Ottawa, Ontario, this 3rd day of June, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE O'KEEFE
BETWEEN:
and
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
O'KEEFE J.
[1] This is an application for judicial review pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 of the decision dated May 29, 2003 of Judi Korbin, an adjudicator (the "adjudicator") appointed under the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 (the "Code") wherein she determined that the respondent had been unjustly dismissed from his employment with the applicant and ordered the applicant to pay damages to the respondent in lieu of reinstatement.
[2] The applicant requests:
1. An order overturning Judi Korbin's decision of May 29, 2003, awarding Arvine Norgren the sum of $5,500 in lieu of reinstating his employment.
2. An order that he is not entitled to any damages or severance pay.
3. Such further and other relief as may be found to be appropriate by the Honourable Court.
4. The costs of this application.
Background
[3] Redlon Agencies Ltd. (the "applicant") was incorporated in British Columbia in 1986 and is currently a B.C. registered company that is licenced to deliver parcels within the municipality of Powell River. The applicant has been engaged in contract work with Canada Post since 1986 pursuant to various Divisional Combined Urban Services ("DCUS") contracts. The respondent was employed with the applicant since 1998.
[4] In July 2001, the applicant's contract was up for renewal, but as he was unsure whether it was being renewed he submitted a bid after Canada Post put out a request for tenders for the provision of delivery of mail and parcels in the Powell River area, pursuant to a DCUS contract. The applicant was the successful bidder.
[5] There are allegations as to the respondent's ability to continue doing the work he was, but in any event, the applicant kept the respondent on for a period of time after the awarding of the contract.
[6] By letter dated April 22, 2002, the applicant gave the respondent four weeks notice that he was dismissing him effective May 16, 2002 from his position of postal delivery driver, ostensibly under the retirement provision that the applicant alleged is permissible under the British Columbia Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, Chapter 114.
[7] The respondent submitted a complaint of unjust dismissal under the Code. By letter dated August 28, 2002, the parties were advised that an adjudicator had been appointed under the Code to deal with the complaint, by the then Minister of Labour.
Adjudicator's Decision
[8] The adjudicator first dealt with the threshold question of whether she had jurisdiction. The applicant had objected to the matter being dealt with under the Code on the basis that its business is governed by provincial legislation. The adjudicator noted that a notice of constitutional question was submitted and sent to the Attorneys General of the provinces and Canada. The only response was from the Attorney General of Canada indicating that they would not be intervening.
[9] The adjudicator first discussed elements of the DCUS contract and the attached Combined Urban Services Supplement (the "Supplement") and noted the elements of the relationship between the company and Canada Post pursuant to the DCUS and Supplement. The adjudicator noted, for example, (i) the DCUS contract is for the transportation of mailable matter tendered by Canada Post in accordance with the schedule; (ii) the company provides three or four vans and personnel to operate the vans to deliver products in Powell River, B.C.; (iii) the company handles bags of mail for box sites, parcels for delivery, some registered, some (parcel post) or express mail to homes and businesses in Powell River; (iv) failure to comply with the Supplement (which identifies the terms and conditions for the DCUS contract) is considered an event of default and can have serious consequences, including cancellation of the DCUS contract; (v) the DCUS contract refers to the contractor and its employees as representatives of Canada Post; (vi) Canada Post sets out the delivery procedures and the company follows them; and (vii) there are no "customer lists" but the customers are individuals and businesses that have elected to use postal services provided by Canada Post.
[10] The adjudicator noted the applicant's submission that the customers it services are simply using a delivery service. Its business is provincial in nature and as such, is governed by provincial legislation. It was therefore entitled to retire the respondent pursuant to the provincial retirement provisions, and further, that the unjust dismissal provisions of the Code do not apply.
[11] The adjudicator determined that if upon examination of the normal and ongoing operations of the applicant company, she found that it is in whole or in part integral to the effective operation of Canada Post, then the applicant is within federal jurisdiction and the Code applies.
