Date: 20000428
Docket: IMM-2335-98
Weldeab Tewelde,
Applicant
- and -
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
Muldoon, J.
[1] This is an application for judicial review, pursuant to section 82.1 of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, Chap. I-2, of two decisions by a Minister's delegate dated April 8, 1998 determining that the applicant constitutes a danger to the public in Canada. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on May 28, 1999. The applicant seeks certiorari quashing both decisions of the Minister's delegate. His full name is Weldeab Osgodom Tewelde, but he goes by "Walter" Tewelde.
Facts
[2] The applicant, Mr. Weldeab Tewelde, now over forty years old, was born in Eritrea, at the time a province of Ethiopia, and is a citizen of the new State of Eritrea. He arrived in Canada on April 21, 1981 and made a claim for convention refugee status. He was declared a convention refugee on November 21, 1984 and became a permanent resident on March 17, 1986. Since this time, the applicant has repeatedly got himself in trouble with the law.
[3] In total, the applicant has been convicted of five criminal offences. On March 23, 1990, he was convicted on two counts of living off the avails of prostitution and on one count of robbery for which he was sentenced to eighteen months less a day and six months respectively. On December 11, 1995, he was convicted of possession of narcotics in respect of 48 grams of cocaine but sentenced only to time already served plus a day. On July 10, 1997, he was convicted of possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking, again in respect of cocaine, indeed, crack cocaine, and sentenced, in part, to eighteen months in jail, $5,000 fine and 2 years probation. The sentence of one day on the possession of narcotics charge reflects the fact that the applicant spent over 50 days in pre-trial detention.
[4] The applicant was notified, by letter dated December 3, 1997, that the Minister would be considering whether to issue an opinion, pursuant to subsection 70(5) and paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, Chap. I-2 (the Act), that the applicant was a danger to the public. The letter listed the documents which would be provided to the Minister's delegate for consideration. A copy of each document was attached. The letter advised the applicant of the effect such an opinion would have and invited him to make representations regarding whether he was a danger to the public and whether there might be sufficient humanitarian and compassionate factors to outweigh any danger which he might pose.
[5] In response to the respondent's letter, counsel for the applicant made submissions in letters dated January 21, January 31 and February 2, 1998. One of the submissions concerned the applicant's then current employment as a nursing assistant. In the letter dated January 21, 1998, counsel wrote:
| Mr. Tewelde has worked as a nursing assistant at the St. Boniface General Hospital. He wants to complete a nursing degree. His work is humanitarian work, an asset to the community. In the 1995 sentencing for possession Judge Corrin noted: "He's chose [sic] a humanitarian calling and has been, by all accounts, assiduously applying himself to fulfilment of his ambitions in that regard. |
In the same letter, counsel submitted that the delegate should consider the risk awaiting the applicant should he be deported to Eritrea. Attached to the letter dated February 2, 1998, were several pages of notes written in the hand of the applicant. He elaborated only slightly on counsel's fears:
| I left home in 1977, fled to Saudi Arabia[.] I work at American Embassy until 1981. In 1981 I com[e] to Canada. [When] I was at hom[e] I was an active member of ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front. [I] know [that] Eritrea is under the [illegible] of P.L.F. (other party)[.] It might not be safe for me to go home. |
[6] On April 8, 1998, the delegate issued two opinions, each stating that the applicant constituted a danger to the public, pursuant to subsection 70(5) and paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act respectively. Each decision is found in a one-page letter mailed to the applicant and together in a document entitled Request For Minister's Opinion - Act. 70(5) and 53(1)(d) (hereinafter Request For Minister's Opinion). The opinions expressed are based on the applicant's submissions, on comments provided by one of the respondent's reviewing officers, on reports concerning the current conditions in Eritrea, on a document entitled Ministerial Opinion Report and on reports concerning his criminal past.
[7] The issue of the risk facing the applicant was canvassed in some detail in the Request For Minister's Opinion. Part E of the Ministerial Opinion Report, however, does not canvass the issue of risk, despite that part's being prefaced by the following instructions: "If applicable, list humanitarian and compassionate, public policy or removal risk considerations".
