Date: 20010927
Docket: T-312-99
T-340-99
Neutral citation: 2001 FCT 1067
BETWEEN:
T-312-99
CHIEF CHRIS SHADE, and RANDY BOTTLE,
TOM LITTLE BEAR, NARCISSE BLOOD,
KIRBY MANY FINGERS, DOROTHY FIRST RIDER,
LEVI BLACK WATER, LES HEALY,
ALEX (MICKEY) GOOD STRIKER,
LEWIS LITTLE BEAR, JIM RUSSELL,
MARTIN HEAVY HEAD, RODNEY FIRST RIDER,
Chief and Councillors of the Blood Band for themselves
and on behalf of the Indians of the Blood Band Reserve No. 148
and 148A and the BLOOD BAND
Plaintiffs
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
AND HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA
Defendant
AND BETWEEN:
T-340-99
KAINAIWA NATION (BLOOD TRIBE)
and CHIEF CHRIS SHADE, SUING ON HIS OWN BEHALF
AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE KAINAIWA/BLOOD TRIBE
PEIGAN NATION and CHIEF PETER STRIKES WITH A GUN, SUING ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PEIGAN NATION
SIKSIKA NATION AND CHIEF DARLENE YELLOW OLD WOMAN MUNROE, SUING ON HER OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SIKSIKA NATION
TSUU T'INA NATION AND CHIEF ROY WHITNEY SUING ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE TSUU T'INA NATION
BEARSPAW BAND and CHIEF DARCY DIXON, SUING ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BEARSPAW BAND
CHINIKI BAND and CHIEF PAUL CHINIQUAY, SUING ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CHINIKI BAND
WESLEY BAND and CHIEF JOHN SNOW SR. SUING ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE WESLEY BAND
Plaintiffs
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
AND HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA
Defendants
HARGRAVE P.
[1] These actions, T-312-99 and T-340-99, involve, in broad terms, claims to riparian rights and to lands in southern Alberta. Action T-312-99, involving the Blood Band, constitutes a claim for riparian rights associated with the Belly and Saint Mary's Rivers which flow through the Plaintiffs' reserve. As to action T-340-99, the various Tribes, Nations and Bands lay claim, by way of Aboriginal title, to substantial land in what is now southern Alberta.
[2] The causes of action, as pleaded, are substantially against the federal Crown. Relief is sought against both the federal Crown and the Province of Alberta. The Plaintiffs seek, in various ways, to justify the action against the Province of Alberta in this Court. The issue on this motion is thus whether the Federal Court has jurisdiction over the Province of Alberta.
[3] In the present instance, the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against the Province of Alberta. The Province succeeds on its motion to strike out the relevant portions of the Statements of Claim. I will now consider this in more detail, beginning with some relevant background.
BACKGROUND
[4] In the case of the riparian rights action, which the parties also call the natural boundaries action, the Plaintiffs say they have occupied lands, now known as Blood Indian Reserves No. 148 and 148A from time immemorial. Bordering that Reserve area are portions of the Belly River and the Saint Mary's River, rivers which are said, in the Statement of Claim, to be essential to the economic, cultural and spiritual way of life of the members of the Blood Band.
[5] When the predecessor members of the Blood Band entered into Treaty No. 7, in 22 September, 1877, the Plaintiffs contend that the intention was to provide to the Plaintiffs the use and ownership of the Rivers, their banks and beds, including the use of the water, in order to provide the means to establish a new economy based on ranching and agriculture.
[6] The Blood Band Plaintiffs say that the riparian ownership at issue has not been extinguished by treaty or legislative enactment and that they are thus owners of the banks and beds either by reason of existing Aboriginal rights, treaty rights, or as riparian owners, having retained water rights in the Rivers for their own use and benefit. The alternative here is that if the Blood Band Plaintiffs do not have the riparian rights which I have described, that is said to be the direct result of a breach of fiduciary duties on the part of the federal Crown.
