Federal Court Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content


Date: 19990709


Docket: T-1093-97

BETWEEN:

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION,

     Plaintiff

     - and -

     EDUARDS PODINS,

     Defendant.

     REASONS FOR DECISION

McKEOWN J.

[1]      The defendant, Mr. Eduards Podins worked as a shopkeeper in the Valmiera Ersatsgefängnis ("Replacement" or "EG") prison in Valmiera, Latvia, from November 17th , 1941 to the middle of September, 1943. During that period, his official title was policeman, Latvian Auxiliary Police. The plaintiff, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ("the Minister"), seeks to revoke the defendant"s citizenship, alleging that he "collaborat[ed] with German authorities in Latvia during the period 1941-1943, as a member of the Latvian Auxiliary police, a local Auxiliary police under the command of the Germans," and through his "work in such capacity as a concentration camp guard in the so-called "Valmiera Replacement Prison", in Latvia, during the same period."1 The plaintiff does not allege that the defendant personally engaged in atrocities or crimes.

[2]      The defendant"s history, subsequent to the alleged period of collaboration can be briefly summarized as follows: He was taken prisoner of war by the British in 1945 and was discharged from the prisoner of war camp in the spring of 1946. He applied to go to England as an immigrant in November of 1947. He became a British citizen in 1955. He applied to come to Canada in early 1959 and landed in Canada on May 29th , 1959. On February 10th, 1971, he applied for Canadian citizenship and was granted citizenship in Canada on February 22nd, 1971.

[3]      On March 10th, 1997, the Minister notified Mr. Podins that she intended to request that the Governor in Council revoke his citizenship pursuant to sections 10 and 18 of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29 (the "Citizenship Act"), and section 18 of the Canadian Citizenship Act , R.S.C. 1970, c. C-19 (in effect when Mr. Podins applied for citizenship), on the following grounds:

             that you have been admitted to Canada for permanent residence and have obtained Canadian citizenship by false representations or fraud or knowingly concealing material circumstances in that your failed to divulge to Canada Immigration and Citizenship officials your collaboration with German authorities in Latvia during the period 1941 - 1943, as a member of the Latvian Auxiliary police, a local Auxiliary police under the command of the Germans and your work, in such capacity as a concentration camp guard in the so-called "Valmiera replacement prison", in Latvia, during the same period.2             

The applicable sections of the Citizenship Act provide,

             10.(1) Subject to section 18 but notwithstanding any other section of this Act, where the Governor in Council, on a report from the Minister, is satisfied that any person has obtained, retained, or renounced or resumed citizenship under this Act by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances:             
             (a) the person ceases to be a citizen; or             
             (b) the renunciation of citizenship by the person shall be deemed to have had no effect, as of such date as may be fixed by order of the Governor in Council with respect thereto.             
             (2) A person shall be deemed to have obtained citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances if the person was lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances and, because of that admission, the person subsequently obtained citizenship.             
             18.(1) The Minister shall not make a report under section 10 unless the Minister has given notice of his intention to do so to the person in respect of whom the report is to be made and             
             (a) that person does not, within thirty days after the day on which the notice is sent, request that the Minister refer the case to the Court; or             
             (b) that person does so request and the Court decides that the person has obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.             

[4]      Pursuant to s. 18(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, the defendant requested that the Minister refer the case to the Court for a hearing. On May 23rd, 1997 the Minister referred the case to the Court.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Plaintiff

[5]      The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Podins concealed the material circumstances of his wartime activities on his OS. 8 form, an immigration form which the plaintiff submits the defendant was required to complete in 1959 when he applied for entry into Canada. Specifically, according to the plaintiff, Mr. Podins was a member of the Latvian Auxiliary Police, controlled by the German Security Police in Valmiera, Latvia. In his capacity as a policeman ("schutzmann") or guard ("kartibnieks"), he managed a shop and performed other duties associated with the operation of the staff canteen and distribution of liquor and cigarette rations at the Valmiera Replacement Prison EG. The plaintiff alleges that this prison was in fact a concentration camp. The plaintiff further alleges that subsequent to his work in the EG, the defendant was a volunteer member of a Latvian Security Police Battalion and that he voluntarily served as a member of the Latvian Legion, also known as the Waffen SS . According to the plaintiff, the defendant"s concealment on his OS. 8 form of his wartime activities was material because it foreclosed further inquiries by the immigration officials of the day into whether or not he came within the security rejection criteria in place at the time, specifically, as a "collaborator" with Canada"s enemy during World War Two. In sum, because of his false representation or fraud or knowing concealment of the material circumstances of his wartime activities, the defendant was issued a visa for entry to Canada and by that visa, was lawfully admitted into Canada. On the basis of that admission, he subsequently obtained Canadian citizenship.

[6]      The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant obtained Canadian citizenship in violation of s. 10(1) (d) of the Canadian Citizenship Act, RS.C. 1970, c. C-19, in force at the time of the defendant"s citizenship application in 1971. It provides,

             10.(1) The Minister rmay, in his discretion, grant a certificate of citizenship to any person who is not a Canadian citizen and who makes application for that purpose and satisfied the Court that (d) he is of good character and not under order of deportation.             

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, by virtue of his wartime activities, was not of good character when he applied for citizenship and therefore did not meet the requirements for Canadian citizenship in 1971.

The Defendant

[7]      The defendant denies that he was ever a guard at Valmiera EG, and maintains that he was merely hired within the job category of "guard" because there was no official position for the job he actually performed, that of storekeeper. He also denies that he ever worked as a policeman, stating that he did not do police work, wear a uniform or armband, or take an oath. He further denies that Valmiera EG was a concentration camp. In his submission, it was a prison camp which had been in operation since 1918, first run by the Latvians, and later by the Soviet, and subsequently, German occupiers.

[8]      Regarding the allegation of service in the Waffen SS, the defendant argues that this ground does not come within the ambit of the plaintiff"s "case" against him, as stated in the Notice of Revocation ("the Notice"). Specifically, the Notice attaches and thereby limits the allegation of "collaboration" to his alleged service "as a member of the Latvian Auxiliary police" and names no other ground. In the alternative, if the plaintiff"s case is found to encompass the allegation of service in the Waffen SS , the defendant states that he was conscripted into the Waffen SS and thus cannot be seen to have served voluntarily. Involuntary or coerced service in the Waffen SS did not constitute "collaboration" as contemplated by the security screening criteria in place in 1959, when the defendant was landed. Thus, he would not have been deemed inadmissible on the basis of this service. Equally, his employment as a storekeeper in the Valmiera EG did not constitute "collaboration" as contemplated by Canada"s security screening criteria in 1959.

[9]      The defendant further submits that he was not subject to security screening when he applied for admission to Canada in 1959, as he was at that time a British citizen by naturalization, a category exempt from security screening. He further submits that as a British citizen resident in the United Kingdom, he had not been required to complete an OS. 8 form, as is alleged by the plaintiff; rather, he completed an IMM. 461 form. This form, unlike the OS. 8, did not require any information on the applicant"s wartime activities, requiring particulars regarding only the applicant"s current and previous two jobs. At his landing interview, he was not questioned orally as to his wartime activities or his employment history. He submits that in any event, there was no legal authority under the Immigration Act in effect in 1959 for the security screening of prospective immigrants with regard to collaboration with the enemy. Finally, the defendant submits that he was a man of good character at the time of his application for citizenship in 1971, that this is substantiated by the testimony of witnesses for both himself and the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff has not presented any evidence to challenge this fact.

ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

[10]      I must decide whether the defendant obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. I must also decide whether he misrepresented himself as being "of good character" at the time of his citizenship application. In order to render this decision, I must decide the following sub-issues:

     1.      Did the defendant collaborate with German authorities by virtue of his position at Valmiera EG in Latvia during the period 1941-43?         
     2.      Specifically, did the defendant serve as a member of the Latvian Auxiliary Police, a local Auxiliary Police under the command of the Germans, during this period? If so, did he join the Auxiliary Police voluntarily?         
     3.      Did the defendant serve as a concentration camp guard in the Valmiera replacement prison in Latvia during this same period?         
     4.      Does the "case" against the defendant, as set out in the plaintiff"s Notice of Revocation of Citizenship, encompass the defendant"s service in the Waffen SS from 1943 to 1945? If so, was the plaintiff conscripted into the Waffen SS or did he enlist voluntarily?         
     5.      Were British citizens by naturalization who immigrated to Canada in May of 1959 subject to security screening? If so, was there legal authority for security screening of immigrants at this time?         
     6.      Was the defendant of good character when he applied for citizenship in 1971?         

AMBIT OF THE NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP

[11]      As has been noted, the defendant submits that the plaintiff"s allegation with regard to his service in the Waffen SS does not come within the ambit of the Notice. The relevant part of the Notice reads

             in that you failed to divulge to Canadian immigration and citizenship officials your collaboration with German authorities in Latvia during the period 1941-1943, as a member of the Latvian Auxiliary police, a local Auxiliary police under the command of the Germans and your work, in such capacity as a concentration camp guard in the so-called "Valmiera replacement prison", in Latvia, during the same period.             

In The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Johann Dueck (16 October 1998), Ottawa T-938-95 (F.C.T.D.) at 13, Noël J.[as he then was] held,

             ... the matter referred to the court pursuant to Section 18 of the [Citizenship] Act is "the case" as set out by the Minister in the Notice ... It follows that it is not open to the Minister in a reference before this Court to seek a determination on an issue that does not come within "the case" set out by the Minister in her Notice.             

In my view, the allegation that Mr. Podins collaborated with German authorities by virtue of his membership in the Waffen SS does not come within "the case" as set out in the Notice. The Notice specifies that the "collaboration" attributed to the defendant pertains to his alleged membership in the Latvian Auxiliary Police and his "work in such capacity". This wording in effect limits the scope of the allegedly collaborationist activities to Mr. Podins" employment at Valmiera EG, and precludes the introduction of other allegations post-dating that period. As the "case" against Mr. Podins does not encompass allegations of membership in the Waffen SS , it is not necessary to make findings of fact on that issue.

     FINDING OF FACT

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

[12]      Professor Konrad Kwiet, the plaintiff"s witness, was qualified as an expert in the following areas:

-      modern German and European history, particularly the years 1939 to 1945;
-      the evolution and development of National Socialism in Germany, and its policies and objectives in Germany and throughout Europe from 1939 to 1945;
-      Nazi Germany"s plans and objectives (1939-1945) for the occupation of the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by its armed forces and agencies, including police and civil administration forces;
-      the implementation of the policies and objectives of Germany"s National Socialist government in Europe generally, and in the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in particular;
-      the role of the military, police and civil agencies of Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1944 in the implementation of the policies and objectives of Germany"s National Socialist Government in the Baltic countries and in particular Latvia;
-      the collaboration of the Baltic people, particularly Latvians, in the implementation of the policies and objectives of Germany"s National Socialist Government in Latvia.

The following historical overview is drawn from Professor Kwiet"s expert report as well as his testimony before the Court.

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF LATVIA

[13]      In 1918 Latvia became a parliamentary republic, after having been occupied by major powers"particularly Germany and Russia"over the centuries. Latvia"s independence came to an end as part of a secret protocol of the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. Hitler collaborated in the Soviet occupation of Latvia and other Baltic states in order to ensure peace on the Eastern front at the start of the war. In June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied Latvia, establishing a Stalinist regime which lasted for one year, during which time the Latvian state and society were in large measure Sovietized.

[14]      In 1941, Germany launched its attack on the Soviet Union, code named "Operation Barbarossa." Its chief aims were the elimination of the Soviet system, the conquest of a new "living space" (Lebensraum) in the east, and the implementation of the "Final Solution", that is, the extermination of the Jews. Commencing its military campaign on June 22nd , 1941, the Germans quickly overran Latvia and occupied it in the following month.

[15]      Professor Kwiet described the various means through which Germany achieved it ends in the occupied Soviet territories, legally, militarily, and administratively through the police and civil structure. The Jurisdiction Decree of May 14, 1941, excluded the use of military court martials in all matters relating to the civilian population, thus ensuring that there would be no interference with the genocidal programme against racially and politically undesirable individuals. The Kommisar Order of June 6, 1941 similarly sanctioned the killing of communist political officials.

[16]      Reichs Führer SS Heinrich Himmler was entrusted with authority over "special tasks" in "Operation Barbarossa", that is, measures against the ideological enemies of the Reich. This involved ensuring cooperation between the advancing German Army and police formations deployed in the Army"s operational areas. In addition, special commandos operating in rear army areas were to combat "efforts that are hostile to the German State and Reich". Four Operational Task Forces ("Einsatzgruppen", individually "EGs"), each numbering between 600 and 1,000 men, entered the territory of the Soviet Union in the rear of the invading German armies. They were entitled to take "executive measures" (the official term for liquidation) against the civilian population. They were ordered to execute Communist party officials, Jews occupying positions in the state and party apparatus, as well as "other radical elements" designated as "snipers", "agitators" "propagandists" or "saboteurs". They were also directed to secretly encourage "anti-communist" and "anti-Jewish" circles in the conquered territories, and to instigate pogroms which were referred to euphemistically as "self-cleansing measures", to be performed by the indigenous population. EG A, designated for the Baltic countries and northern sector of Soviet Union, was assigned to the German Army Group North, which started its advance on June 22nd, 1941, and took Riga, the Latvian capital on July 1st, 1941.

[17]      Once EG A entered Latvia, the killing operations began. Orders to instigate pogroms and to carry out "cleansing operations" came from the highest echelons of the Nazi leadership, in particular from the commander of the Security Police. Indigenous collaborators were to hunt down and kill Jews and communists, and to instigate pogroms. Called the "Self-Defence Forces" these collaborators originated in the underground Latvian independence movement formed after the Soviet occupation in 1940. They performed the first wave of killings of Bolshevists and Jews immediately prior to and following the invasion of the German forces. An EG A report from October of 1941 recorded the liquidation of 30,000 Jews, almost half of the 70,000 living in Latvia at the time of the German invasion. The remaining Jews were incarcerated in ghettos set up in Riga and in the cities of Daugavpils (Dünaburg) and Lietaja (Libau). In November 1941, German civil authorities announced that certain districts, including Valmiera (Wolmar in German) were judenfrei (free of Jews). There is no evidence of any Jews remaining in Valmiera after September 1941.

[18]      After the first so-called "self-cleansing" operations by the indigenous Self-Defence Forces, the Germans quickly took control of the Latvian civil structure. Latvia passed from military to civil rule on Sept 1st , 1941. Under the authority of Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Alfred Rosenberg, there was established the Reich Commissariat Ostland, which contained the subordinate levels of civil administration--the Reich Commissariat Latvia, and the local administrations, the district Commissariats. The highest ranking German civil administrator in Latvia, General Commissar Drechsler, exercised authority through the district Commissars. According to Professor Kwiet, although the civil administration was referred to as Latvian self-administration, this term was misleading as there was no internal Latvian policy and all administrative bodies were subject to German control.

[19]      On orders from Himmler, a police structure was assigned and attached to the civil administrative structure in Latvia, with an SS and Police Leader in charge of each Commissariat level. The police forces under German control consisted of the Security Police and SD, the Order Police and the indigenous Auxiliary Police. The "Security Police and SD" consisted of the German Political Police, the Criminal Police and Secret or Security Service. Known generally as the Security Police, these forces were responsible for political and criminal policing, which included commanding executions, and overseeing concentration camps. The Order Police consisted of what was, prior to German occupation, the regular and rural police. Now assimilated into the German police structure, this force performed regular policing functions. However, Professor Kwiet ascribed a collaborationist role to the Order Police, noting that "[u]nder the cover of "pacification" and partisan warfare, Jews and communist officials, escaped prisoners of war and partisans, "vagrant civilians" and "other suspicious elements" were sought out and liquidated."3 In addition, "[t]he Order Police was called in to supervise deportation transports, to assist in mass executions as well as to guard and subsequently liquidate ghettos and camps."