[8] The applicant filed an application for leave and for judicial review in respect of the two opinions of the delegate on May 14, 1998. Pursuant to rule 9 of the Federal Court Immigration Rules, 1993 SOR/93-22, this Court's Registry duly requested that the delegate send the applicant either the reasons for the decision or a note stating that no reasons were forthcoming. The delegate sent a note confirming that no reasons were given. On leave for judicial review being granted to the applicant, the delegate sent the material relevant to his decisions to the applicant. Unfortunately, nothing in the bundle of documents was identifiable as reasons.
Legal Issues
[9] On of the delegate's opinions was made pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Act. This subsection provides:
| 70. (5) No appeal may be made to the Appeal Division by a person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) or (b) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made where the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada and the person has been determined by an adjudicator to be
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70. (5) Ne peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel les personnes, visées au paragraphe (1) ou aux alinéas (2)a) ou b), qui, selon la décision d'un arbitre:
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[10] The second opinion was rendered pursuant to paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act. This paragraph provides:
| 53. (1) Notwithstanding subsections 52(2) and (3), no person who is determined under this Act or the regulations to be a Convention refugee, nor any person who has been determined to be not eligible to have a claim to be a Convention refugee determined by the Refugee Division on the basis that the person is a person described in paragraph 46.01(1)(a), shall be removed from Canada to a country where the person's life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion unless
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53. (1) Par dérogation aux paragraphes 52(2) et (3), la personne à qui le statut de réfugié au sens de la Convention a été reconnu aux termes de la présente loi ou des règlements, ou dont la revendication a été jugée irrecevable en application de l'alinéa 46.01(1)a), ne peut être renvoyée dans un pays où sa vie ou sa liberté seraient menacées du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques, sauf si, selon le cas: [...]
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[11] The applicant raises five issues. The first issue concerns whether the delegate acted in a perverse and capricious manner and without regard to the material before him in finding the applicant to be a danger to the public or whether the delegate"s decision otherwise failed the appropriate standard of review. The second issue concerns whether the delegate considered certain submissions made by the applicant in respect of humanitarian issues. The third issue concerns whether the delegate considered the risk facing the applicant were he to be returned to Eritrea and, in particular, whether a 1984 risk assessment should have been considered. The fourth issue concerns whether the delegate breached the principles of fundamental justice as laid out in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights And Freedoms , Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (the Charter). The fifth issue concerns whether the delegate breached the duty of fairness owed to the applicant by not providing him with reasons or by not allowing for oral representations prior to the opinion being formed.
[12] The applicant"s first submission is based on the allegation that his many convictions do not support a finding that he is a danger to the public. He asserts that his earlier crimes took place long ago, were different in nature to his most recent ones and, therefore, cannot have been relevant to a finding of danger. In his written submissions, the applicant also plays down his recent drug-related convictions as merely for possession and social trafficking. He states that his recent convictions cannot lead one to conclude that he is likely to re-offend or to pose a danger on any other ground. He asserts, indeed, that incarceration, his acceptance that he made a mistake and his plea for forgiveness can only lead one to conclude that he will not re-offend.
[13] The respondent submits that the whole of the applicant"s criminal record is relevant to forming a danger opinion. He points to the fact that the earlier convictions are for serious offences involving violence and the victimization of others. The recent convictions evince an ongoing involvement in the dangerous drug sub-culture.
[14] A Minister"s delegate may determine that someone is a danger to the public under subsection 70(5) of the Act if there is a possibility that he has committed a serious crime in the past and that he may seriously be thought to be a potential re-offender; Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , [1997] 2 F.C. 646 (F.C.A.) at 668 Mr. Justice Gibson, in Thompson v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (IMM-107-96, August 16, 1996) (F.C.T.D.), points out, however, that this does not mean that the mere fact of a conviction is sufficient to base a finding that someone is dangerous.
