Federal Court Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date: 20060517

Docket: IMM-4391-05

Citation: 2006 FC 614

BETWEEN:

BEHBOUD SAADATKHANI

Applicant

and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

REASONS FOR ORDER

LUTFY C.J.

[1]         The applicant is a citizen of Iran. His affidavit in support of this application for judicial review of his negative pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) repeats the principal facts which were the basis of his unsuccessful 1995 claim for Convention refugee status:

4.          My spouse was severely ill and prescribed certain drugs which were scarce in Iran. I was very upset that the drugs could not be found, and this instigated me to take part in an anti government demonstration. The demonstration was in opposition to the government's policies, its lack of provision for its citizens, and its poor economic support for the people.

5.          Then the Islamic authorities, Pasdars, raided the demo and began shooting in the air. The crowd got even angrier and began burning tires and throwing stones. Tensions escalated and the Pasdars began shooting at people's legs. The crowd began disbursing, but I saw some people who were wounded. I then assisted the two wounded men by carrying them to a hospital.

6.          The regime found out about my involvement in the demo and my assistance towards wounded participants. To flee the inevitable persecution, I fled Iran and on June 30, 1995, I came to Canada and claimed refugee status.

[2]         The applicant's refugee claim failed because the panel of the Convention Refugee Determination Division concluded that his evidence was neither credible nor trustworthy. The applicant's application for judicial review of the negative Convention refugee determination was dismissed by Justice Francis C. Muldoon in Saadatkhani v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1865 (QL)(T.D.). Concerning the decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division, Justice Muldoon stated: "One might go farther and say this Court is convinced that [the decision] is correct." He then added: "I have never seen [a case] which is quite so clear."

[3]         The applicant's first argument is that the PRRA officer erred in not accepting as credible the facts which formed the basis of his refugee claim without first affording him an oral hearing pursuant to paragraph 113(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27 ("IRPA") and section 167 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227.

[4]        The respondent acknowledges that the PRRA officer was required to review the factual basis of the applicant's refugee claim in order to assess whether the applicant is a protected person within the context of section 97 of the IRPA, a provision which was not in force at the time of the 1996 refugee hearing. However, the respondent adds that the PRRA officer could properly conclude, without his own oral hearing, that there was "insufficient evidence to arrive at a different conclusion" than that of the Convention Refugee Determination Division. I agree.

[5]         It would be incongruous if, in the absence of any new evidence concerning the substance of the applicant's refugee claim, the PRRA officer could reach a conclusion inconsistent with the credibility finding made by the Convention Refugee Determination Division and confirmed in strong terms by a judge of this Court on judicial review.

[6]         The applicant's second argument is based on facts which were not before the refugee tribunal. In the spring of 1997, some months after his refugee hearing, the applicant converted to Christianity. As a result of his conversion, according to his PRRA submissions, he would face the risk of torture, death and cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon his return to Iran. The applicant submits that the PRRA officer erred in concluding that the burden of proof under both sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA was not met. This argument raises questions of mixed fact and law.

[7]         It was open to the PRRA officer to conclude that there was "insufficient evidence that the applicant would be brought to the attention of authorities because of his conversion".

[8]         Also, I am satisfied that no reviewable error has been established concerning the finding of lack of evidence regarding the applicant's personal commitment to working as a missionary such that he would be compelled to convert Muslims upon returning to Iran. The applicant produced a general statement from his pastor concerning their temple's involvement in missionary work. He also filed letters from two Iranian-born persons who converted to Christianity with his assistance. This evidence could properly be characterized as "insufficient" by the PRRA officer.

[9]         In my view, both aspects of the PRRA officer's decision concerning the applicant's conversion to Christianity are not "clearly wrong" and can withstand "a somewhat probing" analysis on judicial review.

[10]       For these reasons, this application for judicial review will be dismissed. In response to special circumstances raised by the applicant's counsel, he will be given seven (7) days from the date of these reasons to suggest the certification of a serious question.

"Allan Lutfy"

Chief Justice


FEDERAL COURT

NAMES OF SOLICITORS AND SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD

COURT FILE NO.:                  IMM-4391-05

STYLE OF CAUSE:                 BEHBOUD SAADATKHANI

                                                v.

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND                                      IMMIGRATION

PLACE OF HEARING -          TORONTO, ONTARIO

DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 27, 2006

REASONS FOR ORDER:       THE CHIEF JUSTICE

DATED:                                    MAY 17, 2006

APPEARANCES:

MEHRAN YOUSSEFI FOR THE APPLICANT

LORNE McCLENAGHAN                                                      FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD:

MEHRAN YOUSSEFI FOR THE APPLICANT

BARRISTER AND SOLICITOR

TORONTO, ONTARIO

MR. JOHN H. SIMS, Q.C.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA                                  FOR THE RESPONDENT

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.