[20]      The Latvian Auxiliary Police, or "Schutzmannschaft", referred to all indigenous recruits serving either in the Order Police, the Security Police, or in the prison system. It was subordinated primarily to the Order Police, with some Auxiliary units directly attached to the Security Police. According to Professor Kwiet, all Auxiliary forces, regardless of their immediate supervision, were ultimately accountable to the Security Police. Additionally, as is reflected in the term "Auxiliary", there was no independent Latvian police force during the German occupation, the Latvian Auxiliary Police having been under the strict command of the German Order Police, and the general supervision of the Security Police.

[21]      Professor Kwiet described the role of the police in anti-Jewish measures in Latvia. In the fall of 1941, 50,000 Jews were deported to Latvia from other areas of the German Reich. At this point in time, construction of barracks for incoming deportees at Salaspils and Jungfernhof (both southeast of Riga) was incomplete. The Higher SS and Police Leader for the Reich Commissariat Ostland ordered that the majority of Jews detained in the Riga ghetto be killed to make room for the arriving deportees. In the first "ghetto cleansing operation," on November 30th , 1941, 4000 Jews in the Riga ghetto were killed, as well as 1,000 Jews newly arrived from Berlin. In a second "Aktion" on December 8th and 9th, more than 27,000 Latvian Jews were killed. Only some 2,600 Riga Jews survived this cleansing operation, as they were still needed as skilled workers. All SS and police units deployed in Riga, including the Auxiliary Order Police, were involved in this second Aktion. Mass deportations continued to arrive at Riga and upon arrival, old and sick Jews were selected and driven to a nearby forest to be killed. As at other murder sites, members of the Latvian Auxiliary Order Police took part in both the selection and guarding of victims. Member of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, known as the Arajs commando, were assigned to execution squads. By February 1942, some 20,000 Jews from Central Europe were incarcerated in the Riga ghetto or in the camps of Salaspils and Jungfernhof. Virtually all of them fell victim to the Final Solution at a later stage.

VALMIERA DURING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION

[22]      Valmiera is located some 100 kilometres northeast of Riga. On July 7th, 1941, the advancing units of the German 61st Infantry Division arrived at Valmiera. It did not encounter any military resistance. According to Professor Kwiet, this indicates that the Russian troops had already left earlier, some time after July 1st. There was no evidence before me of any fighting in Valmiera. Once the military formation had moved on, the Germans made no effort to set up district military headquarters or local military headquarters in Valmiera. Nor did they deploy a sub-unit of EG A in the area. It was left to the Latvian Self-Defence Forces to take over the local administration as well as to perform "self-cleansing" measures, clearing the area of Jews and communists.

[23]      Valmiera passed from military to civil rule on September 1st, 1941, with District Commissar Herman Hansen presiding over the District Commissariat Valmiera. On August 28, 1941, the local Self-Defence forces were dismantled and replaced by the Latvian Auxiliary police, subordinated to the German Order Police, which established a headquarters in Valmiera in September. Members of these units, known as Schutzmannshaften (protective units) were screened for political reliability. The Valmiera area covered three district precincts, which, by October 1941, comprised 115 officials. In early November 1942, some 1,000 men were serving in the Valmiera District Police.

[24]      In early October 1941, the Valmiera Security Police Branch Office was set up, with Werner Gottschalk installed as Head of the Branch Office. This branch of the Security Police was entrusted with the task of controlling the activities of the Latvian political police and criminal police, as well as the Order Police, and the different branches of the Valmiera District Police were compelled to submit reports to this office. The Security Police in the Valmiera district was responsible for tracking down, arresting, interrogating and punishing any suspect considered an enemy. It imposed "protective custody" (Schutzhäft) and issued the order to transfer prisoners (Schutzhäftlinge) into a concentration camp and also decided on a person"s possible release. It took over control of the prison system in the Valmiera District. It prepared, supervised and carried out several killing actions, in close cooperation with both the German and Latvian Auxiliary police.

[25]      In Valmiera, as in other parts of Latvia, the killing operations began immediately following the German invasion. In 1940, under Soviet rule, the total number of Jews living both in the City and District of Valmiera, was 278. It is assumed some Jews left the district when, on the eve of the German occupation, the Soviets ordered a forced deportation of Latvians. In addition, some Jews may have attempted to escape Valmiera once news of the German invasion had reached them. The remaining Jewish community was murdered within a short period of time. In September 1941, when German District Commissar Hansen assumed control of the civil administration of Valmiera District, he declared it to be judenfrei, referring to three Jewish children still alive in the city, and indicating they would be transferred to a concentration camp. The General Commander of the Security Police, Walter Stahlecker, reported that by mid-October 1941, 209 Jews and communists had been executed in the Valmiera District by units operating under the command of the Security Police. While Jews and communists were the primary target groups for liquidation, also selected were Gypsies, the mentally ill and, as armed resistance against Nazi rule in occupied Soviet territories intensified, anyone suspected of being a partisan or having aided the partisans.

THE PRISON AT VALMIERMUIZA

[26]      The case against the defendant with respect to alleged collaboration, turns, to a significant degree, on the nature of Valmiera EG, that is, whether or not it functioned as a concentration camp. The Court heard evidence on this matter from Professor Kwiet, and also from witnesses who testified before the Commission to take evidence in Valmiera from August 12th to 24th, 1998, over which I presided. The Commission also toured Valmiera Estate (Valmiermuiza), the ancient estate on which Valmiera EG was situated. There, it heard the testimony of former Valmiera EG employee Tamara Kalve. I note that Professor Kwiet was limited in his ability to assist the Court with regard to Valmiera EG since he had never travelled to Valmiera, and his knowledge of the prison"s facilities, buildings and overall physical appearance, as well as the treatment of its prisoners, was based on documents provided to him by the plaintiff and on witness accounts by people who did not testify before the Court. Furthermore, no map or drawing of Valmiermuiza was entered into evidence. As a result of the plaintiff"s failure to adduce such evidence, there was considerable confusion among the witnesses as to the prison"s layout, and I was limited in my ability to make findings on the functions of the various buildings at Valmiermuiza.

[27]      There were at least three buildings in Valmiermuiza which housed prisoners. The manor itself spans 400 hectares. It was first used as a prison in 1918 when Latvia achieved independence, and was taken over by both successive occupying powers, the Soviet Union in 1940, and Germany in 1941. Professor Kwiet examined a series of documents from which he drew inferences as to the function of the prison at the time of the arrival of the Germans. A document entitled "Passes", and dated July 7th , 1941, the day of the arrival of the German Army, refers to "Isolation Camp guards". A document dated July 19th , 1941, contains the names and ranks of the members of the Valmiera Isolation Camp Guard Platoon. According to Professor Kwiet, the fact that ten of the guards listed in this document are military men and ten are civilians reflects the composition of the Latvian Self-Defence Forces. From this he inferred that the Valmiera Isolation Camp was established by the local nationalist Latvian Self-Defence Forces in the first week of July 1941, when they assumed control of the police and administrative structures of Valmiera, immediately following the retreat of the Soviet Army and prior to the arrival of the Germans. Since there was no evidence that Mr. Podins had any association whatsoever with the Self-Defence Forces, I make no findings with respect to their activities in Valmiera in July or August, 1941.

[28]      Professor Kwiet further concluded that the Valmiera Isolation Camp"s purpose was to detain the growing number of "enemies""Jews and communists and "others""rounded up and arrested by the Self-Defence Forces, and to isolate them from the population. A decision was then taken as to who was to be liquidated at once, who was to be imprisoned further or, in some cases, to be released again. According to Professor Kwiet, Jews and communist officials were selected and escorted to nearby execution sites. Citing witness statements by individuals who did not testify before the Court, he referred to several killing operations, most of them conducted at a shooting range situated in the nearby Kelderleja forest. However, in cross-examination, Professor Kwiet acknowledged that these witnesses did not actually see these killings, but based their accounts on hearsay, and that none of these witness accounts connected the reported killing operations to the isolation camp.

[29]      A document entitled "List of the Valmiera Isolation Camp Employees" and dated July 21st , 1941 refers to 55 camp employees, signifying an expansion of camp operations. Two documents, dated August 27th and September 8th, 1941, and addressed to Administrative Lieutenant Steins, refer to "Valmiera Concentration Camp." According to Professor Kwiet, this change in terminology reflected the transition from the control of the Self-Defence Forces in Valmiera to the establishment of the "concentration camp administration" set up in Riga by the Security Police in August, 1941. Following the abolishment of all Self-Defence Forces on August 28th , 1941, the camp command and guard detachment, which had been staffed by the Self Defence Forces, were accordingly restructured. Ten personnel regarded as trustworthy and politically reliable were reappointed. Vacancies were filled with new recruits, now strictly controlled by the German Security Police. According to Professor Kwiet, in October 1941, the transformation was completed, the total control of the German Security Police over the prison being reflected in its new name, "Erstazgefängnis" (replacement prison), or, as it was commonly called, "EG".

[30]      Tamara Kalve, who testified before the Commission on behalf of the plaintiff, and who worked at Valmiera prison from 1936 to its closing, recalled that when the Russians arrived in 1940, the prison had been used as simply a regular prison. The inmates included political prisoners, burglars and, in her words, "all kinds of prisoners."4 After the Russians had left and before the Germans arrived, there was a brief period in which the prison was empty. With the arrival of the Germans, the witness stopped working at the prison for about a month, after which all former employees were ordered to report of the local Office of Employment, run by the Germans. At this office, Ms. Kalve was ordered to report to the prison for resumed employment on a specified date. The person in charge of the prison was named Runka and he reported to someone named Gotsalks [sic], presumably Werner Gottschalk, commander of the Security Police Branch Office in Valmiera. According to Ms. Kalve, Runka and Gotsalks [sic] met at least once a week.

[31]      Professor Kwiet described the general organizational structure of Valmiera EG. He testified that the camp was staffed solely by Latvians, and this was corroborated by two former prisoners. He cited a report from the head of Valmiera EG to the Valmiera German Security Police of July 19th, 1943, which referred to 93 camp employees. Arnolds Runka was installed as Head or Chief of the camp, with two deputies or assistant chiefs below him, and eight office employees, comprised of a secretary, accountant, cashier and clerk. There were also fourteen economic employees, who included instructors supervising what Professor Kwiet called the "forced labour" of the inmates, including a field crops and flax sorting instructor, as well as a technician and quartermaster. Also recorded as employees were the camp physician and his assistant, a female cook, and a labourer. Wardens and guards represented the largest group, totalling sixty-three. Six wardens supervised the wings and cells of the prison. There were fifty-seven guards, comprised of fifty males and seven females. Within the male guard unit, thirteen were classified as senior Auxiliary policemen (Oberschutzmänner ) and 37 as Auxiliary policemen (Schutzmänner). According to Professor Kwiet, these terms clearly indicate that the Valmiera camp guards were part of the Shutzmannschaft, that is, the Latvian Auxiliary police. He stated that the guards at Valmiera EG wore the green uniform of the former Latvian Army. This was, for the most part, corroborated by the Commission witnesses, though one recalled the guards wearing the green-gray military uniforms of the Valmiera Security Police. A number of the witnesses who testified before the Commission recalled that the guards also wore armbands, though they were uncertain as to what appeared on the armbands.

[32]      According to Professor Kwiet, a minority of the guards, less than 20%, had already served in the isolation camp set up by the Self-Defence Forces. The majority were recruited at the time when the camp was being transformed from an isolation camp into a replacement prison by the Security Police. They were all volunteers, as no one was forced to join the Auxiliary police or subsequently to enter the camp guard unit. The prevailing recruitment procedures required candidates to fill out a questionnaire and sign a work contract. This was followed by a screening process carried out by Security Police officials.

[33]      Extrapolating from his knowledge of general Nazi practices and from high level decrees and directives not directly pertaining to Valmiera EG, Professor Kwiet testified that individuals had to swear an oath four weeks after being admitted to the Schutzmannschaft. He also stated his belief that Valmiera EG guards, "as with all police and SS units"were duty bound to keep silent about the services, especially the crimes they witnessed or committed."5 Vitauts Aunins, a witness before the Commission, who worked as a sentry or guard at Valmiera EG from November 1941 to January 1943, testified that he did not take an oath.

[34]      Professor Kwiet"s evidence on the duties of Valmiera EG guards was based on the accounts of witnesses not before the Court and "guard regulations" issued for the Riga and Kaunas Ghettos. There were no surviving "guard regulations" for Valmiera EG. Extrapolating from these sources, he stated that guards were posted at watch towers, a watch house and other places around the perimeter of the camp complex. They were to prevent the escape of inmates who attempted to break through the fence of barbed wire or to escape while on outside work assignment. To this end, they were equipped with rifles and entitled to make use of them without warning.

[35]      This account of the guards" duties does not wholly cohere with the evidence before the Court. I am satisfied on the evidence before me that there was no fence around the entire Valmiera EG complex. There were watch towers around at least two of the buildings housing prisoners, and the building which still functions as a prison was flanked by four watch towers.

[36]      Professor Kwiet"s evidence on the guards" duties was contradicted by Vitauts Aunins, who testified that although he was issued a shotgun when he began his sentry duties, his only instructions were to shoot in the air if someone were to run. He had no special instructions on what to do if they didn"t stop running.

[37]      According to Professor Kwiet as well as the Commission witnesses who were at Valmiera EG during the relevant period, the guards" regular duties included escorting labour squads to their places of work. The instructions for Riga and Kaunas Ghettos specified that the guards were not to maltreat the prisoners. Professor Kwiet cited the statements of witnesses not before the Court reflecting a range of behaviour exhibited by guards at Valmiera EG. In my view, the statements are inadmissible since I heard evidence on the same subjects from witnesses who appeared before me at the Commission in Latvia. One such statement by Dr. Berzins, a former prisoner, conflicted with the evidence he gave in these proceedings at the Commission in August of 1998.

[38]      According to Professor Kwiet, the change in terminology from "concentration camp" to EG did not signify a change in the function of the prison. Rather, it reflected a jurisdictional conflict whereby the Security Police in Latvia renamed their concentration camps in order to avoid ceding control to the SS Main Office for Economics and Administration in Germany, which was generally in charge of concentration camps. According to Professor Kwiet, this name change did not affect the composition of the inmates--political prisoners, which included all those regarded by the Security Police, any German-controlled police, or the SS as opponents of the regime. According to Professor Kwiet, once all of the Jews in the area had been killed or detained in ghettos (by November 1st, 1941, Valmiera district was declared judenfrei), those incarcerated at the EG were as follows: all members and functionaries of the Communist Party, its Youth Movement and other affiliated organizations; partisans, parachutists and Soviet prisoners of war who had been caught and handed over to the Security Police; persons who had carried out acts of sabotage or espionage, or who had joined the National Latvian Resistance movement; those who had violated the anti-Jewish laws by offering Jews shelter or positions in the underground; those who refused to work; those who had listened to banned foreign broadcasting and disseminated the "rumours" heard; and on several occasions, for a few days, Gypsy families. Others were less severely punished and offered the possibility of release: those accused of having supported Soviet rule and policies in Latvia or elsewhere, or of having been sympathetic to the Bolshevist cause.

