Date: 20010525
Docket: IMM-1977-00
Neutral Citation: 2001 FCT 516
Between:
MIAO FANG SUN
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD J.:
[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of the March 9, 2000 decision of Bernard Leclerc, a visa officer at the Canadian Consulate General in Hong Kong, determining that the applicant is unable to meet the requirements for immigration in the "investor" category and refusing her application for permanent residence in Canada.
[2] On January 25, 2000, the visa officer held an interview with the applicant to determine whether she met the requirements for permanent residence in Canada in that category as set out in the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2. At that time, the applicant was asked to provide documentary evidence to corroborate her salary from 1993 to 2000. The applicant, who had no such evidence with her, requested that she be allowed the opportunity to provide a declaration to this effect. The visa officer refused. The applicant was informed by letter dated March 9, 2000 that her application for permanent residence was refused. The visa officer, in his own words, "was not prepared to accept the aforementioned documentation as proof of her salaries because a declaration from herself would be self-serving". Further, he "was not prepared to accept a declaration from her partner of more than 6 years either as it would not be supported by documentation".
[3] Relying on He v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (January 20, 1999), IMM-1377-98, the applicant submits that the visa officer should have allowed her to provide whatever corroborative evidence she could and then make a determination of what weight that evidence should be given.
[4] As has been clearly established by the Federal Court of Appeal in Chiu Chee To v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (May 22, 1996), A-172-93, the appropriate standard of review for discretionary decisions of visa officers with respect to immigration applications is the same as that enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Maple Lodge Farms Limited v. Government of Canada et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, where Mr. Justice McIntyre states at pages 7 to 8:
. . . It is, as well, a clearly-established rule that the courts should not interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a statutory authority merely because the court might have exercised the discretion in a different manner had it been charged with that responsibility. Where the statutory discretion has been exercised in good faith and, where required, in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and where reliance has not been placed upon considerations irrelevant or extraneous to the statutory purpose, the courts should not interfere. . . .
[5] In the case at bar, the applicant was applying under the "investor"category. It is her "responsibility to provide the appropriate documentation to the visa officer to satisfy the requirements for admission under that category" (see Wu v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1086 (T.D.) (QL)). It is true, here, that the applicant was apprised by the visa officer of concerns with respect to her application. Upon reviewing the evidence, it appears that the visa officer was prepared to allow the applicant further opportunity to respond to these concerns by providing some verifiable documentary evidence, i.e. necessary documentary evidence which would not consist of mere declaration by the applicant or her partner. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that a breach of the rules of fairness occurred. I would have come to a different conclusion if the visa officer had refused to consider such declarations and give them any degree of weight, had the applicant provided them on due time, i.e. at the time of her interview when she knew she would never be able to produce any other "verifiable" evidence. Indeed, the applicant was never denied the opportunity to produce her own written declaration or that of her partner before or at the time of her interview with the visa officer.
[6] Consequently, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
May 25, 2001