Date: 20040715
Citation: 2004 FC 991
Ottawa, Ontario, the 15th day of July 2004
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHORE
BETWEEN:
RICHARD CONDO
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
[1] When legislation provides for a series of steps through an inherently designed logic as in this case, the Court does not have, and cannot purport to have, first instance specialized jurisdiction. Should after a hearing, an Applicant consider that the National Parole Board (NPB) had committed a reviewable error, then, and only then, is a motion for judicial review an option.
Prohibiting a NPB hearing, as to whether a statutory release should be revoked, is not an option by which to detour, eliminate or cut short, steps, inherent to the legislation itself.
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
[2] This is an application for judicial review, pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act,[1] of the decision of the Commissioner of Correctional Service Canada (the "Commissioner"), pursuant to subparagraph 129(2)(a)(i) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,[2] to refer the Applicant's case to the NPB in order to determine whether the Applicant's statutory release date should be revoked.
BACKGROUND
[3] On April 14, 2000, the Applicant, Richard Condo, was convicted of, inter alia, criminal harassment, kidnapping and aggravated assault. On July 26, 2001, Mr. Condo was found to be a long-term offender pursuant to subsection 753(5) of the Criminal Code,[3] and was sentenced to a prison term of 5 years, with a supervision period of 10 years. The Court granted him credit for time spent in custody of 3 years, for the time spent in custody prior to sentencing.
[4] In describing the assault of the victim, the Court stated: "[The victim] sustained an acute trauma to her left cheekbone caused by a blow of considerable force. Dr. Callaghan said that this would require a blunt impact with a high degree of force and would result in significant pain in the aftermath. There would be internal bleeding..."[4] In its report recommending a review of Mr. Condo's statutory release, the Commissioner clarified that the assault fractured the victim's cheekbone and suffered a severe bruise to her left eye. She required plastic surgery and reconstructive surgery.
[5] Under section 112 of the CCRA, Mr. Condo could be released on statutory release, after having served 2/3 of his sentence.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[6] In its report recommending a review of Richard Condo's eligibility for statutory release, the Commissioner stated:
On note que "[la victime] a été frappée au visage, de façon brutale, comme le rapporte les inscriptions au rapport de police. On y lit que des blessures sont observées à savoir, fracture de l'os de la joue mentionne également que les blessures devront nécessiter de la chirurgie plastique ainsi que de la chirurgie de reconstruction squelettique."
L'évaluatrice mentionnera que "Parmi la kyrielle d'accusations qui ont pesées sur le sujet, rappelons que les vois de fait graves (art. 268 du code criminel) et l'enlèvement (art. 279.(1)(1.1) du code criminel) sont deux délits qui répondent à l'article 752 du code criminel qui définit les sévices graves à la personne. A cet égard, lors du passage à la Cour de M. Condo, les autorités ont intentées une procédure pour faire déclarer Richard Condo "délinquant dangereux" après qu'il eut été reconnu coupable d'actes ayant causé des sévices graves à la victime. Ne satisfaisant pas aux exigences de la déclaration de délinquant dangereux, le sujet a été reconnu délinquant à contrôler et assujetti à une ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée de 10 ans (période maximale de surveillance) en vertu de l'art. 753.1(3) du code criminel. Dans l'optique où les procédures intentées et imposées sont nées de délits ayant causé des sévices graves par définition légale, il va de soi, pour le SCC que les délits commis ont causé un dommage grave à la victime." L'évaluatrice rappelle également au lecteur que la victime était enceinte au moment de délits.
Mentionnons que plusieurs éléments liés à la nature des délits et la façon dont les actes se sont produits (victime fut forcée à monter dans le véhicule du sujet et y sera séquestrée durant de longues heures) nous ont également incité à se questionner sur la notion de dommage psychologique. Toutefois, nous avons conclut que considérant le fait que la victime avait continué de visiter le sujet durant son incarcération, il fut difficile d'attester de la présence d'un dommage psychologique grave.[5]
[7] The Commissioner thus concluded that Mr. Condo had committed an offence which caused serious harm to another person on the basis of the nature and extent of the victim's injuries as well as the fact that he was convicted of aggravated assault, kidnapping, had been found to be a long term offender and received the maximum supervision period. The Commissioner was not, on the other hand, prepared to conclude that Mr. Condo had caused serious psychological harm to the victim, despite that one would expect such harm given the nature of the crime committed against her.
