Ottawa, Ontario, October 17, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE LAYDEN-STEVENSON
BETWEEN:
DENNYS HUMBERTO RAVENSTEIN GIL;
DINA RITA SOTO DE RAVENSTEIN;
ALEJANDRA SOFIA RAVENSTEIN SOTO;
MARIANA JUDITH RAVENSTEIN SOTO; AND
ANDREINA MARIA RAVENSTEIN SOTO.
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board, in an
18-page decision, dismissed the claims of Dennys Ravenstein (the principal claimant), his wife (Dina Ravenstein), and their three children (Alejandra, Mariana, and Andreina) and determined that they are not Convention refugees. They seek judicial review of that decision. I have carefully reviewed the documentation, the transcript of the hearing, the reasons of the RPD and the arguments of counsel and I have concluded that the application should be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
[2] The applicants are citizens of Venezuela. For convenience, I will refer to them collectively throughout these reasons as either "Mr. Ravenstein" (since all claims are dependent on his claim) or "the applicant".
[3] Mr. Ravenstein, a professional engineer with a specialization in safety and hygiene, was employed by the Venezuelan Petroleum Company (PDVSA) for approximately 18 years. He was terminated in early 2003 for his participation in a national strike that was initiated by the unions and the opposition to the government of President Chavez. During his tenure at PDVSA, Mr. Ravenstein also worked part time as a consultant. After being fired, he continued his consultancy work for a private construction company on a full-time basis.
[4] Mr. Ravenstein had been a member of the Democratic Action Party (AD Party) since 1987. He was an area co-ordinator during the strike and claims that he intended to run in the municipal election, but he left the country before the election took place.
[5] He alleges that on July 3, 2003, five people from the Bolivarian Circles came to his home and asked him to return to work for PDVSA, in support of the revolution, and to assist in gathering a group of former employees to do the same. He also says that he was asked to cease his political activities with the AD Party. When he refused, he was threatened.
[6] On September 21, 2003, Mr. Ravenstein claims that he was kidnapped by members of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the Venezuelan Political Police (DISIP). They insisted that he return to work at PDVSA and that he cease his political activities. They allegedly showed him pictures of his family and told him that his family would be killed if he did not cooperate. He, under duress, agreed to meet their demands. They then demanded payment of $10,000 in exchange for his life, but subsequently agreed to accept $3,000 with an undertaking to pay the remainder in 15 days.
[7] When he returned home, Mr. Ravenstein and his family decided to flee Venezuela. They went into hiding and left on October 8th, travelling to Canada by way of the United States.
THE DECISION
[8] Identity and the nexus between Mr. Ravenstein's fear of persecution and the Convention ground of political opinion were accepted. The RPD made some specific negative credibility findings and it found that the documentary evidence did not support the allegation that Mr. Ravenstein would be subject to extortion, harassment, or other serious harm at the hands of pro-government groups. The RPD determined that there was no serious possibility of persecution by the FARC in Caracas.
ISSUES
[9] Mr. Ravenstein has engaged in a microscopic dissection of the board's reasons and alleges multiple errors. Many are redundant and, with one exception, can be reduced to a single question: did the board fail to consider relevant evidence tendered by the applicant?
ANALYSIS
[10] First, Mr. Ravenstein maintains that the RPD prejudiced the claim, failed to give due consideration to the facts of his particular circumstances, and failed to properly deal with his family's situation as an individual claim. To support his submission, he points to two decisions of the RPD (decided by the same member) both of which are exhibited to his affidavit. The first decision relates to a friend of Mr. Ravenstein and was rendered on November 27, 2004. The second decision is that relating to Mr. Ravenstein and it was rendered on December 1, 2004. Mr. Ravenstein refers to several portions of the two decisions that are identical. He has square bracketed those excerpts of his decision that differ from the decision regarding his friend. He argues that there is very little difference between the decisions and basically maintains that his decision is a mere carbon copy of his friend's decision.