[15] This Court is satisfied, notwithstanding the applicant"s pleas for forgiveness, that there is sufficient evidence to ground a finding that he is a danger to the public. As a whole, the applicant"s criminal record, all of which is relevant, shows a serious possibility of re-offending. It includes incitement to robbery, which was not carried out by the applicant/pimp's prostitutes. Not only does it span seven years but it features two consecutive convictions centred around drugs. It shows that the applicant has not learned from his past mistakes and speaks directly to the risk of re-offending. That his most recent conviction may be described as social trafficking does not alleviate the serious nature of the wrong he has committed nor diminish the fact that he was dealing with crack-cocaine. Nor can the minimal sentence meted out for the original drug conviction serve to cover up his tarnished past. On these last two charges alone and in light of the circumstances surrounding them he can be considered a danger to the public. In this regard, the Court notes the decision in Smith v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (IMM-1153-96, July 15, 1997) (F.C.T.D.).
[16] No error being apparent on a somewhat probing examination, this Court does not need to address whether the standard of review appropriate to the matter in question is one of unreasonableness or patent unreasonableness. The delegate"s opinion, in essence, passes muster on both accounts.
[17] The applicant"s second submission is based on his contention that the delegate did not consider the applicant"s submissions concerning humanitarian matters contained in various letters. In particular, he notes that, in the Ministerial Opinion Report - Part E, on which the decision under review is partly based, there is no mention of these submissions. The respondent submits that there is no evidence to indicate that the delegate failed to consider any of the submissions made by the applicant.
[18] The only submission which might embrace a humanitarian matter is counsel"s assertion that the applicant, as a nursing assistant, was performing humanitarian work. The Court has difficulty in understanding, however, that the performance of this job is per se a humanitarian matter. No description was provided by counsel of what a nursing assistant does. In its absence, there is no support for the applicant"s argument, notwithstanding that his job was described by Judge Corrin in his reasons for sentencing on November 30, 1995 as a "humanitarian calling". Judge Corrin did not however find that the applicant declined to be paid wages in his "humanitarian calling". That counsel, in his letters, characterized the job as humanitarian work changes nothing. The submission fails.
[19] The applicant"s submission that the delegate should have considered the danger to the applicant if he were returned to Eritrea must also fail. Counsel for the applicant made much, in his letter of January 21, 1998, of the need for the delegate to consider the danger to which the applicant would be exposed were he to be returned to Eritrea. The allegation of danger, however, was supported by some very meagre evidence in a letter dated February 2, 1998. Also, it is clear that a detailed risk assessment was made in the first part of the Request For Minister"s Opinion, on which both danger opinions are grounded. As such, it cannot now be found that the delegate failed to consider the risk facing the applicant were he to be deported. Nor can it be found that insufficient weight was accorded to this risk.
[20] In respect of whether the risk analysis contained in the applicant"s 1984 refugee claim should have been before the delegate, this Court must also find against the applicant. He was given the particulars of the list of documents which would be placed before the delegate and invited to supplement it with his own submissions. That he failed to do so sufficiently can only redound on him. This does not mean that, in the circumstances, a delegate is relieved of his or her duty to consider all relevant material. It simply means that the onus is on persons such as the applicant to get un-listed material before the delegate so that he or she has a chance to consider it. That a copy of some document may happen to exist in some filing cabinet somewhere in a ministry office in Canada cannot serve to reverse this applicant's onus as regards a particular document.
