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                                                                                                                                   Date: 20001013

                                                                                                                              Docket: T-1846-00

BETWEEN:

KARLA TEALE

Applicant

- and -

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

REASONS FOR ORDER

BLAIS J.

[1]         This is a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the applicant's involuntary transfer from the Joliette custodial facility to the Regional Psychiatric Centre (Prairies) (RPCP).

[2]         To succeed, the applicant had to persuade the Court that she had a serious issue to be tried, that she might suffer irreparable harm if she were transferred, and that the balance of convenience weighed in her favour.

[3]         I will first examine the applicant's submissions that she might suffer irreparable harm if she is transferred. In doing so, I shall assess the evidence that is before me.


[4]         I decided earlier, at the hearing, to reject a document that the applicant's counsel attempted to introduce, which was simply hearsay, in fact, and was not supported by an affidavit.

[5]         During the hearing, I reserved on an objection by the applicant as to the hearsay content in paragraph 14 of the affidavit of Mr. Daniel Mérineau, the acting head of the Joliette Institution. I am allowing the objection and thereby removing this paragraph from the affidavit, which in all other respects remains valid.

[6]         It remains for me to assess the irreparable harm, if any, that Ms. Teale, the applicant, will suffer. She states under oath that her accessibility to the community and to her family resources as well as her life will be endangered if she is transferred and, moreover, that she has been the victim of death threats in the past.

[7]         The applicant was unable to document or submit any additional evidence to support these statements.

[8]         The applicant states in paragraph 10 of her affidavit that she may suffer the loss of her residual liberty; in fact, she believes that her mobility will be less in her new detention centre and that her contacts with other inmates will be reduced, since the centre to which she will be transferred is a higher security institution.

[9]         I have difficulty understanding how an environment with increased security and reduced contacts with other inmates can result in a greater threat to her security.


[10]       In my opinion, the applicant has failed in her attempt to demonstrate that she may suffer irreparable harm if she is transferred.

[11]       As to the balance of convenience, it clearly favours the respondent, who has a duty to take whatever measures are necessary to comply with the provisions of the Act.

[12]       The applicant's transfer does not deprive her of any right and the Correctional Service authorities will be in a better position to carry out the assessment of the applicant, even if she announces in advance that she will not cooperate.

[13]       The applicant's admissions as to her potential refusal of release in no way releases the Correctional Service of its statutory obligations.

[14]       It is in the public interest that the Correctional Service be able to fulfil its mandate.

[15]       In R.J.R. MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, the Supreme Court, per Sopinka and Cory JJ., states at paragraph 69:

[69]          Courts have addressed the issue of the harm to the public interest which can be relied upon by a public authority in different ways. On the one hand is the view expressed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Attorney General of Canada v. Fishing Vessel Owners' Association of B.C., [1985] 1 F.C. 791, which overturned the trial judge's issuance of an injunction restraining Fisheries Officers from implementing a fishing plan adopted under the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, for several reasons, including, at p. 795:

(b) the Judge assumed that the grant of the injunction would not cause any damage to the appellants. This was wrong. When a public authority is prevented from exercising its statutory powers, it can be said, in a case like the present one, that the public interest, of which that authority is the guardian, suffers irreparable harm.


This dictum received the guarded approval of Beetz J. in Metropolitan Stores at p. 139. It was applied by the Trial Division of the Federal Court in Esquimalt Anglers' Association v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) (1988), 21 F.T.R. 304.

...

[71]          In our view, the concept of inconvenience should be widely construed in Charter cases. In the case of a public authority, the onus of demonstrating irreparable harm to the public interest is less than that of a private applicant. This is partly a function of the nature of the public authority and partly a function of the action sought to be enjoined. The test will nearly always be satisfied simply upon proof that the authority is charged with the duty of promoting or protecting the public interest and upon some indication that the impugned legislation, regulation, or activity was undertaken pursuant to that responsibility. Once these minimal requirements have been met, the court should in most cases assume that irreparable harm to the public interest would result from the restraint of that action.

[16]       Since the applicant has failed on two components of the test -- the irreparable harm and the balance of convenience -- it is unnecessary, in the circumstances, to examine in detail the third component, which is whether there is a serious issue to be tried. I note, however, that the applicant is seeking the intervention of the Federal Court, while her internal remedies are not exhausted, which is apparent on the face of the record.

[17]       For all these reasons, this motion for an injunction is dismissed.

                            Pierre Blais

                                   J.

QUÉBEC, QUEBEC

October 13, 2000

Certified true translation

Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L., Trad. a.


Federal Court of Canada

Trial Division

Date: 20001013

                                                     Docket: T-1846-00

Between:

KARLA TEALE

Applicant

- and -

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

REASONS FOR ORDER


FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

TRIAL DIVISION

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET NO:                         T-1846-00       

STYLE:                                     KARLA TEALE

Applicant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

PLACE OF HEARING:            Montréal, Quebec

DATE OF HEARING: October 6, 2000

REASONS FOR ORDER OF BLAIS J.

DATED:                                   October 13, 2000

APPEARANCES:

Marc Labelle                                                                             for the applicant

Eric Lafrenière                                                               for the respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

LABELLE, BOUDRAULT, COTÉ & ASS.

Montréal, Quebec                                                                     for the applicant

Morris Rosenberg

Deputy Attorney General of Canada                                           for the respondent

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