[39]      Professor Kwiet pointed out that the concentration camps at Salaspils and Jungfernhof, generally classified as concentration camps in the historical literature, were also referred to by another name, specifically "extended police prisons". However, in cross-examination, Professor Kwiet acknowledged that unlike Salaspils, Jungfernhof and Kaiserwald, Valmiera EG has not been classified as a concentration camp in the historical literature, stating that the camp itself has been neglected in the literature, apart from one 1995 article entitled by Margers Vestermanis entitled "The National Socialist Prisons and Death Camps in Occupied Latvia 1941 till 1945." Before the Court, Professor Kwiet provided a rough translation of a passage from the article, stating that the camp

             ...was administered under the official term Ersatzgefängnis Wolmar, "Replacement Prison Valmiera". Strength of the inmates some 500 political prisoners, Gypsies, Soviet prisoners of war, politisch belastet, political inmates or ...with political affiliation. Out of the Gypsies and prisoners of war, some 200 were shot in spring of 1942. Commander Lieutenant Sileks, winding up or closure of the camp and transfer of the inmates into the central camp of Salaspils in autumn of 1943.6             

[40]      In cross-examination, Professor Kwiet acknowledged that although there were directives from Germany that all deaths in the occupied territories be recorded, he had not seen any such statistics regarding Valmiermuiza.

[41]      Citing a statistical report of the Security Police which was not before the Court, Professor Kwiet noted that as of March 15th, 1943, the number of inmates amounted to 417, with 390 males and 27 females. This report categorized prisoners as "Schutzhäftlinge", which he translated as political prisoners held in custody by the German Security Police. In his opinion, this terminology clearly indicates that the Valmiera "replacement prison" functioned as a "Schutzhaftlager", that is, a concentration camp under the jurisdiction of the Security Police. Inmates would be arrested by either the Latvian Auxiliary police or the German Police. Following an interrogation, the German Security Police imposed the sanction of "Schutzhaft" or "protective custody", which Professor Kwiet translated as "to incarcerate the delinquent into the concentration camp without any legal proceedings."7

[42]      There was considerable inconsistency among the witnesses before the Commission, former prisoners and employees of Valmiera EG, as to the name of the prison. It was referred to, variously, as "the EG" the "prison", the "concentration camp", "Colony-Farm", and "Kremlin". Two Commission witnesses, a former inmate and a former employee, used the term "concentration camp". Dr. Berzins, a prisoner during the relevant period, referred to the prison as an EG but stated that it was also called a concentration camp by people in Valmiera. Furthermore, he testified that this was the "official title of the place," used in documents he received from the Red Cross in Germany.8 Although he was not told the reason for his arrest and was given no trial, he did receive an explanatory note from the Red Cross Branch in Germany stating the reason for his arrest as Schutzhaft, which he translated as "security detention". He traced this term back to a German law of 1934 enabling the German government to detain people indefinitely without providing any reasons. As to the actual conditions at Valmiera EG, Dr. Berzins described a number of executions, only one of which he personally witnessed, having heard gunshots on the other occasions. He did testify that on one such occasion, his father, brother, and a number of cell mates, were led to Kelderleja Forest, that he heard shots fired, and these men did not return. He personally witnessed beatings at Valmiera EG only on a couple of occasions.

[43]      Another Commission witness, Elmars Krauja, had worked as a cashier at what he called "Valmiera Prison" during the relevant period. He stated there were actually two prisons, one being a regular prison, one kilometre away from Valmiermuiza, and one being a concentration camp for "political prisoners" on the actual estate. He had worked at both of them, beginning at the concentration camp and moving to the prison once the camp was liquidated. There was no other evidence to support the regular prison not being on the grounds of Valmiermuiza and I do not accept his evidence on this point. A number of features of what Mr. Krauja called the "concentration camp" suggests that it was actually Valmiera EG. He recalled that the camp administrative office was located in a white house, which was corroborated by Tamara Kalve. He also recalled that the camp had employed a clerk named Tamara Kalve. He identified as the camp"s chief an individual named Bunka [sic], presumably Runka, and recalled him consulting with a man named Gottschalk from the German Security Police Branch office in Valmiera. As will be addressed more fully shortly, he also recalled the execution of two men at the camp, Gulbis and Saulitis, an event to which a number of the former prisoners and employees of Valmiera EG attested. For these reasons, I conclude his evidence relating to a "camp" or "concentration camp" pertained to Valmiera EG.

[44]      Although Mr. Krauja referred to a "concentration camp", his recollection of the camp"s operations, as reflected in his job as cashier, is not consistent with the general understanding of that term. His job as cashier included receiving valuables from incoming prisoners, mostly watches and rings, which the guards would bring to him and which he would store, recording the items in a logbook. Upon the prisoners" release from the camp, their valuables would be returned. He recalled that most of the political prisoners incarcerated in the "concentration camp" were eventually released and had their valuables returned to them. Other than the above-mentioned execution of two men, he could not recall having witnessed any acts of violence. These details, while not determinative of the issue, cast considerable doubt on Professor Kwiet"s evidence that Valmiera EG was a "concentration camp" as this term is generally understood. Specifically, the release of most prisoners, and the return of their valuables, simply cannot be reconciled with what is known about concentration camps.

[45]      Given that the evidence discloses no consistently used name for the prison in question, at least with regard to the contentious label "concentration camp", it is necessary to consider the aptness of this terminology in light of the actual functioning of Valmiera EG. With this in mind, I now turn to the evidence regarding conditions at Valmiera EG, provided by Professor Kwiet, as well as the witnesses who testified before the Commission, former prisoners and employees of the prison during the relevant period.

[46]      Professor Kwiet attempted to describe the physical layout of Valmiera EG. As he had never visited the site of the prison, his description was based on second hand knowledge, gleaned from the statements of witnesses who did not testify before this Court. I accord no weight to his description of the camp. Certain of the key features he described were contrary to the observations of the Commission which heard witness testimony in Valmiera and toured Valmiermuiza. Specifically, he described Valmiera Estate as enclosed, and stated that all prisoners were kept in one 2-3 storey red-brick building, with men and women in separate wings. He testified that the store was located near the prison building. However, all of the witnesses who were at Valmiermuiza during the period in question, including prisoners and staff members, described a number of different buildings used to house the prisoners, who were segregated according to gender and their supposed offences. While they differed as to the function of each building, they consistently described Valmiera EG as comprising a number of prison buildings, contrary to Professor Kwiet. They also described the store as being about one kilometre away from the various prison buildings. Most significantly, it was about one kilometre away from what appears to have been the main prison, which was enclosed by barbed wire fence and flanked by four guard towers, one at each corner.

[47]      This was borne out in the Commission"s tour of Valmiermuiza. The witness who testified on site, Tamara Kalve, stated that the vicinity of the store and the administration building was open, not sealed or patrolled by guards. The nearby stone gates through which one would pass from the main road onto Valmiermuiza were open at all times and members of the public who shopped at the store were free to come and go onto the estate grounds. There were no guards stationed at these gates. In cross-examination, Professor Kwiet conceded that his knowledge was second hand and could be wrong. The witnesses who believed there was a concentration camp at Valmiermuiza were unable to agree as to which building was the concentration camp.

[48]      There were similar difficulties in Professor Kwiet"s evidence as to the organizational structure and conditions at Valmiera EG. He referred to a "rigid and brutal regime to which the inmates were subjected,"citing statements of witnesses who did not testify before the Court.9 However, in cross-examination, he acknowledged that two of the four sources cited had not supported this conclusion, one having said that the worst treatment inmates suffered was being cursed by prison guards, the other having said that the prisoners were treated well. On other matters regarding the organization of the camp, such as whether or not Valmiera EG guards had to take oaths, Professor Kwiet extrapolated from his knowledge of German police and prison practices in Lithuania and Estonia, inferring that the same procedures were followed in Latvia, and hence at Valmiera EG. Given the difficulties in substantiating and verifying Professor Kwiet"s evidence on many of the practices and conditions at Valmiera EG, I can only assign it negligible weight. On these points, Professor Kwiet"s evidence must be considered in light of that of the witnesses before the Commission who were inmates or employees at Valmiera EG during the relevant period.

[49]      According to Professor Kwiet, the inmates suffered from hunger. He cited witness statements that prisoners were fed less than 200 grams of bread a day, as well as a watery soup with boiled vegetables. He also cited the statement of a former Valmiera prison guard that prisoners weren"t very well fed and were quite weak, although they were not starving. Two of the witnesses before the Commission, both of whom were prisoners at Valmiera EG during the relevant period, testified as to the food at the camp. Anna Vaitkus was imprisoned at the camp in November 1941 for her alleged participation in the theft of a horse while a member of the Young Communist League. She stated that although the prisoners were given clean water, they were not given milk (although she did get one cup of milk when she had contracted tuberculosis). She recalled that the food was terrible, and that "a good master feeds his dog better than [they] were fed.".10 For breakfast, they were given half a litre of acorn coffee and 200 grams of dry bread. The next meal was a soup containing a few potatoes, cabbage, and beet leaves. The evening meal was a thin soup which contained worms. Mr. Timermanis, who was imprisoned on December 17, 1941, described a similar daily diet, saying the food was "so bad it could not be worse."11

[50]      Professor Kwiet"s evidence as to a "rigid and brutal regime to which the inmates were subjected" was borne out to varying degrees by the witnesses before the Commission. Ms. Vaitkus was at the prison for 15 months. While there, she was guarded by matrons, female guards. The male guards would only check to make sure everyone had returned from work. She testified that as she was an obedient and quiet person, she was not treated badly by the matrons, receiving only an occasional scolding. Ms. Vaitkus was released from the prison in March of 1943, after approaching a Mr. Zicevs, whom she described as "the assistant to the head officer" of the Security Police Office. She was released after expressing regret at having joined the Young Communist League and her activities in that capacity.

[51]      Ms. Vaitkus recalled seeing two acts of violence against others. In one instance, a woman who had been brought to the prison at the same time as her was punished for hiding the Latvian flag in sawdust. Ms. Vaitkus recalled that she was beaten severely and returned to her quarters, "black and blue all over."12 Ms. Vaitkus also described the execution of two inmates in February 1942. All of the EG inmates and staff members were made to watch the execution. Her account of this incident was corroborated by a number of the other Commission witnesses and was also cited by Professor Kwiet. She recalled that this was the one day she saw Germans in the prison. On that particular morning, the witness and the other prisoners held in a building known as the Tower were not led to work. They were ordered by the chief of the prison, Runka, and the female guards, to dress and assemble in the prison yard in groups of two, in front of where the men were already assembled. There were heavily armed guards present, as well as members of the Security Police.

[52]      The Chief of the Security Police declared that two inmates were to be punished, and two men were then led from the Tower. The witness recognized one of the men, Mr. Saulite (or Saulitis, as he was called by the other eye-witnesses who testified) as a neighbour from her hometown. The two men were led outside of the fenced area in which the inmates stood. A visiting official spoke in German, with Runka translating into Latvian. The two men were ordered to turn their backs. Saulite fell to his knees, and begged for his life, while the other man, Gulbis, who was from the city of Valmiera, refused to turn around and defied the executioners, saying "shoot me in my face." Both were shot by Latvian executioners. One of the Germans approached the two men and shot each of them in the temple. They were left lying in the snow and the assembled prisoners were ordered back to their cells. Ms. Vaitkus recalled that the "offence" said to have been committed by the two men involved reading a newspaper or bringing one onto prison grounds.

[53]      Her evidence on this incident was corroborated, with greater or less detail, by the other witnesses who testified before the Commission, including former prisoners as well as former employees Ms. Kalve and Mr. Krauja. According to Ms. Kalve, all of the staff members were under strict orders to attend the execution.

[54]      Mr. Timermanis testified as to other acts of violence during his imprisonment. Questioned as to whether he was ever paid for the work he did during his imprisonment, he replied that the only pay he got was "a blow of a fist and the kick of a foot."13 However, Mr. Timermanis said this of his entire period of imprisonment, which included subsequent internment at camps known unequivocally to be concentration camps, namely Salaspils, Stutthof and Mauthausen. It was unclear whether his remark pertained to Valmiera EG. Speaking specifically of Valmiera EG, he recalled one guard being a "brutal man" and stated that all guards were this way towards the inmates.14 He also recalled that each of the prisoners had a letter (A, B, or C) sewn onto his or her uniform, with "A" representing the most severe class of prisoner, who was destined for execution at Kelderleja. Although Mr. Timermanis did not himself wear a uniform, he was placed in class "A" for reasons unknown to him.

[55]      Mr. Timermanis recalled that the guards used to assemble in a building called the Blue House, located near the eastern gate of the grounds. The prison store was also in this building. Once in the spring of 1942, Mr. Timermanis was ordered, along with five other inmates to clean the guards" meeting place, which he described as a drinking hall. When the guards arrived, an old prison guard, the former prison chief, Silnieks, who was drunk, poked the inmates in the stomach with a revolver and threatened to shoot them all. On another occasion, Mr. Timermanis was on a work detail, unloading wood from a train, and began to smoke a cigarette given to him by a railway worker. The supervising guard, Vilis Krastins, called him off the train, stood him up against the warehouse door, put his gun to his shoulder and threatened to shoot him.

[56]      Dr. Berzins was questioned as to acts of violence he witnessed while imprisoned at Valmiera EG. He recalled a mass shooting which occurred on July 26, 1941. The people to be shot were led out of cells located in the bottom floor of the building. Of the 35 prisoners in the building, only five remained after the shooting. He did not see the shootings but heard them through an open window in his cell. The shots were coming from the direction of Kelderleja, which was two to three kilometres away from the prison. Included among those executed were Dr. Berzins" father, his father"s brother, many people from his parish, and several inmates who had shared his cell. On August 9th , 1941, after he had been transferred to another prison on the estate, he heard shots from the direction of the Gauja River. On another occasion, he witnesses approximately twenty Russian-speaking prisoners of war being led across a field in front of the cabinetry shop, the building where he worked. Through the window of the building, he saw them being led into Irshu Parks and shortly thereafter heard shots fired. One night in the summer of 1943, he heard people, including the prison chief Runka, enter the building and walk down the corridor. Then he heard "some blows and some groaning."15 Dr. Berzins testified that he personally saw beatings at Valmiera EG only a couple of times.

[57]      Ms. Kalve referred in her testimony to a number of instances of mass shootings. However, her knowledge of these events was vague and based solely on rumour, not personal observation. She knew of Kelderleja, and testified that a considerable number of people were shot there. She recalled this location being six to eight kilometres away from the administration building. Among those shot were political prisoners, including those from the political prison at Valmiermuiza, Jews, and also possibly Gypsies. She couldn"t say when these shootings had occurred, recalling only one instance specifically. She did not know who had done the shooting, recalling only that it was a special command from Valmiera.

[58]      The witnesses before the Commission testified as to the work prisoners performed while at Valmiera EG. During her imprisonment, Ms. Vaitkus worked at the office of the Security Police in town, where her job was to mend clothing, wash the floors, operate the oven, and wash dishes. She and her workmates were escorted into town every day by armed guards who worked in the prison. Mr. Timermanis referred to being assigned to several work duties, including, as noted above, cleaning the guards" "drinking hall" in the Blue House, and unloading wood from a train. He also worked at the flax factory. He recalled one occasion on which he managed to slip out of a work group. Although he was not punished for this, he was thereafter barred from work outside the prison.

[59]      The other former prisoner who testified, Dr. Berzins, recalled performing two jobs: clearing the fields, and working in the carpentry shop at Valmiermuiza. He considered himself lucky to have been assigned to this work, describing the guard who ran the shop, Antons Liepa, as "a wonderful person."16 He recalled being treated "comparatively well" in the carpentry shop but "much worse" by the guards who escorted him to work sites.17 Dr. Berzins also recalled two instances in which he was assigned to work in the store. He was taken to the store and handed over to its owner or manager, Mr. Podins, who ordered him to arrange food ration coupon cards. Dr. Berzins appreciated this placement as he would be fed in the guards" kitchen while working at the store. He recalled that Mr. Podins wore a shopkeeper"s smock. There were no military authorities at the shop and he never saw Mr. Podins salute anybody.