[21] The applicant next submits that the delegate breached the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed under section 7 of the Charter in that first, he was not accorded a hearing or an interview, second, he was not provided with a copy of the recommendations upon which the delegate acted and was not provided with an opportunity to comment on them, third, he was not given reasons for the opinion which was eventually formed and fourth, he was not given reasons for the delegate"s decision. This sort of matter was canvassed during 1991-92 by the Supreme Court of Canada in Chiarelli v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, wherein Mr. Justice Sopinka wrote for the Court the following passages which commence on p. 743:
| The scope of principles of fundamental justice will vary with the context and the interests at stake. In R. v. Lyons,[1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, La Forest J., writing for the majority, stated at p. 361: |
| It is clear that, at a minimum, the requirements of fundamental justice embrace the requirements of procedural fairness (see, e.g., the comments to this effect of Wilson J. in Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at pp. 212-23). It is also clear that the requirements of fundamental justice are not immutable; rather, they vary according to the context in which they are invoked. Thus, certain procedural protections might be constitutionally mandated in one context but not in another. |
| Similarly, the rules of natural justice and the concept of procedural fairness, which may inform principles of fundamental justice in a particular context, are not fixed standards. See: Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l'Acadie v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879, at pp. 895-96; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, at p. 682. |
| In Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, La Forest J. explained at p. 539 that in assessing whether a procedure accords with fundamental justice, it may be necessary to balance competing interests of the state and the individual. |
| What these practices have sought to achieve is a just accommodation between the interests of the individual and those of the state, both of which factors play a part in assessing whether a particular law violates the principles of fundamental justice; see R. v. Lyons, [[1987] 2 S.C.R. 309], at pp. 327 and 329; R. v. Beare, [[1988] 2 S.C.R. 387], at pp. 403-5; also my reasons in R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at p. 745 (dissenting on another point); see also R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at p. 304, per La Forest J. (Dickson C.J. and Lamer J. concurring). The interests in the area with which we are here concerned involve particularly delicate balancing... (pp. 743-44) |
The quoted high judicial decisions are far from identical in fact and law, but the enunciation of principles aids in comprehending the parties' disparate stances. The applicant's submissions on Charter section 7 are therefore discounted in these circumstances. He is reasonably characterized as a danger to the public in Canada pursuant to both invoked sections of the Immigration Act. The respondent submits that, as the liberty and security interests of a person are not effected by an opinion made under subsection 70(5) of the Act, section 7 of the Charter may not be invoked.
[22] The respondent is correct in the submission that the interests defined under section 7 of the Charter are not engaged when an opinion is rendered pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Act. As Mr. Justice Strayer, in Williams, wrote, p. 667:
| On the basis of the jurisprudence to date, then, I am unable to conclude that "liberty" includes the right of personal choice for permanent residents to stay in this country where, as the Supreme Court said in Chiarelli:21 |
| They have all deliberately violated an essential condition under which they were permitted to remain in Canada. |
The applicant relied on the reasons of Gibson J. in Farhadi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 3 F.C. 315 (F.C.T.D.) but these serve only to reinforce the conclusion rendered by Strayer J. As for danger opinions made under paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act, the passage quoted above and the decision in Ngo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (IMM-2257-96, IMM-2258-96, June 17, 1997) (F.C.T.D.) make it clear that they, too, do not engage the interests defined in section 7 of the Charter.
[23] The final written submission of the applicant is that the delegate breached the duty of fairness owed to him (as opposed to his Charter rights) by not providing written reasons or oral hearings prior to the rendering of the two opinions. In support of this submission, the applicant argues that the delegate"s opinions have a significant impact on him in that they both allow for his removal to a country nearby the one from which he fled as a refugee. He asserts that, in addition, the opinion based on subsection 70(5) of the Act prevents him from appealing his removal order. The applicant also argues that it would be anomalous if reasons were required when making a humanitarian and compassionate decision pursuant to subsection 114(2) of the Act but not required for a danger opinion which entails an examination of the exact same matters. At the hearing, the applicant also argued that the respondent is effectively estopped from relying on certain documents as reasons but added that, even if the Minister wished to rely on these documents, they would be inadequate as reasons. The respondent concedes that an opinion made pursuant to paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act must be supported by reasons. The Minister argues, however, that these were eventually provided and were adequate. As for the opinion made pursuant to subsection 70(5), the respondent submits that reasons are not required.
