Federal Court Decisions

                                                                                                                                  Date: 20040716

                                                                                                                             Docket: T-2257-03

Citation: 2004 FC 1000

Ottawa, Ontario, the 16th day of July 2004

PRESENT:      THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHORE

BETWEEN:

EFFIGI INC.

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1]         A child is born and thus receives the gift of life; however, for the child to have official status the birth must be announced, and that requires registration.

Similarly, a work appears through its production; but to be recognized officially, a trade-mark is necessary and that requires registration.

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

[2]         This is an appeal, pursuant to section 56 of the Trade-marks Act,^[1] of the decision of the Registrar of Trade-marks (the Registrar), dated November 14, 2003, rejecting the application for registration 1,087,282 of the mark MAISON UNGAVA under paragraph 37(1)(c) of the Act.

[3]         The applicant asks that the Registrar's decision be overturned. It is therefore asking this Honourable Court to return the matter of application 1,087,282 to the Registrar for him to approve the publication and advertisement of this application 1,087,282 in relation to the trade-mark MAISON UNGAVA in the Trade Marks Journal.

FACTS

[4]         On December 19, 2000, the applicant, Effigi Inc. (Effigi), filed an application for registration under number 1,087,282 for the trade-mark MAISON UNGAVA, with a view to the proposed use of this trade-mark in Canada in association with the following wares: bed clothes, bath linen and table linen.

[5]         On October 19, 2001, Tricorn Investments Canada Ltd. filed an application for registration for the mark UNGAVA on the basis of use of this mark in Canada since 1981 in association with the following wares: household linen, bed clothes and window coverings.

REGISTRAR'S DECISION

[6]         On May 2, 2002, the examiner in the trade-marks office (the examiner) issued an initial examination report pursuant to the filing of Effigi's application for registration dated December 19, 2000. In this report, the examiner indicated that, having regard to the provisions of section 16 of the Act, Effigi did not appear to be the person entitled to the registration of the MAISON UNGAVA mark, since the date of filing was subsequent to the date of first use, specifically October 1981, disclosed in the information pertaining to application 1,118,871, likewise pending and allegedly confusing.

[7]         On August 12, 2002, Effigi filed a reply to the examiner's report, disputing the Registrar's objection. In its reply, the applicant alleges that in Unitel International Inc. v. Canada (Register of Trade-marks),^[2] the Court of Appeal found that the alleged dates of first use in two pending applications for registration were irrelevant when applying paragraph 37(1)(c) of the Act.

[8]         On September 20, 2002, the examiner issued a second examination report. He concluded that Unitel International Inc. C.A. did not apply to Effigi's situation, stating:

[translation]

The Office thinks the Unitel decision of the Federal Court of Appeal is consistent with the longstanding practice of the Trade-marks Office in relation to paragraph 37(1)(c). Considering the facts in that case, the Court upheld the decision that, where two pending applications are confusing with each other, the application that has both a prior date of filing and a prior date of first use should be advertised, and the other one should be rejected in accordance with paragraph 37(1)(c). The judge's observation that "... the dates of first use are not a relevant consideration under paragraph 37(1)(c)" is considered obiter dicta and not binding upon the Office.^[3]

[9]         On January 16, 2003, the applicant responded to the second examination report by restating the position it had expressed on August 12, 2002.

[10]       On November 14, 2003, the Registrar rejected application for registration 1,087,282 in relation to the MAISON UNGAVA mark pursuant to paragraph 37(1)(c) of the Act. In his decision, the Registrar stated:

[translation]

... having regard to the provisions of paragraphs 37(1)(c) and 16(3)(a) of the Trade-marks Act, the applicant [Effigi] is not the person entitled to the registration of the MAISON UNGAVA trade-mark, because this trade-mark is confusing with another trade-mark for the registration of which an application is pending, namely UNGAVA (application no. 1,118,871), and because the UNGAVA trade-mark has been previously used in Canada by another person....^[4]

[11]       Insofar as the judgment in Unitel International Inc. CA. was concerned, the Registrar stated that it was "[translation] obiter dicta and not binding on the Office".^[5]

ISSUES

[12]       What is the standard of review on an appeal from the Registrar's decision?

[13]       Did the Registrar err in his interpretation and application of paragraph 37(1)(c) of the Act?

ANALYSIS

What is the standard of review on an appeal from the Registrar's decision?

