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     Date: 19981223

     Docket: IMM-4278-97

Ottawa, Ontario, the 23rd day of December 1998

Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pinard

Between:

     Gurcharan Singh NIJJAR

     Applicant

     - and -

     MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION OF CANADA

     Respondent

     ORDER

     The application for judicial review of the decision dated September 9, 1997, by the Convention Refugee Determination Division, which determined that the applicant is not a Convention refugee, is dismissed.

                             YVON PINARD

                             JUDGE

Certified true translation

M. Iveson

     Date: 19981223

     Docket: IMM-4278-97

Between:

     Gurcharan Singh NIJJAR

     Applicant

     - and -

     MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION OF CANADA

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD J.:

[1]      The application for judicial review concerns a decision dated September 9, 1997, by the Convention Refugee Determination Division, which determined that the applicant is not a Convention refugee.

[2]      It seems that the panel"s decision is based solely on the applicant"s lack of credibility, due to three improbabilities related to essential points of his claim. After reviewing the evidence, as I see nothing irrational in the assessment of the plausibility of the applicant"s testimony by the members of the panel, I accordingly cannot intervene. It is necessary to bear in mind the degree of deference applicable to a finding of credibility by such a panel, as expressed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Aguebor v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1993), 160 N.R. 315, at page 316:

                 There is no longer any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the Court merely observed that in the area of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be more palpable, and so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on the face of the record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the burden that rests on an appellant, of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division could not reasonably have been drawn. In this case, the appellant has not discharged this burden.                 

[3]      The panel"s perception that the applicant is not credible effectively amounts to a finding that there is no credible evidence to justify his claim for refugee status (see Sheikh v. Canada (M.E.I.) , [1990] 3 F.C. 238, at page 244). In this regard, the panel"s failure to attach importance to the medical certificate filed by the applicant is of no consequence, as the report"s conclusion is linked to the veracity of the applicant"s story.



[4]      Consequently, despite the valiant efforts of counsel for the applicant, the application for judicial review must be dismissed. As I indicated at the hearing, in light of the fact situation, there is no question to be certified.

                             YVON PINARD

                                     JUDGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

December 23, 1998

Certified true translation

M. Iveson

     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

     TRIAL DIVISION

     NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

COURT NO.:      IMM-4278-97

STYLE OF CAUSE:      GURCHARAN SINGH NIJJAR v. MCI

PLACE OF HEARING:      MONTRÉAL, QUE.

DATE OF HEARING:      DEC. 1, 1998

REASONS FOR ORDER OF PINARD J.

DATED      DEC. 23, 1998

APPEARANCES:

HARRY BLANK          FOR THE APPLICANT

CAROLINE DOYON          FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

HARRY BLANK          FOR THE APPLICANT

CAROLINE DOYON          FOR THE RESPONDENT

Morris Rosenberg

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

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