Date: 20020201
Docket: IMM-4679-00
Neutral Citation: 2002 FCT 89
BETWEEN:
SHARON JACKSON
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
[1] This is an application pursuant to paragraph 82.1(1) of the Immigration Act [hereinafter referred to as the "Act"] for judicial review under the Federal Court Act of a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board [hereinafter referred to as the "Board"] dated May 5, 2000 wherein the Board determined that the applicant was not a Convention refugee.
[2] Counsel for the applicant raised a preliminary matter orally, suggesting that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on behalf of the sitting judge.
[3] Counsel for the applicant suggested that the sitting judge had shown bias in Ithibu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2001] F.C.J. No. 499 (IMM-2429-00) dated April 3, 2001, concerning a Kenyan claimant.
[4] In that case, the same counsel had suggested that the Presiding Member displayed bias, having stated that English literature pertained only to English authors, showing great disrespect to African English authors. The Presiding Member, Madame Beaubien-Duque, did not recuse herself and denied suggestion of a reasonable apprehension of bias. She wrote in her decision:
The panel then questioned the claimant about his courses. He said his program was English literature and Commerce and that he studied poems and short stories. When asked to name some authors, the claimant gave African names. The panel was surprised by the claimant's answers and asked him why he was not giving the names of English authors. The claimant said that these were African authors who wrote in English. The panel does not find the claimant's answer acceptable. English literature deals with English authors. The panel has serious doubts as to the claimant's enrolment in English literature courses.
[5] Counsel for the applicant suggested that my decision in Ithibu, supra, particularly in paragraphs 61 to 64, where I dismissed the judicial review application, shows a reasonable apprehension of bias because I decided not to agree with counsel for the applicant at that time, thereby refusing the argument that the Presiding Member of the Board had shown a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[6] Counsel for the applicant seems to suggest that since I disagreed with his opinion in Ithibu, supra, it is therefore to be concluded that by doing so, I am also displaying a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[7] Counsel for the applicant based his argument on the fact that everybody but me had considered the quotation by the Presiding Member in paragraph 4, as showing an apprehension of bias, and given that I am not of the same opinion as everyone else regarding that quotation, there is no other conclusion than the fact that I have displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[8] Counsel for the respondent suggested that the request for the sitting judge to recuse himself on that basis is frivolous and has no reasonable basis whatsoever.
[9] I have carefully reviewed the decision I rendered in Ithibu, supra and, being functus, I cannot really comment on my own decision.
[10] Nevertheless, I have tried to imagine what would be the result if I should follow the perverse reasoning of the counsel for the applicant. Any time a counsel suggests to a Court that a judicial review of a tribunal decision should be granted on the basis that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, if the Federal Court judge decides to disagree, this decision would therefore show in itself that the judge himself has a reasonable apprehension of bias because other people would think that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[11] In my view, when a Federal Court judge makes a decision after hearing the parties, in a particular case, this would sometimes lead to an appeal of that decision, sometimes it would not. In some cases, the Federal Court of Appeal could decide to quash the decision and decide to render another decision or to return the case for reconsideration. If the Federal Court of Appeal decides that the Trial Division judge made a wrong decision, it could be for many different reasons including a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[12] As far as I know, the question whether I had a reasonable apprehension of bias in making my decision in Ithibu, supra was not raised at the Trial Division nor at the Federal Court of Appeal level.
[13] In my view, counsel for the applicant has failed to provide any valid reasons as to why I should recuse myself from the present matter on the basis that I have a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Reasonable apprehension of bias: the test
[14] The test for reasonable apprehension of bias was set out by de Grandpré J. in the case of Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at p. 394, and was stated as follows:
The apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. [T]hat test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically -- and having thought the matter through -- conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly."
This test has been consistently endorsed and applied by the Supreme Court of Canada. See Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673; R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 and Ruffo v. Conseil de la Magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267.
[15] I find therefore that a reasonable and informed person would conclude that I would decide fairly in this case.
