St. Catharines, Ontario, June 8, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Snider
BETWEEN:
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Plaintiff
and
JURA SKOMATCHUK
Defendant
Docket: T-560-04
AND BETWEEN:
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Plaintiff
and
JOSEF FURMAN
Defendant
Motion to Admit Transfer Lists
[1] These proceedings have been brought to this Court pursuant to s 18(1)(b) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the Plaintiff) seeks a determination that Mr. Jura Skomatchuk and Mr. Josef Furman (together referred to as the Defendants) obtained their Canadian citizenship by false representations or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. The Plaintiff is attempting to prove that the Defendants failed to disclose their activities during the Second World War, when they allegedly served as concentration camp guards for the Nazi German government of the time.
[2] By way of preliminary motion, the Plaintiff seeks to admit seven documents that are crucial to the case against the Defendants. The documents are referred to as "Transfer Lists", and are described in greater detail below. The Defendants objects to the admission of the Transfer Lists.
[3] On June 5, 2006, I heard the testimony of Dr. Johannes Tuchel regarding these lists and on June 6, I heard oral submissions from the parties on the admissibility. For the reasons that follow, I have determined that the Transfer Lists may be received in evidence, either:
- under the statutory exception set out in s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 (CEA); or
- under the principled approach to the contemporary hearsay rule.
[4] I wish to stress that, at this stage, I am not deciding that any particular facts have been proved. Rather, I am simply deciding that these documents constitute admissible evidence. Only after I have heard all of the evidence and submissions in these proceedings will I make findings of fact.
The "Transfer Lists"
[5] The Transfer Lists are photocopies of original documents being held in the Central Archives of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation, in Moscow. The photocopies are of varying quality and, in one case, two separate copies of the same original document have been provided.
[6] All seven documents are similar in content and design. They are typewritten in German, sometimes with German handwriting on some portions. Each document also contains handwritten Cyrillic notations. Translations have been provided of both languages, with sworn affidavits by the translators. At first glance, the lists appear to record the transfer of guardsmen between "Training Camp Trawniki" and other labour camps, concentration camps or SS formations. The documents each contain a list of names and corresponding identification numbers, organized by rank. In some cases, the documents also state the birth date and birth location of the guardsmen. The documents are dated and, in most cases, signed.
[7] Each list contains a name that resembles that of one of the two Defendants. The spellings of the names are not consistent throughout the lists, except phonetically.
The Witness
[8] Dr. Johannes Tuchel testified for the Plaintiffs in this motion. He is best described as an academic historian and researcher; he is the Director of the German Resistance Memorial Centre in Germany and a Senior Lecturer at the Free University of Berlin. Although Dr. Tuchel's status as a qualified expert witness may be challenged in the full trial of these matters, the Defendants agreed to accept his testimony for the purposes of this motion.
[9] Dr. Tuchel explained that he attended the Central Archives of the FSB, in Moscow, in December 2004 and personally compared the original transfer lists to the copies before the Court today. He also examined a number of other related documents held by the FSB. Dr. Tuchel provided his assessment of the authenticity and reliability of the transfer lists, based on his research and knowledge of the concentration camp system employed by the Third Reich.
Relevance of the Transfer Lists
[10] Regardless of which test for admissibility is considered, the threshold question is whether the evidence is relevant to the matters before me. Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. The documents in issue deal with the transfer of persons between concentration camps in 1943. As discussed above, these lists contain names that appear to resemble those of the Defendants and information related to those names. This information is relevant to the alleged activities of each of the Defendants as set out in the statements of claim. For example, at paragraph 41 of the statement of claim against Mr. Furman, the Plaintiff pleads that "Josef Furmanchuk was transferred . . . to perform guard duties in Lublin on or about May 1943"; one of the Transfer Lists applies to this alleged transfer. I find that the lists are relevant to these proceedings.
[11] Once it is determined that evidence is relevant to the questions in issue, the general rule is that the evidence should be admissible. As stated by Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at p. 697:
The basic principles of the law of evidence embody an inclusionary policy which would permit into evidence everything logically probative of some fact in issue, subject to the recognized rules of exclusion and exceptions thereto. . . . If error is to be made it should be on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion and our efforts . . . should be towards admissibility unless a clear ground of policy or law dictates exclusion.
