Ottawa, Ontario, this 9th day of May, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE SNIDER
BETWEEN:
Applicant
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
SNIDER J.
[1] The Applicant, Mr. Rajendra Goolram, is an Indo-Guyanese citizen who claims a well-founded fear of persecution based on a perceived political alliance with the mainly Indo-Guyanese People's Progressive Party ("PPP"). He fears that he would be at risk from members of the mainly Afro-Guyanese People's National Congress ("PNC") and that the police could not protect him. Having arrived in Canada on February 27, 2002, he applied for refugee status on October 28th of the same year. In a decision dated April 27, 2004, a panel of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Protection Division) ("the Board") determined that the Applicant was not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The main basis of its decision was that the Applicant had failed to rebut the presumption of the availability of state protection.
[2] The Applicant seeks judicial review of that decision.
Issues
[3] The determinative issue raised by this application is whether the Board's conclusion on state protection was patently unreasonable in that it was made without regard to the evidence. For the reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that the Board erred.
Analysis
[4] The Board's assessment of state protection is squarely within its expertise. Accordingly, this decision can only be overturned if it was patently unreasonable, meaning that it was made without regard to the evidence.
[5] It is generally presumed that a state is able to protect its citizens. A claimant may rebut this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence of a state's inability to do so (Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689). Thus, the burden was on the Applicant to present such evidence. What was submitted? The Applicant's only evidence on this point was that he had not gone to the police to report the incident that allegedly precipitated his flight from Guyana because "they don't care". He proffered no documentary evidence that demonstrated that the predominately Afro-Guyanese police refuse service to Indo-Guyanese citizens. In argument before me, the Applicant pointed to no evidence that Indo-Guyanese persons, who were perceived as members of the PPP, were targeted by either the police or the PNC.
[6] In spite of this dearth of evidence from the Applicant, the Board had before it documentary evidence, that was assembled by the Board. That evidence was referred to by the Board in its decision, although no specific quotes were used or citations noted. With respect to the documentary evidence, the Board noted the following:
There is a "high degree of crime" in Guyana and "to some degree, the police are not able to deal with the problems that are found in Guyana".
The police have "limitations in terms of their resources".
"It has been very difficult for the Guyanese government to attract Indo-Guyanese personnel into the police force".
There "is no evidence on which to conclude that the police systematically discriminate on ethnic grounds in the delivery of their services".
The Government "is making serious efforts and has proclaimed into force new legislation to help shore up the police and security forces".
[7] On my review of the record, there is ample evidence to support each of these statements by the Board. Further, I can find no major area of the documentary evidence that would relate to the situation of the Applicant that was ignored by the Board.
[8] The Applicant wishes me to conclude that the failure of the Board to refer to any specific documentary evidence is an error. In support of his position, he relies on two recent decisions of this Court - Naqui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 282; and Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FC 982. In my view, each of these cases is distinguishable and neither case stands for the proposition that a failure to refer specifically to any individual document will constitute a reviewable error.
[9] Naqui was a decision in which a decision of the Board was overturned, primarily on the basis that the Board erred in many of its findings on credibility. With respect to the Board's alternative conclusion on the issue of state protection, Justice MacTavish, at para. 31, notes that the Board's analysis with respect to the issue of state protection was "extremely brief" and that no mention was made of any specific documents. She observes that "country condition information regarding the extent to which state protection is available to members of the Shia minority contains a number of conflicting reports". At para. 33, she states:
. . . the Court must be satisfied that the Board has indeed weighed the information before it. In this case, the Board's consideration of the state protection issue is cursory, and completely lacking in any reference to any specific document in the country information. As Justice Russell noted in Ali . . . , there is a difference between a Board failing to refer to all of the country condition information and a Board failing to refer to any of it.
[10] We do not know what evidence was before the Board in that case; nor do we know how "extremely brief" the analysis was. We do know that the claimants in Naqui had made a number of reports to the police which were not acted on and asserted that the police "began a campaign against the Shias, arresting them in order to extort bribes for their release".
[11] The situation in Ali was similar to that of Naqui, in that the decision was overturned on the basis of errors in the Board's credibility finding. Once again, the claimants had presented extensive evidence of their personal experiences, as Shias, with the police. Justice Russell, in the face of that evidence, stated that the Board failed to adequately assess the impact of sectarian violence on the claimant, given his particular circumstances.
[12] The Applicant's efforts to access police assistance and the evidence before the Board, in this case, are much different. The Applicant did not seek out police assistance for his alleged attack by PNC. With respect to the issue of state protection, there was not a single document before the Board that concludes that the police refuse to pursue Indo-Guyanese complaints. Thus, the situation before the Board in this case is not one, as was before Justice MacTavish, where there are conflicting reports on police treatment of Indo-Guyanese citizens. Quite simply, there is no objective evidence to support the Applicant's contention that the police would not help him if he were to find himself victimized by the PNC or any other criminals.
[13] Further, I do not agree with the Applicant that the measure of the adequacy of the Board's reasons should be the number of quotes or footnotes from the evidence. The Board is assumed to have weighed and considered all the evidence submitted to it unless the contrary is shown (Florea v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 598 (F.C.A.)).
[14] In Naqui, the "test" set out by Justice MacTavish is not whether page numbers and quotes from the evidence are referenced but, rather, whether the Court is satisfied that the Board weighed the information. In this case, I am satisfied that the Board understood and appreciated the evidence. Although no specific citations were used, the Board described, albeit in general terms, the situation in Guyana, recognizing the difficulties and negatives as well as the positives. Had the Applicant submitted his own documentary evidence or had drawn the Board's attention to evidence in the record supporting his view of a complete breakdown of the state apparatus, it might have been incumbent on the Board to make more explicit references to that evidence.
[15] In conclusion, the Board, in a decision that is not patently unreasonable, responded to the case presented to it and not to the case that the Applicant wishes he had made. The burden was on the Applicant to present clear and convincing confirmation of the state's inability to protect him. He did not do so.
Conclusion
[16] For these reasons, the Application will be dismissed. Neither party submitted a question for certification. None will be certified.
ORDER
This Court orders THAT:
1. The application is dismissed; and,
2. no question of general importance is certified.
"Judith A. Snider"
_______________________________
FEDERAL COURT
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: IMM-4537-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: RAJENDRA GOOLRAM v.
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
DATE OF HEARING: May 3, 2005
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
REASONS FOR ORDER AND
ORDER: The Honourable Madam Justice Snider
DATED: May 9, 2005
APPEARANCES:
Robert Blanshay For Applicant
Lorne McClenaghan For Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Robert Blanshay FOR APPLICANT
Barrister & Solicitor
Toronto, Ontario
John H. Sims, Q.C. FOR RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada