i) and (ii).
[36] As I have already stated, the parties do not agree regarding the substance of the dispute and the Court does not consider that the answer to that question is clear and obvious in this case.
[37] The Court is also not satisfied that it is clear and beyond doubt that Parliament had intended to choose the exclusive jurisdiction model where a reviewable decision under section 18 was also the subject of a CHRA complaint because it was based on a discriminatory policy and therefore presumably breached section 5 of the CHRA.
[38] Similarly, the determination in Musée des beaux-arts du Canada, supra, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Paul, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1823, and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Syndicat des communications de Radio-Canada, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1060, is not necessarily the one that applies in this case.
[39] Not only is it not certain that there was a lack of jurisdiction but, as I already stated, the Commission was not able to participate in the debate up to this point. Under these circumstances, taking into account the various elements summarized by Brown and Evans (see paragraph 13, above), the Court determines that it is not appropriate or in the interest of justice to intervene at this very preliminary stage of the process. The application is premature.
[40] That being said, it is clear that if later in the process the Commission were to choose to refer this complaint back to the Human Rights Tribunal, after reassessing this issue pursuant to section 44, it would be important that it ensure that the record contain all of the relevant facts, including a copy of the case officer’s report and the policy referred to in the complaint. It should also clearly explain its reasoning[6].
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS:
The application is dismissed with costs.
“Johanne Gauthier”
Judge
Certified true translation
Kelley A. Harvey, BCL, LLB
Appendix A
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.)
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18. The Trial Division has exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal; and
(b) to hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal board, commission or other tribunal. |
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18. La Division de première instance a compétence exclusive en première instance
a) pour émettre une injonction, un bref de certiorari, un bref de mandamus, un bref de prohibition ou un bref de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire, contre tout office, toute commssion ou tout autre tribunal fédéral; et
b) pour entendre et juger toute demande de redressement de la nature de celui qu’envisage l’alinéa a), et notamment toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada aux fins d’obtenir le redressement contre un office, une commission ou à un autre tribunal fédéral |
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28.(1) Notwithstanding section 18 or the provisions of any other Act, the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application to review and set aside a decision or order, other than a decision or order of an administrative nature not required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis, made by or in the course of proceedings before a federal board, commission or other tribunal, upon the ground that the board, commission or tribunal |
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28.(1) Nonobstant l’article 18 ou les dispositions de toute autre loi, la Cour d’appel a compétence pour entendre et juger une demande d’examen et d’annulation d’une décision ou ordonnance, autre qu’une décision ou ordonnance de nature administrative qui n’est pas légalement soumise à un processus judiciaire ou quasi judiciaire, rendue par un office, une commission ou un autre tribunal fédéral ou à l’occasion de procédures devant un office, une commission ou un autre tribunal fédéral, au motif que l’office, la commission ou le tribunal |
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(a) failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; |
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a) n’a pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou a autrement excédé ou refusé d’exercer sa compétence; |
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(b) erred in law in making its decision or order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; or |
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b) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance entachée d’une erreur de droit, que l’erreur ressorte ou non à la lecture du dossier; ou |
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(c) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it. |
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c) a fondé sa décision ou son ordonnance sur une conclusion de fait erronée, tirée de façon absurde ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des éléments portés à sa connaissance. (2) Any such application may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or any party directly affected by the decision or order by filing a notice of the application in the Court within ten days of the time the decision or order was first communicated to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to that party by the board, commission or other tribunal, or within such further time as the Court of Appeal or a judge thereof may, either before or after the expiry of those ten days, fix or allow. |
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(2) Une demande de ce genre peut être faite par le procureur général du Canada ou toute partie directement affectée par la décision ou l’ordonnance, par dépôt à la cour d’un avis de la demande dans les dix jours qui suivent la première communication de cette décision ou ordonnance au bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à cette partie par l’office, la commission ou autre tribunal, ou dans le délai supplémentaire que la cour d’appel ou un de ses juges peut, soit avant soit après l’expiration de ces dix jours, fixer ou accorder. |