[12] However, the evidence in the Transfer Lists, although relevant, poses a problem. As pointed out by the Defendants, the authors of the Transfer Lists will not be available for cross examination. The lists, therefore, are a form of hearsay. While excluding this evidence would solve the problem posed by the Defendants, there are circumstances in which such evidence may be admitted.
Business Records
[13] The Plaintiff argues that the Transfer Lists constitute business records that are admissible under s. 30 of the CEA. This provision is set out in Appendix A to these Reasons. The Plaintiff submits that these lists were created in the "usual and ordinary course of business", as contemplated by s. 30(1) and should, therefore, be admitted. Two questions must be addressed to resolve this issue:
1. Since the Transfer Lists are not originals, do the copies satisfy the requirements of s. 30(3) regarding authenticity and conformity with the laws of the Russian Federation?
2. Were the Transfer Lists made in the "usual and ordinary course of business"?
[14] With respect to the first question, there is little dispute. The documents are copies of the originals which were prepared in Germany during the Second World War and which are now held in the FSB Archives of the Russian Federation. Each copy entered into an exhibit before me is accompanied by a Certificate of Authenticity "compiled in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation" executed by the Deputy Head or, in one case, the Head of the Central Archives of the FSB. The Deputy Head and Head confirm that the documents are authentic copies of the original German documents and that the copies were prepared by them or under their supervision. Further, we heard the testimony of Dr. Tuchel that he has seen the originals of the Transfer Lists held in the Archives in Moscow. I conclude that these are true copies of the Transfer Lists held in the FSB Archives. In addition, I am satisfied that it is not possible to produce the originals. As set out in the Certificates of Authenticity and confirmed by Dr. Tuchel, removal of these documents beyond the borders of the Russian Federation is forbidden. In my view, the requirements of s. 30(3) have been met.
[15] The next question is whether these documents were made in the usual and ordinary course of business. Dr. Tuchel, in his affidavit, attested that the Transfer Lists were made in the "usual and ordinary course of business". While a witness may be called upon to testify as to the circumstances under which documents were created, it is the Court that must determine whether the legal test set out in s. 30(1) has been met (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Fast, 2003 FC 1139, at para 31). Accordingly, I will not rely on Dr. Tuchel's statement as determinative of whether the preparation of the Transfer Lists was done in the "usual and ordinary course of business". Nevertheless, as discussed below, his testimony on the circumstances in which the documents were prepared is very helpful.
[16] I first ask myself whether those SS or police officers who prepared these records were part of a "business". For purposes of s. 30 of the CEA, the term "business" has an expansive meaning and includes "any activity or operation carried on . . . by any government . . . or by any other body or authority performing a function of government". While preparing these documents may not resemble the administrative or financial record keeping of a typical business enterprise, the German SS and Police officers responsible for the administration of the Trawniki SS training camp and other concentration camps were performing a function of the Nazi German government. In my view, this was a "business" as contemplated by s. 30(12) of the CEA.
[17] Next, I consider whether the preparation of the lists was part of the usual and ordinary course of the operation and administration of the German SS and Police. Not every document produced or activity of a police officer could be considered to be in the normal course of business. In responding to this question, Dr. Tuchel's evidence was helpful. There must be some pattern or system to the documents that indicate that they have been created as a normal function of the business. Having reviewed the Transfer Lists, the Certificates of Authenticity and the testimony of Dr. Tuchel, I am satisfied that these documents were part of the system in place in 1943 for tracking the whereabouts of guardsmen. This administrative record keeping system was very regulated, well-organized and consistent. When a group of guards was relocated, a list was drawn up in duplicate; the first copy was forwarded to the receiving posting and one copy was retained by the sending camp. The lists were generally consistent as to form. Each guardsman was identified with a registration number that was used on subsequent lists for the same individual. With one exception, the lists were signed by officers known, through Dr. Tuchel's research, as officers with the sending camp. While only seven lists are part of these proceedings, Dr. Tuchel testified that he has seen 30 to 40 such documents with similar structure and layout. In short, the Transfer Lists are the type of document one would expect to see in an enterprise where personnel are frequently relocated to meet the needs of the organization.
[18] For these reasons, I am persuaded that the Transfer Lists should be admitted pursuant to s. 30 of the CEA.
Principled Approach to the Hearsay Rule
[19] In the event that I am wrong in my finding that these are business documents that should be admitted pursuant to s. 30 of the CEA, I will consider one other ground of admissibility argued by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff submits that the Transfer Lists should be admitted as necessary and reliable evidence pursuant to the principled approach to the contemporary hearsay rule.
