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     IMM-3111-95

     IN THE MATTER OF the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2,

     and amendments thereto;

     AND IN THE MATTER OF a decision of the Appeal Division

     of the Immigration and Refugee Board, concerning the appeal

     under section 70 of the Immigration Act, of a deportation order

     issued to THI MINH NGUYET TRAN, Appeal Division File

     Number T94-07511

BETWEEN:

     THI MINH NGUYET TRAN

     Applicant

     - AND -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     SUPPLEMENTARY REASONS FOR ORDER

McKEOWN J.

     Counsel for the respondent has requested certification of the following question pursuant to subsection 83(1) of the Act:

     Is a person who enters Canada by means of a landed immigrant visa which she was entitled to at the time of making the application therefor, but which, by reason of marriage, she was not entitled to at the time she used the visa to enter Canada, a person described by paragraph 27(1)(e) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2?         

     The Court of Appeal in Liyanagamage v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 176 N.R. 4 at 5 set out the appropriate test for certification of a question:

         In order to be certified pursuant to s. 83(1), a question must be one which, in the opinion of the motions judge, transcends the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation and contemplates issues of broad significance or general application ... but it must also be one that is determinative of the appeal ...         

     In my view, the question submitted by the respondent should not be certified. The case before me is decided on its particular facts and does not transcend the interests of the immediate parties nor does it contemplate issues of broad significance or general application.

     Further, the initial Order was rendered on December 18, 1996 and although I gave the parties the opportunity to provide written submissions on a question to be certified, the respondent did not submit its request until March 4, 1997. Although there is no time limit under subsection 83(1) of the Act for certifying questions, in my view, to grant the respondent's request almost three months after the Order was issued would be unfair to the applicant. The respondent's request to certify the above question is dismissed.

                         _______________________________

                                 Judge

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

March 19, 1997

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