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(3) Where the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction under this section to hear and determine an application to review and set aside a decision or order, the Trial Division has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding in respect of that decision or order. |
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(3) Lorsque, en vertu du présent article, la Cour d’appel a compétence pour entendre et juger une demande d’examen et d’annulation d’une décision ou ordonnance, la Division de première instance est sans compétence pour connaître de toute procédure relative à cette décision ou ordonnance. |
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(4) A federal board, commission or other tribunal to which subsection (1) applies may at any stage of its proceedings refer any question or issue of law, of jurisdiction or of practice and procedure to the court of Appeal for hearing and determination. |
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(4) Un office, une commission ou un autre tribunal fédéral auxquels s’applique le paragraphe (1) peut, à tout stade de ses procédures, renvoyer devant la Cour d’appel pour audition et jugement, toute question de droit, de compétence ou de pratique et procédure. |
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(5) An application or reference to the court of Appeal made under this section shall be heard and determined without delay and in a summary way. |
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(5) Les demandes ou renvois à la Cour d’appel faits en vertu du présent article doivent être entendus et jugés sans délai et d’une manière sommaire. |
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(6) Notwithstanding subsection (1), no proceeding shall be taken thereunder in respect of a decision or order of the Governor in Council, the Treasury Board, a superior court or the Pension Appeals Board or in respect of a proceeding for a service offence under the National Defence Act. [Emphasis added.] |
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(6) Nonobstant le paragraphe (1), aucune procédure ne doit être instituée sous son régime relativement à une décision ou ordonnance du gouverneur en conseil, du conseil du Trésor, d’une cour supérieure ou de la Commission d’appel des pensions ou relativement à une procédure pour une infraction militaire en vertu de la Loi sur la défense nationale. [Je souligne] |
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Federal Courts Act – Loi sur les Cours fédérales
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7
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18. (1) Subject to section 28, the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal; and
(b) to hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
(2) The Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine every application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus in relation to any member of the Canadian Forces serving outside Canada.
(3) The remedies provided for in subsections (1) and (2) may be obtained only on an application for judicial review made under section 18.1. R.S., 1985, c. F‑7, s. 18; 1990, c. 8, s. 4; 2002, c. 8, s. 26.
18.1 (1) An application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought.
(2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected by it, or within any further time that a judge of the Federal Court may fix or allow before or after the end of those 30 days.
(3) On an application for judicial review, the Federal Court may (a) order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; or
(b) declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
(4) The Federal Court may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal board, commission or other tribunal
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe;
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record;
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
(5) If the sole ground for relief established on an application for judicial review is a defect in form or a technical irregularity, the Federal Court may
(a) refuse the relief if it finds that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred; and
(b) in the case of a defect in form or a technical irregularity in a decision or an order, make an order validating the decision or order, to have effect from any time and on any terms that it considers appropriate. 1990, c. 8, s. 5; 2002, c. 8, s. 27. 18.2
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18. (1) Sous réserve de l’article 28, la Cour fédérale a compétence exclusive, en première instance, pour :
a) décerner une injonction, un bref de certiorari, de mandamus, de prohibition ou de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire contre tout office fédéral;
b) connaître de toute demande de réparation de la nature visée par l’alinéa a), et notamment de toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada afin d’obtenir réparation de la part d’un office fédéral.
(2) Elle a compétence exclusive, en première instance, dans le cas des demandes suivantes visant un membre des Forces canadiennes en poste à l’étranger : bref d’habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de mandamus.
(3) Les recours prévus aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) sont exercés par présentation d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire. L.R. (1985), ch. F‑7, art. 18; 1990, ch. 8, art. 4; 2002, ch. 8, art. 26.
18.1 (1) Une demande de contrôle judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général du Canada ou par quiconque est directement touché par l’objet de la demande.