[20] In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that courts should apply a flexible approach to hearsay evidence (R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531; R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915; R. v. B.(K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740). This trilogy of cases built upon a case dealing with documentary evidence (nurses' reports) in Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608. Stated briefly, under the current rules, hearsay evidence may be admitted in cases where the criteria of necessity and reliability are met.
a) Necessity
[21] The jurisprudence establishes that it may be necessary to admit hearsay when other evidence is not available. Perhaps a witness is incompetent (as in Khan, above) or is dead. In some cases, there may be no other convenient way to prove a fact that is in issue (Smith, above).
[22] In this case, there can be little doubt that the authors of the Transfer Lists are not available almost 65 years after the fact. It is likely that they are dead. Without these documents in evidence, no facts can be proven and the Plaintiff (as admitted) will not be able to continue these actions. As a result, I am satisfied that the criterion of necessity has been met.
b) Reliability
[23] In this case, the issue of reliability is more serious. If I admit these documents, the Defendants will be unable to cross examine the authors of the lists. Thus, I must consider whether the inability to cross examine on the perception, memory and credibility of the creators of the Transfer Lists should result in their exclusion. In other words, are there serious reasons to question the trustworthiness or reliability of the documents? In undertaking this review, however, I do not need to establish the ultimate reliability of the documents; the ultimate reliability and the weight to be attached to the Transfer Lists will be determined at the end of the proceeding. As set out by the Supreme Court in R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043 at paras. 74-75, I am concerned with "threshold reliability"; I must determine whether the facts surrounding the utterance of the statement offer sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to compensate for the inability to cross examine.
[24] With this guidance in mind, I turn to the Transfer Lists. There are a number of indicia of the reliability of these documents:
1. As discussed above, the lists were prepared as part of the administration of the concentration camps and the movement of guards from one location to another within the system;
2. The documents contain lists of names and other factual information; in other words, they consist of objective information and not opinions or reports of a subjective nature;
3. The lists were prepared by persons with no interest in these proceedings; they were not prepared in contemplation of litigation;
4. The documents were prepared contemporaneously with the events, as stated by Dr. Tuchel;
5. The seven lists all have common elements, such as a uniform design, structure and purpose; they are consistent as to form and content, with a few minor exceptions;
6. Six of the seven lists are signed by senior officers of the SS or German police, as identified by Dr. Tuchel;
7. Some of the information contained in the lists is corroborated by other documents of German origin that have been examined by Dr. Tuchel at the FSB Archives and elsewhere; and
8. The Transfer Lists are consistent with 30 to 40 such lists that have been seen by Dr. Tuchel.
In my view, these facts satisfy the requirement for threshold reliability.
[25] The Defendants argue that the copies before the Court should not be admitted because they are of such poor quality that they are nearly illegible. In Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Fast, [2002] F.C.J. No. 353 (QL), 2002 FCT 269 at para. 10, the Court commented that copies must be of "sufficient quality" to be put to the use intended. There is no question that these are poor quality copies. Nevertheless, with care, the relevant information can be discerned. I am not prepared to refuse admission on this point. To the extent that the Defendants wish to raise the issue of the lack of clarity of particular portions of the documents, they are free to do so at trial.
[26] The Defendants also point out certain inconsistencies in spelling of the names that are alleged to be theirs and as to certain dates. This is another matter that can be addressed during the hearing on the merits. At this stage, the differences in spelling do not form a bar to the admissibility of the Transfer Lists. Further, while the Defendants cannot cross examine the authors of the lists, they will be able to question Dr. Tuchel, the Plaintiff's witness on these matters.
[27] In conclusion, I am satisfied that the facts establish sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to compensate for the inability of the Defendants to cross examine.
[28] Finally, the Defendants submit that I should exercise my discretion and not admit this evidence. They refer to the statement of Chief Justice Lamer in Smith, above at para 45, that this exception to the hearsay rule is "subject to the residual discretion of the trial judge to exclude the evidence when its probative value is slight and undue prejudice might result to the accused". I will not do so. The Transfer Lists appear to contain directly relevant information to these cases. The probative value of this evidence is arguably very great. Thus, at this preliminary stage, I should err on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion (Corbett, above).
Conclusion
[29] For these reasons, the motion will be allowed and the Transfer Lists which the Plaintiff asserts establish that the Defendants served as guards or collaborators in the German Reich during the Second World War will be admitted.
