Date: 20050309
Docket: T-1127-04
Citation: 2005 FC 233
BETWEEN:
CHC CASINOS CANADA LTD.
Applicant
and
THE CHIPPEWAS OF MNJIKANING
FIRST NATION BAND COUNCIL
Respondent
and
ONTARIO FIRST NATIONS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
("OFNLP")
Intervenor
REASONS FOR ORDER
(Confidential Reasons for Order issued on February 11, 2005)
HENEGHAN, J.
INTRODUCTION
[1] CHC Casinos Canada Ltd. (the "Applicant") seeks an order of mandamus pursuant to the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended (the "Act") to compel the issuance of two building permits by the Chippewas of Mnjikaning First Nation Band Council (the "Respondent"), relative to a casino, "Casino Rama", operated by the Applicant on the territory of the Chippewas of Mnjikaning ("MJN"), known historically as Indian Reserve No. 32. The permits are sought in connection with repairs to the sanitary sewer system and the installation of a ventilation system in Baccarat Pit #9.
[2] This application for judicial review was commenced on June 10, 2004. The application was heard, on an expedited basis, on July 14, 2004. Upon motion of the Respondent, that was heard following the hearing of the application for judicial review, an Order issued, sealing certain affidavits and transcripts of cross-examinations, specifically the affidavit of Ms. Jacqueline Castel dated June 10, 2004, the affidavit of Mr. Jeffrey Hewitt dated June 16, 2004, and the cross-examinations of Ms. Castel and Mr. Hewitt conducted on June 22, 2004 and June 29, 2004 respectively.
[3] On December 1, 2004, the Applicant filed a notice of motion in writing, pursuant to the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106 (the "Rules"), seeking leave to file further and new evidence. The parties were heard by conference call on January 4, 2005. By Order dated January 7, 2005, the motion was dismissed. However, the parties were given the opportunity to make further submissions in respect of a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Mnjikaning First Nation v. CHC Casinos Canada Ltd., Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation and Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership [2004] O.J. No. 7 (QL), aff'd. [2004] O.J. No. 4707 (C.A.) (QL). By letter dated January 4, 2005, the Intervenor filed brief submissions.
BACKGROUND
i) The Parties
[4] The Applicant is the operator of a Casino complex known as "Casino Rama" pursuant to the Development and Operating Agreement ("DOA") dated March 18, 1996, entered into between Ontario Casino Corporation, the predecessor to the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation ("OLGC"), the Applicant and its parent corporation, MJN and various corporations associated with MJN. The DOA was later amended on April 15, 1996 and June 12, 2000 and is in effect until July 31, 2011.
[5] The MJN is a Band organized pursuant to the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It is a First Nation and the recognized government of the Chippewa Indian People in and around Reserve No. 32 in the Township of Rama (the "Mnjikaning Reserve"). The MJN was formerly known as the "Chippewas of Rama First Nation" and under that name, executed the DOA. The name change took place in 1994.
[6] The Ontario First Nations Limited Partnership (the "OFNLP") is a limited partnership representing the interests of 133 First Nations in Ontario, other than the MJN, for the purpose of sharing in the proceeds generated from the operations of Casino Rama. It was granted intervenor status in the application with the consent of both the Applicant and the MJN.
ii) The Dispute
[7] On January 23, 2004, the Applicant applied for a building permit for replacement of the sanitary sewer for the bathroom. The application for installation of the ventilation system was submitted on May 31, 2004.
[8] The process concerning the application for and issuance of building permits is governed by the Rama Land Use Development By-Law (the "By-Law"). The By-Law was enacted on July 18, 1979, pursuant to the authority conferred by section 81 of the Indian Act, supra. The application form for the building permit shows that the consent of the owner is required for the proposed work. Historically, the MJN was recorded as the owner for the purpose of the building permit application process. The status of the MJN as "owner" of the casino complex is disputed by the Applicant and the OFNLP.
[9] On June 2, 2004, the building department issued a "conditional" permit for the repairs to the bathroom. According to the Applicant, this was the usual manner in which building permits were issued and work would proceed on the basis of the conditional permit.
