Federal Court Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date: 20050502

Docket: IMM-4269-04

Citation: 2005 FC 597

OTTAWA, ONTARIO, MAY 2, 2005

PRESENT:      THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MARTINEAU

BETWEEN:

                                                      LIOUDMILA RADOSTEVA

                                                                                                                                            Applicant

                                                                           and

                                               THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                                                          AND IMMIGRATION

                                                                                                                                        Respondent

                                            REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

[1]                This is an application for judicial review of the decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board), dated April 14, 2004, wherein it found the applicant not to be a "Convention refugee" nor a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27 (the IRPA), and accordingly rejected her application for protection.


[2]                This is a case where the central issue is one of credibility.

[3]                The Board simply did not believe the story of the applicant. The conclusion that the applicant lacked credibility, and that her story is a complete fabrication, is the rationale behind the whole decision. In fact, the Board did not believe that the applicant was persecuted because she was Jewish, nor was it satisfied that the applicant was truly of Jewish background. Moreover, there was no indication that the applicant, who practices the Russian Orthodox religion, would be perceived as Jewish in Russia. In addition, the Board found that the applicant had not satisfied her burden of establishing that she has a well-founded fear of persecution.

[4]                In its written reasons, the Board indicated in clear and unmistakable terms why it did not believe the applicant. The negative inferences drawn by the Board are based on a number of inconsistencies between her Personal Information Form (PIF) and the applicant's testimony which relates to essential elements of the applicant's claim. Moreover, the Board's conclusions with respect to the numerous omissions found in the applicant's PIF and the lack of satisfactory explanation are not patently unreasonable.


[5]                More precisely, the Board was entitled to draw negative inferences from the fact that the applicant did not indicate that her father was Jewish in her PIF or from the fact that she did not indicate that she had any problem in Russia because of her alleged Jewish background. Moreover, the applicant did not make any reference in her PIF to the alleged second beating she suffered in Ukraine. The Board was allowed to discount the applicant's explanation with regards to this last omission.

[6]                With regard to the medical documents, I believe that the Board's conclusion that they were fraudulently obtained is not unreasonable. For instance, the applicant's alleged injuries did not coincide with the produced medical reports. Moreover, the medical reports were not in the same documentary form, and had different official stamps, although they were allegedly issued three days apart by the same small medical clinic.

[7]                In my opinion, the Board's finding that the applicant's testimony was nothing but a fabrication is not patently reasonable. This general lack of credibility had an effect on the whole of the applicant's claim. It is trite law that a finding of general lack of credibility can affect the probative value of the applicant's documentary evidence. Therefore, the Board was entitled to prefer certain objective documentary evidence over that provided by the applicant.


[8]                As for the Board's conclusion in relation to the applicant's allegation that she would be persecuted because of her association with her former husband who had allegedly evaded service in Chechnya in July 1999, I also find that this is not patently unreasonable. The applicant failed to mention in her PIF that she and her husband divorced in October 2001. The Board was entitled to draw a negative inference from this omission. Moreover, the Board rightly based its conclusion on the fact that, at the time the applicant's former husband left Russia, he could not have been persecuted for draft evasion since reservists were not being sent to Chechnya at that time according to the documentary evidence.

[9]                Indeed, the objective documentary evidence stated that reservists were sent to armed conflict areas only as of January 2000. On this matter, the Board did not rely solely on the decision of another tribunal. It only considered that decision to provide further context for the same alleged events and circumstances. Anyhow, the applicant did not cite any documentary evidence that demonstrated that former spouses of those who evade the draft are being targeted. Therefore, the applicant's alleged fear is not well founded. In my view, the Board was entitled to find that it would be highly speculative and implausible that the Russian authorities would be interested in the applicant, years after her divorce and years after her former husband left Russia. In any event, there was no credible evidence that she actually assisted her husband in any way nor that she was or would be persecuted on that basis.

[10]            In addition, the Board's conclusion in connection with the applicant's son is not patently unreasonable, given the impugned credibility of the applicant, coupled with the objective documentary evidence. In fact, the applicant did not succeed in proving that her son had actually been "called up" or drafted. Moreover, considering the fact that only 20 percent of eligible conscripts are actually enlisted, the applicant had not established a credible fear and, therefore, the Board's conclusion on this matter is not patently unreasonable.


[11]            It was also open to the Board to conclude that the documentary evidence does demonstrate that there have been no repercussions against mothers who have organized themselves to prevent forced military service for their sons. I reiterate that in light of the applicant's general lack of credibility, the Board was entitled to give no probative value to the applicant's documentary evidence. In my opinion, the applicant's allegation that she would be tortured upon her return to Russia is simply not well founded.

[12]            This case does not raise a question of general importance, as none have been submitted by counsel.

ORDER

THIS COURT ORDERS that the application for judicial review of the decision of the Board dated April 14, 2004 be dismissed.

                   "Luc Martineau"                    

                                                                                                                                                   Judge                                


FEDERAL COURT

NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:                                           IMM-4269-04

STYLE OF CAUSE:               LIOUDMILA RADOSTEVA v. M.C.I.

PLACE OF HEARING:                     TORONTO, ONTARIO

DATE OF HEARING:                       APRIL 28, 2005

REASONS FOR ORDER

AND ORDER:                                    THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MARTINEAU

DATED:                                              MAY 2, 2005

APPEARANCES BY:          

Mr. Jeffrey L. Goldman                                                            FOR THE APPLICANT

Ms. Alison Engel                                                                      FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:   

Jeffrey L. Goldman                                                                    FOR THE APPLICANT

Barrister & Solicitor

Toronto, Ontario

John H. Sims, Q.C.                                                                   FOR THE RESPONDENT

Deputy Attorney General of Canada


 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.