[60]      Ms. Kalve, who was the assistant to Valmiera EG"s head accountant during the relevant period and did the bookkeeping for the housekeeping division of the prison (farming, pig-keeping, and gardening), recalled the prisoners" work. She distinguished between political prisoners and short-term "criminals" with lighter sentences, recalling that only the latter were allowed to work outside the camp. Prisoners were always escorted to work sites by guards known as uzraugs or kartibnieks, some of whom were in uniform. The assistant supervisor of the jail, as well as another individual whose title she could not recall, had the authority to order prisoners to do particular jobs. Prisoners would often be sent out in work groups, and she recalled prisoners being assigned to the homes of private citizens as well as surrounding farmers, performing such jobs as cutting wood and doing laundry. She also recalled them working in the agricultural divisions and horse stables at Valmiermuiza. Any produce or food derived through inmate labour was sold for profit, with earnings going back into the farm, and, Ms. Kalve assumed, a certain percentage to Ministry and supervisory officials in Riga. She testified that prisoners who worked in the flax mill received a percentage of profits, some of which was directly paid out to them, with the remainder being held for them until they were released from prison. Ms. Kalve could not recall any instance of prisoners refusing to work, noting that they were interested in working because they were paid for it. Only those who were sick did not work.

[61]      I note that none of the former prisoners who testified before the Commission corroborated Ms. Kalve"s evidence that prisoners were paid for their work. All were asked whether they received any such payment and all replied that they did not. I therefore conclude that they were not paid for their labour at Valmiera EG.

[62]      Valmiera EG ceased its operations in September 1943, and its prisoners were transferred to Salaspils Concentration Camp. According to Professor Kwiet, this was part of the Germans" program to reduce the number of small camps and concentrate the political prisoners in large-scale, central concentration camps. He speculated that most members of the Valmiera EG guard unit were redeployed in various Auxiliary police agencies, and noted that in the end, the general pattern was that such individuals were called up for military service within the ranks of the Latvian Legion, known also as the Waffen SS .

[63]      I find there was no concentration camp at Valmiermuiza. There was a prison located there, housing inmates in various buildings. Life was brutal, but cannot be compared to the horrors of a concentration camp. None of the witnesses who testified were beaten, although some had heard about infrequent beatings. Four of the Commission witnesses referred to executions other than that which they had personally witnessed, that of Gulbis and Saulitis. However, there was no first-hand evidence of any such shootings, and it was unclear whether these alleged shootings were connected to Valmiera EG, as they were said to have occurred outside the prison grounds. Even putting aside the difficulty of these accounts being based on hearsay, the incidents in question, while highly disturbing, do not suggest the type of systematic killing program which characterized concentration camps. Workdays were long, but not life-threatening. The food was terrible, but no one starved to death. It was not a prison with Canadian standards, but that does not make it a concentration camp.

THE DEFENDANT"S PERSONAL HISTORY

[64]      Mr. Podins was born on June 5th, 1918, in Renceni, Latvia, a town ten miles from Valmiera. He grew up on a farm which was owned by his father. He had three brothers and one sister, and was the middle child. He had eight years of education, attending a boarding school located about six miles away from his parents" farm. Throughout that time, he worked on the farm during the summer or when he was home. During his school years, he fell and broke his patella (knee) playing football.

[65]      He left the farm at 17 years of age and became an apprentice to his older brother, Janis, who was a shopkeeper in the town of Tukums, in the Kurzeme district of Latvia, outside Riga. He worked in that shop for one year. He then worked briefly for some relatives until his uncle helped him obtain the position of shop assistant in a co-op store in Valmiera. He started as a junior salesperson and by the time the Russians arrived in 1940, he had assumed the position of section leader in the grocery department. The Russian occupation did not affect his life very much. He continued to work in the store and enjoyed his job. He testified that there was, nonetheless, a climate of fear during the Russian occupation, and that people refrained from talking for fear of being betrayed by an informer.

[66]      When the Germans arrived in the summer of 1941, supplies gradually dwindled in the co-op store and he was laid off at the beginning of September. He went down to the Labour Exchange and obtained a job as a railway apprentice. He began to work on or about October 5th, and after one month, was sent to Riga to take a test. However, he failed the test, and was told to return in a month"s time. When he returned to Valmiera, the Labour Exchange informed him that there would be a vacancy in the grocery store at the Valmiera prison located on the grounds of Valmiermuiza. He knew Mr. Neimanis, the person who operated the store, and he was given the job. According to Mr Podins, about one week had passed from the time he failed the railway exam and returned to Valmiera to the time when he was contacted by the Labour Exchange. He began working at Valmiera EG on November 17th , 1941. Since Mr. Neimanis stayed on at the store for a period, Mr. Podins worked as a salesman at first. Mr. Neimanis" departure was delayed and Mr. Podins worked with him for longer than had been planned, perhaps three months. He testified that although he was of military age, he had not gone into the military because his knee had not healed properly.

[67]      Questioned as to whether there were alternatives to working at the EG he stated, "[i]f you want to live, if you want to eat and live and pay your bills you had to work and it was a rule that everybody works and you had to do it".18 Asked specifically why he didn"t go to work on the family farm, he replied that he didn"t like farm work. He also stated that he did not ask for the job but rather was sent there by the Labour Exchange, and would have been sent to a labour camp if he didn"t work. However, upon further questioning, he did agree that he "liked the job as a pardevj (salesperson) because [he] was trained for many years, as a salesperson."19 At various points in cross examination, when it was put to Mr. Podins that he assisted the Germans, he stated that he had no choice in the matter. However, the evidence does not show that Mr. Podins was coerced or compelled to work at the Valmiera EG shop. There may not have been many options open to Mr. Podins in his chosen line of work, but he was not coerced into working at the Valmiera EG store.

[68]      A series of documents show Mr. Podins to have been hired as an Auxiliary policeman by the German Security Police to fill the position of "guard" at Valmiera EG. A letter dated 17 November 1941, the date Mr. Podins was hired by the EG, is addressed "To the Chief of the Political Police of the Valmiera Region." It reads, "I am requesting a report on the political views of Eduards Podins, born on 5 June 1918 and residing at No. 32 Riga Street in Valmiera, who has entered service at the camp subordinated to me." It is signed by "Acting Chief" [of the EG] A. Runka. Another document entitled "Certificate" dated May 7th , 1943 reads, "[t]his is to certify that Eduards Podins, born 5 June 1918, served as a policeman in the Valmiera District EG Service from 17 November 1941 to 1 April 1943." It is signed by A. Runka, Chief of the Valmiera District EG and by E. Rungulis, Deputy Chief Clerk.

[69]      In an undated document entitled "List of service armbands of the Valmiera District EG employees", the name "Podins Eduards" appears at number 52. His "occupation" is listed as "Policeman" ("kartibnieks" in the Latvian original) and his "Armband No." is listed as 2134. The document is signed by "Chief of the Valmiera EG, A. Silins" and "Senior clerk: S. Spalis". Just above their signatures appears "Note: Armbands listed under numbers 1-58 have been distributed, while those numbered 59-75 remain in reserve."This would imply that Mr. Podins had been issued an armband, and in the column under "Signature on receipt" there is the symbol """, indicating that he had signed for the armband as had those listed above him. In cross-examination, Mr. Podins testified that A. Silins was the EG chief, later to be replaced by Arnolds Runka. Mr. Podins testified that he did not remember receiving an armband, and he never wore one, as it wasn"t required. No witness, including the former prisoners, ever saw Mr. Podins wear an armband. I find that Mr. Podins did not wear an armband during his employment at Valmiera EG.

[70]      A series of other documents refers to Mr. Podins in his capacity as a Valmiera EG employee and as a policeman. A statement dated June 21st, 1943, signed by Runka, certifies that "policeman Eduards Podins" requires two bicycle tires and inner tubes. Another document provides a "List of the Valmiera District EG employees who are entitled to receive army ration cards as of 25 January 1943". The name "Podins Eduards" appears at number 43, and under "Post Held" it indicates "policeman". Beside some of these names, including Mr. Podins", appear check marks. Mr. Podins testified he had no memory of receiving any such army ration cards. Another document lists those Valmiera District EG employees entitled to receive army ration cards as of February 22nd , 1943. "Podins Eduards" appears at number 43 under the category "Policeman" ("kartibnieks" in Latvian). While some of the names on this list are checked off, no check mark appears beside Mr. Podins" name.

[71]      A letter written in German to the Leader of the German Sicherheitspolizei (the Security Police) in Valmiera, dated July 30 1943, is entitled "Report." It refers to an attached list of the employees of the Valmiera EG or Replacement Prison entitled to Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) ration cards. It also requests further orders so the cards in question can be handed out for four weeks. It is signed by A. Runka, Director of the Valmiera EG, and J. Devits, Clerk. The attached list appears under the heading "List of the members of the Valmiera Ersatzgefängnis performing outside service and entitled to the Wehrmacht ration card of 2 August 1943:" "Runka Arnolds", appears first, under the rank of "Leader". "Podinš Eduards" appears at number 39, with his rank listed as "Schutzmann".

[72]      Another document, dated July 1943 and signed by EG Chief Runka as well as Acting Secretary L. Auzenberga, lists

             Valmiera District EG personnel who, in addition to coupons associated with soap ration cards, also have the right to extra rations of cigarettes in accordance with paragraph 6 of the "Directive Regarding the Order of Distribution of Tobacco Goods" announced in Instruction Gazette No. 197 of 27 September 1942.             

"Runka, Arnolds" appears first with his occupation listed as "Chief". Interestingly, the list includes civilian employees in various occupations as well as policemen. For instance, Elmars Krauja, who testified before the Commission in Valmiera, appears at number 6, and his occupation is "Cashier". A number of non-police or army occupations are listed, including "Secretary," "Technician", and "Cabinetmaker Instructor". "Podins Eduards" appears at number 37, with his occupation listed as "Policeman" (kartibnieks). Mr. Podins" name also appears at number 63 on a June 1943 list "of Valmiera District E.G. personnel who receive army food ration cards and up to now have received a half-litre of spirits once every four weeks..."

[73]      Presented with these documents, Mr. Podins repeatedly denied that he had ever worked as a policeman at Valmiera EG. He stated, "I"ve been paid on a payroll because they have no such job description as a shopkeeper. In Valmiermuiza they put on the paper "police, Auxiliary police".20

[74]      This explanation was corroborated by Tamara Kalve, who, as has been noted, worked during the relevant period as the head accountant"s assistant, and did the bookkeeping for the prison"s two housekeeping divisions. She was shown the document entitled "List of Service ID Certificates of the Valmiera Region [E]G Camp and Housekeeping Personnel" dated June 1943, and asked to comment on Mr. Podins" stated position as "kartibnieks" or "policeman". Ms. Kalve testified, "Eduards Podins worked in the shop. Formally he was included into the list of kartibnieks , and to the list of guards, for the sake of his salary."21 She elaborated that at the beginning of the German occupation, before Mr. Podins was hired, the store, which was to serve the needs of prison employees, was not successful. Several women were working there, but the store was in disorder. At that point, the prison did not have Ministry approval for those women employed at the store, as they were not on the list of employees. Ms. Kalve could not recall how these women had been paid. She did recall that around 1941 when the women left, there was a proposal to hire a new store employee and place him on the Ministry payroll as a kartibnieks. Mr. Podins was hired to work in the store and his official title of kartibnieks or schutzmann reflected this administrative decision which enabled him to receive a regular salary. Another witness before the Commission and former prison employee, Mr. Krauja, was shown a list referring to Mr. Podins as a kartibnieks, and he testified that Mr. Podins had never been a kartibnieks as he understood it.

[75]      Mr. Podins described Valmiermuiza as the site of a "colony farm" and a prison, also called the Kremlin. He described the prison as being far away from the store, and stated that he never was on the prison part of the grounds. The shop was on the outskirts of the estate, near the road leading to town.

[76]      As has been noted, the Court toured Valmiermuiza, where it heard the evidence of Ms. Kalve. However, Ms. Kalve"s testimony as to the location and function of the various buildings comprising Valmiermuiza and the EG was contradicted by the other five witnesses who testified before the Commission on these matters. There was also considerable inconsistency among these other witnesses. Furthermore, as has been noted, no plan or map of Valmiermuiza was adduced as evidence or presented to these witnesses. Thus, I can make few findings as to the actual layout of Valmiermuiza, including the EG and the functions and conditions of each of the buildings which appear to have housed prisoners.

[77]      However, based on the Commission"s tour of the site, and on the evidence before the Commission, I find credible Mr. Podins" testimony as to the layout of Valmiermuiza, and the distance of the store from the prison buildings. There appear to have been two areas of the estate on which prisons were located. The store, and the nearby EG administration building where Mr. Podins dropped off the store"s earnings, were situated between these two areas. While the store is no longer standing, the white administration building remains. The building which appears to have been the main prison known as the "Kremlin" is still standing and functions as a prison today. It is situated approximately one kilometre from the site of the store and administration building. Thus, Mr. Podins, in the regular course of his work, would not have been in the vicinity of this prison.

[78]      On the other side of the store (ie. in the direction opposite to that of the Kremlin] and administration building are two buildings no longer in use which, according to the testimony of the witnesses before the Commission, functioned as prisons during World War Two. One appears to have been called the Colony and the other, the remains of the estate castle, the Tower. There was considerable disparity among the witnesses as to the types of prisoners incarcerated in these buildings and the severity of their conditions. Nonetheless, whatever their function, these buildings are currently not visible from the store, as they are blocked by trees. No evidence was adduced to suggest that this area had been treeless or that the buildings had been visible from the store during Mr. Podins" employment. Thus, I find credible his statement that he did not enter or regularly see these prison buildings in the course of his work at the store.

[79]      Mr. Podins was questioned extensively as to his actual duties at the prison and he described his daily routine. Throughout his employment at the EG, Mr. Podins lived with his younger brother Gunnars at 32 Riga Street, in Valmiera, and commuted to work by bicycle. He was very busy and generally worked from five- and-a-half to seven days a week. He stated that there was too little work for two people, but once Mr. Neimanis left, there was too much work for one person. When he began the job, he was Mr. Neimanis" assistant. When he left the job, in 1943, he was the store manager, or, in Latvian, "veikal vedis". His workday started at eight o"clock in the morning, when he would stop at the dairy on his way to work and pick up milk for the canteen located in the same building as the store. He would then open the store and wait on the customers.

[80]      The store was primarily a grocery store, but it did have other goods and occasionally, customers asked him to find goods which were hard to get in those days. He would try to fill these special orders in the evenings. His customers were guards, employees and their wives, and people who lived in the community. There was no other shop in the area.

[81]      In the same building as the store there was a canteen in which the prison staff would socialize and eat lunch. Mr. Podins testified that his connection with this canteen was limited, his job being to check that it was clean and to sell those in charge the food served there. According to Mr. Podins, he never had to intervene with regard to the canteen"s upkeep because it was regularly cleaned, though he could not say by whom. He stated that "every day _[there were] people coming in and out with heavy boots. They had to clean."22 When it was put to Mr. Podins, in cross-examination, that those doing the cleaning were prisoners, he claimed never to have seen a prisoner there, and stated that in any event, he would close the shop at 5:00 p.m. so he wouldn"t have seen them. This answer is not wholly credible as Mr. Podins testified that he sometimes stayed late at the store to fill special orders.