[7] The riparian action goes on to claim declaratory relief, as to ownership and riparian rights, together with an accounting, against both the federal Crown and the Province of Alberta and alternatively, damages against the federal Crown for breach of fiduciary duty. Here I would note that the Constitution Act of 1930, incorporating the Natural Resource Transfer Agreement of 1930, transferred public lands and natural resources in Alberta from the federal Crown to the Province of Alberta. Thus, in the view of the Blood Band Plaintiffs, the Province of Alberta seems also to be an appropriate defendant.
[8] This leads to the second action, which is sometimes referred to by the parties as the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement action, being action T-340-99, but which is also called the Treaty 7 action, the term which I will use. Treaty 7, as I have already noted, came into being 22 September 1877. However it is probably relevant to touch on the historical overview which is set out in the Statement of Claim in the Treaty 7 action. Basic is that the various Bands, Tribes, and Nations say that they have occupied an area within southern Alberta since time immemorial.
[9] By Royal Charter of 2 May 1670 the entity popularly referred to as the Hudson's Bay Company obtained various rights, including exclusive trading privileges over land which later became known as Rupert's Land. Some 90 years later, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 set up new colonies in North America. The Proclamation provided for protection of Indian Tribes or Nations, reserving various lands to them, prohibiting the purchase or taking of such lands from the Indians who were in residence.
[10] In 1869 the Northwest Territory and, relevant here, Rupert's Land, became part of Canada, with the Hudson's Bay Company surrendering its interest in Rupert's Land to the Crown to become part of the Dominion of Canada.
[11] This brings us to Treaty 7 of 22 September, 1877. Pertinent here is that while Treaty 7, in part, recites the surrender to the Government of Canada, by the Indians inhabiting a large area, a portion of which is involved in the Treaty 7 action, the Plaintiffs deny that they ever surrendered their Aboriginal title over Treaty 7 territory. Further, the Plaintiffs make the point that Aboriginal title to or rights in renewable and non-renewable resources were not ceded to the federal Crown by Treaty 7, but if they were, the result was that lands and resources were held in trust for the Plaintiffs and therefore could not be ceded to the Province of Alberta by the Natural Resource Transfer Agreement of 1930. Alternatively, if the lands were transferred by that Agreement the federal Crown is in breach of its fiduciary duty. This leads to the relief sought.
[12] In the Treaty 7 action, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs includes declaratory relief as to the establishment of fiduciary or trust obligations and a failure to fulfil those obligations, a declaration of the Plaintiffs have not surrendered or yielded up their Aboriginal title and right to the Treaty 7 territory and a declaration that the Plaintiffs continue to have a legal interest in the Treaty 7 territory. The Plaintiffs also seek damages.
[13] Again, in the view of the Plaintiffs in the Treaty 7 action, the Province of Alberta, which now holds lands which the Plaintiffs claim, is viewed by the Plaintiffs as an appropriate defendant, along with the Federal Crown.
[14] Counsel for the Province of Alberta made various points by which to demonstrate a want of Federal Court jurisdiction against the Province. Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in both written and oral submissions dealt, to one degree or another, with a number of approaches by which to justify Federal Court jurisdiction over the Province of Alberta. I will, in turn, deal with those which are of substance.
Section 17 Relief Against the Crown
[15] Counsel for the Province of Alberta lays the ground work for this motion to strike out by observing that this is a statutory court without inherent jurisdiction and then goes on to refer to the standard case, ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 at 766, where the Supreme Court of Canada sets out the three-part test that must be satisfied in order that the Federal Court may have jurisdiction:
1. There must be a statutory granted jurisdiction by the Federal Parliament.
2. There must be an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory granted jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be "a law of Canada" as the phrase is used in section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Critical to the Plaintiff's case is finding a "statutory grant of jurisdiction by the Federal Parliament" in favour of the Federal Court. Without this statutory grant of jurisdiction I need not consider the other elements in the ITO test.