[16] Therefore, the request by counsel for the applicant is dismissed.
FACTS
[17] The applicant was born in Akwatia, Ghana on March 16, 1968.
[18] From January 1992 until November 1999, the applicant and her mother operated two (2) shoe stores, one in the district of Kejetia and the other in Alabar.
[19] The applicant and her mother were opposed to the government of J.J. Rawlings and his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). She and her mother therefore joined the official opposition party called the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 1996.
[20] On January 12, 1998 the applicant alleges that her mother received a letter signed by the Kumasi Chief Executive Nana Akwasi Agyemang, giving her a two-week notice of eviction. The applicant alleges that her mother was discriminated against due to her membership to the NPP.
[21] Two weeks later, the applicant's mother was forced out of her store and jailed. Following this mistreatment, the applicant's mother passed away on May 28, 1998.
[22] The applicant however continued to run her store in the district of Alabar.
[23] On October 5, 1999 the applicant alleges that a group of citizens in Kumasi organized a demonstration similar to a previous one that had been held on September 30, 1999, demanding the removal from office of the KMA Chief Nana Akwasi Agyemang.
[24] A street fight broke out as a consequence of this demonstration and some of the demonstrators tried to run into the applicant's shoe store. She struggled to prevent them from entering and looting the premises, however in the chaos, the applicant was mistakenly arrested and detained in prison.
[25] During a two-week period, the applicant alleges that she was badly beaten, tortured and raped. Furthermore, she was questioned as to her political affiliations, namely her membership to the NPP. She alleges that she was forced to admit that she and some other NPP members had beaten security agents.
[26] Six (6) weeks later, on November 20, 1999, the applicant escaped from detention with the help of a friend of her uncle's. She then fled to Togo and arrived to Canada on November 25, 1999. She claimed refugee status the very same day.
[27] The applicant claims that if she were returned to Ghana she would be at risk of persecution on the grounds of her gender and her political opinions.
ISSUE
[28] Did the Board err in concluding that the applicant would not be the subject of persecution based upon the grounds of her gender and her political opinions should she return to Ghana?
ANALYSIS
[29] No, the Board did not err in finding that the applicant would not be subjected to persecution based upon the grounds of her gender and her political opinions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[30] First and foremost it is necessary to define the standard of review applicable by this Court in regards to the Board. Generally, the standard of review for questions of fact and fact and law is patently unreasonable, whereas for questions of pure law, it is correctness.
[31] In Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 4 F.C. 269 (F.C.T.D.), Evans J. stated:
[para 45] On the other hand, the Refugee Division's determination of whether the relevant facts satisfy the Rasaratnam test, properly understood, is a question of mixed fact and law, and is reviewable only for unreasonableness.
[32] Later in Conkova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 300 (F.C.T.D.), Pelletier J. found:
[para 5] The standard of review of decisions of the CRDD is generally patent unreasonableness except for questions involving the interpretation of a statute when the standard becomes correctness. Sivasamboo v. Canada [1995] 1 F.C. 741 (T.D.), (1994) 87 F.T.R. 46, Pushpanathan v. Canada [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, (1998) 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
[33] In Boye v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1994), 83 F.T.R. 1 (F.C.T.D.), Jerome A.C.J. stated: [para 6] Furthermore, the Refugee Division is entitled to make an adverse finding of credibility based on the implausibility of an applicant's story, provided the inferences drawn can be reasonably said to exist. Negative findings with respect to an individual's credibility are properly made, provided the tribunal gives reasons for its decision in clear and unequivocal terms.
[34] In the present case, the issues raised by the applicant are those related to fact. Therefore, the standard of review to be applied is that of patent unreasonableness.