[11] Because I regard this allegation as an extremely serious one, I have carefully scrutinized the two decisions and I have concluded that Mr. Ravenstein's criticism is not justified. The decisions are alike, and indeed identical, for several pages. However, both decisions are lengthy and both contain comprehensive analyses regarding the country conditions documentary evidence. Both contain detailed reference to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA). Given that both decisions relate to individuals from the same country with like backgrounds, it is not surprising that the determinations in relation to each of them would be similar.
[12] My examination of the two decisions reveals that the identical excerpts are in relation to the documentary evidence with respect to country conditions, the analysis of the country conditions, and the IRPA references. In Koroz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 261 N.R. 71 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal stated that where the question is one of fact finding concerning general country conditions of approximately the same time, a panel may rely on the reasoning of an earlier panel on the same documentary evidence. Here, the two decisions were rendered by the same member over a span of four days. There was no obligation on the member to reinvent the wheel in relation to matters of country conditions or statutory provisions.
[13] I agree that the RPD, in one sentence at page 9 of its reasons, incorrectly states Mr. Ravenstein's age, education and experience. All references in that sentence, in fact, are applicable to Mr. Ravenstein's friend. However, this error was fully compensated for at page 16 of the reasons where the RPD discusses Mr. Ravenstein's qualifications at length, and accurately. It appears that the earlier sentence ought to have been either corrected or removed from the reasons. I regard this as an editing error and while it is preferable that more care be taken, given the length of the two decisions, I can understand how it occurred. In any event, I do not regard the error as fatal. The specific factual circumstances of the respective claimants in each case are fully explored and considered in the board's reasons. Thus, there is no merit to this argument.
[14] Mr. Ravenstein contends that the RPD did not consider the affidavits of other employees that were entered in evidence and that its failure to do so constitutes an error of law. I disagree. At pages 16 and 17 of the reasons, the board explicitly addresses the affidavits in question and determines that no weight will be attached to them because the political profiles of the deponents differ from that of Mr. Ravenstein. The weighing of evidence is the task of the board and it is not for the Court to intervene. It was open to the RPD to reject the affidavits on the basis that it did.
[15] The next assertion is that the board erred in relying on documentary evidence to the exclusion of the uncontradicted evidence of Mr. Ravenstein. It is settled law that the board is entitled to rely on documentary evidence in preference to that of a claimant and there is no general obligation on the board to point out specifically any and all items of documentary evidence on which it might rely: Zhou v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1087 (F.C.A.). The presumption that a claimant's sworn testimony is true is always rebuttable and, in appropriate circumstances, may be rebutted by the failure of the documentary evidence to mention what one would normally expect it to mention: Adu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 114 (C.A.).
[16] The contention that the RPD ignored the evidence of human rights violations in Venezuela is without merit. The reasons constitute a detailed recitation of the country conditions documentary evidence and the board's analysis of it. The reasons contain not less than 34 references to documentary evidence that includes country conditions, the personal information form (PIF), and information submitted by Mr. Ravenstein. It is open to the RPD to prefer what it considers to be reputable, objective sources of documentary evidence over evidence tendered by a claimant.
[17] Mr. Ravenstein also submits that the board erred in overemphasizing his interview with the immigration officer at the port of entry (POE). The board itemizes discrepancies between Mr. Ravenstein's testimony and the information contained in the POE notes and in his PIF. The POE notes contained no reference to the DISIP as one of the kidnappers on September 21, 2003. When questioned by the immigration officer as to who Mr. Ravenstein feared, if returned to Venezuela, he responded, "[t]he FARC, Circulos Bolivarianos, Tuparmaros". When questioned as to what he was afraid of, he stated that "FARC guerillas" kidnapped him and extorted money from him on September 21st. At the hearing, Mr. Ravenstein was asked whether he told the immigration officer that he also feared DISIP agents and he stated that he could not remember. He could not explain why there was no reference to DISIP agents in the POE notes. Since a Spanish interpreter was provided for the interview and the omission constituted a significant element of his claim, the board determined that his explanation for not providing any information regarding the DISIP to the immigration officer seriously undermined the credibility of the allegation regarding the DISIP.