[14]       The applicant submits that on an appeal from a decision of the Registrar involving a question of statutory construction, the applicable standard of review is that of correctness.^[6] In the case at bar, the issue is one of statutory interpretation and therefore the standard of review is that of correctness.

[15]       The respondent submits that, as a general rule, the standard of review of decisions of the Registrar, whether on questions of fact or questions of law, is that of reasonableness. However, when evidence is adduced in the Court, "the ... judge must come to his or her own conclusion as to the correctness of the Registrar's decision."^[7]

[16]       The respondent notes that the evidence that is adduced must have greater probative force than that of the evidence provided to the Registrar if the standard of review is to be changed.^[8] In this case, the respondent argues that the evidence does not have greater probative force than that of the evidence provided to the Registrar. The respondent further argues that the evidence adduced by the applicant concerns the files of several other applications for trade-mark registrations that have no relationship to this case.

[17]       The respondent further submits that none of the cases submitted by the applicant concerns a case in which an applicant who was first to file an application for registration had priority over another pending application for registration with a prior date of use and covering trade-marks that are confusing with each other.

[18]       The Court accepts the applicant's argument. United Grain Growers determines that in considering a question of statutory construction, the standard of review is that of correctness.

Did the Registrar err in his interpretation and application of paragraph 37(1)(c) of the Act?

[19]       Effigi argues that the Registrar erred in deciding that the provisions of subsection 16(3) of the Act supplemented those of paragraph 37(1)(c) when rejecting an application for registration at the level of the examination proceeding.

[20]       Effigi submits that the Registrar has no inherent authority, and that his jurisdiction is derived solely from the Act.^[9] More particularly, section 37 of the Act gives the Registrar the authority to decide, at the level of the examination proceeding, to reject an application for registration of a trade-mark.

[21]       In the case at bar, paragraphs 37(1)(a) and (b) are not applicable since the only issue for determination involves the interpretation of paragraph 37(1)(c). The applicant submits that the language of paragraph 37(1)(c) is clear: the Registrar shall reject an application for the registration of a trade-mark if he is satisfied that the applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark because it is confusing with another trade-mark for the registration of which an application is pending.^[10]

[22]       The applicant also submits that the Court of Appeal considered this issue earlier in Unitel International Inc. C.A. The Court of Appeal, it says, held that under paragraph 37(1)(c), the only issue for determination is whether there is confusion between the applicant's mark and the mark for which an application for registration is already pending; the date at which the trade-mark was first used is irrelevant.^[11]

[23]       The respondent, on the other hand, systematically analyzes the Act and submits, as a result of this analysis, that the Registrar has authority to consider paragraph 16(3)©) of the Act when determining whether a trade-mark application should be rejected pursuant to section 37. In construing paragraph 37(1)(c), the respondent argues, it is necessary to read the paragraph according to the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, in its context, in light of all the other relevant provisions of the Act, and harmoniously with the scheme and the object of the statute.^[12]

Grammatical and ordinary sense of the words

[24]       Paragraph 37(1)(c) reads:

37. (1) The Registrar shall refuse an application for the registration of a trade-mark if he is satisfied that		37. (1) Le registraire rejette une demande d'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce s'il est convaincu que, selon le cas :
...		[...]
(c) the applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark because it is confusing with another trade-mark for the registration of which an application is pending,		c) le requérant n'est pas la personne qui a droit à l'enregistrement de la marque de commerce parce que cette marque crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de commerce en vue de l'enregistrement de laquelle une demande est pendante.
and where the Registrar is not so satisfied, he shall cause the application to be advertised in the manner prescribed.		Lorsque le registraire n'est pas ainsi convaincu, il fait annoncer la demande de la manière prescrite.

[25]       The respondent argues that the word "pending" does not specify that the application filed previously must be accepted and the one filed later must be rejected. I agree with the respondent that the word "pending" does not specify how the Registrar should choose between two co-existing applications. The language of the paragraph is ambiguous, therefore.

[26]       The respondent cites the "Report of the Trade Mark Law Revision Committee"^[13] and John Osborne,^[14] who was a member of the committee, in support of his position. The report does not establish the respondent's position. Instead, it explains that the Registrar is not authorized to reject an application in favour of a trade-mark that is not registered or where an application for registration has not been filed. The report makes no mention of two co-existing applications.