ALLEGATION OF BIAS AGAINST THE PRESIDING MEMBER OF THE BOARD
[35] At the beginning of the second sitting which took place on May 5, 2000, counsel for the applicant presented a motion for the panel to recuse itself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias against the Presiding Member Jeannine Beaubien-Duque. According to the applicant, the Presiding Member had shown bias in case number M98-07759 which concerned a Kenyan claimant and was also
argued by Mr. Stewart Istvanffy. In this particular case, the Presiding Member had stated that English literature concerned only English authors and, thereby, showed great disrespect to authors of Africa who wrote in English.
[36] In the present case, the request for recusal put forth by Mr. Istvanffy was denied. The Board stated at page 3 of its decision:
The panel reacted to counsel's aggressive tone and insulting remarks by reading certain articles from the Code of Ethics of the Quebec Bar Association. The panel denied counsel's request. The panel applied Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), and we have concluded that a reasonable and informed person would conclude that we would decide fairly.
[37] The applicant's allegation of apprehension of bias is ill-founded. If the applicant was in fact concerned that her rights may have been violated, she should have raised her objection at the outset, the first sitting held on April 17, 2000, and should not have waited until the second sitting on May 5, 2000 to do so. In Re Human Rights Tribunal and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, [1986] 1 C.F. 103 MacGuigan J. held at page 113:
However, even apart from this express waiver, AECL's whole course of conduct before the Tribunal constituted an implied waiver of any assertion of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal. The only reasonable course of conduct for a party reasonably apprehensive of bias would be to allege a violation of natural justice at the earliest practicable opportunity. Here, AECL called witnesses, cross-examined the witnesses called by the Commission, made many submissions to the Tribunal, and took proceedings before both the Trial Division and this Court, all without challenge to the independence of the Commission. In short, it participated fully in the hearing, and must therefore be taken impliedly to have waived its right to object.
(my emphasis)
[38] It is trite law that alleged violations of natural justice must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
[39] This was confirmed in the case of Kostyshyn v. West Region Tribal Council [1992] F.C.J. No. 731 (F.C.T.D.) where Muldoon J. held that the aggrieved party must "allege promptly" and in the case of Hernandez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] F.C.J. No. 607 (F.C.T.D.), where Pinard J. made reference to the case of Del Moral v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] F.C.J. No. 782 (F.C.T.D.). In Del Moral, supra Dubé J. concluded that "the only reasonable course of conduct for a party reasonably apprehensive of bias would be to allege a violation of natural justice at the earliest practicable opportunity."
[40] In summary, the applicant, in the present case, should have reacted to the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice "at the earliest practicable opportunity" as per MacGuigan J. in In Re Human Right Tribunal, supra, which would have been the initial sitting held on April 17, 2000, if she genuinely thought that a violation of her rights had occurred. By waiting until the second sitting, she waived her right to object. In my opinion therefore, the applicant's allegations of bias do not present itself to be a serious issue which warrants the intervention of this Court.
CREDIBILITY OF THE APPLICANT
The applicant's own shoe store
[41] The applicant claims that she has been the victim of persecution and will continue to be, based upon her political membership to the NPP. The applicant alleges that her mother was evicted from her shoe store by force due to her membership to the NPP. However, the applicant's own shoe store, which was situated relatively near to her mother's shoe store, remained unaffected until her departure in November 1999. This evidence had the effect of weakening the applicant's claim of persecution on the ground of her political opinions. At page 3 of the Board's decision, the Board wrote:
The panel questioned the claimant at length about her mother and the two shoe stores. The panel found that the claimant's explanations were generally confusing and vague. She insisted her mother was evicted by force because of her public support for the NPP. However, the store the claimant operated was not far away from the mother's and she also alleges she was a public supporter of the NPP. Yet, her store was never closed down and she declared she continued working there till her departure in November 1999, almost two years afterwards. The claimant gave no satisfactory explanation as to why she was not forced to shutdown.
[42] The applicant could not justifiably explain this phenomenon to the Board's satisfaction nor did she challenge this factual finding made by the Board in her memorandum.