[12] The adjudicator relied upon the methodology and analysis of the former Canada Labour Relations Board in Muir's Cartage Ltd. and Canada Post Corporation (1992), 17 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 182 (aff'd F.C.A.) leave to appeal dismissed [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 50, in determining jurisdiction. The adjudicator noted the Board in Muir's Cartage, supra, followed the three part test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Northern Telecom Limited v. Communications Workers of Canada et al. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115 and applied in relation to postal services in Canada Post Corporation and Shoppers Drug Mart Limited (1987), 1 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 218 (aff'd F.C.A.) as follows:
1. Is Canada Post a core federal undertaking?
The adjudicator determined that as Parliament has exclusive authority over postal services, the answer to the first question is yes.
2. (a) Is part of the normal activity of the employer a postal operation and, if so,
(b) Does this constitute, in whole or in part, an integral part of Canada Post's business?
(a) The adjudicator stated:
The respondent (Redlon) confirmed that its employees fill out the necessary paper work supplied by Canada Post for C.O.D.s, express parcels and undeliverable items and utilize equipment in the form of scanners supplied by Canada Post to participate in tracking mailable items within the Canada Post network. In effect, as in the Muir's case, the respondent directly contributes to fulfilling Canada Post's objects as defined in Subsection 5(1) paragraphs (a) and (b) of its enabling legislation. After careful consideration of the submissions and documentary evidence I am satisfied that, at a minimum, the portion of the Respondent's business concerned with fulfilling its obligations under the DCUS contract, the part of the operation where the Appellant worked, was directed at the provision of postal services.
(b) The adjudicator noted that the company's contribution to the provision of postal services in Powell River, a small community in British Columbia, is substantial and significant. The adjudicator stated:
. . . I am satisfied that without the Respondent's participation (or that of another contractor), Canada Post's ability to provide postal services in Powell River would be compromised. Without the Respondent, or another contractor, Canada Post would either have to provide the services itself using its own employees or elect to shut down or curtail postal services in that community. Consequently, I find that the Respondent's postal operations are an integral part of Canada Post operations.
3. Is there a practical and functional relationship between the employer and Canada Post?
The adjudicator noted numerous and continuous daily links between the company and Canada Post, and concluded that there is a practical and functional relationship between the company and Canada Post. The adjudicator also noted that at least three of the company's employees were deployed exclusively to provide the services articulated in the DCUS contract and the Supplement, and did so on a daily basis for a significant part of the day. The adjudicator also found that:
While the Respondent describes itself as a delivery service the facts provided by the Respondent and the terms and conditions described in the DCUS Contract and the Supplement show that its activities constitute a significant contribution to postal operations in Powell River and those operations are in turn linked to those of Canada Post such that Canada Post is able to fulfil its mandate. The seamless integration of the Respondent with Canada Post networks and operational requirements is essential to the effective and efficient operation of postal services in Powell River and while the Respondent is replaceable it is a necessary link between Canada Post and its clientele in Powell River.
[13] The adjudicator therefore determined that the applicant's work was integral to the operations of Canada Post in Powell River and therefore she had jurisdiction to deal with the claim for unjust dismissal.
[14] After determining that she did have jurisdiction to deal with the complaint, the adjudicator found that the respondent had been unjustly dismissed, and stated the following:
Merits of the Complaint
In all of the particular circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the Respondent did not have just cause to terminate the Appellant's employment. The Respondent may well have had concerns about the Appellant's performance and his ability to continue to safely and effectively perform his job functions. However, no evidence was provided to me to indicate that the Respondent had ever raised these concerns with the Appellant prior to his termination. Consequently, there was no evidence that the Complaint [sic] was ever afforded an opportunity to address these concerns or correct any perceived deficiencies in his performance. Nor was there evidence to suggest the termination could be justified on any other legitimate or sustainable grounds. What I do have before me is the letter of termination which thanks the Appellant for his efforts and complements [sic] him on his dependability. On this basis there is no reason to think that the Appellant's performance was anything other than satisfactory. As such, I am satisfied that the Respondent did not have just cause to dismiss the Appellant.