[27]       One extract from John Osborne supports the respondent's submission. In R. v. Heywood,^[15] the Supreme Court of Canada, reviewing the admissibility of legislative debates, stated:

The admissibility of legislative debates to determine legislative intent in statutory construction is doubtful.... This Court has repeatedly held that legislative history is not admissible as proof of legislative intent in the construction of statutes....

It is apparent that legislative history may be admissible for the more general purpose of showing the mischief Parliament was attempting to remedy with the legislation....

Nonetheless there are persuasive reasons advanced which support the position that legislative history or debates are inadmissible as proof of legislative intent in statutory construction. Many of these same reasons are also put forward to demonstrate that such materials should be given little weight even in those cases where they are admitted. The main problem with the use of legislative history is its reliability. First, the intent of particular members of Parliament is not the same as the intent of the Parliament as a whole. Thus, it may be said that the corporate will of the legislature is only found in the text of provisions which are passed into law. ...^[16]

Judging from Heywood, the Supreme Court of Canada assigns little weight to historical evidence in the context of statutory interpretation.

Context of the statute

[28]       The respondent argues that another principle of statutory interpretation is applicable, namely that the same words should be given the same meaning in the Act as a whole.

[29]       The respondent notes that the phrase "the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark" in paragraph 37(1)(c) is also found in sections 18 and 38. Section 16 defines the phrase. Sections 16, 18 and 38 read as follows:

16.           (1) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a trade-mark that is registrable and that he or his predecessor in title has used in Canada or made known in Canada in association with wares or services is entitled, subject to section 38, to secure its registration in respect of those wares or services, unless at the date on which he or his predecessor in title first so used it or made it known it was confusing with		16.           (1) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l'article 30 en vue de l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce qui est enregistrable et que le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre a employée ou fait connaître au Canada en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, a droit, sous réserve de l'article 38, d'en obtenir l'enregistrement à l'égard de ces marchandises ou services, à moins que, à la date où le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre l'a en premier lieu ainsi employée ou révélée, elle n'ait créé de la confusion :
(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person;		a) soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par une autre personne;
(b) a trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by any other person; or		b) soit avec une marque de commerce à l'égard de laquelle une demande d'enregistrement avait été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre personne;

(c) a trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person.
c) soit avec un nom commercial qui avait été antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre personne.               (2) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a trade-mark that is registrable and that the applicant or the applicant's predecessor in title has duly registered in or for the country of origin of the applicant and has used in association with wares or services is entitled, subject to section 38, to secure its registration in respect of the wares or services in association with which it is registered in that country and has been used, unless at the date of filing of the application in accordance with section 30 it was confusing with		(2) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l'article 30 en vue de l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce qui est enregistrable et que le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre a dûment déposée dans son pays d'origine, ou pour son pays d'origine, et qu'il a employée en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, a droit, sous réserve de l'article 38, d'en obtenir l'enregistrement à l'égard des marchandises ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est déposée dans ce pays et a été employée, à moins que, à la date de la production de la demande, en conformité avec l'article 30, elle n'ait créé de la confusion :
(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person;		a) soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par une autre personne;
(b) a trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by any other person; or		b) soit avec une marque de commerce à l'égard de laquelle une demande d'enregistrement a été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre personne;
(c) a trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person.		c) soit avec un nom commercial antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre personne.
(3) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a proposed trade-mark that is registrable is entitled, subject to sections 38 and 40, to secure its registration in respect of the wares or services specified in the application, unless at the date of filing of the application it was confusing with		(3) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l'article 30 en vue de l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce projetée et enregistrable, a droit, sous réserve des articles 38 et 40, d'en obtenir l'enregistrement à l'égard des marchandises ou services spécifiés dans la demande, à moins que, à la date de production de la demande, elle n'ait créé de la confusion :
(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person;		a) soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par une autre personne;
(b) a trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by any other person; or		b) soit avec une marque de commerce à l'égard de laquelle une demande d'enregistrement a été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre personne;