[16] While Section 17.1 of the Federal Court Act grants this Court jurisdiction over claims against the Crown, the reference to "Crown", by reason of the definition of "Crown" in Section 2(1) of the Federal Court Act, is clearly to Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada. Counsel for the Province of Alberta refers to a number of authorities to bolster this clear proposition, including Union Oil of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen [1975] 52 D.L.R. (3rd) 388, affirmed by both the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada at (1977) 72 D.L.R.(3rd) 81 and 82. Union Oil also stands for the general proposition that while the Parliament of Canada might legislate to give the Federal Court jurisdiction over the Crown in right of a Province, the Federal Court Act does not authorize the Court to entertain a proceeding against the Crown in right of a Province. This concept is clearly set out by the Federal Court of Appeal at page 81:
The jurisdiction of the Federal Court is entirely statutory and, accepting that it lies within the powers of the Parliament of Canada, when legislating in a field within its competence, to give the Federal Court jurisdiction to implead the Crown in right of a Province, we do not think any of the statutory provisions to which we were referred, or any others of which we are aware, authorize the Court to entertain a proceeding at the suit of a subject against the Crown in right of a Province.
The Court of Appeal then went on to consider the Privy Council's decision in Re Silver Bros. Ltd. [1932] 2 D.L.R. 673 and concluded that:
...the specific definition and references in the Federal Court Act to the Crown in right of Canada are sufficient to show that the traditional immunity of the Crown in right of the Provinces from suit in its Courts was not intended to be abrogated by the general descriptions of subject-matter of jurisdiction in the Federal Court Act. (Pages 81 and 82)
[17] Also pertinent here is Lubicon Lake Band v. The Queen [1981] 2 F.C. 317, affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal (1981) 13 D.L.R. (4th) 159. There Mr. Justice Addy determined that neither Section 17(1) nor Section 17(2) were of assistance in giving the Federal Court jurisdiction over the Province of Alberta for generally, in the case of a statutory Court, provisions as to jurisdiction must be strictly construed in favour of limiting jurisdiction and particularly:
Dealing with the position of the Province of Alberta, as a defendant, what has been said regarding section 17(1) relating to the oil companies applies equally to it. The word "Crown' in the Federal Court Act is specifically restricted by section 2 to the Crown in right of Canada. Furthermore, even if it should be held that the provisions of section 16 of the Interpretation Act, whereby it is declared that Her Majesty's rights or prerogatives are not affected by any enactment unless specifically mentioned or referred to therein, apply exclusively to Her Majesty in right of Canada, I find that the common law rule under which that immunity from general enactment is maintained, applies to the Crown in right of every province. (Refer Pacific Western Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen in right of Canada.) Alberta would enjoy that immunity in so far as any enactment by the Parliament of Canada is concerned. The Crown in right of Alberta is not mentioned in section 17(2) and, therefore, is not bound by that enactment. Even if section 17(2) were held to cover claims between "subject and subject," by no stretch of the imagination could the Crown in right of Alberta be considered as a "subject" of the Crown in right of Canada. (page 323)
Certainly there could well be a benefit to some users of the Federal Court were one to take a broad and elastic view of the Court's statutory jurisdiction, including under section 17(1) and(2) of the Act. Thus, in the context of striking out for want of jurisdiction, where the test is that there be a certain want of jurisdiction, to the extent that it be plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed by want of jurisdiction, I would favour the Plaintiffs if there were any possibility of jurisdiction. However, I have also kept in mind the concept of strict construction, pointed to by many jurists, including Mr. Justice Addy in Lubicon, to keep the jurisdiction of our Court within the statutory limits, when considering the submissions of counsel for the Plaintiffs.