[82]      None of the witnesses ever saw Mr. Podins in a uniform or wearing an armband at the prison. Mr. Podins said he always wore a shopkeeper's coat, and that was confirmed by several of the witnesses. He testified that he did not wear a hat other than a cap which he wore in the rain, and his testimony was not contradicted by any of the witnesses. None of the witnesses remembered seeing him act in any capacity other than as the salesman, manager, or shopkeeper of Valmiermuiza EG, and none remembered seeing him commit any acts of violence. Anna Vaitkus, a former prisoner who had, prior to these proceedings, recalled a guard named Podins, was asked to verify that the defendant, present at the Commission to take evidence, was in fact the guard she had in mind. She testified as follows

     A: I have to ask for an apology. This Mr. Podins is not the Mr. Podins about whom I was telling you previously, and may God forgive me my misunderstanding.         
     Q: Was this gentleman ever a prison guard?         
     A: This is not the person that was taking us places and had an armband. That person was one metre 80 centimetres tall. He had dark hair and he had a thin, long face.         
     Q: Even after all these years this gentleman couldn"t possibly be him..         
     A: No, couldn"t...After all, the face doesn"t change.23         

This testimony was very compelling and Ms. Vaitkus was a very credible witness.

[83]      The one former prisoner who did have contact with Mr. Podins at Valmiera EG was Dr. Berzins. As has been noted, he recalled being assigned to work in the store on two occasions. He was taken to the store and handed over to the person he assumed was the owner, Mr. Podins, who ordered him to arrange food ration coupons and glue them onto a ration sheet. Dr. Berzins testified that he appreciated this work placement as he would be fed lunch from the guards" kitchen or canteen on these occasions. He recalled Mr. Podins wearing a shopkeeper"s smock but didn"t know what clothing he was wearing underneath. Asked whether he had ever seen Mr. Podins salute anyone, he replied that he hadn"t, also noting that there were no military authorities at the shop.

[84]      Questioned about this encounter, Mr. Podins stated that he did not ask for Dr. Berzins, but was phoned and asked whether he had any work. He referred to Dr. Berzins" assignment to the store as "occupational therapy" and recalled that Dr. Berzins was very happy to have that assignment.24 Ms. Kalve, who had been the head accountant"s assistant during the relevant period, commented on the procedure followed by prison personnel who wanted inmates assigned to their workplace. The staff member would have to apply to the supervisor, who would send him prisoners to help with the task at hand. One accompanying guard would be sent with the prisoners. In such a situation, Mr. Podins would have had the authority to tell the prisoner what to do, just as any private citizen receiving prisoners would have been able to give the prisoner orders as to the task to be performed, whether it was doing laundry, cutting the grass, or cutting wood.

[85]      Ms. Kalve also commented on Mr. Podins" position at the EG. In her opinion, the store hadn"t been used so much to turn a profit as to serve the local staff. She remembered shopping at the store several times a week, and that it sold groceries, necessities, needles, thread, some clothing, and the types of items that could generally be found in a village store. Money from sales went into the Valmiermuiza account. She described Mr. Podins" occupation as "store clerk", pardevjs in Latvian. She did not consider Mr. Podins" position at Valmiera EG as significant, particularly compared to more profitable ventures like pig-keeping.

[86]      Mr. Podins" testimony as to his actual duties at Valmiera EG was, for the most part, credible and was corroborated by the evidence of other witnesses who had been at the prison and remembered him from that time. Importantly, these corroborating testimonies included those of former prisoners who might be said to have an adverse interest to an alleged former guard or policeman. Although Mr. Podins was classified on paper as a policeman or guard, and was accordingly listed on the payroll, his actual job did not involve any such duties. He was not observed wearing a guard"s uniform, carrying a gun, saluting, guarding or escorting prisoners. Former prisoners who recognized or knew of Mr. Podins, knew him to be the shopkeeper and nothing more. Based on the foregoing, I am satisfied that Mr. Podins was not actually an Auxiliary Policeman or prison guard, his designation as such having been a matter of administrative convenience. He was the shopkeeper for the shop at Valmiermuiza.

[87]      Questioned as to whether he was present at the execution of Gulbis and Saulitis, Mr. Podins stated he was not there. He was pressed on this issue, referred to the evidence of witnesses that all inmates and staff were required to attend, and asked where he was at the time:

             Q: Where were you?             
             A: I wouldn"t know. I wouldn"t -- probably in downtown. I don"t know. I have no memory whatsoever. I"ll try to remember but I have no memory.             
             Q: You have no memory of this.             
             A: None, none at all, zero.             
             Q: Might you have been in the camp?             
             A: I don"t know where I was at that time. Maybe I was in the camp. But you see, maybe I blanked it out, you know. 25             

[88]      Mr. Podins" evidence on this point strains credulity. Ms. Kalve, whose work did not involve direct contact with prisoners, testified that she was ordered, along with all other employees, to attend the execution. Indeed, all of the witnesses who were at Valmiera EG during the relevant period recalled this event. Mr. Podins" failure to recall this event at all, either through direct observation or at the level of rumour, is not plausible.

[89]      More generally, Mr. Podins" stated lack of any knowledge regarding conditions at Valmiera EG strained credulity. Under cross-examination on issues such as inmate composition and general conditions at the EG, Mr. Podins was often evasive, claiming not to have had any interest in such matters and to have no memory of them at present. Lapses in memory are to be expected, especially given the witness"s advanced age and the passage of over fifty years since the events in question. However, at certain points in his testimony, Mr. Podins disclaimed knowledge of anything that transpired at the prison outside the narrow workings of the EG store. He was also evasive in answering questions which tended to link him to prison guards, such as questions regarding his job of distributing rations to the guards.

[90]      On the one hand, Mr. Podins" stance of ignorance, forgetfulness and neutrality was consistent with the impression he made as a quiet man who keeps to himself and chooses to block out any disturbing events, an attitude which appears to have characterized his life both during the war and through to this day. On the other hand, his stated ignorance as to any events which transpired outside the confines of the EG store was not wholly believable. While I found Mr. Podins" testimony as to his actual duties at the camp to be, for the most part, credible and, as I stated above, corroborated by the other witnesses, I note that his general stance regarding Valmiera EG was not wholly credible.

[91]      In September 1943, the prison was closed. Although Mr. Podins denied this, I am satisfied on the evidence that the prison was closed. He was conscripted at that time into the Latvian Legion. When it was found out he had a medical problem (his knee injury), he was made a guard in Riga for one year, starting on October 1st, 1943. As has been noted, it is not necessary to make detailed findings on this period of Mr. Podins" military service, as it is not properly before the Court as part of the "case" against him.

[92]      In the fall of 1944, as the Russians approached, he joined an artillery regiment in Poland. He did not remain there for very long, as there was very heavy bombing around Danzig, and about two days later, the Russians arrived. He suffered a shrapnel wound in his back on May 7th, 1945, was taken by ship to Copenhagen, and after a day or two, went to Keil, Germany, where he surrendered to the British as a prisoner of war. As his wound was partially healed, he did not need hospitalization, and was placed in a prison camp at Putlos, near Lubeck, Germany. While at Lubeck, he met his older brother, Herberts, who had also been taken prisoner of war. When winter came, he and many of the other prisoners of war were sent to Cedelham, Belgium, where they stayed in barracks for the winter. In the spring of 1946, he was given discharge papers and returned with Herberts to Lubeck, Germany. There, they were housed in a barracks in a camp called Artilerie Kaserne, which is where their other brother Janis was living. Mr. Podins worked at the store in the camp until October 1947.

[93]      In October 1947, at the camp office, Mr. Podins saw an advertisement for immigrants to Canada, Australia and Britain. He filled out some application forms and went through a medical examination. He passed the medical and a month later, he was told that he could go to England. He was picked up by truck and taken to Holland, and landed in England on November 6, 1947. In England, he worked on a farm, and then in a canteen, pouring tea. In 1950, he obtained a job as an orderly in a hospital in Surrey. While working in that hospital, in 1951, he met his soon-to-be wife and they were married in January 1953. They subsequently had two children, one born in England in 1953, a son who later died, and a daughter who was born in Canada in December 1964. In 1955, Mr. Podins began a three-year nursing course at Nethern Hospital.

[94]      In 1955, Mr. Podins applied for British citizenship. As a result of this application, he was interviewed by Detective Constable Watts, of the Metropolitan London Police Force. This interview was done on behalf of the British Home Office, which required a security check when any alien applied for naturalization, such as Mr. Podins did. Based on the information he obtained at the interview, Mr. Watts prepared a report dated February 21, 1955. Mr. Watts, who testified before the Court, admitted that he had no recollection of Mr. Podins, other than what was stated in the report. Mr. Watts indicated that prior to doing any interviews, he would always look at the reports from various registries, obtain the applicant's application documents and then interview him at the applicant"s home. He was certain that this was the procedure that would have been followed in interviewing Mr. Podins. Mr. Watts testified that he would try to get a complete picture of the applicant's life, but because it was impossible to check any Eastern European residence and employment, he concentrated on the loyalty that the proposed immigrant had shown in his time in Britain, together with checks on his employment in Britain.

[95]      In the report, Mr. Watts had indicated that Mr. Podins was a shop assistant in Valmiera. There was no indication of the name of the employer or the place of employment. The report contains the following passage:

             Alien states that he was born on 5th June, 1918 at Renceni, Latvia and received his elementary education in that village until the age of fourteen. For the next 2 years he helped on his father"s farm and then moved to the nearby town of Valmiera, where he obtained work as shop assistant in a Co-operative store. He claims that the Russian occupation of Latvia in June 1940 did not affect his work or living conditions and that when the German forces over-ran his country one year later, he was still allowed to continue as a shop assistant.             

It appears that Mr. Podins" employment at Valmiera EG was not disclosed at this interview. It is not clear, however, whether this gap is the result of a conscious effort on Mr. Podins" part to conceal information, or rather a function of the interview process. Mr. Watts testified that his primary concern was with an alien"s life subsequent to arrival in Britain as it was virtually impossible to verify the details of an individual"s past in Eastern Europe. Thus, it may be that he did not inquire into such specifics as the identities of Mr. Podins" employers in each of his shopkeeping positions in Latvia.

[96]      Mr. Watts had access to a 1950 report from an immigration officer in Britain, which was very short, but with one difference between the information provided the immigration officer and that provided to Mr. Watts. In the interview with Mr. Watts, Mr. Podins stated that he was in the military from autumn of 1943, whereas in the immigration officer's report, it stated that he was only in the military in 1944. Mr. Watts testified he was surprised that he did not notice this difference at the time of the interview, but it may be explained by the fact that, as has been noted, he took the view that it was virtually impossible to check on an alien's past when the alien had lived in Eastern Europe before and during the war. Mr. Watts testified that his primary interest was to see how the alien immigrant had assimilated into British life. Mr. Watts indicated that there would have been a check with the security services, as well as for any criminal record or any information that had come to the attention of the police in Britain in any way. Mr. Watts testified that for security checks, the usual tombstone data of a person's correct name, place and date of birth was very important. In Mr. Podins' case, all the security checks came back negative. Mr. Podins provided Mr. Watts with a copy of his Latvian passport, together with other documents set out at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2 of the report.

[97]      Mr. Podins told Mr. Watts that he had been conscripted into the Latvian Army, that he then went to Riga for one year, and continued on to Poland with the 15th Artillery Division. In the report, Mr. Watts informed the Home Office that Mr. Podins was a person of good character. Mr. Podins received his British citizenship in May, 1955.

[98]      Mrs. Podins, who testified before the Court, confirmed that she had prepared the letter attached to Mr. Podins' Application by an Alien for a Certificate of Naturalization in Britain, and Mr. Podins copied the letter. She said Mr. Podins' English grammar and spelling were not sufficient at that time for him to have prepared the letter. In fact, she indicated that all of Mr. Podins" forms up until the 1970s, were either completed by her or prepared by her and copied by him. However, Mrs. Podins had no recollection of attending the interview with Mr. Watts, although he had indicated it was his normal practice to have the applicant"s spouse in attendance.

[99]      In late 1958, Mr. and Mrs. Podins decided to immigrate to Canada. Mr. Podins had seen an advertisement in the local newspaper indicating that Canada required nurses and was prepared to pay $288 a month, which was double the amount of his salary in England. He also thought that Canada would provide a better future for his son. Mr. Podins went to Canada House in Grosvenor Square, London, to get a package of papers, which he took home for his wife to complete. When the application form was complete, Mr. Podins took the application form with the medical report and X-ray to Canada House at Trafalgar Square in London. However, he was subsequently informed that he had not passed the medical and would not be admissible to Canada unless he had an operation on his knee. He had the operation and provided the report to Canada House. Following that, the Podins" were asked to report to Canada House in London for an interview, which they attended early in 1959.

[100]      Mr. Podins and his wife both testified that she did most of the talking at the interview, and that the interview lasted approximately one half hour. However, both testified that the majority of the half hour was taken up by the immigration officer telling them what a great place Canada was. Mrs. Podins testified that she was almost 100% sure that she had completed Immigration form IMM. 461, which was shown to her at the hearing, and she was 100% sure she had not filled in Immigration form 0.S.8, because it is bilingual and she would have remembered if the form she had filled out was bilingual. She also indicated that because of the additional details about wartime activities required on the O.S.8, she would have had to ask Mr. Podins a lot of questions to complete it, and she had no problem filling out the form to the best of her recollection. Mrs. Podins testified in cross-examination that the form she helped her husband complete required information on only the applicants" two previous jobs. I do not find it credible that Mrs. Podins could remember this detail 40 years later. However, she was credible in testifying that the form she completed did not require information on wartime employment, and the IMM. 461 form clearly did not require information regarding jobs held during the war.

[101]      Mrs. Podins testified that all she knew of Mr. Podins wartime activities was that he was a shopkeeper in a prison for the first part of the war, though she did not know what kind of prison. She only knew he was a shopkeeper and that guards and villagers shopped at his store. She also knew that he subsequently was in the Latvian Army and believes that he had been conscripted. Mrs. Podins testified that she had grown up in Ireland during the war and had no interest in the war. I find this part of her evidence credible, since Ireland was neutral during the war and it was not the topic of conversation it was in Canada and Britain. With regard to her own nationality and immigration process, Mrs. Podins testified that she had fallen into the category of Irish nationals considered to be British subjects, having been born in Ireland before 1948. Thus, as far as the interview with the Canadian immigration officer in London was concerned, she said she wasn't treated any differently than her husband, since they were both British subjects.

[102]      Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Podins could recall filling out any other forms during the interview, nor could they recall the immigration officer filling out any forms. Both denied that the immigration officer asked any questions about Mr. Podins' wartime activities.

[103]      The Podins" received some papers, either at the interview of shortly thereafter, and three months later, on May 29th , 1959, landed in Quebec by ship. They were greeted there by a member of the Grey Nuns, who took their papers and helped them through the immigration procedures. Both Mr. and Mrs. Podins denied having answered any questions at this point. The nun also arranged accommodations for the Podins" in New Westminster, British Columbia, where Mr. Podins had a job arranged at the psychiatric hospital in Essendale. Mrs. Podins started working there three or four months later. Mr. Podins" Immigration Card, which has his landed information, has all the correct tombstone data as well as information concerning his parentage, financial resources and address in Canada.

[104]      Mr. Podins worked at the Essendale Hospital in New Westminster, until 1962, when he returned to England to further his training in nursing. He then became a general or registered nurse. The family returned to Canada in 1964, where a second child, Fiona, was born. The couple subsequently purchased a nursing home in Burnaby, which they renamed Deer Lake Private Hospital. They sold it in 1984.