[10] The contention with respect to the issuance of the building permit for the sanitary sewer system and the ventilation system in Baccarat Pit #9 is part of another dispute, also between the Applicant and the Respondent. That other matter relates to the refusal of the Respondent to issue eight building permits, for various repairs, including repairs to the sanitary system. The refusals in relation to the other eight building permits are the subject of an application for judicial review in this Court, being cause number T-910-04. As part of their evidence in the present application, the Applicant and the Respondent have filed a number of affidavits, including certain affidavits that have been filed in cause number T-910-04.
[11] The Applicant has filed three affidavits sworn by Mr. Harry Oshanski, as well as two affidavits sworn by Ms. Jacqueline Castel and the affidavit of Mr. Christopher Harry. Mr. Oshanski is Vice-President, Resort Operations of Casino Rama. Ms. Castel is an in-house lawyer, employed by the Applicant. Mr. Harry is the Executive Director of Table Games Operations with the casino.
[12] The Respondent filed three affidavits of Mr. Kelvin Jamieson, Director, Special Projects with MJN. He is responsible for the building permit process on behalf of the Band. The Respondent also filed two affidavits of Mr. Jeffrey Hewitt, in-house counsel.
[13] The Applicant conducted cross-examination of both Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Hewitt and included the transcripts of those cross-examinations in its Record.
[14] The Respondent conducted cross-examinations of Ms. Castel and Mr. Oshanski. The transcripts of those cross-examinations are included in the Respondent's Record.
[15] Mr. Oshanski's evidence was directed to the process usually followed by the Applicant in seeking building permits from the Respondent. An application would be made and subject to the provision of whatever technical information was required, following which a conditional permit would issue, allowing the work to be done. In the present case, a conditional permit was issued on June 2, 2004 for the work on the sanitary sewer.
[16] No permit was issued in connection with the work on the ventilation system, for which application for a building permit was made on May 31, 2004. No building permit, conditional or otherwise, was issued in response to that application but the Applicant takes the position that the Respondent is obliged to issue a permit to allow the work on the ventilation system to be carried out. The existence of an agreement in relation to both building permits is the stated basis for the application for judicial review. Mr. Oshanski says that he acted upon the agreement, that the building permits would be issued, by issuing purchase orders for the work.
[17] In support of its position that an agreement for the issuance of the building permits was reached with the Respondent, the Applicant relied on material included in the affidavit of Jacqueline Castel that was sealed by Order of this Court made on July 14, 2004 and issued on July 15, 2004.
[18] In his affidavit, Mr. Harry addresses the smoky and unhealthy atmosphere in the Baccarat pit resulting from the inadequate ventilation. He relies on complaints received from staff and patrons and speaks also of his personal experience. He comments on the negative effect of the poor air quality on the morale of staff and patrons.
[19] For its part the Respondent, relies on the first Jamieson affidavit to set out the background facts concerning the construction and operation of Casino Rama, as well as the process concerning the issuance of building permits and the status of the Respondent as the owner of the casino complex. In this regard, the Respondent relies on the DOA and a declaration of trust, dated March 1, 1996, an amended declaration and restated declaration of trust dated April 15, 1996. In the latter documents, the Respondent is described, under its former name as "Chippewas of Rama" as the "owner" of the casino complex.
[20] The first Jamieson affidavit, sworn on June 8, 2004 and initially filed in cause number T-910-04 addresses the status of the Respondent as owner of Casino Rama, as addressed in various aspects concerning the development of the casino. In this affidavit, Mr. Jamieson also speaks about the tax dispute between MJN and the OLGC. This issue is raised in relation to the tax exempt status enjoyed by MJN as an Indian Band, pursuant to the Indian Act, supra. Exhibits to the first Jamieson affidavit include copies of correspondence written by and on behalf of the MJN, setting forth its opposition to any attempt to impose provincial sales tax upon Band property and upon property situated upon the Mnjikaning Reserve. Also, Mr. Jamieson speaks about unilateral changes introduced by OLGC in the contracting processes relating to capital expenditures for Casino Rama. These changes, according to Mr. Jamieson, have effectively excluded it from the contracting process and will negatively affect the Respondent's tax exempt status.
[21] As well, Mr. Jamieson, as a witness for the Respondent, says that OLGC's interference with the contracting process has led to a breach of the DOA by the Applicant.