[18] In Joe v. Canada (1983) 49 N.R. 198 (F.C.A.), affirmed [1986] 2 S.C.R. 145, the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with a motion to strike out a portion of a Statement of Claim which sought a declaration that the Plaintiff had an interest in land belonging to the Province of Newfoundland. There the Court appears to have looked at Section 17 of the Federal Court Act in its entirety. The Federal Court of Appeal held that Section 17 of the Federal Court Act did not give this Court jurisdiction to grant relief against the Province:
...the main and primary effect of such a declaration would be, in my opinion, to affect the property rights of the Province of Newfoundland. For that reason, I consider that the declaration sought by the respondents is, in truth, a declaration against the Province of Newfoundland which could not be made in an action directed against the respondents. Moreover, as s. 17 of the Federal Court Act does not give the court jurisdiction to grant relief against a Province, the relief sought by the respondents could not be granted by the court even if the Province of Newfoundland were a defendant in this action. (Page 199)
[19] In Varnam v. Canada [1988] 2 F.C. 454 Mr. Justice Hugessen, of the Court of Appeal, is even more direct in assessing the scope and effect of section 17(1), pointing out that "relief against persons other than the federal Crown is simply not in the contemplation of the text." (page 462).
[20] Somewhat broader, in that the case refers to section 17 of the Federal Court Act generally, is Saugeen Indian Band v. Canada [1992] 3 F.C. 576. There Mr. Justice McKay, at pages 594 - 595 begins with the broad proposition that section 17 does not provide jurisdiction to the Federal Court over any person except the Crown in right of Canada, her servants or agents and then goes to the specific point that section 17 does not give the Federal Court jurisdiction to grant relief against a province:
Finally, it is well settled that this Court does not have jurisdiction under section 17 of the Federal Court Act, which provides for general causes of action, over any person except the Crown (Her Majesty in Right of Canada), her servants or agents. . . . Relief against persons other than the federal Crown is not provided by section 17 and that section does not give this Court jurisdiction to grant relief against a province . . .
[21] More recently Mr. Justice McKay again considered section 17 and whether there was jurisdiction against the Queen in right of New Brunswick, the plaintiff wishing to sue the New Brunswick Crown for taking possession of a ship as mortgagee in possession in Greeley v. The "Tami Joan" (1996) 113 F.T.R. 66. After surveying the cases, including some of those to which I have referred, Mr. Justice McKay made two pertinent points. First, that the Court had no jurisdiction, pursuant to section 17 of the Federal Court Act, against a province; and second, that one must keep separate the matters of jurisdiction over subject matter and jurisdiction over a particular party: see page 73.
[22] I realize that the Plaintiffs do not put great stock in jurisdiction by way of section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act, however the line of cases to which I have referred not only clearly disposes of the possibility of jurisdiction under section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act, but also illustrate some relevant principles. However, there remains a point which forms a substantial portion of the Plaintiffs' submission and that is the effect of section 17(4) of the Federal Court Act.
Jurisdiction by Reason of Conflicting Claims Against the Crown
[23] Section 17(4) of the Federal Court Act provides that:
(4) Conflicting claims against Crown -- the Trial Division has concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings to determine disputes where the Crown is or may be under an obligation, in respect of which there are or may be conflicting claims.
The reference to the Crown here is in the context of the federal Crown. The section gives the Federal Court jurisdiction where the federal Crown is or may under an obligation in respect of which there are or may be conflicting claims.
[24] The position of the Plaintiffs is that the federal Crown is or may be under an obligation to them and that the Plaintiffs and Alberta have conflicting claims to the lands and resources both in Treaty 7 territory and on the Blood Indian Reserve, being the subject matter of the riparian action. Here the Plaintiffs rely upon Roberts v. Canada [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, a decision involving a dispute between two Indian First Nations over land at Campbell River, British Columbia. The Court considered section 17(4) in the context of its earlier designation as section 17(3)(c). The Supreme Court approved the approach of Mr. Justice Hugessen of the Federal Court of Appeal who had observed that the section required first, a proceeding; second, to determine a dispute; third, where the Crown is or may be under an obligation; and fourth, in respect of which there may be conflicting claims (see page 335). The Court felt that the usual situation in which the Rule applied was that of interpleader, but that it could, in certain instances, cover other situations, one being where the Crown holds land for the use and benefit of one of two Indian bands, the issue to be that of deciding for which band the land was held in trust. In effect this is analogous to an interpleader situation.