(2) Les demandes de contrôle judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première communication, par l’office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au bureau du sous‑procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire qu’un juge de la Cour fédérale peut, avant ou après l’expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder.
(3) Sur présentation d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire, la Cour fédérale peut : a) ordonner à l’office fédéral en cause d’accomplir tout acte qu’il a illégalement omis ou refusé d’accomplir ou dont il a retardé l’exécution de manière déraisonnable;
b) déclarer nul ou illégal, ou annuler, ou infirmer et renvoyer pour jugement conformément aux instructions qu’elle estime appropriées, ou prohiber ou encore restreindre toute décision, ordonnance, procédure ou tout autre acte de l’office fédéral.
(4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3) sont prises si la Cour fédérale est convaincue que l’office fédéral, selon le cas :
a) a agi sans compétence, outrepassé celle‑ci ou refusé de l’exercer;
b) n’a pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou d’équité procédurale ou toute autre procédure qu’il était légalement tenu de respecter;
c) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance entachée d’une erreur de droit, que celle‑ci soit manifeste ou non au vu du dossier;
d) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance fondée sur une conclusion de fait erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des éléments dont il dispose;
e) a agi ou omis d’agir en raison d’une fraude ou de faux témoignages;
f) a agi de toute autre façon contraire à la loi.
(5) La Cour fédérale peut rejeter toute demande de contrôle judiciaire fondée uniquement sur un vice de forme si elle estime qu’en l’occurrence le vice n’entraîne aucun dommage important ni déni de justice et, le cas échéant, valider la décision ou l’ordonnance entachée du vice et donner effet à celle‑ci selon les modalités de temps et autres qu’elle estime indiquées. 1990, ch. 8, art. 5; 2002, ch. 8, art. 27.
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Canadian Human Rights Act
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6
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41. (1) Subject to section 40, the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed with it unless in respect of that complaint it appears to the Commission that
(a) the alleged victim of the discriminatory practice to which the complaint relates ought to exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available;
(b) the complaint is one that could more appropriately be dealt with, initially or completely, according to a procedure provided for under an Act of Parliament other than this Act;
(c) the complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission;
(d) the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; or
(e) the complaint is based on acts or omissions the last of which occurred more than one year, or such longer period of time as the Commission considers appropriate in the circumstances, before receipt of the complaint.
44. (1) An investigator shall, as soon as possible after the conclusion of an investigation, submit to the Commission a report of the findings of the investigation.
(2) If, on receipt of a report referred to in subsection (1), the Commission is satisfied
(a) that the complainant ought to exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available, or
(b) that the complaint could more appropriately be dealt with, initially or completely, by means of a procedure provided for under an Act of Parliament other than this Act,
it shall refer the complainant to the appropriate authority.
(3) On receipt of a report referred to in subsection (1), the Commission
(a) may request the Chairperson of the Tribunal to institute an inquiry under section 49 into the complaint to which the report relates if the Commission is satisfied
(I) that, having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the complaint is warranted, and
(ii) that the complaint to which the report relates should not be referred pursuant to subsection (2) or dismissed on any ground mentioned in paragraphs 41(c) to (e); or
(b) shall dismiss the complaint to which the report relates if it is satisfied
(I) that, having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the complaint is not warranted, or
(ii) that the complaint should be dismissed on any ground mentioned in paragraphs 41(c) to (e).
(4) After receipt of a report referred to in subsection (1), the Commission
(a) shall notify in writing the complainant and the person against whom the complaint was made of its action under subsection (2) or (3); and
(b) may, in such manner as it sees fit, notify any other person whom it considers necessary to notify of its action under subsection (2) or (3). R.S., 1985, c. H‑6, s. 44; R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 64; 1998, c. 9, s. 24.