[22] The Respondent, again relying upon the evidence of Mr. Jamieson, said that in addition to being the owner, it is the local authority that authorizes the issuance of building permits. The building permit process is governed by the By-Law that had been passed pursuant to section 81(1) of the Indian Act, supra. Mr. Jamieson is the person authorized to issue building permits, subject to compliance with the legal and technical requirements for same. There are at least three separate stages to the building permit approval process. Mr. Jamieson is to first be satisfied that the owner has approved the project. He must then conduct a technical review to confirm that the application conforms with applicable codes and standards. Third, he submits the application and proposed permit, with any conditions, for review and issuance by the Band manager.
[23] In the present case, the Respondent says that the applications submitted by the Applicant were defective because neither application for a building permit had received the consent of the owner, as specifically required by the building application form.
[24] The application for the repairs to the sanitary system, made on January 23, 2004, records that the owner of the casino complex is "C.O.M.", that is Chippewas of Mnjikaning. However, this application does not show that the owner's consent had been obtained. The application for repairs to the ventilation, made on May 31, 2004, does not record any information about the owner and likewise, does not contain the consent of the owner.
[25] According to Mr. Jamieson's third affidavit, the application for the ventilation repairs was deficient with respect to technical details. He said that the original drawings that were submitted by the Applicant were insufficient to permit approval of the work.
[26] In the course of the hearing, the Applicant moved to strike out substantial portions of the Jamieson affidavits on the basis that these affidavits were replete with hearsay and did not meet the rules for admission of hearsay evidence, that is on the basis of reliability and necessity. In particular, the Applicant challenges the qualifications of Mr. Jamieson to address various matters that are raised in his affidavit, for example, the meaning and application of the DOA, the interpretation of the Indian Act, supra, and the interpretation of Ontario legislation dealing with provincial retail sales tax.
[27] No evidence was introduced on behalf of the Intervenor.
SUBMISSIONS
i) The Applicant
[28] The Applicant argues, generally, that it is entitled to an order of mandamus to compel the Respondent to issue the building permits in question, relying upon the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 F.C. 742 (C.A.), aff'd. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1100. It submits that it has met the requirements, according to the building By-Law for the issuance of the building permits and secondly, that there is an enforceable agreement with the Respondent for the issuance of the permits for the sanitary sewer and the upgraded ventilation system. Further, it argues that the Respondent had issued a conditional permit for the sanitary sewer and discussed the issuance of the permits.
[29] The Applicant submits that this Court should enforce its agreement with the Respondent. It argues that the only reason that the building permits are not being issued is because of a dispute between the Respondent and the Ontario Government concerning provincial sales tax. It argues that this is an extraneous consideration in determining whether the permits should be issued.
[30] It argues that this application for judicial review is properly before the Court since the Respondent is a "band" as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act, supra. It says that the Respondent's authority for issuing building permits derives from the By-Law passed pursuant to section 81(1) of the Indian Act, supra. In these circumstances, its application for judicial review is properly before the Court.
[31] It argues that portions of the Jamieson affidavit should be stricken out or granted little weight because they are based on information and belief and hearsay, contrary to Rule 81 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106. It submits that on the basis of the jurisprudence, including Dragage F.R.P.D. Ltée v. Bouchard et al. (1994), 84 F.T.R. 81, it is clear that affidavits containing facts beyond the personal knowledge of an affiant have been found to be inadmissible in a judicial review application.
[32] Further, the Applicant argues that Mr. Jamieson is unqualified to offer the opinions contained in his affidavit. In this regard, the Applicant relies on Novopharm Limited v. Smith, Kline and French Laboratories Limited and Attorney General of Canada (1984), 53 N.R. 68 (F.C.A.) where the Court found that regard may be given to an affiant's office or qualification in determining whether it is likely that such a person would be aware of the facts. The Applicant argues that Mr. Jamieson, as a civil engineer, is unqualified to give the opinions that he offered and submits that his affidavit of June 8, 2004 should be struck.
[33] In short, the Applicant argues that all of the requirements have been met for the issuance of an order of mandamus and that the Respondent is subject to a public legal duty to act, flowing from its authority to issue building permits pursuant to its by-laws, as authorized by section 81 of the Indian Act, supra. It argues that the Respondent has acted unfairly, oppressively and improperly by refusing to process building permits unless there is a resolution of the tax dispute and the imposition of other conditions.