[25] The difficulty I have with applying Roberts to the present situation is that there are no conflicting claims raised anywhere in the pleadings in this proceeding. Certainly the federal Crown may be under an obligation, or indeed many obligations, but the only claim relying upon such obligations is that which has been advanced by the Plaintiffs. As I say, there is no obligation owed to two or more rival claimants. Certainly there are obligations, for example as between Canada and the Plaintiffs and perhaps between Alberta and the Plaintiffs, but there is no common obligation, as there was in Roberts, in order to provide the underpinning for the application of the section relying upon Mr. Justice Hugessen's analysis.
[26] To extend section 17(4) of the Federal Court Act to grant jurisdiction in a situation in which there are not two conflicting claims would be to distort the purpose of section 17(4) far beyond an interpleader type of situation and indeed, far beyond that envisioned by any reasonable extension of the Supreme Court of Canada approach in Roberts.
Personification of the Crown in Right of Alberta
[27] I should also touch briefly on the submission by the Plaintiffs that the Crown in right of Alberta ought to be treated as a person and, if I understand the argument, there would then be no Crown immunity and, moreover, pursuant to the Alberta Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.A. 1980, chapter P-18, proceedings might be taken against Alberta in any court. Certainly section 16 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides that ". . . in proceedings against the Crown the rights of the parties are as nearly as possible same as any suit between person and person . . .", reference here being to the Alberta Crown. I do not view this provision as extending so far as to make Alberta a subject of Canada. However, this sort of argument was dealt with quite summarily by Mr. Justice Addy in Lubicon Lake Band v. The Queen [1981] 2 F.C. 317 at 323. There, commenting upon an analogous situation, he found that the Province of Alberta would enjoy immunity insofar as any enactment by the Parliament of Canada was concerned. Moreover, he noted first that the Crown in right of Alberta was not mentioned in section 17(2) of the Federal Court Act and was therefore not bound by that enactment. He then said that:
Even if section 17(2) were held to cover claims between "subject and subject," by no stretch of the imagination could the Crown in right of Alberta be considered as a "subject" of the Crown in right of Canada. (page 323)
This disposes of the submission that somehow there is jurisdiction if the Crown in right of Alberta were treated as a person pursuant to Alberta legislation.
Proceedings Against the Crown Act of Alberta
[28] The Plaintiffs also submit that section 8 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, which provides in part that ". . . all proceedings against the Crown in any court shall be instituted and proceeded with in accordance with the relevant law governing the practice in that court." sanctions proceedings in this Court. In reaching this conclusion the Plaintiffs placed emphasis on the reference to "any court", thus clothing the Federal Court with jurisdiction. I construe section 8 as meaning that when the Province of Alberta is sued it shall be dealt with in accordance with the practice of the court in which it is sued. In effect it sets out a procedure, but does not grant jurisdiction to the Federal Court in a substantive sense. However, even assuming that there may be jurisdiction by agreement, which is not the case in a statutory court, section 8 of the provincial Proceedings Against the Crown Act is not an express agreement to give the Federal Court jurisdiction. I now turn to the Plaintiffs' submission that section 19 of the Federal Court Act, together with section 28 of the Alberta Judicature Act, gives this Court jurisdiction.
Inter-governmental Disputes
[29] The issue here is whether section 19 of the Federal Court Act, which provides that:
19. Inter-governmental disputes -- Where the legislature of a province has passed an Act agreeing that the Court, whether referred to in that Act by its present name or by its former name of the Exchequer Court of Canada, has jurisdiction in cases of controversies.