[8] The Commissioner analysed Mr. Condo's criminal record, the seriousness of the offences committed by Mr. Condo, his behaviour while incarcerated, the use of arms in the commission of offences, the nature of his threats, the degree of his remorse for the offenses he has committed, the medical and psychiatric reports, and the existence of supervision in the community for Mr. Condo. The Commissioner then determined that Mr. Condo was at risk of committing an offence which would cause serious harm or death to someone else.
[9] Having determined that Mr. Condo had both caused serious harm to his victim and was at risk of committing an offence which would cause serious harm or death to someone else before his sentence was finished, the Commissioner referred his file to the NPB for a decision as to whether his statutory release should be revoked.
ISSUES
[10] Is there an appropriate alternative remedy open to the Applicant?
ANALYSIS
Is there an appropriate alternative remedy open to the Applicant?
[11] The Respondent submits that the Court should not hear this case because the legislation provides an appropriate alternative remedy through the NPB review of Mr. Condo's case, and that is the most appropriate forum to hear the matter.
[12] Mr. Condo submits that this Court has previously heard matters in which the applicant was requesting a judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to ask the NPB to review the applicant's case in order to determine whether the applicant should be released on his or her statutory release date.[6]
[13] Mr. Condo furthermore submits that a writ of prohibition does not require a decision or order to be in existence as a prerequisite to its exercise, if there is evidence of bad faith or arbitrariness or a prejudice suffered by the Applicant as a result of the failure of the Respondent.
[14] It is the Court's view that the Respondent frames the issue incorrectly. The principle that adequate alternative remedies must be pursued applies to appeals from a decision maker's decision.[7] Here, the NPB does not review the Commissioner's decision by way of appeal. The Commissioner's decision, rather, is the first step in the procedure of the review of an offender's case. Thus, the principle of adequate alternative remedies is not applicable to the case at bar.
[15] Although the Court does not accept the Respondent's argument, it deems that the application should be dismissed on the issue of jurisdiction, as the application for judicial review is premature. It is true, as Mr. Condo points out, that in Ford, this Court did entertain a judicial review application of a decision of the Commissioner asking the NPB to conduct a review of an offender's case. However, there is no evidence that the issue of prematurity was argued in Ford. By contrast, in Dudman v. Canada (National Parole Board),[8] Muldoon J. directly addressed this question. He stated:
However this application is premature. This Court does not have first instance jurisdiction to act upon or dispose of a Commissioner's reference. That is conferred on the N.P.B. according to subsection 129(3). This Court should not purport to usurp the place of the N.P.B. by making a decision on the applicant's counsel's argument on how to interpret subsection 129(3) of the Act before the N.P.B. makes its decision on that point. The N.P.B.'s jurisdiction is just not to be usurped, under the Act, which provides:
107. (1) Subject to this Act, the Prisons and Reformatories Act, the Transfer of Offenders Act, the National Defence Act, the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act and the Criminal Code, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction and absolute discretion
(a) to grant parole to an offender;
(b) to terminate or to revoke the parole or statutory release of an offender, whether or not the offender is in custody under a warrant of apprehension issued as a result of the suspension of the parole or statutory release;
(c) to cancel a decision to grant parole to an offender, or to cancel the suspension, termination or revocation of the parole or statutory release of an offender;
(d) to review and to decide the case of an offender referred to it pursuant to section 129; and
(e) to authorize or to cancel a decision to authorize the unescorted temporary absence of an offender who is serving, in a penitentiary,
(i) a life sentence imposed as a minimum punishment or commuted from a sentence of death,
(ii) a sentence for an indeterminate period, or
(iii) a sentence for an offence set out in Schedule I or II.
The N.P.B. is therefore quite competent to hear and consider the applicant's arguments (despite his assertion of lack of jurisdiction, dismissed above) and it does enjoy first instance jurisdiction in these circumstances. If, after the detention hearing, the applicant thinks that the N.P.B. has gone off the rails and committed a reviewable error, he may then institute an appropriate motion for judicial review, and this Court will then exercise its discretion to grant it or not.[9]
[16] Although the provision in question in Dudman was subsection 129(3) of the CCRA rather than subparagraph 129(2)(a)(ii), this finding is directly applicable to the case at bar because the relevant wording of the provisions is identical. The Court agrees with Mr. Justice Muldoon, and adopts his wording as its own. The Court has no jurisdiction over the matter.
Subparagraph 129(2)(a)(ii) and subsection 129(3) read as follows:
| 129. (1) Before the statutory release date of an offender who is serving a sentence of two years or more that includes a sentence imposed for an offence set out in Schedule I or II or an offence set out in Schedule I or II that is punishable under section 130 of the National Defence Act, the Commissioner shall cause the offender's case to be reviewed by the Service.