[105]      On February 10th, 1971, Mr. Podins filed an Application by a British Subject for a Certificate of Citizenship before the Court of Canadian Citizenship, presenting himself as having been lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence. The Canadian Citizenship Regulations, P.C. 1968-1703, SOR/68 404, were in force at the time Mr. Podins applied for citizenship. Under those Regulations, a British subject had to file an application for a grant of Canadian citizenship pursuant to s. 13(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Regulations either to the Registrar of Canadian Citizenship or to the Clerk of the Court, whereas a person other than a British subject, pursuant to s. 9 of the Regulations, had to file an application for a grant of Canadian citizenship to the Minister. Sub-section 13(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Regulations provided

             13. (1) Where a British subject desires to have a certificate of citizenship granted to him, he shall file an application form with the Registrar or with the Clerk of the Court.             

[106]      Mr. Podins" citizenship application shows that it was filed with the Clerk of the Court. It also bears Mr. Podins" signature to the effect that the statements in the application were true. Thus, s. 13(2) of the Canadian Citizenship Regulations was applicable to Mr. Podins" application. Subsection 13(2) provided:

             13. (2) Sections 9 to 12 except subsections (1) and (2) of section 9 apply to an application for a certificate of citizenship filed with the Clerk of the Court by a person referred to in sub-section (1)             

Sections 9 to 12 (except subsections (1) and (2)) of section 9, included a requirement pursuant to sections 10(1) and 11(1) of the Regulations that the applicant attend at a hearing of his application, where the Court may decide to hear evidence under oath or not under oath. Consequently, Mr. Podins would have attended a hearing before a Court prior to being granted a certificate of citizenship.

[107]      Another view of his Application by a British Subject for a Certificate of Canadian Citizenship suggests that he may have filed his application with the Registrar, as evidenced by the bottom right-hand corner of page 2 of the application which reads, "MAIL TO: The Registrar of Canadian Citizenship". In that case, s. 13(3) of the Canadian Citizenship Regulations would have been applicable to Mr. Podins" application.26 In my view, in light of the sworn application before the Clerk of the Court, it is more likely that he made his application to the Clerk rather than the Registrar. In any event, whether he filed his application for citizenship pursuant to s. 13(2) or s. 13(3) of the Canadian Citizenship Regulations, he had to satisfy the Minister, pursuant to s. 10(2) of the Canadian Citizenship Act, RS.C. 1970, c. C-19 that he possessed the qualifications prescribed in paragraphs 1(b), (c), (d), e), (f) and (g) of that Act. Paragraph (c) required the applicant to show, among other qualifications, that he had "been lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence..." Paragraph (g) required the applicant to satisfy the Court that "he is of good character and not under order of deportation." Mr. Podins was granted citizenship on February 22nd , 1971.

[108]      Mr. Podins retired in 1986. Mr. and Mrs. Podins separated and later divorced. Prior to his retirement, Mr. Podins had purchased an apartment in Hawaii, which he visited fairly frequently. However, in 1990, when the Podins" were no longer married, Mr. Podins was stopped by U.S. Immigration authorities and refused entry into the U.S. because they had received a report that he had been a guard in a concentration camp. Mrs. Podins testified that a relative of Mr. Podins had informed U.S. Immigration that Mr. Podins had been a guard in a concentration camp. Mrs. Podins added that this relative was always drunk, that Mr. Podins had tried to limit his drinking on one occasion, and that he responded by saying he was going to get revenge on Mr. Podins. She had tried to find out more about the allegation and testified that Mr. Podins had told her he had nothing to do with it. He had said that his only involvement in Latvia at that time was working in the shop in the prison, as he had stated earlier. No further evidence was presented on this incident.

CANADIAN SECURITY SCREENING POLICY, 1946-1959

[109]      Although this decision turns, to a significant degree, on how the security screening rejection criteria were applied at the time of the defendant"s immigration to Canada, it is important to understand the broader context of Canada"s security concerns and policy during this period. The government body which handled security matters, the Security Panel, was established in large part because of considerable anxiety in Ottawa about threats to national security. This anxiety was sparked by disclosures flowing from the Gouzenko spy affair which brought Canada into the Cold War. The Security Panel reflected the special responsibilities the Prime Minister had and continues to have in security matters. It was chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet, the most senior official in the service of the government of Canada. It was attended by the expert heads of the security organizations of the government, notably the RCMP, the three branches of the armed forces, the Defence Research Establishment, the Department of External Affairs and such other departments and agencies deemed necessary, including the operational head of the Immigration Branch.

[110]      The Court was assisted in this area by Mr. Nicholas d"Ombrain, who has held a number of senior positions within the Public Service, including Special Adviser to the Deputy Solicitor General of Canada (1977-82), Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (1982-1991), and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and Senior Advisor to the Privy Council Office (1991-95). He was qualified as an expert in the following areas: (1) Cabinet government and the workings of the Cabinet and related supporting machinery; (2) the organization and management of the federal government's apparatus for security intelligence, foreign intelligence and the formulation and dissemination of policies related thereto; and (3) the function of the Prime Minister and the Privy Council Office in relation thereto. It is important to note that Mr. d'Ombrain's expertise relates to the policy of central government and not to operations in the various departments of the federal government.

[111]      Mr. d'Ombrain was a very credible witness and readily admitted that he was not an expert on Immigration procedures or the implementation of security screening criteria. He was forthright in suggesting that counsel for Mr. Podins ask Immigration administration experts about certain documents, since he himself did not purport to have any expertise in this area. I also note that Mr. d'Ombrain prepared his material without interviewing any visa control officer or immigration officer, in my view, quite properly. Mr. d'Ombrain was provided with a number of Cabinet documents and Security Panel documents from the period, together with a few other documents. However, he appears not to have received all of the Security Panel minutes relating to security rejection criteria. It is inexcusable that he was not provided with all the relevant documents. On the other hand, numerous documents were put to him on cross-examination which were unrelated to his expertise in the above noted areas.

[112]      The defendant took the position that the Cabinet directed the RCMP, in 1959, to encourage Eastern European immigration. I am not persuaded that this was the case. There is no doubt that there are numerous documents which show that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and its predecessor, the Department of Mines, wanted continually to have the security criteria relaxed. However, in my view, it is very clear, from Mr. d'Ombrain's evidence, and also that of the visa control officer who testified, Mr. Cliffe, that in actual fact, the RCMP only paid attention to directives from the Cabinet to the Commissioner of the RCMP, and then from the Commissioner of the RCMP to the London Office.

[113]      Mr. d'Ombrain discussed the role of the Cabinet in the period 1946 to 1959. The Cabinet is a strictly informal body whose essential purpose is political although it also fulfils important administrative functions. The fundamental purpose of the Cabinet is to provide a forum for ministers to determine the policy of government and to ensure that all ministers will support the actions that a particular minister proposes to take under statutory authority assigned by Parliament or under the Royal Prerogative. However, its decision-making system is not the formal or legal basis of action by the Government of Canada, which resides with individual ministers, the Governor-in-Council and Parliament.

[114]      It is also important to remember that the Cabinet documents were kept secret and were circulated only to ministers on a need-to-know basis. However, Cabinet directives were an exception to the rule. These were administrative instructions of general application, whose utility lay in their widespread distribution throughout the civil service.

[115]      The Security Panel first met in June 1946 and met a further 67 times up until July 1959. During the 1930s and the Second World War, there was virtually no immigration to Canada. In 1945 Canada's immigration policy was governed by a regulation adopted by an Order in Council in 1931 pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1927.27 This Order in Council restricted immigration to persons from the United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland and the recognised Dominions of the British Empire, explicitly taking into account "... the unemployment conditions now temporarily existing in Canada".28

[116]      Between 1945 and 1947 the government of Canada was actively engaged on a priority basis in the development of a new immigration policy and appropriate measures for the security screening of prospective immigrants. On October 26th, 1945, Order in Council P.C. 6687 was passed, providing that

             the Immigration Officer-in-Charge at a port of entry may grant a landing in Canada to any refugee who entered Canada as such under non-immigrant status subsequent to September 1st, 1939, provided the said refugee established to the satisfaction of the Immigration Officer-in-charge that he is of good character and can comply with the provisions of the Immigration Act in all other respects.             

[117]      On May 1st, 1947, Prime Minister McKenzie King made a statement in the House of Commons which set out a new immigration policy:

             The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by legislation, by regulation, and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy.29             

This statement set in motion the government policy of promoting immigration to Canada during the period spanning 1947 to 1959. The Prime Minister also emphasized that the main obstacle to the free flow of immigrants to Canada in 1947 was not government policy or regulation, but the shortage of transportation. He specifically took note of the large number of displaced persons and refugees in Europe and stated that they would be examined "on the basis of suitability and physical fitness".30 He further stated, "[i]n taking these steps the government is seeking to ensure that the displaced persons admitted to Canada are of a type likely to make good citizens."31

[118]      In June 1947 the Cabinet authorized an Order in Council to admit 5,000 Displaced Persons in the bulk labour category.32 Further admissions were authorized and by the Fall of 1948 the total rose to 40,000, including special provision for Czechoslovakian and Estonian refugees not classified as part of the population of official Displaced Persons.33

[119]      At the same time that the government was liberalizing immigration policy, it was also instituting policies for the security screening of prospective immigrants. These policies were disseminated on a need-to-know basis. The Cabinet decided in 1946 that "... the security screening of prospective immigrants ... should be dealt with by departmental administrative action rather than by legislation."34 It decided against drafting suitable provisions because of the difficulty of drafting such clauses and, although no more specific reason is given, the importance of secrecy in security matters was probably a factor.

[120]      Order in Council P.C. 6687, which, as noted above, was passed on October 26th, 1945, and relaxed the restrictive 1931 regulations, was preceded by a memorandum to the Cabinet providing

             ... only those granted a clearance from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police be eligible for a landing within the meaning of the Immigration Act, those not qualified for such a clearance to continue under their present status until their cases can be finally disposed of.35             

While the Cabinet noted the importance of ensuring that security requirements were respected, there was also a certain tension between the need for effective screening and the need not to impede the flow of immigrants. However, each time the Cabinet was asked to provide direction, it decided that screening should be carried out to the extent thought necessary and practical by the RCMP.

[121]      In July, 1946, the RCMP had yet to establish offices in Europe from which to perform security examinations of prospective immigrants. On August 23rd, 1946, the Security Panel recommended that the RCMP travel to Europe to support Immigration Teams by undertaking security examination of applicants and noted that the RCMP could count on the "... ready co-operation of the United Kingdom Passport Office in undertaking examinations of any suspects."36 The Commissioner of the RCMP accepted the recommendation of the Panel to set up a screening procedure overseas. The RCMP established itself in London in the Fall of 1946 and over the next 18 months added members to Immigration Inspection Teams in Germany, Holland and Italy. Each team consisted of an immigration inspector, a physician from the Immigration Service of the Department of National Health, and an RCMP officer for security screening.

[122]      In January 1947, the Cabinet approved recommendations from the Minister of Mines and Resources to expand the classes of persons admissible as immigrants. However, during discussions, the Minister had noted that the broadening of the regulations would be "ineffective" unless something was done to reduce the time taken to carry out required security screening.37 At a Security Panel meeting on January 30th, 1947, the Panel was informed that the RCMP presence in London was not adequate to the size of the problem: at best they could screen 5,000 of the 30,000-50,000 applicants expected over the coming year. Faced with the question of whether to abandon screening altogether or reduce the number of persons to be vetted, the Panel endorsed the latter course of action. As expressed in its report of February 5th, 1947, it did so largely out of concern for the potential infiltration of Canada by individuals from Soviet countries "instructed to pursue the aims of their government upon taking up residence in Canada."38

[123]      In February 1947, on the basis of this report, the Cabinet decided to institute a system of selective screening. The Secretary to the Cabinet recorded the decision as follows:

             In this report the Panel had reaffirmed the importance of security screening as a general principle and had recommended against its abandonment in respect to immigrants. They proposed that, in order to meet the greatly increased number of applications, the present procedures be modified either by concentrating the screening on applicants from certain defined geographical areas or by placing it on a selective basis at the discretion of the R.C.M. Police.             
             The Cabinet noted the report submitted and agreed that in the circumstances security screening of aliens applying for entry to Canada as immigrants be required only in cases in which it was felt that the information available to the immigration authorities needed to be supplemented by special security investigations.             
             It was also agreed that the possibility of improving screening facilities through increased co-operation from U.K. and U.S. agencies be explored by the Department of Mines and Resources [then the Department that administered Immigration] and the R.C.M. Police in consultation with External Affairs39             

This decision on security screening governed the entire relevant period before me.

[124]      The RCMP developed rejection criteria between 1947 and 1949. The objective of security screening was described in a memorandum to Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent on September 16th, 1949, as follows:

             To deny admission to any persons who, from their known history and background, would be unlikely to adapt themselves to the Canadian way of life and to our democratic form of government.40             

It went on to set out the categories of persons considered inadmissible on security grounds:

-      Communist, known or strongly suspected Communist agitator or suspected Communist Agent.
-      Member of Security Service or German Wehrmacht. Found to bear mark of Security Service Blood Group (non-Germans).
-      Evasive and untruthful under investigation.
-      Failure to produce recognizable and acceptable documents as to time of entry and residence in Germany.
-      False presentation; use of false or fictitious name.
-      Collaborators presently residing in previously occupied territory.
-      Member of the Italian Fascist party or of the Mafia.

-      Trotskyite or member of other revolutionary organization.41

[125]      This list was substantially the same as that used by the RCMP for screening purposes, with the omission of the strictly non-security criteria of "Criminal (known or suspected); Professional gambler; Prostitute: Black Market Racketeer."42 These four non-security criteria were applied by immigration officers rather than the RCMP, which simply provided them with any relevant information.43

[126]      In 1949, the Secretary to the Cabinet recommended a Cabinet directive be issued instructing deputy ministers and agency heads that persons rejected on security grounds not be informed of the reasons or even the fact of rejection on security grounds. He noted that doing so might jeopardize sources in ongoing counter-espionage and other security investigations. Cabinet Directive Circular No. 14, dated October 28, 1949, included a description of prohibited categories of persons:

             Displaced persons and certain classes of prospective immigrants desiring to enter Canada are investigated under established procedures by the R.C.M. Police. Persons in specified categories (i.e., Communists, members of the Nazi or Fascist Parties or any revolutionary organization, 'collaborators', and users of false or fictitious names or documents) are regarded as inadmissible under the Immigration Act and are refused a visa. As some of the persons so rejected are not aware that their subversive records are known to security and intelligence agencies, disclosure of the reasons for their rejection as immigrants tends to excite suspicion and compromise valuable sources of information.44             

[127]      The Security Panel started relaxing the security rejection criteria on October 27, 1950 when it advised the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration with respect to the security screening of German nationals who were no longer excluded on the following grounds:

             ... German nationals who had at any time been identified with any of the organizations listed by the R.C.M. Police should be excluded on security grounds, but ... this general ban should not extend to persons in countries occupied by the Nazis during the war who might have become identified with such organisations under pressure from the occupying power.45             

[128]      On November 30, 1950, the Commissioner of the RCMP issued amended instructions to the head of security screening in Europe, Major Wright, in the following terms:

             Excepting member of SS, Waffen SS, Abwehr, S.D., Gestapo or other important and dangerous Nazis when identified, membership in Nazi party no longer ground for rejection.46             

[129]      In the Spring of 1951, the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration sought to narrow the criteria such that service in the Waffen S.S., in and of itself, would no longer be a cause for rejection. But no action was taken until May 1952 when the Security Panel agreed to the following changes:

     "... the following persons should be refused entry to Canada as immigrants:         
         a)      Former members of the S.S., the Sicherheitsdienst, the Abwehr, the Gestapo, and any former member of the Nazi party who, under Allied Control Council Directive No. 38 of 12th October 1946, was classified as a Major Offender or Offender or who, on evidence before a Security Officer, is in his opinion within either of these categories. Particular care should be taken to exclude persons who were responsible for brutalities in concentration or labour camps.         
         b)      Former members of the Waffen S.S. except:         
             (i)      German nationals who joined before the age of 18, when there are reasonable grounds for believing they were conscripted or joined under coercion.         
             (ii)      Volkdeutsche formerly residing in German occupied territory, whether they were subsequently naturalised German or not, when there are reasonable grounds for believing they were conscripted or joined under coercion.         
             (iii)      Volkdeutsche and other nationalities who were resettled and naturalised German before joining, when there are reasonable grounds for believing that naturalisation was not of their own choosing, and reasonable grounds for believing they were conscripted or joined under coercion.         
             (iv)      German nationals, Volkdeutsche formerly residing in territory not occupied by the Wehrmacht, whether subsequently naturalised German or not, or other nationalities, when any of these persons can satisfy the Security Officer that they were conscripted or joined under coercion.         
     c)      Former collaborators who should be excluded on grounds of moral turpitude, except minor collaborators whose actions resulted from coercion47         

[130]      In October 1955, the Sub-Panel of the Security Panel agreed to replace the blanket prohibition against German nationals who had been members of excluded organizations such as the S.S., the Abwehr and the S.A. These people would only be admitted where their immigration was being sponsored in the close relative categories. However, even with this exemption the Sub-Panel maintained the following blanket prohibition:

             .. former members of the Gestapo, concentration camp guards and persons who, in the opinion of an examining officer, would be considered major offenders under Allied Control Council Directive No. 38 should continue to be automatically rejected as applicants.48             

[131]      In 1957 the Department of Citizenship and Immigration comprehensively reviewed the Immigration policies and procedures, including security screening. The report noted that the British security authorities had agreed to carry out criminal checks ("... which would also reveal whether or not they were a security risk.") on "any special individual cases where the immigration officer has reason to believe that a check would be advisable".49

[132]      In December 1958, the Cabinet Committee on Immigration asked that the Security Panel review the "present security grounds for rejection"50 and the secretariat to the Panel set out the criteria then currently in force:

             (a)      Communist, known or strongly suspected. Communist agitator or suspected Communist Agent.             
             (b)      Member of Security Service or German Wehrmacht. When non-German found to bear mark of Security Service Blood Group.             
             (c)      Nazi.             
             (d)      Criminal (known or suspected).             
             (e)      Professional gambler.             
             (f)      Prostitute and homosexual.             
             (g)      Black Market racketeer.             
             (h)      Persons who under interrogation are evasive and untruthful.             
             (i)      Failure to produce recognized and acceptable documents as to time of entry and residence in Germany.             
             (j)      False representation; use of false or fictitious name.             
             (k)      Collaborators.             
             (l)      Member of the Italian Fascist Party or of the Mafia.             
             (m)      Trotskyites or members of other revolutionary organizations.51             

[133]      These security screening criteria, understood in conjunction with the May 1952 changes noted above, were in place when Mr. Podins applied for entry to Canada in the Spring of 1959.

SECURITY SCREENING OF BRITISH SUBJECTS BY NATURALIZATION

[134]      The defendant's position is that British citizens, whether by birth or naturalization, were exempt from security screening in 1958 and 1959. Accordingly, Mr. Podins submits that he was not subject to security screening and that the application form his wife completed on his behalf did not require answers on wartime activities. As noted earlier, the plaintiff submits that Mr. Podins would have had to fill out an OS. 8 form, which required applicants, at question 33, to provide particulars of their "former addresses and employment since 1939." In the alternative, the plaintiff submits that even if Mr. Podins, as a naturalized British subject, was not required to fill out the OS. 8, but rather, as he submits, completed an IMM. 461, which did not require information on wartime activities, he would have been questioned by the interviewing visa officer as to his wartime activities. In the plaintiff"s submission, if Mr. Podins had provided accurate information either in answering question 33 of the OS. 8, or alternatively at his immigration interview, the immigration officer would have either outright rejected him for admission, or referred him to a "Stage B" or security screening interview with an RCMP officer. She further submits that by failing to provide accurate information as to his wartime activities, Mr. Podins, at the very least, foreclosed the possibility of further investigation into his past and thereby obtained admission into Canada on the basis of a material misrepresentation.

[135]      As has been detailed above, Mr. and Mrs. Podins testified as to the process they underwent in applying for admission into Canada. Mr. Podins recalled going to Canada House in Grosvenor Square, London, in late 1958, where he was given a package of papers to complete. His wife completed the forms. As set out earlier, Mrs. Podins testified that she completed the IMM. 461 form on behalf of Mr. Podins. She stated she was sure it was an IMM. 461 and not an OS. 8 as the form she filled out was in English only and not in both English and French as was the case with the OS. 8. As has been noted, the IMM. 461 did not require information as to the applicant"s address and employment since 1939. Under "Employment History" at question 16, it required information on the applicant"s present and two preceding jobs. At the time of his application in 1959, Mr. Podins was working as a nurse, and prior to that he had been a hospital orderly, a server at a canteen, and a farm labourer. Thus, in answering question 16 of the IMM. 461, he would not have been required to provide any information as to his wartime activities.

[136]      Both parties called a number of witnesses and adduced documentary evidence on the process undergone by naturalized British subjects who applied for admission into Canada. The plaintiff called a former immigration or visa officer, Mr. Gunn, and a former security screening, "Stage B", or visa control officer, Mr. Cliffe. However, neither of these witnesses had served in Britain. Mr. Gunn was qualified as an expert in post-World War II Canadian immigration policy, and the evolution of Canadian immigration criteria and procedures during the post-World War II period in Canada and Europe, including immigration process criteria and procedures applicable to British subjects. He spent his entire career in Canada except for three and a half years (1954 -57) at the Canadian Embassy in Brussels, Belgium as an immigration officer. During that period, he became aware of general criteria used by the RCMP Stage B officers for security screening. However, as with anyone else who worked in the Immigration Department, he was unaware of the security rejection criteria. Mr. Cliffe, as a former security screening or visa control officer, was familiar with the security rejection criteria. However, he never served in Britain, having been stationed in Italy, Germany and Sweden from 1951 to 1957.

[137]      The plaintiff produced a Department of Citizenship and Immigration memorandum dated March 25, 1958, attached to which was "a revised set of all forms and form letters at present in use at all our offices in the United Kingdom and Eire, together with a revised Index".52 The Index, subtitled "Form Letters in use in the U.K.", contains three categories: "Alien", "British" and "General." Under "Alien", the first document package, "A.1." is described as "Replying to initial enquiries emanating from the United Kingdom, which indicate they are from Aliens," and "Attaching forms O.S.8", and presumably other forms, although the rest of the text is missing from the copy provided. Under "British", however, there is no mention of the O.S.8. Rather, the document packages listed under "British", which deal with general inquiries, indicate that the IMM. 461 is to be attached. The first package, B.1 is described as "Acknowledging initial enquiries emanating from the United Kingdom and Eire, where no specific questions are asked." The B.1 package contains seven forms, UK.1, UK.2, UK.3, UK.4 UK.5 and IMM.461 and Medical Instructions. B.2 is described as "Acknowledging initial enquiries emanating from the United Kingdom and Eire, where specific questions are asked. To be answered by additional paragraphs." The B.2 package contains the same seven forms as B.1.

[138]      The plaintiff produced form U.K.1, pointing out that its opening sentence reads "Canada welcomes British subjects born in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, or the Union of South Africa, and citizens of Ireland." She also drew the Court"s attention to the bottom of the form, which reads "IMPORTANT NOTICE - this information applies only to British subjects by birth in the United Kingdom, ... all other British subjects and aliens should complete the application form enclosed and mail it to this office. Upon receipt we will advise you concerning further procedure in your case."

[139]      The plaintiff submits that the "further procedure" to be followed by British citizens by naturalization was completion of the O.S.8. She bases this on section 18 of the Immigration Regulations SOR/56-180, CANADA GAZETTE, PART II, Vol. 90, June 13, 1956, read together with section 6.27(a) of the Manual for the Guidance of Immigration and Visa Officers ("Immigration Manual"), which was in force in May 1959. The relevant subsections of s. 18 of the Immigration Regulations provide,

             18(3) Except as provided in subsection (6), every person who seeks to enter or land in Canada shall be in possession of a visa issued to him by a Canadian immigration officer...             
             18(6)British subjects by birth in the United Kingdom, ... , may seek admission to Canada without being in possession of a visa as required in subsections (3) or (4).             

[140]      The plaintiff notes that only British subjects by birth in the U.K. were exempt from the visa requirement. Section 6.27 (a) of the Immigration Manual, which was in effect in May 1959 provides,

             6.27 (a) Applicants for visa, except those listed on forms Imm. 55 [sponsorship cases], will complete form Imm. O.S. 8, which is to be retained by the visa officer as a permanent record.             

[141]      Reading these two authorities together, the plaintiff submits that even if all British subjects were initially given a package containing an IMM. 461, the "further procedure" indicated in U.K.1, and mandated by the Immigration Regulations and Immigration Manual required naturalized British subjects to complete an O.S.8 form.

[142]      The plaintiff also relied on Mr. Gunn"s testimony that British citizens by naturalization were required to complete an O.S.8 form, and were subject to being security screened by a visa control officer depending on the information such applicants provided regarding their history from 1939 onward. Mr. Gunn noted that visa officers had a general awareness of the various classes coming within the security rejection criteria, but that it was decided that RCMP officers were best qualified to do the actual security screening. He stated that visa officers acquired this knowledge "a little bit at a time" and pointed specifically to an Immigration document entitled "Instruction No. 1" as the first instruction issued on the topic of collaborators.53 This document, dated March 29, 1947 and stamped April 15th of that year, states in its preamble that "all previous instructions concerning procedure in dealing with applications for admission are hereby cancelled and replaced by the following:-" Under the heading "Alien Immigration", at the bottom of page 1, it states, "[p]ersons who served with the enemy in any capacity are not eligible for admission." According to Mr. Gunn, based on this document, visa officers automatically assumed that such individuals would fall within the rejection criteria. This was reinforced later in other documents, such as Circular No. 14, a cabinet directive of October 28, 1949 on the necessity of non-disclosure of the security screening results to applicants. This document lists "collaborators" among those "regarded as inadmissible under the Immigration Act".54 However, Mr. Gunn testified that visa officers were not made aware of changes to the definition of "collaborator", such as that which occurred on May 15th, 1952, when the definition was narrowed to include those guilty of "moral turpitude, except minor collaborators whose actions resulted from coercion."55

[143]      Mr. Gunn testified that if he, as an immigration officer, had received an O.S.8 in which the answer provided to question 33 indicated service in the Waffen SS, a concentration camp, or an Auxiliary Police force in a Nazi-occupied country, he would have referred the applicant for security screening. Equally, if, in 1959, he had been presented with an application by a naturalized British subject who had been born in, and lived in a country occupied by the Soviet Union since 1944, he would have referred the person for security screening. He could not envisage any other immigration officer doing otherwise in any of these scenarios.

[144]      Counsel for the defendant submitted that contrary to Mr. Gunn"s testimony, British citizens by naturalization were not required to complete an O.S.8 and were not subject to security screening. This was corroborated by Dr. P.E. Hoogewerf, whom the defendant called as a witness. Dr. Hoogewerf, a naturalized British citizen born in India, had applied for and been granted admission to Canada in 1960. Referred to both the IMM. 461 and the OS. 8, he testified that he was eighty per cent certain he had filled out the IMM. 461 and not the OS. 8. Specifically, he did not recall the form he completed being in French and English; rather, it was in English only. Also, the details he had to provide regarding previous employment were "quite simple" and he did not recall being asked, on the form, or orally, any questions about his work history during the war.

[145]      In cross examination, Mr. Gunn acknowledged that he knew of no instructions to the effect that a naturalized British citizen was to be sent an O.S. 8 after filling out the IMM. 461. In this context, he maintained that an applicant"s completing an actual O.S.8 form was less important than the information required by question 33 regarding wartime activity and that such information could be obtained at the immigration interview.

[146]      A series of documents show that British citizens by naturalization were not subject to security screening. A Memorandum to the Deputy Minister of Immigration from the Director of the Immigration Branch, dated February 7th, 1951, provides in para. 1 that "[a]t the present time, all immigrants are security screened except British subjects, citizens of Ireland, citizens of the United States, legal and permanent residents of the United States and native-born citizens of Central and South American countries residing therein." At paragraph 7, it summarizes the function of the London Security Section, stating that it "clears all aliens residing in the United Kingdom who apply for admission to Canada."[emphasis added]

[147]      A document with the heading "Security Screening of British Immigrants" from P.M. Dwyer, Secretary of the Security Panel, dated Ottawa, September 5th , 1952, reads,

             [t]he fact that no security screening is officially given to British immigrants before they enter Canada has for some time been of concern to members of the Panel...British immigrants are not checked for security before they enter Canada.             

[148]      A letter from L.H. Nicholson, Commissioner of the RCMP, dated October 20th, 1955, addressed to Colonel Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, states at paragraph 3,

             [w]e have a very satisfactory arrangement with the British Security Service whereby we are advised should a communist come forward as an immigrant to Canada. Although in such cases we are not able to prevent his entry, we can, at least, keep track of his movements upon arrival.             

[149]      A Department of External Affairs Canada document dated Ottawa, January 19th, 1956, and marked "confidential" states that "[u]nder immigration procedures all prospective immigrants to Canada must be screened for security except: (a) British subjects, citizens of countries of the British Commonwealth and citizens of Ireland."56

[150]      On November 28th, 1956, a confidential memorandum was sent by the Director, C.G.I.S. U.K. to the Acting Chief, Operations Division, Immigration Branch. It stated,

             "[i]n accordance with London Memorandum no. 163/56 dated the 17th of August, 1956, Stage "B" Officers are no longer attached to our offices. Consequently, preliminary Stage "B" examinations or interview are no longer conducted at any of our offices in the United Kingdom.             

It continued, "[s]tage "B" green forms, U.K.8, are forwarded in quadruplicate to the Stage "B" Officer at Canada House for the completion of Stage "B" documentation." The U.K.8 is explained in the above cited Immigration Branch document dated March 25th , 1958 which includes an index of form letters in use in the U.K. at that time.57 The index describes the U.K.8 as a ""Green Form" (Stage "B"). Used in alien cases and in British cases where clearance of case is required in respect of criminal record." Based on this description, I conclude that the only instance in which a British citizen was subjected to a paper security screening was when his/her IMM. 461 disclosed a criminal record.

[151]      Lastly, there is a Department of Citizenship and Immigration communication from the Sub-Committee on security screening to the Chairman, Committee on review of Immigration Policy and Procedures, dated June 28th, 1957 and marked "Secret". Under the heading "Analysis of Security Criteria", there appears "an outline of the criteria on which, at the present time, security screening waiver or exemption is based..." Under "United Kingdom", at paragraph 12, the report provides,

             [a]lthough a British Communist is just as dangerous as a Communist from any other country, it is neither politically sound nor practically possible to conduct security screening in the United Kingdom...The institution of security screening would inevitably lead to a slowdown in the movement of immigrants from the United Kingdom. Even should the screening of British Communists over-ride the importance of the British movement, the fact remains that there are apparently no facilities in the United Kingdom by which screening of British subjects can be conducted.             

At paragraph 15, the report continues,

             [i]t is recommended that British subjects by birth or naturalization in the United Kingdom be exempt from security screening as at present. [emphasis added]             

[152]      This internal Immigration Department report indicates that all British citizens"whether by birth or naturalization"were exempt from security screening in 1959, when Mr. Podins applied for admission to Canada.