(a) between Canada and that province, or
(b) between that province and any other province or provinces that have passed a like Act,
the Court has jurisdiction to determine the controversies and the Trial Division shall deal with any such matter in the first instance.
in tandem with section 28 of the Judicature Act of Alberta:
28 The Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Canada, or the Supreme Court of Canada alone, according to the Supreme Court Act (Canada) and the Federal Court Act (Canada) have jurisdiction
(a) in controversies between Canada and Alberta;
(b) in controversies between Alberta and any other province of Canada in which an Act similar to this Act is in force;
(c) in proceedings in which the parties by their pleadings have raised the question of the validity of an Act of Parliament of Canada or of an Act of the Legislature of Alberta, when in the opinion of a judge of the court in which they are pending the question is material, and in that case the judge shall, at the request of the parties, and may without request if he thinks fit, order the case to be removed to the Supreme Court of Canada in order that the question may be decided.
grant jurisdiction in this instance. Certainly the jurisdiction granted is broad, section 19 of the Federal Court Act being phrased in terms of controversies. Indeed, the term controversies ". . . is broad enough to encompass any kind of legal right, obligation or liability that may exist between governments": see the reasons of Mr. Justice of Appeal Le Dain in The Queen (Canada) v. The Queen (P.E.I.) [1978] 1 F.C. 533 at 583. In this instance the Plaintiffs submit that the two actions represent precisely the type of cases that are contemplated by section 19 of the Federal Court Act and which are facilitated by subsections (a) and (c) of section 28 of the Judicature Act.
[30] To begin, section 28(c) of the Judicature Act does not apply. It only comes into play when the judge of the court in first instance decides, at the request of the parties, or on its own initiative in a proper case, to order a case be removed to the Supreme Court of Canada in order to determine the validity of an Act of Parliament or an Act of the Legislature of Alberta. It is does not give a grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Court, but merely a procedure, once the parties are properly before a court, to have the case removed to the Supreme Court of Canada. I now turn to a consideration of section 19 of the Federal Court Act and section 28(a) of the Judicature Act.
[31] Key in both section 19 of the Federal Court Act and section 28 of the Judicature Act is that there be a controversy between Canada and the Province of Alberta. I must find the controversy from a reading of the Record: I ought not to speculate as to what subsequent pleadings might put at issue or what controversies might conceivably arise in this proceeding in the future. Here there is no material in the Record to indicate a dispute between governments. On that basis section 19 of the Federal Court Act does not come into play so as to give the Court jurisdiction. However there is also another reason why there is no jurisdiction under section 19.
[32] In Fairford First Nation v. Canada, (1996) 96 F.T.R. 172 and on appeal (1997) 205 N.R. 380, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal took pains to distinguish Union Oil Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada and British Columbia (1975) 52 D.L.R. (3rd) 388, affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal (1977) 72 D.L.R. (3rd) 81, in turn upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada at 82 and relied upon by the Plaintiffs. The Fairford case stands for the proposition that jurisdiction, pursuant to section 19 of the Federal Court Act, may only be invoked by Canada or by a province and not by a private citizen: see the trial decision at page 394.
CONCLUSION
[33] The present actions by the Plaintiffs disclose no reasonable cause of action, the Court clearly being without a statutory grant of jurisdiction to hear a claim against the Province of Alberta in the present circumstances. It is not a shortcoming which may be cured by any amendment. Thus Her Majesty the Queen in right of Alberta is removed as a defendant.
(Sgd.) "John A. Hargrave"
Prothonotary
Vancouver, British Columbia
27 September 2001
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-312-99
STYLE OF CAUSE:Chief Chris Shade et al. v. HMQ
PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, BC
DATE OF HEARING: May 2, 2000
REASONS FOR ORDER OF HARGRAVE, P.
DATED: September 27, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Bob Wilkins, Joanne Crook FOR PLAINTIFFS
Everett Bunnell, Q.C., A.P. Argento FOR DEFENDANT
Province of Alberta
James Baird, Lisa Shields FOR DEFENDANT
Her Majesty the Queen
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Walsh Wilkins FOR PLAINTIFFS
Calgary, AB
Macleod Dixon FOR DEFENDANT
Calgary AB Province of Alberta
Morris Rosenberg FOR DEFENDANT
Attorney General of Canada Her Majesty the Queen