[30] To be very clear, I repeat that the weight to be attributed to the documents is still to be determined. Whether the evidence establishes that the Defendants served as guards or collaborators and, ultimately, whether they obtained their Canadian citizenship by false representations or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances will only be decided after considering all of the evidence and submissions in these proceedings.
[31] No costs were sought; none will be awarded.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the motion is allowed and the Transfer Lists admitted into evidence in these proceedings.
"Judith A. Snider"
APPENDIX "A"
CanadaEvidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5
| 30. (1) Where oral evidence in respect of a matter would be admissible in a legal proceeding, a record made in the usual and ordinary course of business that contains information in respect of that matter is admissible in evidence under this section in the legal proceeding on production of the record. (2) Where a record made in the usual and ordinary course of business does not contain information in respect of a matter the occurrence or existence of which might reasonably be expected to be recorded in that record, the court may on production of the record admit the record for the purpose of establishing that fact and may draw the inference that the matter did not occur or exist. (3) Where it is not possible or reasonably practicable to produce any record described in subsection (1) or (2), a copy of the record accompanied by two documents, one that is made by a person who states why it is not possible or reasonably practicable to produce the record and one that sets out the source from which the copy was made, that attests to the copy's authenticity and that is made by the person who made the copy, is admissible in evidence under this section in the same manner as if it were the original of the record if each document is (a) an affidavit of each of those persons sworn before a commissioner or other person authorized to take affidavits; or (b) a certificate or other statement pertaining to the record in which the person attests that the certificate or statement is made in conformity with the laws of a foreign state, whether or not the certificate or statement is in the form of an affidavit attested to before an official of |
30. (1) Lorsqu'une preuve orale concernant une chose serait admissible dans une procédure judiciaire, une pièce établie dans le cours ordinaire des affaires et qui contient des renseignements sur cette chose est, en vertu du présent article, admissible en preuve dans la procédure judiciaire sur production de la pièce. (2) Lorsqu'une pièce établie dans le cours ordinaire des affaires ne contient pas de renseignements sur une chose dont on peut raisonnablement s'attendre à trouver la survenance ou l'existence consignées dans cette pièce, le tribunal peut, sur production de la pièce, admettre celle-ci aux fins d'établir ce défaut de renseignements et peut en conclure qu'une telle chose ne s'est pas produite ou n'a pas existé. (3) Lorsqu'il n'est pas possible ou raisonnablement commode de produire une pièce décrite au paragraphe (1) ou (2), une copie de la pièce accompagnée d'un premier document indiquant les raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas possible ou raisonnablement commode de produire la pièce et d'un deuxième document préparé par la personne qui a établi la copie indiquant d'où elle provient et attestant son authenticité, est admissible en preuve, en vertu du présent article, de la même manière que s'il s'agissait de l'original de cette pièce pourvu que les documents satisfassent aux conditions suivantes : que leur auteur les ait préparés soit sous forme d'affidavit reçu par une personne autorisée, soit sous forme de certificat ou de déclaration comportant une attestation selon laquelle ce certificat ou cette déclaration a été établi en conformité avec les lois d'un État étranger, que le certificat ou l'attestation prenne ou non la forme d'un affidavit reçu par un fonctionnaire de l'État étranger. (4) Lorsque la production d'une pièce ou d'une copie d'une pièce décrite au paragraphe (1) ou (2) ne révélerait pas au tribunal les renseignements contenus dans la pièce, du fait qu'ils ont été consignés sous une forme qui nécessite des explications, une transcription des explications de la pièce ou copie, préparée par une personne qualifiée pour donner les explications, accompagnée d'un document de cette personne indiquant ses qualités pour les donner et attestant l'exactitude des explications est admissible en preuve, en vertu du présent article, de la même manière que s'il s'agissait de l'original de cette pièce. Le document prend la forme soit d'un affidavit reçu par une personne autorisée, soit d'un certificat ou d'une déclaration comportant une attestation selon laquelle ce certificat ou cette déclaration a été établi en conformité avec les lois d'un État étranger, que le certificat ou l'attestation prenne ou non la forme d'un affidavit reçu par un fonctionnaire