[153]      Appendix B, attached to this report, indicates that all British citizens, other than those with criminal records, were not merely granted a waiver of security screening, but were exempt as a class from security screening. Appendix B sets out the categories of immigrants and the security action applied to them. Under the category "Immigrants NOT normally screened for security" , there appears at (a), "British subjects (except persons born in Cyprus)". The authority cited for this practice is 7.07, which refers to the paragraph of the Immigration Manual listing "Categories not ordinarily screened for security." Various paragraphs in the June 28th , 1957 report itself suggest a distinction between waivers and exemptions. For instance, while paragraph 22 refers to exemptions on the basis of age, paragraph 24 refers to waivers for wives whose husbands have been cleared for security. Furthermore, paragraph 26 recommends that wives no longer require a waiver but be granted an exemption. Paragraph 40 recommends that the "formality of the ministerial waiver" be done away with and replaced by an exemption in the case of those coming within the "close relatives" category. In the summary of recommendations, at paragraph 58, it is recommended that "the exempt and waiver categories" be "amalgamated in one group of exemptions." These references indicate that there was a distinction between those for whom the security screening requirement was waived and those who were exempt. These passages, taken together with the recommendation, at paragraph 15 of the report, that British subjects by naturalization be "exempt from security screening as at present," indicate that Mr. Podins was exempt from security screening when he applied for admission to Canada in 1959.

[154]      The testimony of Mr. Cliffe, the former visa control officer, supports this conclusion. He testified that a paper records check was done in the case of British citizens, but that "even if it came back positive they allowed them to proceed to Canada..."58 Questioned on this point again, he confirmed that while he remembered British citizens being paper screened, "no action was taken on the basis of information that we obtained. We informed Canada who they were getting."59 In cross-examination, he agreed it was likely that a British citizen immigrating from London to Canada in 1958 or 1959 would not be interviewed by a visa control officer. Asked to comment on the confidential memorandum dated November 28th, 1956, from the Director, C.G.I.S. U.K. to the Acting Chief, Operations Division, Immigration Branch, he agreed that as of that date, "preliminary stage B examinations or interviews [were] no longer conducted at any of [the RCMP] offices in the United Kingdom."60 In direct examination, he testified that Stage "B" would not be applicable to British subjects regardless of whether the person was a British subject by birth or naturalization.61

[155]      As has been noted, Mr. Gunn testified that an immigration officer would have referred somebody like Mr. Podins for security screening. He cited 7.03(b) of the Immigration Manual in effect in May, 1959, as authorizing immigration officers to refer an applicant for security screening even if the applicant was in an exempt class. 7.03(b) provides

             [a]n officer of the RCMP, as in (a), who is posted to a Canadian visa office abroad may be requested by the visa officer to screen any prospective immigrant without regard to his nationality or usual country of residence.             

[156]      While immigration officers had this discretion, in my view, it is unlikely they would have exercised it on a regular basis. As Mr. Cliffe testified, immigration officers tended not to refer people for screening unless required to do so, their attitude toward applicants being, in Mr. Cliffe"s words, "let"s get them to Canada."62 This was corroborated by Mr. d"Ombrain who agreed in cross-examination that it was generally true that the "policy of the Canadian government from the very earliest times in Canadian history at least until 1959, was to promote and encourage British citizens to immigrate to Canada".63

[157]      Even allowing for the discretionary authority of immigration officers to recommend security screening under 7.03(b) of the Immigration Manual in effect in 1959, it cannot be established, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Podins was subject to security screening. Since there is no direct evidence other than that of Mr. and Mrs. Podins as to the actual procedure they underwent in immigrating to Canada, the plaintiff"s case depends on the presumption that the following practices were implemented in a uniform and consistent manner: (1) naturalized British citizens were generally required to provide details of their wartime history through the O.S.8 or otherwise in order to obtain a Canadian immigrant visa; (2) it was the general practice of immigration officers working in the field in 1959 to exercise their discretion under 7.03(b) of the Immigration Manual to refer naturalized British citizens to "Stage B" security screening, notwithstanding the general exemption for British citizens; and (3) it was the general practice of "Stage B" security screening officers to reject individuals who worked as shopkeepers in prisons under the control of the Germans during World War II.

[158]      A number of factors suggest the absence any such uniform practices. The immigration and RCMP documents reviewed above corroborate the defendant"s position that naturalized British citizens were not subject to security screening. The index to form letters in use in the U.K. as well as the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Podins, and Dr. Hoogewerf suggest that notwithstanding 6.27 of the Immigration Manual, which required all applicants for visas to complete an O.S.8 form, applicants processed in the London office were not required to do so. Rather, they completed the IMM. 461. Thus, the immigration officer who interviewed applicants would not have had before him or her the information elicited under question 33 of the O.S.8, the individual"s wartime history. Given these factors, even allowing that immigration officers could exercise their discretion to refer for security screening those usually exempt, it cannot be presumed that they would have done so with the necessary degree of regularity, especially since it has not been established they would have had the necessary information regarding an individual"s wartime history. Even assuming they had such information, an exercise of discretion is by definition individual and does not provide a basis for concluding there was a consistent practice among immigration officers. Furthermore, the evidence we do have on the practice of immigration officers of the period suggests they were disinclined to refer applicants for security screening, their primary concern having been to enable the influx of British immigrants into Canada. Finally, even in the unlikely event that an immigration officer would have exercised his or her discretion to refer Mr. Podins to "Stage B" security screening, it cannot be concluded that it would have been likely that a "Stage B" officer would have rejected someone who had been a shopkeeper in a prison under the control of the Germans in Latvia during World War II.

[159]      Based on the foregoing, it cannot be concluded that because Mr. Podins was issued a visa, he must have made a material misrepresentation to Canadian immigration or security screening authorities. I agree with the defendant that British citizens in 1958 and 1959 were exempt from security screening and find that Mr. Podins was not security screened. I am satisfied that Mr. Podins completed Form Imm.461 and answered the questions on that form truthfully. In any event there was clearly no uniform system in place in the United Kingdom in 1959 to make it likely that Mr. Podins was referred to security screening before his admission to Canada.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF FACT

[160]      My findings of fact, set out above, can be summarized as follows. Mr. Podins was on the payroll of the Auxiliary Police in Valmiera from November 17th, 1941 to the middle of September, 1943. His employment at Valmiera EG was not coerced. However, I am satisfied that he did not, in actuality, work as a policeman, and that he was designated in the prison records as a "schutzman" or "kartibnieks" because there was no official job category of "shopkeeper", the position which he actually held at Valmiera EG.

[161]      Conditions at Valmiera EG fell below contemporary international human rights standards, and those of a contemporary Canadian prison. Former inmates testified that they were subjected to forced labour, inadequate food, and beatings. There was also direct, corroborated evidence of an execution at the prison, overseen by German SS personnel. However, the evidence regarding conditions at Valmiera EG does not suggest the systematic brutality of a concentration camp. I find that it functioned, not as a concentration camp, but as a prison under the control of the German occupiers during the years in question.

[162]      As I have noted, Mr. Podins was, for the most part, credible, with regard to his duties at Valmiera EG. The former inmates who testified before the Commission remembered him, not as a guard but as the shopkeeper, and none remembered seeing him in a guard"s uniform. His activities as shopkeeper did not necessitate entry into prison areas of Valmiermuiza. Based on the Commission"s tour of the estate grounds, these prison areas would have been blocked from his view, and there was no evidence suggesting otherwise. Mr. Podins" stated ignorance as to the execution of two prisoners, which took place at Valmiermuiza in February, 1942, was not credible. Two former prison employees, Ms. Kalve, and Mr. Krauja, recalled being compelled to attend this execution, and it is not plausible that Mr. Podins would have no knowledge or recollection of this event. However, while his disavowal of any such knowledge raises questions as to his overall credibility, I have found his testimony to be credible and corroborated on all of the essential points in question before me. Furthermore, such concerns regarding Mr. Podins" memory of events which took place at Valmiera EG does not bring him within the ambit of the plaintiff"s allegations with regard to collaboration during the relevant period.

[163]      Furthermore, even if Mr. Podins" activities at Valmiera EG could be deemed "collaboration" as understood by Canadian security screening officers in 1959, the plaintiff has not established that British citizens by naturalization were subject to security screening at that time. They were not required to complete an O.S.8 form, which was mandatory for all aliens, and required particulars of wartime employment, military service, and prisoner of war status. Rather, British citizens by naturalization were required to complete the IMM. 461, which did not contain any questions regarding the applicant"s wartime history. Nor has it been established that Mr. Podins would have been asked such questions at his immigration interview. Based on the documentary evidence before the Court, and the testimony of other British immigrants to Canada during the period, I cannot accept the plaintiff"s submission that British citizens by naturalization were routinely asked such questions. I do not find that Mr. Podins was subject to security screening when he immigrated to Canada in 1959.

[164]      On the basis of these findings of fact, I find that Eduards Podins was lawfully admitted into Canada on May 29th, 1959, and that he did not obtain Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. Since I have found that Mr. Podins was not subject to security screening in 1959, it is not necessary to determine whether there was legal authority for such screening at that time.

CHARACTER

[165]      As has been noted, the plaintiff seeks to revoke Mr. Podins" citizenship on the additional ground that he obtained Canadian citizenship in violation of s. 10(1) (d) of the Canadian Citizenship Act , RS.C. 1970, c. C-19, in force at the time of his citizenship application in 1971. It provides,

             10. (1) The Minister may, in his discretion, grant a certificate of citizenship to any person who is not a Canadian citizen and who makes application for that purpose and satisfies the Court that             
                     d)      he is of good character and not under order of deportation                     

The plaintiff submits that the defendant, by virtue of his wartime activities, was not of good character when he applied for citizenship and therefore obtained Canadian citizenship unlawfully.

[166]      Based on Mr. Podins" testimony, as well as that of other witnesses who testified as to his behaviour, I make the following findings regarding his character. Mr. Podins" wartime employment as the shopkeeper at Valmiera EG does not, in my opinion, place him outside the definition of "good character" as contemplated by s.10(1)(d) of the Canadian Citizenship Act which was in force in 1971. He had limited contact with the inmates and, as has been noted, did not actually work as a policeman or guard. While his disavowal of any knowledge of the execution which took place at Valmiera EG and more generally of the prison and wartime conditions strained credulity, these questionable aspects of his testimony are not sufficient to call into question his "good character" at the time of his citizenship application in 1971.

[167]      The defence called a number of character witnesses, including family members, friends and business associates who testified that Mr. Podins is, and has been, a gentle, generous, mild-mannered, and honest man. None of these witnesses knew the details of Mr. Podins" wartime activities. In weighing this evidence, I am cognizant of the fact that these witnesses were called by the defence to attest to Mr. Podins" good character. However, I also note that none of the former Valmiera EG inmates, who might be considered adverse in interest to the defendant, provided evidence which reflects poorly on Mr. Podins" character, either directly or indirectly. Based on the totality of evidence before the Court, I find that Mr. Podins, in obtaining Canadian citizenship in 1971, did not violate s. 10(1) (d) of the Canadian Citizenship Act , RS.C. 1970, c. C-19, in effect at the time of his citizenship application.

[168]      As stated earlier, I find that Eduards Podins was lawfully admitted into Canada on May 29th, 1959, and that he did not obtain Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they may make written submissions.

    

     JUDGE

OTTAWA, Ontario

July 9, 1999.

__________________

1Notice in Respect of Revocation of Citizenship, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, March 10th , 1997.

2Ibid.

3 Written Statement of Konrad Kwiet, 14 March 1998, pp. 14-15.

4 Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 227.

5 Written Statement of Konrad Kwiet, 14 March 1998, p. 40.

6Transcript, p. 380.

7 Written Statement of Konrad Kwiet, 14 March 1998, p. 37.

8 Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 511.

9 Written Statement of Konrad Kwiet, 14 March 1998, p. 37.

10 Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 198.

11Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 428.

12 Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 205.

13Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 433.

14Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 413.

15Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 536.

16 Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 526.

17Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 531.

18 Transcript, p. 1794.

19 Transcript, p. 1807.

20 Transcript, p. 1853.

21 Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 247.

22Transcript, at p. 1821.

23 Commission Evidence, transcript, p. 213.

24 Transcript, at p. 1817.

25 Transcript, p. 1809.

26 Section 13(3) of the Regulations provides,      [w]here a person referred to in subsection (1) [a British subject] files an application for a certificate of citizenship with the Registrar pursuant to that subsection, and the Minister pursuant to subsection (2) of section 10 of the Act refers the application to a Court, the sections 10 to 12 of these Regulations apply to that application.

27 P.C. 695, 21 March 1931.

28      Ibid.

29      Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 1 May 1947, p. 2644.

30      Ibid.

31      Ibid.

32 "Memorandum for the Cabinet: Displaced persons: policy re immediate acceptance", C.D. Howe, Acting Minister of Mines and Resources and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy, Privy Council Office, 2 June 1947.

33 "Memorandum to the Cabinet: Report from the Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy: Third Report of the Interdepartmental Immigration Labour Committee, Honourable J.A. MacKinnon, Minister of Mines and Resources, Chairman, Privy Council Office, 15 September 1948.

34 Evan Gill to the Hon. J.A. Glen, 23 August 1946.

35 A.D.P. H[eeney]. To [Norman] Robertson (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs), 20 September 1946.

36 Evan Gill to the Hon. J.A. Glen, 23 August 1946.

37 "Cabinet Conclusions", Meeting of 29 January 1947, p. 5.

38 "Memorandum to the Cabinet: Security examination of prospective immigrants", E.W.T. Gill, Vice-Chairman, Security Panel, Privy Council Office, 4 February 1947.

39 A.D.P. Heeney to the Hon. J.A. Glen, Cabinet Decision letter, 7 February 1947.

40 "Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Rejection of prospective immigrants on security grounds", N.A.R[obertson]., Privy Council office, 16 September 1949.

41Ibid.

42 "Screening of Applicants for Admission to Canada, H.Q. File No. C. 311-42-2-3 (Vol. 2), 20 November 1948.

43 Associate Commissioner Laval Fortier to Commissioner Jolliffe, Department of Mines and Resources, 7 February 1949.

44 "Cabinet Directive: Circular No. 14: Rejection of Immigrants on Security Grounds", N.A. Roberston, Secretary to the Cabinet, Privy Council Office, 28 October 1949.

45 Security Panel, Minutes of the 31st Meeting, 27 October 1950, E.F. Gaskell, Secretary, p. 7.

46 S.T. Wood to Major J.A. Wright, Ottawa, 30 November 1950.

47 Security Panel, Minutes of 42nd Meeting, 15 May 1952, P.M. Dwyer, Secretary, pp. 3-4.

48 Security Sub-Panel, Minutes of the 13th Meeting, held 18 October 1955, p. 5.

49 "Security Screening Policy" attached to Burns et al to Chairman, Committee on review of Immigration Policy and Procedures, 28 June 1957, p. 2.

50 "Review of Present Grounds for Rejection of Applications for Immigration", 2 April 1959, p. 1.

51 Ibid.

52 Director, C.G.I.S., U.K., London, England, to Chief, Operations Division, Ottawa.

53 Transcript, p. 983.

54 Supra note 44.

55 Supra note 47.

56 Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Heads of Canadian Posts Abroad and to Trade Commissioners not located at External Affairs Posts.

57 Supra note 52.

58 Transcript, p. 1329.

59 Transcript, p. 1382.

60 Transcript, p. 1391.

61 Transcript, pp. 1407-08.

62 Transcript, p. 1388.

63 Transcript, p. 584.

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.