(c) a trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person.
c) soit avec un nom commercial antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre personne. (4) The right of an applicant to secure registration of a registrable trade-mark is not affected by the previous filing of an application for registration of a confusing trade-mark by another person, unless the application for registration of the confusing trade-mark was pending at the date of advertisement of the applicant's application in accordance with section 37.		(4) Le droit, pour un requérant, d'obtenir l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce enregistrable n'est pas atteint par la production antérieure d'une demande d'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce créant de la confusion, par une autre personne, à moins que la demande d'enregistrement de la marque de commerce créant de la confusion n'ait été pendante à la date de l'annonce de la demande du requérant selon l'article 37.
(5) The right of an applicant to secure registration of a registrable trade-mark is not affected by the previous use or making known of a confusing trade-mark or trade-name by another person, if the confusing trade-mark or trade-name was abandoned at the date of advertisement of the applicant's application in accordance with section 37.		(5) Le droit, pour un requérant, d'obtenir l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce enregistrable n'est pas atteint par l'emploi antérieur ou la révélation antérieure d'une marque de commerce ou d'un nom commercial créant de la confusion, par une autre personne, si cette marque de commerce ou ce nom commercial créant de la confusion a été abandonné à la date de l'annonce de la demande du requérant selon l'article 37.
...		[...]
18.           (1) The registration of a trade-mark is invalid if		18.           (1) L'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce est invalide dans les cas suivants :
(a) the trade-mark was not registrable at the date of registration,		a) la marque de commerce n'était pas enregistrable à la date de l'enregistrement;
(b) the trade-mark is not distinctive at the time proceedings bringing the validity of the registration into question are commenced, or		b) la marque de commerce n'est pas distinctive à l'époque où sont entamées les procédures contestant la validité de l'enregistrement;
(c) the trade-mark has been abandoned,		c) la marque de commerce a été abandonnée.
and subject to section 17, it is invalid if the applicant for registration was not the person entitled to secure the registration.		Sous réserve de l'article 17, l'enregistrement est invalide si l'auteur de la demande n'était pas la personne ayant droit de l'obtenir.
(2) No registration of a trade-mark that had been so used in Canada by the registrant or his predecessor in title as to have become distinctive at the date of registration shall be held invalid merely on the ground that evidence of the distinctiveness was not submitted to the competent authority or tribunal before the grant of the registration.		(2) Nul enregistrement d'une marque de commerce qui était employée au Canada par l'inscrivant ou son prédécesseur en titre, au point d'être devenue distinctive à la date d'enregistrement, ne peut être considéré comme invalide pour la seule raison que la preuve de ce caractère distinctif n'a pas été soumise à l'autorité ou au tribunal compétent avant l'octroi de cet enregistrement.

...
[...]38.      (1) Within two months after the advertisement of an application for the registration of a trade-mark, any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, file a statement of opposition with the Registrar.		38.           (1) Toute personne peut, dans le délai de deux mois à compter de l'annonce de la demande, et sur paiement du droit prescrit, produire au bureau du registraire une déclaration d'opposition.
(2) A statement of opposition may be based on any of the following grounds:		(2) Cette opposition peut être fondée sur l'un des motifs suivants :
(a) that the application does not conform to the requirements of section 30;		a) la demande ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l'article 30;
(b) that the trade-mark is not registrable;		b) la marque de commerce n'est pas enregistrable;
(c) that the applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark; or		c) le requérant n'est pas la personne ayant droit à l'enregistrement;
(d) that the trade-mark is not distinctive.		d) la marque de commerce n'est pas distinctive.
(3) A statement of opposition shall set out		(3) La déclaration d'opposition indique :
(a) the grounds of opposition in sufficient detail to enable the applicant to reply thereto; and		a) les motifs de l'opposition, avec détails suffisants pour permettre au requérant d'y répondre;
(b) the address of the opponent's principal office or place of business in Canada, if any, and if the opponent has no office or place of business in Canada, the address of his principal office or place of business abroad and the name and address in Canada of a person or firm on whom service of any document in respect of the opposition may be made with the same effect as if it had been served on the opponent himself.		b) l'adresse du principal bureau ou siège d'affaires de l'opposant au Canada, le cas échéant, et, si l'opposant n'a ni bureau ni siège d'affaires au Canada, l'adresse de son principal bureau ou siège d'affaires à l'étranger et les nom et adresse, au Canada, d'une personne ou firme à qui tout document concernant l'opposition peut être signifié avec le même effet que s'il était signifié à l'opposant lui-même.
(4) If the Registrar considers that the opposition does not raise a substantial issue for decision, he shall reject it and shall give notice of his decision to the opponent.		(4) Si le registraire estime que l'opposition ne soulève pas une question sérieuse pour décision, il la rejette et donne avis de sa décision à l'opposant.