[34] Further, the Applicant argues that it is owed a duty of fairness by the Respondent and the Respondent has breached that duty, by deciding against issuing the permits until resolution of the tax dispute. It also submits that the refusal to issue the permits is a departure from established procedure by the Respondent and relying on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, says that this is a breach of procedural fairness.
ii) Respondent's Submissions
[35] The Respondent opens its argument by referring to the standard of review and submits that, based on the pragmatic and functional approach discussed in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, the standard for its actions as a tribunal is reasonableness. Further, it submits that the Applicant has not met the test for the issuance of an order of mandamus.
[36] In particular, it argues that it was not under a public duty to act and did not owe a public duty to the operator. It concedes that as a tribunal authorized to issue building permits, it acted pursuant to a public law duty concerning the Applicant's arguments as to the existence of urgent health and safety concerns. However, it also argues that as a tribunal, it has no public law duty to give consent for construction work which involves an assessment of its authorization as owner.
[37] Next, the Respondent argues that the Applicant does not have a clear right to have a building permit issued. The Applicant has not obtained the consent of the Respondent as owner and this refusal by the Respondent, as owner, is not subject to judicial review. As well, the Respondent says the Applicant is not acting in compliance with the DOA and has not submitted complete and proper building permit applications.
[38] Next, the Respondent submits that there is no agreement between the parties concerning the issuance of building permits.
[39] The Respondent submits that there are other adequate remedies available to the Applicant, as set out in section 14.1 of the DOA which provides for access to mandatory mediation and arbitration.
[40] As well, the Respondent argues that the Applicant has unclean hands and is not entitled to relief. In this regard, it suggests that the OLGC had instructed the Applicant to bring this judicial review application. The Respondent submits that the Court may deny the relief sought where it finds that the Applicant is acting on behalf of another party, and relies on Browning v. Ryan (1887), 4 Man. R. 486.
[41] The Respondent argues that the Applicant has admitted that it is in breach of the DOA and outlined the particulars of that breach. First, it says that the Applicant, as the operator, has unilaterally changed the procedure for contracting operations procedures where the consent of the MJN is required, pursuant to the DOA. Second, it argues that the Applicant failed to obtain MJN's approval for the operating budgets as required by the DOA. Finally, it says that the Applicant failed to obtain approval from the MJN for renovations, when that approval was required.
[42] The Respondent submits that in the circumstances, the balance of convenience lies in its favour against the grant of the order of mandamus. It says that the Applicant has no financial interest in the casino but it paid a fee for its work there. On the other hand, the Respondent has a clear financial interest along with other Ontario First Nations.
[43] In response to the Applicant's arguments concerning Mr. Jamieson's affidavits, it says that the witnesses for the Applicant have basically agreed with that evidence on all material issues. Further, it submits that an affidavit based on hearsay is reasonably necessary in the circumstances in which this application was brought.
[44] Finally, the Respondent argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this application for judicial review because the subject matter, that is the issuance of two building permits, arises from the interpretation of the DOA and that agreement is a contract, subject to construction in accordance with the laws of Ontario. As such, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
iii) Intervenor's Submissions
[45] The Intervenor raised two points. First, it submits that the other 133 First Nations in Ontario have a clear and significant interest in the casino and its revenues. Any activity that would reduce the revenue at the casino directly affects the members of the Intervenor. Second, it argues that pursuant to its own By-Law, the Respondent has a duty with respect to the issuance of building permits and submits that as long as the technical requirements are met, the Respondent is obliged to issue the permits. It submits that the DOA sets out the purposes of the casino and clearly, one of those purposes is the production of revenue for the benefit of other First Nations in Ontario. The delay in issuing the building permits is affecting the revenue available for distribution to the members of the OFNLP.
[46] It challenges the assertion of the Respondent that it is the owner of the casino and further, submits that this is not an issue to be decided by this Court. It relies upon a decision of the Ontario Superior Court in Chippewas Mnjikaning, supra and recently upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In that decision, the Ontario Superior Court held that Casino Rama was established as a partnership between all First Nations in Ontario and the government of Ontario. Accordingly, the Intervenor submits that the present dispute is not merely a private matter between the Applicant and the Respondent.