Remedy
Subsection 242(4) of the Code sets out my remedial powers and reads as follows: . . .
The Appellant advised me that he does not wish to return to the workplace. Consequently, I am satisfied that an order pursuant to subsection 242(4)(c) is appropriate.
I have taken into account all of the relevant circumstances in this case which include the fact that the Appellant does not seek to return to work for this Employer, his length of service prior to his termination, the character of his employment, and his age.
In the result, I find the Appellant shall be entitled to damages in the amount of $5,500.00, less any statutory deductions, in lieu of reinstatement to employment.
Issues
[15] 1. Did the adjudicator err in determining that she had jurisdiction to hear the complaint under the Canada Labour Code?
2. Did the adjudicator err in awarding damages to the respondent for unjust dismissal?
Applicant's Submissions
[16] Issue 1 (Jurisdiction)
The applicant submitted that as a B.C. registered company that operates solely within the province of British Columbia, and based on information received from various sources, including Canada Post, it should not be deemed to be subject to the provisions of the Code. The applicant submitted that Mr. Redlon contacted the B.C. Employment Standards Branch and was advised that if a B.C. registered company does not operate outside the province, they are covered under B.C. labour standards.
[17] The applicant submitted that during the entirety of the company's existence, materials and correspondence related to employment matters and standards have been received solely from the provincial ministry. At no time prior to the respondent's complaint, did the applicant receive any information or communication from "Canada Labour" on working conditions or labour standards, as he should have had if he was in fact under the jurisdiction of the Code.
[18] The applicant submitted that the adjudicator therefore erred in determining that it was subject to the Code.
[19] Issue 2 (Retirement and Severance)
The applicant submitted that the respondent had requested to work for the applicant company until he reached the pensionable age for Old Age Security payments and a Canada Pension Plan retirement pension (approximately two and one-half years later). The applicant intended to hire the respondent for only a short term (approximately two years), delivering parcels for Canada Post.
[20] The applicant submitted that complaints were received about the respondent and it was noticed that over time the respondent was having increasing difficulties in performing the job functions, including lifting parcels and loading parcels. He therefore decided to end the respondent's employment with the company on the basis of retirement age pursuant to B.C. legislation, which he is permitted to do as a B.C. company.
[21] The applicant submitted that in keeping with the B.C. labour standards, he gave the respondent notice on April 22, 2002, that his employment was being terminated "under the retirement category" effective at the end of the day May 16, 2002. This was four weeks notice. In his submissions to the adjudicator, the applicant submitted that he was advised by the respective provincial and federal departments that in each instance once an employee turns sixty-five years of age, he or she could be retired by an employer.
[22] The applicant further submitted that in any event, under the provisions of the Code , an employer is not required to pay severance pay to an employee who "on or before ceasing to be employed are entitled to a pension under the Old Age Security Act, or a retirement pension under the Canada Pension Plan Act or the Quebec Pension Plan Act".
[23] The applicant submitted that the respondent is of the age that he is entitled to a pension as indicated in exhibit A to the affidavit of David Redlon, sworn August 13, 1994
[24] Accordingly, as the respondent was not entitled to receive a severance payment, the adjudicator erred in awarding damages to the respondent.
Respondent's Submissions
[25] The respondent did not file any affidavits or memorandum. Accordingly, there is no response to the applicant's submissions.
[26] In his submissions to the adjudicator, the respondent stated that he was unaware of the employer being dissatisfied in any fashion with his work, and he had at no time indicated that he was planning on retiring once he was at the age where he was eligible for a pension.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
[27] The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, states in part as follows:
| 91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
. . .