The demolition of the applicant's mother's shoe store
[43] On January 12, 1998 the applicant recounts that her mother received a letter signed by the Kumasi Chief Executive Nana Akwasi Agyemang which provided her with a two-week notice to leave the building where her store was situated. Two weeks later, the applicant's mother was allegedly evicted by force from her shoe store. The applicant believes that her mother's eviction was caused by her membership to the NPP. However, the Board noted that the area where the mother's business was located had previously been scheduled for demolition. This becomes apparent from the documents labelled P-13 and P-14 attached to the applicant's affidavit under the heading of Exhibit B. These pieces of evidence rattle the applicant's alleged claim of persecution based on her political opinions.
[44] Exhibit P-13 is a letter dated January 28, 1000 which reads as follows, and can be found at page 32 of the applicant's file:
[...] I need not remind you of the horrifying experience you went through: how sad your beloved mother lost her life through demolition exercised by the monstrous city mayor [...]
[45] Exhibit P-14, found at page 34 of the applicant's file, contains a photograph depicting the demolition site. When questioned on this topic, the applicant was unable to satisfy the Board with her answers. Consequently, at page 4 of the Board's decision, one can read:
The panel noted that several references both in the claimant's testimony and in the documents she adduced (P13, P14), suggest the area was planed [sic] for demolition. The claimant was unable to clarify this point in a satisfactory manner. The panel does not believe her mother was a victim of political persecution as she alleges.
[46] Since the applicant was able to operate her business for the subsequent period of two (2) years after her mother's forced eviction, it would seem that the Board came to a reasonable factual finding in this regard.
Mistaken arrest of the applicant
[47] The applicant alleges that her arrest, detention and acts she suffered while detained are directly linked to her political opinions, namely her membership to the NPP. In this regard the Board wrote at page 4 of its decision:
For her part, the claimant alleges she was persecuted for her political opinions because she was arrested during a demonstration on October 5 and jailed for six weeks. She alleges her membership in the NPP is related to her arrest and to the torture she lived while in jail.
[48] At the hearing, the applicant was questioned in regards to the events that took place on October 5,1999. She testified that as a consequence of the demonstration, she was mistakenly arrested and detained in prison. The Board states at page 4 of its decision:
The panel remarked that the claimant was not in the demonstration as such and only came out to support the demonstrators when it passed by her store. When asked why she had not participated from the start, she said it was because she was too tired. When referring to the encounter with the police and the demonstrators in front of her store, the claimant said that a "misunderstanding cropped up". She was not the only one arrested,
[...] The panel does not find the claimant's explanations to reflect a political motivation for the alleged arrest. Furthermore, given the low political profile of the claimant, the fact she was neither an organizer or a true participant in the demonstration, the panel does not find the claimant credible when she alleges her membership in the NPP as a motive for her problems.
[49] Again, it would seem that the Board was justified in coming to its factual findings on this topic.
Accuracy of dates
[50] The applicant seemed to be confused as to the exact dates of certain major events consequently, the Board began to question her credibility even more. In her Personal Information Form (PIF), the applicant refers to demonstrations being held on September 30, 1999 and October 5, 1999. Found at page 20 of the certified record, the applicant wrote:
On October 5, 1999 some concerned citizens of Kumasi organized a city-wide demonstration dubbed "Ya Abrawo", as a sequel to a similar one held on 30th September 99, demanding the immediate removal from office of the KMA chief, Nana Akwasi Agyemang.
[51] The Board examined a newspaper article filed by the applicant in support of her claim in order to confirm that demonstrations were held on September 30, 1999 and October 5, 1999. In this weekly newspaper entitled The Guide published for the period between September 30 to October 6, reference is made to a demonstration being held "last Thursday" and that "subsequent demonstrations
would begin next Tuesday". The Board concluded that this reference was to the date of September 23, 1999 and not September 30, 1999. At page 5 of its decision, the Board states:
Since the weekly newspaper issue is dated September 30 to October 6, 1999, it is clear that the only demonstration referred to took place on September 23 ("last Thursday"), as reported in the other papers. There is no evidence of a demonstration on September 30 as written by the claimant in her story. The panel finds this to be a major contradiction which mars the claimant's credibility.