de l'État étranger. (5) Lorsque seul un fragment d'une pièce est produit en vertu du présent article par une partie, le tribunal peut examiner tout autre fragment de la pièce et ordonner que, avec le fragment de la pièce ainsi produit précédemment, l'ensemble ou tout fragment de cet autre fragment de la pièce soit produit par cette partie en tant que pièce produite par elle. (6) Aux fins de déterminer si l'une des dispositions du présent article s'applique, ou aux fins de déterminer la valeur probante, le cas échéant, qui doit être accordée aux renseignements contenus dans une pièce admise en preuve en vertu du présent article, le tribunal peut, sur production d'une pièce, examiner celle-ci, admettre toute preuve à son sujet fournie de vive voix ou par affidavit, y compris la preuve des circonstances dans lesquelles les renseignements contenus dans la pièce ont été écrits, consignés, conservés ou reproduits et tirer toute conclusion raisonnable de la forme ou du contenu de la pièce. (7) Sauf si le tribunal en décide autrement, aucune pièce ou aucun affidavit n'est admissible en preuve en vertu du présent article, à moins que la partie qui produit la pièce ou l'affidavit n'ait, au moins sept jours avant sa production, donné à chacune des autres parties à la procédure judiciaire un avis de son intention de le produire et ne l'ait, dans les cinq jours qui suivent la réception d'un avis à cet effet donné par l'une de ces parties, produit aux fins d'examen par cette partie. (8) Si la preuve est produite sous forme d'affidavit, en vertu du présent article, il n'est pas nécessaire de prouver la signature ou la qualité officielle de la personne souscrivant l'affidavit si la qualité officielle de la personne est énoncée dans le corps de l'affidavit. (9) Sous réserve de l'article 4, lorsqu'une personne a connaissance de l'établissement ou du contenu d'une pièce produite ou admise en preuve en vertu du présent article, ou lorsqu'on peut raisonnablement s'attendre à ce qu'elle en ait connaissance, cette personne peut, avec la permission du tribunal, être interrogée ou contre-interrogée à ce sujet par toute partie à la procédure judiciaire. (10) Le présent article n'a pas pour effet de rendre admissibles en preuve dans une procédure judiciaire : (a) un fragment de pièce, lorsqu'il a été prouvé que le fragment est, selon le cas : (i) une pièce établie au cours d'une investigation ou d'une enquête, (ii) une pièce établie au cours d'une consultation en vue d'obtenir ou de donner des conseils juridiques ou établie en prévision d'une procédure judiciaire, (iii) une pièce relativement à la production de laquelle il existe un privilège qui est invoqué, (iv) une pièce reproduisant une déclaration ou faisant allusion à une déclaration faite par une personne qui n'est pas ou ne serait pas, si elle était vivante et saine d'esprit, habile et contraignable à divulguer dans la procédure judiciaire une chose divulguée dans la pièce; (b) une pièce dont la production serait contraire à l'ordre public; (c) une transcription ou un enregistrement de témoignages recueillis au cours d'une autre procédure judiciaire. (11) Les dispositions du présent article sont réputées s'ajouter et non pas déroger : (a) à toute autre disposition de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale concernant l'admissibilité en preuve d'une pièce ou concernant la preuve d'une chose; (b) à tout principe de droit existant en vertu duquel une pièce est admissible en preuve ou une chose peut être prouvée. (12) Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent au présent article. « affaires » Tout commerce ou métier ou toute affaire, profession, industrie ou entreprise de quelque nature que ce soit exploités ou exercés au Canada ou à l'étranger, soit en vue d'un profit, soit à d'autres fins, y compris toute activité exercée ou opération effectuée, au Canada ou à l'étranger, par un gouvernement, par un ministère, une direction, un conseil, une commission ou un organisme d'un gouvernement, par un tribunal ou par un autre organisme ou une autre autorité exerçant une fonction gouvernementale. « copie » Relativement à une pièce, est assimilée à une copie une épreuve, agrandie ou non, tirée d'une pellicule photographique représentant cette pièce, et « pellicule photographique » s'entend notamment d'une plaque photographique, d'une pellicule microphotographique et d'un cliché au photostat. « pièce » Sont assimilés à une pièce l'ensemble ou tout fragment d'un livre, d'un document, d'un écrit, d'une fiche, d'une carte, d'un ruban ou d'une autre chose sur ou dans lesquels des renseignements sont écrits, enregistrés, conservés ou reproduits, et, sauf pour l'application des paragraphes (3) et (4), toute copie ou transcription admise en preuve en vertu du présent article en conformité avec le paragraphe (3) ou (4). « procédure judiciaire » Toute procédure ou enquête, en matière civile ou pénale, dans laquelle une preuve est ou peut être faite, y compris l'arbitrage. « tribunal » Le tribunal, le juge, l'arbitre ou la personne devant qui une procédure judiciaire est exercée ou intentée.