5. Postal Service
. . .. |
|
91. Il sera loisible à la Reine, de l'avis et du consentement du Sénat et de la Chambre des Communes, de faire des lois pour la paix, l'ordre et le bon gouvernement du Canada, relativement à toutes les matières ne tombant pas dans les catégories de sujets par la présente loi exclusivement assignés aux législatures des provinces; mais, pour plus de garantie, sans toutefois restreindre la généralité des termes ci-haut employés dans le présent article, il est par la présente déclaré que (nonobstant toute disposition contraire énoncée dans la présente loi) l'autorité législative exclusive du parlement du Canada s'étend à toutes les matières tombant dans les catégories de sujets ci-dessous énumérés, savoir:
. . .
5. Le service postal.
. . . |
[28] Part III of the Code states:
| 167. (1) This Part applies
(a) to employment in or in connection with the operation of any federal work, undertaking or business other than a work, undertaking or business of a local or private nature in Yukon, the Northwest Territories or Nunavut;
(b) to and in respect of employees who are employed in or in connection with any federal work, undertaking or business described in paragraph (a);
(c) to and in respect of any employers of the employees described in paragraph (b);
. . . |
|
167. (1) La présente partie s'applique :
a) à l'emploi dans le cadre d'une entreprise fédérale, à l'exception d'une entreprise de nature locale ou privée au Yukon, dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest ou au Nunavut;
b) aux employés qui travaillent dans une telle entreprise;
c) aux employeurs qui engagent ces employés;
. . . |
[29] The terms "federal work, undertaking or business" are defined in section 2 of the Code:
| "federal work, undertaking or business" means any work, undertaking or business that is within the legislative authority of Parliament, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing,
. . . (h) a work or undertaking that, although wholly situated within a province, is before or after its execution declared by Parliament to be for the general advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two or more of the provinces,
(i) a work, undertaking or business outside the exclusive legislative authority of the legislatures of the provinces, and |
|
« entreprises fédérales » Les installations, ouvrages, entreprises ou secteurs d'activité qui relèvent de la compétence législative du Parlement, notamment :
. . . h) les ouvrages ou entreprises qui, bien qu'entièrement situés dans une province, sont, avant ou après leur réalisation, déclarés par le Parlement être à l'avantage général du Canada ou de plusieurs provinces;
i) les installations, ouvrages, entreprises ou secteurs d'activité ne ressortissant pas au pouvoir législatif exclusif des législatures provinciales; |
[30] Other relevant provisions in the Code state:
| 235(2) For the purposes of this Division,
(a) except where otherwise provided by regulation, an employer shall be deemed to have terminated the employment of an employee when the employer lays off that employee; and
(b) an employer shall be deemed not to have terminated the employment of an employee where, either immediately on ceasing to be employed by the employer or before that time, the employee is entitled to a pension under a pension plan contributed to by the employer that is registered pursuant to the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, to a pension under the Old Age Security Act or to a retirement pension under the Canada Pension Plan or the Quebec Pension Plan.
242(4) Where an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, the adjudicator may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to
(a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person;
(b) reinstate the person in his employ; and
(c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal. |
|
(2) Pour l'application de la présente section :
a) sauf disposition contraire d'un règlement, la mise à pied est assimilée au licenciement;
b) l'employeur est réputéne pas avoir licenciél'employédans le cas oùcelui-ci acquiert le droit dès sa cessation d'emploi -ou avait déjà droit -à une pension accordée aux termes d'un régime de pensions auquel cotise l'employeur et qui est enregistréen conformitéavec la Loi de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension, à la pension prévue par la Loi sur la sécuritéde la vieillesse ou à une pension ou rente de retraite accordée aux termes du Régime de pensions du Canada ou du Régime de rentes du Québec.