[52] Furthermore, it would seem that the demonstration scheduled for October 5, 1999 did not ever occur. An Internet article provided by the applicant indicated that the demonstration which was in fact scheduled for the date of October 5, 1999 was postponed and did not take place. To address this point, the Board wrote at page 5 of its decision:
The panel also requested an information research to be done by the Documentation Center concerning the demonstration of October 5 during which the claimant alleged she was arrested. No information could be found. Both counsel and the claimant were informed of this and were given adequate time to respond. Counsel sent an Internet document in which it is indicated that the October 5, 1999, demonstration was in fact postponed. It did not take place. The panel consequently concludes that the claimant invented her story to enter this country without going through the required channels. The panel does not find the claimant to be credible on a general basis.
[53] In response to the Board's conclusion, the applicant writes at paragraph 25, page 46, of her observations:
25. The tribunal is wrong to when they analyse an Internet article in which we showed that in fact a demonstration was organised for October 5,2000 and then called to be cancelled at last minute. The RCO have not been able to find any evidence of the demonstration and we found the article. For us, it is clear that if the demonstration was called to be cancelled at very last minute, many people would have gone anyway because poor people don't read newspapers everyday; however, the tribunal just considered the Internet article in the wrong way saying that the demonstration did not take place (page 5 of the decision). With that, the panel shows a great cultural bias toward the applicant and all third World countries;
[54] The applicant attempts to adduce a highly speculative theory which does not render unreasonable the factual conclusion that was drawn by the Board. It must be noted that the Internet article was, in fact, produced by the applicant and her counsel in support of her claim and not by the Board.
Psychological report produced by David L.B. Woodbury
[55] The applicant provided a Diagnostic Interview Report completed by David L.B. Woodbury, her psychologist. The purpose of this report was to make reference to the post-traumatic stress disorder allegedly suffered by the applicant due to the mistreatment she endured in Ghana.
[56] As a general principle, a medical report cannot serve to preclude the Board from making its own assessment of the credibility of a refugee claimant. In the case of Danailov v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] F.C.J. No. 1019 (F.C.T.D.), Reed J. held:
With respect to the arguments concerning the panel's findings on credibility, I read both the transcript and the Tribunal's decision before hearing counsels' submissions. I have now had the benefit of those submissions and could not conclude that the Tribunal's finding was other than entirely proper on the basis of the evidence before it. With respect to the assessment of the doctor's evidence, to find that that opinion evidence is only as valid as the truth of the facts on which it is based, is always a valid way of evaluating opinion evidence. If the panel does not believe the underlying facts it is entirely open to it to assess the opinion evidence as it did.
[57] Also in the case of Madahar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1614 (F.C.T.D.), an issue arose in regards to the medical evidence presented to the Board. I made reference to Kalia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] F.C.J. No. 1682 (F.C.T.D.) where Pinard J. concluded:
While the above is sufficient to dismiss this application, I also wish to address the Board's dismissal of the applicant's medical evidence. In my view, it was open to the Board to reject this medical evidence, given that the facts underlying the reports were found not to be credible.
[58] It is apparent from the jurisprudence of this Court that an expert opinion is of value only if the Court recognizes the credibility of the facts as presented by a medical professional.
[59] Similarly in the case of Gyamfuah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1994] F.C.J. No. 861 (F.C.T.D.) Simpson J. held:
In this case, although counsel argued that section 2(3) applied, the Applicant's evidence was wholly disbelieved. This meant that the factual foundation for the medical report which described torture injuries and post traumatic stress disorder was rejected and, of necessity, the diagnosis became irrelevant.