(5) If the Registrar considers that the opposition raises a substantial issue for decision, he shall forward a copy of the statement of opposition to the applicant.
(5) Si le registraire est d'avis que l'opposition soulève une question sérieuse pour décision, il fait parvenir une copie de la déclaration d'opposition au requérant.                 (6) The applicant shall file a counter statement with the Registrar and serve a copy on the opponent in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time after a copy of the statement of opposition has been served on the applicant.		(6) Le requérant doit produire auprès du registraire une contre-déclaration et en signifier, dans le délai prescrit après qu'une déclaration d'opposition lui a été envoyée, copie à l'opposant de la manière prescrite.
(7) Both the opponent and the applicant shall be given an opportunity, in the prescribed manner, to submit evidence and to make representations to the Registrar unless		(7) Il est fourni, de la manière prescrite, à l'opposant et au requérant l'occasion de soumettre la preuve sur laquelle ils s'appuient et de se faire entendre par le registraire, sauf dans les cas suivants :
(a) the opposition is withdrawn or deemed under subsection (7.1) to have been withdrawn; or		a) l'opposition est retirée, ou réputée l'être, au titre du paragraphe (7.1);
(b) the application is abandoned or deemed under subsection (7.2) to have been abandoned.		b) la demande est abandonnée, ou réputée l'être, au titre du paragraphe (7.2).
(7.1) The opposition shall be deemed to have been withdrawn if, in the prescribed circumstances, the opponent does not submit either evidence under subsection (7) or a statement that the opponent does not wish to submit evidence.		(7.1) Si, dans les circonstances prescrites, l'opposant omet de soumettre la preuve visée au paragraphe (7) ou une déclaration énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire, l'opposition est réputée retirée.
(7.2) The application shall be deemed to have been abandoned if the applicant does not file and serve a counter statement within the time referred to in subsection (6) or if, in the prescribed circumstances, the applicant does not submit either evidence under subsection (7) or a statement that the applicant does not wish to submit evidence.		(7.2) Si le requérant ne produit ni ne signifie une contre-déclaration dans le délai visé au paragraphe (6) ou si, dans les circonstances prescrites, il omet de soumettre la preuve visée au paragraphe (7) ou une déclaration énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire, la demande est réputée abandonnée.
(8) After considering the evidence and representations of the opponent and the applicant, the Registrar shall refuse the application or reject the opposition and notify the parties of the decision and the reasons for the decision.		(8) Après avoir examiné la preuve et les observations des parties, le registraire repousse la demande ou rejette l'opposition et notifie aux parties sa décision ainsi que ses motifs.

[30]       Section 16 of the Act sets out the conditions in which an applicant is "entitled" to the registration of a trade-mark. In particular, the trade-mark intended for registration cannot be confusing with some other trade-mark that was "previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person".

[31]       Because sections 18 and 38 include the phrase "the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark", section 16 is used to interpret them.

[32]       The respondent argues that, in a similar way, paragraph 37(1)(c) includes this phrase and therefore section 16 should be used to interpret it.

[33]       I do not agree with this submission by the respondent. He is interpreting the phrase "the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark" in isolation instead of reading it in the context of paragraph 37(1)(c) of the Act. Unlike sections 18 and 38, paragraph 37(1)(c) describes the particular circumstances in which the applicant would be entitled to the registration of a trade-mark. It is therefore possible to understand paragraph 37(1)(c) without referring at all to section 16. But sections 18 and 38 are incomplete without reference to section 16.

[34]       Moreover, the purpose of paragraph 37(1)(c), like that of section 16, is to set out the conditions in which an applicant is "entitled" to the registration of a trade-mark. Consequently, section 16 does not assist in the interpretation of paragraph 37(1)(c).

[35]       Finally, section 16 itself confirms that it is applicable only after the Registrar has completed the examination process. Section 16 explains that an application for registration of a trade-mark must be rejected if the application is confusing with another trade-mark that was previously used by someone else or for which someone else has previously filed an application for registration. Subsections 16(4) and 16(5) set out the limitations on the application of subsections 16(2) and 16(3), namely, that the trade-mark of the other person must be "pending at the date of advertisement of the applicant's application in accordance with section 37". Thus subsections 16(4) and 16(5) indicate that section 16 does not apply to applications until the date of advertisement of the applicant's application. Since the examination process is conducted prior to the date of advertisement of the applicant's application, section 16 does not apply to the examination process.