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41. (1) Sous réserve de l’article 40, la Commission statue sur toute plainte dont elle est saisie à moins qu’elle estime celle‑ci irrecevable pour un des motifs suivants :
a) la victime présumée de l’acte discriminatoire devrait épuiser d’abord les recours internes ou les procédures d’appel ou de règlement des griefs qui lui sont normalement ouverts;
b) la plainte pourrait avantageusement être instruite, dans un premier temps ou à toutes les étapes, selon des procédures prévues par une autre loi fédérale;
c) la plainte n’est pas de sa compétence;
d) la plainte est frivole, vexatoire ou entachée de mauvaise foi;
e) la plainte a été déposée après l’expiration d’un délai d’un an après le dernier des faits sur lesquels elle est fondée, ou de tout délai supérieur que la Commission estime indiqué dans les circonstances.
44. (1) L’enquêteur présente son rapport à la Commission le plus tôt possible après la fin de l’enquête.
(2) La Commission renvoie le plaignant à l’autorité compétente dans les cas où, sur réception du rapport, elle est convaincue, selon le cas :
a) que le plaignant devrait épuiser les recours internes ou les procédures d’appel ou de règlement des griefs qui lui sont normalement ouverts;
b) que la plainte pourrait avantageusement être instruite, dans un premier temps ou à toutes les étapes, selon des procédures prévues par une autre loi fédérale.
(3) Sur réception du rapport d’enquête prévu au paragraphe (1), la Commission :
a) peut demander au président du Tribunal de désigner, en application de l’article 49, un membre pour instruire la plainte visée par le rapport, si elle est convaincue :
(i) d’une part, que, compte tenu des circonstances relatives à la plainte, l’examen de celle‑ci est justifié,
(ii) d’autre part, qu’il n’y a pas lieu de renvoyer la plainte en application du paragraphe (2) ni de la rejeter aux termes des alinéas 41c) à e);
b) rejette la plainte, si elle est convaincue :
(i) soit que, compte tenu des circonstances relatives à la plainte, l’examen de celle‑ci n’est pas justifié,
(ii) soit que la plainte doit être rejetée pour l’un des motifs énoncés aux alinéas 41c) à e).
(4) Après réception du rapport, la Commission :
a) informe par écrit les parties à la plainte de la décision qu’elle a prise en vertu des paragraphes (2) ou (3);
b) peut informer toute autre personne, de la manière qu’elle juge indiquée, de la décision qu’elle a prise en vertu des paragraphes (2) ou (3). L.R. (1985), ch. H‑6, art. 44; L.R. (1985), ch. 31 (1er suppl.), art. 64; 1998, ch. 9, art. 24.
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FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T‑1159‑04
STYLE OF CAUSE: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA v. JOCELYN HOTTE
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: January 17, 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER: The Honourable Madam Justice Johanne Gauthier
DATED: February 14, 2005
APPEARANCES:
Dominique Guimond FOR THE APPLICANT
Dominique Mathurin FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
John H. Sims, Q.C. FOR THE APPLICANT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec
Dominique Mathurin FOR THE RESPONDENT
Montréal, Quebec
[1] It is not clear whether Mr. Hotte raised a discrimination problem in these matters and whether the decision-makers reviewed that issue. Mr. Hotte has since filed other grievances disputing inter alia the assessment procedure for his security classification, a matter relevant to his transfer since that classification is also used to determine the institution able to receive an inmate.
[2] This decision was confirmed on appeal without any remark by the Court of Appeal on this point, ([1999] F.C.J. No. 705 (CA)).
[3] Like Blanchard J. in that matter, the Court is aware of the fact that the standard of review applicable to the issue of jurisdiction is that of correctness.
[4] See footnote 7. Further, the Court notes that in Poulin v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1358 at paragraph 15, Beaudry J. states that if the offender contesting a decision by the CSC through an application for judicial review wanted to raise other grounds of violation of the CHRA, he could refer to the Commission “which would be a much more appropriate forum at this stage”.
[5] It finds that it could not, but its reasons are far from being clear for the Court.
[6] The same remark applies to paragraph 44(2)(b).