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Date: 19980904


Docket: IMM-1269-97

BETWEEN:

     JULIO CESAR FLORES VELASQUEZ

     Applicant

     - and -

     MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

NADON J.:

[1]      The applicant seeks to set aside a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board") dated March 11, 1997, which dismissed the applicant"s claim for refugee status in Canada.

[2]      The applicant is a citizen of El Salvador who arrived in Canada in September 1995. He fears that death squads or the military would kill him because he deserted the army which he had joined in June 1990.

[3]      The Board concluded that the applicant"s fear that he would be persecuted because he had deserted the army was not justified as it was unsupported by the documentary evidence. In reaching that conclusion, the Board found support in this Court"s decision in Gomez-Carrillo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] 121 F.T.R. 68, where Gibson J. stated at 72:

             ... it is of note that the absence of reference to persecution of military deserters in the aftermath of a civil war in a nation where civil rights abuses were so notorious in the early years of this decade, and where monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses continues to be extensive, is a matter, I am satisfied, that the Tribunal was entitled to take note of and to rely on to rebut the presumption in favour of the sworn testimony of the applicant. In fact, in this mater, the applicant"s sworn testimony did not go extensively to the question of persecution of persons similarly situated to himself. Rather, his testimony dealt primarily with his subjective fear.             

[4]      The Board"s conclusion, in my view, is one that it could reach on the evidence before it. I must agree with the Board that if deserters were persecuted upon their return to El Salvador, there would be some mention of that fact in the documentary evidence. Consequently, I can find no error on the Board"s part.

[5]      During the course of his arguments, counsel for the applicant submitted that the Board had erred in assessing the applicant"s claim to refugee status. Counsel argued that the applicant did not fear for his life because he had deserted the army but rather because he had witnessed war crimes committed by the military. It is for this particular reason that the applicant fears that he might be killed.

[6]      It is of interest to note that that is not what the applicant stated in the Personal Information Form ("PIF") which he signed on October 12, 1995. What the applicant said in his PIF was that he deserted the army because "[he] was not willing to kill innocent people nor to violate the human rights of the people". In other words, the atrocities witnessed by the applicant are the reason he deserted the army but not the reason he fears persecution. A reading of the applicant"s PIF cannot lead to any other conclusion.

[7]      In any event, even if counsel were right on this point, I am still of the view that that does not deter from the Board"s conclusion. Again, one would have expected to find something in the documentary evidence to support the applicant"s fear. Surely, the applicant is not the only deserter who witnessed war crimes.

[8]      During the course of his refugee hearing, the applicant adduced a copy of the death notice of a friend who, according to him, was also a deserter. The Board discounted this piece of evidence. The applicant also adduced copies of newspaper articles which referred to the death squads and former military personnel who, according to the applicant, murdered civilians. The Board also discounted this evidence. I have carefully read the reasons given by the Board in dealing with this evidence and I can find no fault on its part.

[9]      Finally, with respect to the applicant"s fear of persecution by reason of his family, the Board found that the evidence in that regard was insufficient. That conclusion cannot be qualified, on the evidence, as unreasonable.

[10]      For these reasons, this application for judicial review shall be dismissed.

Ottawa, Ontario      "MARC NADON"

September 4th, 1998      Judge

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