242(4) S'il décide que le congédiement était injuste, l'arbitre peut, par ordonnance, enjoindre à l'employeur :
a) de payer au plaignant une indemnitééquivalant, au maximum, au salaire qu'il aurait normalement gagnés'il n'avait pas étécongédié;
b) de réintégrer le plaignant dans son emploi;
c) de prendre toute autre mesure qu'il juge équitable de lui imposer et de nature à contrebalancer les effets du congédiement ou à y remédier. |
Analysis and Decision
[31] Standard of Review
The standard of review to be applied with respect to the issue of the adjudicator's jurisdiction is correctness (see Przybyszewski v. Metis Nation of Ontario [2004], F.C.J. No. 1328 (QL) (F.C.C.)).
[32] On the issue of the adjudicator's finding of unjust dismissal and the awarding of damages, the standard of review is patent unreasonableness (see Air Charter Ltd. v. KMET [1998] F.C.J. No. 740 (QL) (F.C.T.D.)).
[33] Issue 1
Did the adjudicator err in determining that she had jurisdiction to hear the complaint under the Canada Labour Code?
Pursuant to subsection 91(5) of the Constitution Act, 1867, postal service is exclusively within federal jurisdiction. Labour relations are in almost all instances considered to fall within provincial jurisdiction under subsection 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, "Property and Civil Rights in the Province". This was confirmed in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] A.C. 396. Labour and employment relations can be brought under a federal head of powerin one of two ways: first, if the activity in question constitutes a federal work or undertaking or business and second, if an activity is "integral to" an existing federal work or undertaking (see United Transportation Union v. Central Railway Corp., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1112, Reference re Industrial Relations and Dispute Investigation Act (Canada) (1995) 3 D.L.R. 721 (S.C.C.)). In Re Arrow Transfer Co. Ltd., [1974] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 20 at pages 34 to 35, the Chair of the B.C. Labour Relations Board noted that in determining whether the relationship between the operation in question is "integral" to the core federal undertaking, "in each case the judgment is a functional, practical one about the factual character of the ongoing undertaking and does not turn on technical, legal niceties of the corporate structure or the employment relationship."
[34] In Letter Carrier's Union of Canada v. Canadian Union of Postal Works [1975] 1 S.C.R. 178, the Supreme Court of Canada held there could be no doubt that the subject matter of the postal service is expressly assigned to the exclusive legislative authority of Parliament under subsection 91(5) of the B.N.A. Act [sic], and that employer and employee relations in that service are correspondingly within that authority. It is not necessary for there to be exclusive employment upon or in connection with a federal work.
[35] I have taken the facts as stated by the adjudicator and accepted that the adjudicator accurately stated the relevant portions of the DCUS contract and the Supplement in her reasons.
[36] I would find that the adjudicator properly analyzed the information before her, and followed the proper process pursuant to the aforementioned case law in determining that the applicant's functions were integral to a federal work or undertaking, specifically postal service. There is nothing in the applicant's record or submissions to show the adjudicator erred in her analysis in any fashion. Accordingly, I would uphold the adjudicator's determination that she had jurisdiction under the Code. She committed no reviewable error.
[37] Issue 2
Did the adjudicator err in awarding damages to the respondent for unjust dismissal?
The applicant submitted that pursuant to paragraph 235(2)(b) of the Code, he was permitted to terminate the respondent's employment without having to provide severance pay as the respondent was "entitled to a pension under a pension plan contributed to by the employer that is registered pursuant to the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, to a pension under the Old Age Security Act or to a retirement pension under the Canada Pension Plan or the Quebec Pension Plan". Accordingly the Adjudicator erred in awarding damages.