Persecution on the ground of the applicant's gender
[60] It is worth mentioning that there was a second ground of persecution alleged in the case at bar, that of the applicant's gender. In the applicant's supplementary
memorandum, at paragraphs 26-30, this topic is clearly identified under the heading of Gender Guidelines. The applicant submits that the Board made no reference to this point at the hearing nor in its reasons. The applicant is mistaken. At page 5 of its decision, it is read:
[...] Also, the panel does not see any motive why the claimant would have been persecuted because she is a woman and believes the claimant has failed to prove a well-founded fear on this point as well.
[61] It is clear that the Board appreciated that the applicant is a woman, however no evidence was adduced to prove that the applicant, as a woman, would be subject to persecution for the express reason of her gender. Consequently, the Board did not see it fit to pursue this point any further.
[62] The applicant submits at paragraph 27 of her supplementary memorandum:
This case should have been considered with the Gender Guidelines in mind.
[63] And later at paragraph 29:
The tribunal should have considered the application of the Gender Guidelines and these guidelines should have been followed both in the form of the hearing that took place and in the decision that had to be rendered.
[64] In my view, the allegation of persecution on the ground of the applicant's gender was a secondary issue. The central issue of this case was the applicant's allegation of persecution on the ground of her political opinions, namely her membership to the NPP. The Board did not commit a reviewable error simply because it did not make extensive comments on this secondary issue either at the hearing or in the reasons; especially when the central issue was addressed at the hearing and in the reasons in tremendous detail.
[65] Therefore, this application for judicial review is dismissed.
[66] Counsel for the applicant suggested two questions as follows:
1. A hearing model has been developed in Montreal where the refugee applicant is told that it is not necessary to tell their story in the Personal Information Form, where the refugee hearing officer is asked to question first, reversing the normal order of the proof and where the right to a complete hearing has been gutted with all emphasis being placed on the cross-examination of the refugee applicant. This hearing model has resulted in systematic injustices. Does the use of the new hearing model in refugee hearings in Montreal violate the judicial guarantees of article 7 and article 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the right to equality under article 15 of the Charter? Do the guarantees of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and guarantees in international law to due process and a fair hearing apply to the hearings before the Immigration and Refugee Board? Is it appropriate for the Federal Court of Canada to apply these guarantees in its role of surveillance and control over the Immigration and Refugee Board?
2. The following statement was made in another decision and the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias was raised at the beginning of the hearing against the Presiding Member in this case, the author of these lines:
The panel then questioned the claimant about his courses. He said his program was English literature and Commerce and that he studied poems and short stories. When asked to name some authors, the claimant gave African names. The panel was surprised by the claimant's answers and asked him why he was not giving the names of English authors. The claimant said that
these were African authors who wrote in English. The panel does not find the claimant's answer acceptable. English literature deals with English authors. The panel has serious doubts as to the claimant's enrollment in English literature courses.
Does this indication of racial bias violate the Charter guarantees under articles 7 and 12 as well as the right to equality under article 15 of the Charter? What is the proper test for reasonable apprehension of bias before the Immigration and Refugee Board?
[67] Counsel for the respondent suggested that these two questions should not be certified and provided arguments pursuant to his letter dated January 17, 2002.
[68] I have carefully reviewed these questions and arguments provided verbally by counsel for the applicant at the hearing and by counsel for the respondent in writing.
[69] I agree with the arguments provided by the respondent and also given that these two questions were already suggested in Ithibu, supra and given that I have already decided that these questions do not raise an issue of general importance, therefore no questions will be certified.
"Pierre Blais"
Judge
Montreal, Quebec
February 1, 2002
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM--1679-00
STYLE OF CAUSE: SHARON JACKSON
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND ININIIGRATION
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: Montreal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: January 15, 2002
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER OF
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLAIS
DATED: February 1, 2002
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Stewart Istvanffy FOR APPLICANT
Mr. Michel Pepin FOR RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Mr. Stewart Istvanffy
Montreal, Quebec FOR APPLICANT
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montreal, Quebec FOR RESPONDENT