Scheme and object of the Act

[36]       The respondent submits that in Canada, use is a linchpin in the acquisition, maintenance and enforcement of trade-mark rights. In the history of the common law, no right originates spontaneously in a trade-mark. It is through time and use that a trade-mark acquires sufficient value to give rise to certain rights.^[17]

[37]       The Act and its predecessors adopted from the common law use as the basis of the Act. Since the concept of use is so important in the Act, the Registrar evidently has jurisdiction to reject an application on the basis of use.

[38]       This argument is not persuasive. If that interpretation of the paragraph is correct, the Act establishes that the Registrar cannot, during the examination process, reject an application by virtue of the fact that someone else uses it. However, this becomes an important factor when there is an opposition. The Act does not overlook the issue of use, but considers it later in the process.

[39]       The applicant submits that the reason why the Registrar does not have jurisdiction to reject an application because someone else is using a trade-mark that may be confusing with the applicant's is that the Registrar does not have sufficient information to be able to determine whether the other person was using the trade-mark before the applicant filed its application.

[40]       I agree with the applicant. If the application for registration is based on use, under paragraph 30(b), the applicant, when filing the application, must explain for how long it has used the trade-mark. The applicant need not provide many particulars, however, and the Registrar is not authorized to request further information. Thus, during the examination process, the Registrar cannot make a complete decision.

[41]       The Registrar himself acknowledges this. In Unitel International Inc. v. Canada (Registrar of Trade-marks),^[18] the applicant filed an application for registration on June 14, 1990, based on a use dating back at least to July 8, 1985. The Registrar rejected this application because another company had filed an application for registration for a very similar trade-mark based on its use as early as September 19, 1977. The applicant, when communicating with the Registrar, argued that the other company had not used the trade-mark since September 19, 1977. The Registrar rejected this claim, stating:

However, during the examination process, the practice is to treat a claimed date of first use as accurate. It is considered that the proper place for challenges to claimed dates of first use to be considered is in opposition proceedings or in proceedings before the courts, which include appropriate procedures and evidentiary mechanisms for dealing with contested issues of this nature....^[19]

The examination process is not an adequate process for determining whether one trade-mark has been used prior to another.

[42]       Unitel International Inc. C.A. is consistent with my interpretation of paragraph 37(1)(c) of the Act. In Unitel International Inc. C.A., the Court of Appeal stated:

In their reasons, the Registrar and the Trial Judge referred to the alleged dates of first use in the two applications. We would observe that the dates of first use are not a relevant consideration under paragraph 37(1)(c). The only issue is whether there is confusion between an applicant's trade-mark and a trade-mark for which an application for registration is already pending.^[20]

The respondent argues that the issue before the Trial Division and the Court of Appeal was simply whether the Registrar, being persuaded that the requirements of subsection 37(1) were fulfilled, still had an obligation to have the application advertised. The Court had not yet determined the issue of the interpretation of paragraph 37(1)(c) and thus the analysis of the Court of Appeal in this regard is simply obiter.

[43]       It is true that the Court's comments in this regard are only obiter dicta, but they are also very clear and bear directly on the central issue. So even if the decision is not binding on this Court, those comments are nevertheless very persuasive.

[44]       In conclusion, it is my opinion that the Court of Appeal, in Unitel International Inc. C.A., did determine that pursuant to paragraph 37(1)(c), "The only issue is whether there is confusion between an applicant's trade-mark and a trade-mark for which an application for registration is already pending."

CONCLUSION

[45]       The appeal is allowed.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court is that the decision by the Registrar, dated November 14, 2003, is overturned;

The Court returns the matter to the Registrar for him to approve the publication and advertisement of the said application for the trade-mark MAISON UNGAVA in the Trade Marks Journal;

However, in view of the circumstances and the development of the issues by both parties, there will be no disposition as to costs.

                     "Michel M.J. Shore"

                                Judge

Certified true translation

Suzanne M. Gauthier, C.Tr., LL.L.

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:                                            T-2257-03

STYLE:                                                EFFIGI INC. and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

PLACE OF HEARING:                      MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC

DATE OF HEARING:                        JUNE 22, 2004

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

AND JUDGMENT:                            THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHORE

DATED:                                              JULY 16, 2004

APPEARANCES:

Barry Gamache                                     FOR THE APPLICANT

Mariève Sirois-Vaillancourt                    FOR THE RESPONDENT

Francisco Couto

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

LEGER ROBIC RICHARD                  FOR THE APPLICANT

Advocates

Montréal, Quebec

MORRIS ROSENBERG                      FOR THE RESPONDENT

Deputy Attorney General

of Canada

Ottawa, Ontario