Federal Court Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date: 20010625

Docket: T-45-01

Neutral citation:2001 FCT 714

BETWEEN:

ARTEM DJUKIC

Plaintiff

-and-

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Defendant

                    REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

GILES A.S.P.

[1]    By the motion before me, the Defendant seeks to strike the statement of claim as revealing no cause of action. The Plaintiff is in the business of assisting immigrants (principally from the former Yugoslavia) to comply with the formalities of immigrating to Canada.


[2]    In his statement of claim, he alleges that since late 1997 in the case of the Bonn embassy and May 1998 in the case of the Vienna embassy, all applications filed by the Plaintiff on behalf his clients were refused. Such conduct, it is alleged, continues to date.

[3]    In paragraph 7 and 8 of the claim, he lists a number of actions complained of.    The conduct specified it is alleged, was specifically engaged in by "the embassies or in conspiracy with each other for the sole purpose of attempting to interfere with the economic and contractual relations of the Plaintiff with his client".

[4]    In paragraph 11, the Plaintiff further alleges, "as a consequence of the foregoing, the defendant's representatives engaged in a course of conduct to induce the clients to breach their agreement with the plaintiff. In the alternative, the plaintiff pleads that the defendant's representatives were abusing their offices and engaged in a course of conduct with the intent to harm the plaintiff and generally acted without authority".

[5]    In paragraph 15, the Plaintiff further alleges "that as part of the conspiracy, a representative of the Sarajevo embassy deliberately made false and erroneous statements to a Bosnian newspaper alleging wrongful conduct on behalf of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff pleads that the statements were defamatory and were made with the deliberate intent to cause economic harm and damage to the Plaintiff and adversely affect the Plaintiff's contractual relations with his clients".


[6]                In his written representations responding to the motion to strike now before me, the Plaintiff states at paragraph, "the Plaintiff in his statement of claim alleges specific acts of conspiracy, defamation, economic interference and abuse of authority". In the motion to strike, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has failed to plead the material facts relating to conspiracy, defamation, economic interference or abuse of authority.

[7]                I should perhaps first deal with a technicality. In the Defendant's notice of motion, the first ground cited is Rule 22(1)(a) which rule does not exist. It is quite apparent that what was meant was Rule 221(1)(a). The Plaintiff was certainly not mislead by this typographical error and I do not propose to dismiss the Defendant's motion because of this typographical error any more than I will fail to consider the submissions of the Plaintiff because of his failure to cite the rules and statutes in both official languages as required by the Rules.

[8]                Dealing first with the allegation of conspiracy, to plead a conspiracy properly, a Plaintiff must inter alia plead an agreement between two or more people with some specificity. Paragraph 12 of the statement of claim indicates that the Plaintiff does not have the necessary detail. There may be cases where a list of facts may indicate the necessary existence of a conspiracy. The facts listed here where numerous employees in an embassy act in the same way is equally as indicative of a central direction by a superior as it might be of the existence of a conspiracy among the actors. The list of facts is not of itself sufficiently specific pleading of conspiracy. For this reason, and the reasons set out by the Defendant in the reply, the pleading of conspiracy must be struck out.


[9]                With regard to the pleading of defamation, I note that to plead defamation, the allegedly defamatory words must be specifically pleaded. This requirement is well amplified in the Defendant's written representations contained in her motion record at paragraphs 28 to 31 inclusive. The pleadings of defamation must therefore be struck out.

[10]            The pleadings of unlawful interference with contractual relations and economic interests are also insufficiently pleader. They fail to show a primary or any intent to injure the Plaintiff other than an allegation of a conclusion. Neither do they show that the actions complained of were unlawful. Economic interference which is closely akin to the tort of inducement of breach of contract has to be pleaded with the same degree of particularity and must show at least some examples in great particularity as set out by the Plaintiff at paragraph 54 of his motion record on page 16. The essential elements of the tort of abuse of authority are:

1. An act by a public officer.

2. Which to his or her knowledge amounts to an abuse of office.

3. And such act causes damage to another person.


It is not sufficient to list perhaps in answers to particulars a list of persons and separately, a list of acts complained of and leave it to the Defendant to use the necessary permutations and combinations to come out with a sufficiently particular pleading. It is apparent that the Plaintiff has not disclosed which particular act by which particular public officer has lead to which particular damage.

[11]            I thus conclude that the abuse of authority has not been adequately pleaded and should be struck.    I have thus concluded that, in some part because of a lack of particularity, no cause of action has been adequately pleader in the statement of claim and the statement of claim should be struck in its entirety. Because of the large number of acts of public servants complained of, I am not satisfied that no cause of action could be framed. I will therefore provide that the Plaintiff may seek leave to file an amended statement of claim.

ORDER

[12]            The statement of claim is struck out as revealing no cause of action provided that the Plaintiff may re-apply within 30 days to file an amended statement of claim.

"Peter A. K. Giles"

                                                                                                  A.S.P.                        

Toronto, Ontario

June 25, 2001


FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record

COURT NO:                                        T-45-01

STYLE OF CAUSE:                             ARTEM DJUKIC

Plaintiff

-and-

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Defendant

CONSIDERED AT TORONTO, ONTARIO PURSUANT TO RULE 369

REASONS FOR ORDER

AND ORDER BY:                                GILES A.S.P.

DATED:                                                MONDAY, JUNE 25, 2001

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY:      Mr. Mark Klaiman

For the Plaintiff

Ms. Claire leRiche

For the Defendant

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:           Klaiman, Edmonds

Barristers & Solicitors

60 Yonge Street, Suite 1000

Toronto, Ontario

M5E 1H5

For the Plaintiff

Morris Rosenberg

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

For the Defendant


FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                            Date: 20010625

                                                                                                  Docket: T-45-01

Between:

ARTEM DJUKIC

Plaintiff

-and-

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Defendant

                                                 

REASONS FOR ORDER

AND ORDER

                                                 

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.