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| the foreign state. (4) Where production of any record or of a copy of any record described in subsection (1) or (2) would not convey to the court the information contained in the record by reason of its having been kept in a form that requires explanation, a transcript of the explanation of the record or copy prepared by a person qualified to make the explanation is admissible in evidence under this section in the same manner as if it were the original of the record if it is accompanied by a document that sets out the person's qualifications to make the explanation, attests to the accuracy of the explanation, and is (a) an affidavit of that person sworn before a commissioner or other person authorized to take affidavits; or (b) a certificate or other statement pertaining to the record in which the person attests that the certificate or statement is made in conformity with the laws of a foreign state, whether or not the certificate or statement is in the form of an affidavit attested to before an official of the foreign state. (5) Where part only of a record is produced under this section by any party, the court may examine any other part of the record and direct that, together with the part of the record previously so produced, the whole or any part of the other part thereof be produced by that party as the record produced by him. (6) For the purpose of determining whether any provision of this section applies, or for the purpose of determining the probative value, if any, to be given to information contained in any record admitted in evidence under this section, the court may, on production of any record, examine the record, admit any evidence in respect thereof given orally or by affidavit including evidence as to the circumstances in which the information contained in the record was written, recorded, stored or reproduced, and draw any reasonable inference from the form or content of the record (7) Unless the court orders otherwise, no record or affidavit shall be admitted in evidence under this section unless the party producing the record or affidavit has, at least seven days before its production, given notice of his intention to produce it to each other party to the legal proceeding and has, within five days after receiving any notice in that behalf given by any such party, produced it for inspection by that party. (8) Where evidence is offered by affidavit under this section, it is not necessary to prove the signature or official character of the person making the affidavit if the official character of that person is set out in the body of the affidavit. (9) Subject to section 4, any person who has or may reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the making or contents of any record produced or received in evidence under this section may, with leave of the court, be examined or cross-examined thereon by any party to the legal proceeding. (10) Nothing in this section renders admissible in evidence in any legal proceeding (a) such part of any record as is proved to be (i) a record made in the course of an investigation or inquiry, (ii) a record made in the course of obtaining or giving legal advice or in contemplation of a legal proceeding, (iii) a record in respect of the production of which any privilege exists and is claimed, or (iv) a record of or alluding to a statement made by a person who is not, or if he were living and of sound mind would not be, competent and compellable to disclose in the legal proceeding a matter disclosed in the record; (b) any record the production of which would be contrary to public policy; or (c) any transcript or recording of evidence taken in the course of another legal proceeding. (11) The provisions of this section shall be deemed to be in addition to and not in derogation of (a) any other provision of this or any other Act of Parliament respecting the admissibility in evidence of any record or the proof of any matter; or (b) any existing rule of law under which any record is admissible in evidence or any matter may be proved. (12) In this section, "business" means any business, profession, trade, calling, manufacture or undertaking of any kind carried on in Canada or elsewhere whether for profit or otherwise, including any activity or operation carried on or performed in Canada or elsewhere by any government, by any department, branch, board, commission or agency of any government, by any court or other tribunal or by any other body or authority performing a function of government; "copy", in relation to any record, includes a print, whether enlarged or not, from a photographic film of the record, and "photographic film" includes a photographic plate, microphotographic film or photostatic negative; "court" means the court, judge, arbitrator or person before whom a legal proceeding is held or taken; "legal proceeding" means any civil or criminal proceeding or inquiry in which evidence is or may be given, and includes an arbitration; "record" includes the whole or any part of any book, document, paper, card, tape or other thing on or in which information is written, recorded, stored or reproduced, and, except for the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), any copy or transcript admitted in evidence under this section pursuant to subsection (3) or (4).
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FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKETS: T-440-04 & T-560-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION v. JURA SKOMATCHUK
AND BETWEEN
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION v. JOSEF FURMAN
PLACE OF HEARING: St. Catharines, Ontario
DATES OF HEARING: June 5-6, 2006
APPEARANCES:
| Marlene Thomas Jamie Todd Angela Marinos Bruce Hughson
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| Eric Hafemann Paul Williams
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada |
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Eric Hafemann, Esq., Waterloo, Ontario
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