[18] The hurdle for Mr. Ravenstein in this respect is that the board's conclusion that he was not at risk at the behest of the DISIP was not based exclusively on the discrepancy between the POE notes and his PIF. Mr. Ravenstein also failed to disclose in his PIF that the FARC and DISIP had pressured him to terminate his involvement in the AD Party. When questioned in this regard, he stated that he had included the information pertinent to the risk to life, but not all of the details of the relevant circumstances. Since this allegation was also a central element of his claim, the failure to include it in the PIF was found to seriously undermine his credibility.
[19] Additionally, the RPD determined that apart from references to oil camps (which had no application to Mr. Ravenstein) there is an absence of reports indicating any targeting by, among others, the DISIP of former PDVSA employees because of their participation in the strike, termination from PDVSA, or after their names and identification numbers were published nationally in Venezuela. Rather, the documentary evidence indicates that individuals and the Venezuelan media freely and publicly criticized the government during 2003. The board concluded that, in view of the substantive documentary evidence on the political situation and country conditions in Venezuela, it was implausible that there would not be reports of former PDVSA workers and AD Party members being targeted, if in fact these incidents were occurring as alleged by Mr. Ravenstein. This finding falls squarely within the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in Aguebor v. Canada(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 160 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.) and does not warrant intervention.
[20] All other alleged errors are subsumed under the allegation that the RPD erred in failing to consider Mr. Ravenstein's specialized skills combined with the non-operational status of the plant at which he had been employed in concluding that he would not be targeted. In essence, this is an attack on the board's finding that "[b]ased upon the [applicant's] strike and union activities, political profile, the documentary evidence...and [the] credibility concerns...[the RPD finds that] former PDVSA employees and AD party members such as the [applicant] are not being targeted...in Venezuela today". This is a factual determination and as such cannot be set aside on judicial review unless it is determined to be patently unreasonable: Pushpanathan v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982.
[21] It is obvious on the face of its reasons that the RPD was well aware of Mr. Ravenstein's specialization. Indeed, it accurately recites the specialties and the nature of them at page 16. Mr. Ravenstein's real quarrel is with the fact that the RPD did not conclude that he possessed a profile similar to those who would be at risk of being targeted. I reiterate that the RPD undertook an extensive and comprehensive review of the country conditions. In its analysis of the totality of the documentary evidence, it concluded that those people who formerly held senior executive positions and those who spoke to the media were at risk. Mr. Ravenstein did not come within that profile. He was not a senior executive; he did not hold office in the Petrol organization; he had not made a statement to the media; and he did not hold an office in the political party. He was a white collar PDVSA worker and an AD party member. As such, he would not attract attention. My earlier comments with respect to the board's reliance on documentary evidence are equally apposite to this issue. The board's finding is not patently unreasonable.
[22] Finally, the board reviewed and analysed the documentary evidence and referred extensively to numerous sources that supported a conclusion that there was little risk of harm for Mr. Ravenstein in Caracas. It did acknowledge that there was a risk of extortion and kidnapping at the hands of guerrilla groups such as FARC, in the border areas, but concluded that there would be no serious risk if Mr. Ravenstein relocated to Caracas. There exists, for Mr. Ravenstein, an internal flight alternative (IFA). The RPD approached this issue in accordance with the test articulated in Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.) and Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.). Its decision on this question is reviewable only if it is patently unreasonable: Sivasamboo v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995]
1 F.C. 741 (T.D.). An applicant who seeks to establish that an IFA is unreasonable must meet a very high threshold: Ranganathan v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001]
2 F.C. 164 (C.A.). Given my conclusion that the board's decision in relation to DISIP is not patently unreasonable, Mr. Ravenstein does not meet the threshold. It necessarily follows that the determination with respect to the existence of an IFA is sound.
[23] For the foregoing reasons, the application for judicial review will be dismissed. Counsel did not suggest a question for certification and none arises in this matter.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGE
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-10408-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: DENNYS HUMBERTO RAVENSTEIN GIL ET AL
v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: October 12, 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER: LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.
APPEARANCES:
| Mr. Paul E. Lesarge
|
|
| Ms. Janet Chisholm
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Paul E. Lesarge London, Ontario |
|
| John H. Sims Q.C. Toronto, Ontario |