[24] The applicant"s position that the duty of fairness requires reasons for both danger opinions is grounded on the judgment of Madam Justice L"Heureux-Dubé in Baker v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (No. 25823, July 9, 1999) (S.C.C.). In them, L"Heureux-Dubé J. confirms that a decision"s importance for, or impact on, an applicant is a significant factor in determining the level of procedural fairness appropriate to the particular decision-making process. As the respondent submits, however, this point was not lost on Mr. Justice Strayer in Williams, supra where he concluded that reasons are not required in the case of a subsection 70(5) danger opinion. Strayer J. writes:
| What then did the respondent lose through the Minister forming the opinion that he is a danger to the public in Canada? He lost the right to pursue an appeal under paragraph 70(1)(a) on any question of law or fact or mixed question of law and fact. In place of this he was given the right to seek a judicial review which would be fully as effective in respect of any questions of law but might not provide as complete a review of findings of fact. This he did not do nor is it suggested that the respondent really has an unrequited desire to argue that the adjudicator erred in fact or law with respect to issuing the deportation order. In any event, the substitution of judicial review for a right of appeal, by virtue of the Minister forming his opinion, does not strike me as a serious effect on his rights. |
[25] Another reason to distinguish Madam Justice L"Heureux-Dubé"s treatment of subsection 114(2) decisions, at least from that of subsection 70(5) opinions, is that the latter require a balancing of an individual"s circumstances with the right of Canadians to circumscribe the amount of danger that they are willing to tolerate. As such, the nature of the opinions and the process followed in reaching them result in a tribunal with a much stronger administrative character than that which makes subsection 114(2) decisions. The decision in Baker , to the limited degree that the applicant relies on it, therefore, cannot be seen as having overruled Mr. Justice Strayer"s cogent analysis. Reasons, therefore, continue not to be required for subsection 70(5) opinions. That they may be for other decisions, such as ones made under paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act (a fact which the respondent concedes), is irrelevant. As for whether an oral hearing is required, this Court finds that the relevant factors, including the impact of the delegate"s subsection 70(5) opinion on the applicant, do not necessitate that one be convened.
[26] In respect of the reasons underlying the opinion made pursuant to paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act, this Court needs only to make a few remarks. First, where reasons are withheld and then merely alluded to after the applicant"s "pleadings" are closed, this Court adjudges that the spirit of rule 9 of the Federal Court Immigration Rules, 1993 , which requires that a certified copy of any reasons be sent to an applicant without delay, to have been satisfied, without substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. The applicant hardly had to guess what the reasons were when composing his response. After all, it was he who was personally convicted of robbing, living off the avails of prostitutes' hard work and risk-taking, inciting others to commit aggravated assault and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (tribunal record: p. 8). Item 11 on pp. 8-9 of the tribunal record notes:
| 11. DANGER RATIONALE |
| SUBJECT HAS A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. HE DOES NOT ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY OF HIS CONVICTIONS. HIS CONVICTIONS ARE THOSE WHICH ENDANGER LIFE. THE JUDGE IN HIS SENTENCING REMARKS FOR HIS LATEST CONVICTION STATED "THE ACCUSED WAS RELEASED FOLLOWING AN EARLIER CONVICTION AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REINVOLVED AND IT CAN BE SAID, HE DOES POSE A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY." |
| (Mr. Justice Kennedy, Man. Q.B.) |
What can the applicant show to persuade the Court that he has changed his ways? There is nothing on this record except his own pleading to the Canada which he has so wronged - handwritten by the applicant :
| I am asking for forgiveness, I want to seek employment and complete my degree at U. of M. |
| (tribunal record p. 13) |
The applicant's sequence of vicious and exploitive criminal offences, persuades this Court that left to his own devices the applicant will be unable to resist the temptation to be an "important" man in his community, and will be offending again, as he has in past. He has had plenty of time to reflect on his own criminal misconduct, and to amend his ways, if so inclined. According to the respondent"s submissions, the words of L"Heureux-Dubé J., in Baker , can be interpreted as sanctioning this sort of thing. Baker, it ought to be remembered was rendered while the present case was pending. Out of respect for the principles of procedural fairness and rule 9, therefore, the danger opinion made pursuant to paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act should be allowed to stand in the circumstances.