DISCUSSION AND DISPOSITION
[47] This application is brought pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended. The relief sought is an order of mandamus, pursuant to section 18.1(a) of that Act. Mandamus is a discretionary remedy and the prerequisites for its grant have been set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Apotex Inc., supra as follows:
(1) Mandamus- The Principles
Several principal requirements must be satisfied before mandamus will issue.
...
1. There must be a public legal duty to act:
...
2. The duty must be owed to the applicant:
...
3. There is a clear right to performance of that duty, in particular:
(a) the applicant has satisfied all conditions precedent giving rise to the duty;
...
(b) there was (I) a prior demand for performance of the duty; (ii) a reasonable time to comply with the demand unless refused outright; and (iii) a subsequent refusal which can be either expressed or implied, e.g. unreasonable delay;
...
4. Where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, the following rules apply:
(a) in exercising a discretion, the decision-maker must not act in a manner which can be characterized as "unfair", "oppressive" or demonstrate "flagrant impropriety" or "bad faith";
(b) mandamus is unavailable if the decision-maker's discretion is characterized as being "unqualified", "absolute", "permissive" or "unfettered";
(c) in the exercise of a "fettered" discretion, the decision-maker must act upon "relevant", as opposed to "irrelevant", considerations;
(d) mandamus is unavailable to compel the exercise of a "fettered discretion" in a particular way; and
(e) mandamus is only available when the decision-maker's discretion is "spent"; i.e., the applicant has a vested right to the performance of the duty.
...
5. No other adequate remedy is available to the applicant:
...
6. The order sought will be of some practical value or effect:
...
7. The Court in the exercise of its discretion finds no equitable bar to the relief sought:
...
8. On a "balance of convenience" an order in the nature of mandamus should (or should not) issue.
[Citations omitted]
[48] The sole issue arising from this application is whether the Applicant should be granted the relief sought, that is an order of mandamus requiring the Respondent to issue the building permits to allow the work to be done on the sanitary sewer and the ventilation system in Baccarat Pit #9. As noted earlier, the Applicant alleges that it has a right to the permits pursuant to an agreement with the Respondent.
[49] In my opinion, the existence of the so-called agreement is irrelevant to this application. Either the Applicant has a legal right to the issuance of the permits or it does not. In my opinion, the issuance of the building permits is governed by the Respondent's mandate as the governing body, including its building By-Law, and not as a matter of agreement between the parties. In any event, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether or not such agreement exists between the parties. In this regard, I refer to Lawther v. 424470 B.C. Ltd. (1995), 60 C.P.R. (3d) 510.
[50] As noted above, the Applicant challenges the admissibility of certain portions of the Jamieson affidavits on the basis that the affidavits contain inadmissible hearsay evidence. Alternatively, the Applicant argues that if certain paragraphs are not stricken out, they should be accorded little weight.
[51] In my opinion, those arguments are not well-founded. Mr. Jamieson is an employee of the Respondent. It is appropriate that he should comment on records in the control of the Respondent, including certain contracts that deal with the casino and the relationship between the Applicant and the Respondent. The challenged provisions of the affidavits will not be struck.
[52] In the present case, the evidence shows that the Respondent has a public role as the governing body of the MJN. As such, its actions and decisions are subject to judicial review by this Court. As the governing body, it is obliged to act fairly and to make decisions without regard to irrelevant and extraneous matters; see Apotex Inc. v. Quebec (Minister of Health & Social Services) (1994), 26 Admin. L.R. (2d) 199 (Que. S.C.).
[53] The resolution of a retail sales tax dispute with the province of Ontario, in my opinion, is irrelevant to the disposition of an application for a building permit. On the basis of the evidence submitted, it is clear that such a dispute exists. It is also clear that the Respondent has stated its position that it will not process any more applications for building permits until the matter of the imposition of retail sales tax is resolved.
[54] However, that is not the end of the matter. The Respondent submits that the Applicant is not entitled to obtain the two building permits because it has failed to comply with the technical requirements, including the requirement to obtain the consent of the owner to the proposed work. The Respondent states that it is the owner and, in that capacity, it will not consent to the issuance of the permits.
[55] The Applicant and the Intervenor dispute the status of the Respondent as owner. They argue that that question does not arise in this application and need not be decided.