(2) After the review of the case of an offender pursuant to subsection (1), and not later than six months before the statutory release date, the Service shall refer the case to the Board together with all the information that, in its opinion, is relevant to it, where the Service is of the opinion:
(a) in the case of an offender serving a sentence that includes a sentence for an offence set out in Schedule I, that
...
(ii) the offence was a sexual offence involving a child and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender is likely to commit a sexual offence involving a child before the expiration of the offender's sentence according to law; or
(3) Where the Commissioner believes on reasonable grounds that an offender who is serving a sentence of two years or more is likely, before the expiration of the sentence according to law, to commit an offence causing death or serious harm to another person, a sexual offence involving a child or a serious drug offence, the Commissioner shall refer the case to the Chairperson of the Board together with all the information in the possession of the Service that, in the Commissioner's opinion, is relevant to the case, as soon as is practicable after forming that belief, but the referral may not be made later than six months before the offender's statutory release date unless
(a) the Commissioner formed that belief on the basis of behaviour of the offender during the six months preceding the statutory release date or on the basis of information obtained during those six months; or
(b) as a result of any recalculation of the sentence under this Act, the statutory release date of the offender has passed or less than six months remain before that date.
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129. (1) Le commissaire fait étudier par le Service, préalablement à la date prévue pour la libération d'office, le cas de tout délinquant dont la peine d'emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans comprend une peine infligée pour une infraction visée à l'annexe I ou II ou mentionnée à l'une ou l'autre de celles-ci et qui est punissable en vertu de l'article 130 de la Loi sur la défense nationale.
(2) Au plus tard six mois avant la date prévue pour la libération d'office, le Service défère le cas à la Commission -- et lui transmet tous les renseignements en sa possession et qui, à son avis, sont pertinents -- s'il estime que :
a) dans le cas où l'infraction commise relève de l'annexe I :
[...]
(ii) soit elle est une infraction d'ordre sexuel commise à l'égard d'un enfant et il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire que le délinquant commettra, avant l'expiration légale de sa peine, une telle infraction;
(3) S'il a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu'un délinquant condamné à une peine d'au moins deux ans commettra, s'il est mis en liberté avant l'expiration légale de sa peine, soit une infraction causant la mort ou un dommage grave à une autre personne, soit une infraction d'ordre sexuel à l'égard d'un enfant, soit une infraction grave en matière de drogue, le commissaire défère le cas au président de la Commission -- et lui transmet tous les renseignements qui sont en la possession du Service et qui, à son avis, sont pertinents -- le plus tôt possible après en être arrivé à cette conclusion et au plus tard six mois avant la date prévue pour la libération d'office; il peut cependant le faire moins de six mois avant cette date dans les cas suivants :
a) sa conclusion se fonde sur la conduite du délinquant ou sur des renseignements obtenus pendant ces six mois;
b) la date prévue pour la libération d'office du délinquant est, en raison de tout nouveau calcul de la durée de sa peine prévu à la présente loi, déjà passée ou tombe dans cette période de six mois. |
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CONCLUSION
[17] The Court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction and therefore the Court deems that the matter as framed by the Applicant is premature.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that it be declared that the matter is premature for it to consider.
"Michel M.J. Shore"
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-561-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: RICHARD CONDO v.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: July 13, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
DATED: July 15, 2004
APPEARANCES:
Me Diane Magas FOR THE APPLICANT
Me Éric Lafrenière FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
MAGAS LAW OFFICE FOR THE APPLICANT
Ottawa, Ontario
MORRIS ROSENBERG FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
[1] R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7.
[2] 1992, c. 20 (the "CCRA").
[3] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
[4]Applicant's Record, Vol. 1, pp. 76-77.
[5]Respndent's Record, Vol. 1, Évaluation en vue d'une décision, pp. 31-32.
[6] The Applicant cites: Ford v. Canada (Commissioner of Corrections), [1990] F.C.J. No. 109 (QL) (F.C.) ["Ford"]; McBride v. Canada (Commissioner of Corrections), [1994] F.C.J. No. 2014 (QL) (F.C.)- however, McBride dealt with a decision made by the NPB and not the Commissioner.
[7] Harelkin v. University of Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561.
[8] [1996] F.C.J. No. 679 (QL) (F.C.) ("Dudman").
[9] Supra at paras. 10-11.