Federal Court Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content


Date: 19980325


Docket: IMM-1085-98

         IN THE MATTER OF the Immigration Act, S.C. 1988, c. 35 and
         amendments and regulations thereto;
         IN THE MATTER OF a decision of an Immigration Adjudicator to
         issue a Deportation Order dated April 26, 1995, against Collin
         O "Neil Taylor;
         IN THE MATTER OF a decision by an Immigration Officer,
         Citizenship and Immigration Canada, regarding the status of Collin
         O "Neil Taylor;

BETWEEN:

     COLLIN O"NEIL TAYLOR

     Applicant

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

[1]      The applicant"s motion for a stay of the deportation order dated April 26, 1995 is denied. The applicant has not satisfied me that there is a serious issue to be tried nor that he will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted.

[2]      The Minister having concluded that the applicant constituted "a danger to the public in Canada", the applicant lost his right to appeal the deportation order made against him to the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. The deportation order was made following the applicant"s conviction for fraud over $1,000 contrary to paragraph 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code , as a result of which the applicant became a person described in subparagraph 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., c. I-2. By his judicial review proceedings, the applicant attacks both the deportation order and the Minister"s decision that he is a danger to the public in Canada.

[3]      The only ground of attack put forward by counsel for the applicant and worthy of discussion is that the Minister did not acknowledge receipt of the applicant"s submissions, nor did he refer to them in reaching his conclusion. In response to a letter dated February 21, 1996 sent to the applicant by the Criminal Backlog Review Task Force advising that the Minister was considering the issuance of an opinion pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Immigration Act that "[the applicant is] a danger to the public in Canada" and asking for submissions within 15 days, the applicant"s former solicitor, Mr. Clinton C. Ellis, sent a letter setting forth the reasons why the applicant should not be declared a danger to the public in Canada. Mr. Ellis enclosed a number of documents with his letter. The applicant submits that there is no evidence that Mr. Ellis" letter and documents were considered by the Minister before he formed his opinion.

[4]      In my view, the applicant"s submission that the Minister did not consider Mr. Ellis" letter and documents is without merit. The Minister concluded that the applicant was a danger to the public in Canada on May 6, 1996 and on June 28, 1996 a letter advising the applicant of the Minister"s opinion was sent to the applicant by W.E. MacIntyre of the Immigration Appeal Office. A copy of this letter was sent to Mr. Ellis.

[5]      The only evidence of Mr. Ellis" involvement in this file is his letter of April 11, 1996 and therefore Mr. MacIntyre, and hence the Minister, could only be aware that Mr. Ellis was the applicant"s solicitor by reason of that letter. I am satisfied that his letter was received by the Minister. I cannot, as the applicant suggests, presume that the Minister did not consider the letter before reaching his opinion. As Strayer J.A. stated in Williams v. Canada (MEI) (1997), 212 N.R. 63 at 71:

... the court must assume that the decision-maker acted in good faith in having regard to that material.

[6]      The burden of proving bad faith rests upon the applicant. There is no evidence before me that the Minister acted in bad faith. I am therefore satisfied that the judicial review application filed by the applicant does not raise any serious issue. The evidence adduced does not show that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if deported to Jamaica.

     "MARC NADON"

     Judge

Ottawa, Ontario

March 25, 1998

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.