[56] The Intervenor argues that the Respondent is merely the "host" of the casino, an enterprise that exists for the benefit of all First Nations in Ontario. Relying on the DOA, it submits that the Respondent is obliged to provide all necessary consents to ensure the operation of the casino for the benefit of its members. By implication, those "consents" include building permits.
[57] For its part, the Applicant submits that the DOA is irrelevant to the question of its entitlement to the building permits. Although the Applicant produced a copy of the DOA as an exhibit to the affidavit of Mr. Oshanski sworn on June 10, 2004, objections were raised when questions about that agreement were posed during the cross-examinations of Mr. Oshanski and Ms. Castel.
[58] I reject the Applicant's arguments concerning the status of the Respondent as owner and the relevance of the DOA. On the basis of the evidence submitted, it appears that both the Applicant and the Respondent had historically treated the Respondent as the "owner", for the purpose of obtaining building permits. The DOA grants the Applicant a right to enter the lands comprising the Mnjikaning Reserve and standing to bring this application for judicial review. It governs its relationship with the Respondent.
[59] I disagree with the submissions of the Applicant that the status of the Respondent as "owner" is irrelevant to the disposition of this application. According to the Declaration of Trust, as amended, the Respondent is the sole beneficial owner of the property upon which the casino is situated. The Trust Agreement, as amended, is to be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of Ontario.
[60] The status of the Respondent as "owner" is important here, in light of the remedy sought by the Applicant. The discretionary remedy of mandamus is available in respect of public authorities. If the Respondent also enjoys status in a private law capacity it is not subject to an order of mandamus. This Court cannot compel the Respondent to consent to a building permit application, if it has the right to withhold that.
[61] The DOA, the Trust Agreement and various other agreements produced by the Applicant and the Respondent establish the context of the relationship between the parties. According to clause 17.9 of the DOA, this agreement is governed by and subject to interpretation in accordance with the laws of Ontario. Insofar as the legal status of the Respondent as "owner" arises under this agreement, that is a matter to be determined in accordance with Ontario law and is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
[62] The By-Law says nothing about requiring the consent of the owner to the proposed renovations or repairs to the casino. That requirement appears only on the application form for the building permit. The DOA appears to require the consent of the Respondent to some structural changes, for example clause 3.3(h). To the extent that the Respondent's right to grant or withhold consent to a building permit application arises from the interpretation of the DOA, that is a matter for determination in the courts of Ontario, not this Court.
[63] In my opinion, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought here because a determination of the legal rights of the Applicant and the Respondent cannot be made without regard to the DOA and related agreements governing the existence and operation of the casino.
[64] Furthermore, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has shown that it has complied with the necessary technical requirements, that is by providing all necessary drawings and technical reports. The evidence of urgent health and safety concerns as contained in the affidavit of Mr. Harry, is minimal.
[65] The Intervenor's arguments have been directed to its interests in maximizing revenue from the casino to be distributed among its members. These submissions are not relevant to a determination of the rights and obligations of the Applicant and the Respondent. In my opinion, these arguments are unrelated to the issue raised by the Applicant in its application for judicial review.
CONCLUSION
[66] In the result, this application for judicial review and mandamus is dismissed, with costs to the Respondent. "E. Heneghan"
J.F.C.
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
March 9, 2005
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1127-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: CHC CASINOS CANADA LTD.
Applicant
- and -
THE CHIPPEWAS OF MNJIKANING
FIRST NATION BAND COUNCIL
Respondent
- and -
ONTARIO FIRST NATIONS
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ("OFNLP")
Intervenor
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 2004 and
TUESDAY, JANUARY 4, 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER AND
ORDER: HON. MADAM JUSTICE HENEGHAN
DATED: Confidential Reasons for Order filed February 11, 2005
and public Reasons for Order filed March 9, 2005
APPEARANCES:
Ms. Bonnie Tough
Ms. Kathryn Podrebarac FOR THE APPLICANT
Mr. Philip Tunley
Ms. Christine Lonsdale
FOR THE RESPONDENT
Mr. Tycho Manson
FOR THE INTERVENOR
- 2 -
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Tough & Podrebarac LLP
Toronto, Ontario FOR THE APPLICANT
McCarthy Tetrault LLP
Toronto, Ontario FOR THE RESPONDENT
Torys LLP
Toronto, Ontario FOR THE INTERVENOR