[38] It is clear that the applicant is equating the award of damages with a severance payment. I do not agree with the applicant. By way of explanation, I would adopt the reasoning of Adjudicator J. M. Gordon in Goodwin v. Conair Aviation Limited, [2002] C.L.A.D. No.602 (QL), as to the interplay between the termination and unjust dismissal provisions of the Code, and apply it to this case:
29. Division XIV of Part III of the Code provides a procedure for a non-union employee to file a complaint against a dismissal the employee "considers to be unjust" (see Section 240(1)). Where, as here, the Minister of Labour appoints an Adjudicator to hear and determine the employee's complaint of unjust dismissal, the employer must, generally speaking, proceed first to prove the dismissal was for just cause. The requirements to avail oneself of the just cause protection of the Code were succinctly enumerated by Adjudicator Edgar in Unnamed Complainant v. Martin Pauluik Transport Inc., [2001] C.L.A.D. No. 201 at page 1:
From the information before me it is clear that the Complainant has completed at least 12 consecutive months of continuous employment by the Employer and was not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement. It is also clear that the Complainant was not a manager of the Employer. Further, there were no objections taken that the Complainant was laid off because of lack of work or because of he discontinuance of a function or that a process for redress has been provided elsewhere under any other Act of Parliament. These facts satisfy the legal requirements of the Code that go to my jurisdiction to hear this complaint.
. . .
31. Conair cannot avoid its obligation to establish the justness of its decision to dismiss Ms. Goodwin by simply asserting that management elected to utilize the "without cause" approach to the severance of the employment relationship, and met the notice and compensation obligations under the Code. The reasoning of Adjudicators who have reached a contrary conclusion under the Code (in particular Adjudicator Wakeling and those who follow him) is not persuasive. As I have already observed, I find the reasoning of the Federal Court and the Adjudicators cited by the Complainant to be consistent with the purpose of this part of the Code and the intention of Parliament as expressed in the language of the Code. In MacDonald -and- Northern Thunderbird Air Ltd., [1995] C.L.A.D. No. 551, the Adjudicator rejected the employer's argument that it could terminate an employee without alleging cause by simply paying severance pay such that the employee's only recourse was to bring a civil action. The Adjudicator rejected that argument in the following terms:
If an employer terminates the employee and pays severance without alleging any cause, that does not in itself disentitle the employee from claiming that he/she has been unjustly dismissed. If that were so, then the intention of Parliament expressed in Section 240 of the Code to provide a remedy for employees who have been unjustly dismissed would be thwarted by employers simply paying the severance pay required under Section 235. . . .
If Parliament intended to limit unjust dismissal complaints to those persons who were terminated and were provided with reasons for the dismissal, it would have clearly stated that to be the case in Section 240 and made Section 240 subject to Section 235. (at page 2).
32. I accept the Complainant's contention that just cause would constitute a hollow protection if an employer could terminate an employee without alleging cause as long as it met the notice and severance requirements of the Code. This contention finds support in the reasoning of Arbitrator Roach in Duncan -and- Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 48, citing the Federal Court of Appeal in C.I.B.C. -and- Boisvert (1986), F.C. 431 (appealed to S.C.C. dismissed without reasons):
The very right of dismissal has been completely altered to preclude arbitrary action by the employer and to ensure continuity of employment. Only a right of "just" dismissal now exists, and this certainly means dismissal based on an objective, real and substantial cause, independent of caprice, convenience or purely personal disputes. . . . (at page 8).
[39] The adjudicator in the present case found that the respondent had been unjustly dismissed. I am of the opinion that the adjudicator properly exercised her jurisdiction under paragraph 242(4)(c) of the Code in awarding damages. The applicant cannot avoid the operation of the unjust dismissal provisions by resorting to the severance payment provisions.
[40] The adjudicator based her decision in part on a lack of evidence before her that showed that the applicant was justified in dismissing the respondent. The adjudicator noted that there was no evidence before her to confirm that the respondent had been advised of the applicant's concerns and had been provided with opportunities to deal with the applicant's concerns before he was dismissed. Based on a review of the decision, I can find no reviewable error.
[41] The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
ORDER
[42] IT IS ORDERED that the application for judicial review is dismissed.
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1103-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: REDLON AGENCIES LTD.
- and -
ARVINE NORGREN
PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF HEARING: March 15, 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER OF: O'KEEFE J.
APPEARANCES:
David Redlon
On Behalf of Corporation
No Appearance
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
David Redlon
Powell River, British Columbia
Arvine Norgren
Powell River, British Columbia