[27] A final issue raised by counsel for the applicant at the hearing concerns whether the delegate, in his danger opinions, offended the Act by effectively reversing a previous finding that the applicant was at risk on return to Eritrea without using the cessation provisions found in sections 69.2 and 69.3 of the Act. Opposing counsel considered this argument a novel one and this Court needs only to add that it is also a legally unsupportable one. The Act, in essence, does not require that delegates invoke cessation procedures, in order to reverse a previous finding on risk, prior to making a danger opinion.
[28] At the hearing, counsel for the respondent noted that there are, now, two distinct decisions which are called under review. She invoked rule 302, thus:
| 302. Unless the Court orders otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be limited to a single order in respect of which relief is sought. |
The Minister's counsel urged this:
| This case is somewhat complicated,... by the fact that there's [sic] two decisions in question in the same judicial review proceeding. Up until the issuance of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Baker and the dramatic change in landscape that resulted from that decision, the Minister has generally not objected to an applicant challenging two danger opinions in the same application, because up until the issuance of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Baker, the standard was the same, the procedural fairness requirements were the same, everything was the same, so it, in effect, amounted to one decision even though it was under two sections of the Act. I think now that practice is likely to change since under the Federal Court rules, of course, each judicial review application is supposed to relate to one decision and one decision only, and depending on how the law plays out, it may well be that the standard of review and the duty of fairness is different, under Section 70(5) than from 53(1)(d), so in the future it may well be that the Minister will enforce that requirement and require that the applicant file two separate applications for each opinion. In this case, that wasn't done, of course, because the initial initiating document and most of the submissions were completed before Baker had been decided. That being said, I'm sure Your Lordship is capable of looking at each decision and determining how Baker impacts on the requirements for each of the two separate sections. The respondent's position is that reasons are required for the 53(1)(d) decision because of the impact of that decision, but that reasons are not required for the decision pursuant to subsection 70(5). I will address first 70(5) because obviously that's the harder one, on 53(1)(d) there's not really a dispute, my learned friend [sic] are both in agreement that reasons are required. Under 70(5) the Minister has a number of reasons why reasons are not required. First and foremost is the fact that the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Williams specifically addressed the issue, "are reasons required pursuant to subsection 70(5)?". And the Federal Court of Appeal gave a resounding "no". That decision, My Lord, is binding on the trial division, of course, provided it's not overtaken by Baker and the Supreme Court of Canada decision. The Minister's position is that Williams is not overtaken by Baker and there are two important reasons for this. |
| (transcript pp. 69 to 71) |
This is a case in which "the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of [this] proceeding on its merits can be effected by means of the order contemplated in rule 302 supra. The applicant does not concede, but the reasons required in this case may be found on pp. 3 and 4 of the tribunal's record, as was suggested by L'Heureux-Dubé, J. in Baker, which judgment was released during the pendency of this present case. This acceptance of the notes made in July, 1998, will surely, in these circumstances, constitute the just, most expeditious and least expensive means of coming to the determination of this proceeding. Those notes also cover and support the Minister's resolution of the questions of risk and refoulement, which were debated by the respective counsel herein. The Court agrees with the Minister's posture on those matters.
Conclusion
[29] The applicant failed to show that the opinion rendered by the Minister"s delegate pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Act was improper or not simply reasonable in any way. This part of his application is, therefore, dismissed. The Minister's opinion made pursuant to paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act, moreover, will be allowed to stand on the grounds that Baker was rendered by the Supreme Court after the present proceedings were under way and that these present proceedings do not create any substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice in these circumstances. The application is totally dismissed, therefore.
[30] The applicant's counsel proposed several questions which, he urged, were serious and of general importance, as contemplated by section 83 of the Immigration Act. The Court declines to certify any of those questions in these circumstances.
Ottawa, Ontario
April 28, 2000
Judge