Date: 20020816
Docket: IMM-4509-00
Neutral Citation: 2002 FCT 881
Ottawa, Ontario, this 16 th day of August 2002
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PELLETIER
BETWEEN:
YOGARATNAM KANVATHIPILLAI
BOONGOTHAI YOGARATNAM
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
[1] Yogaratnam Kanavathipillai and his wife Boongothai Yogaratnam (the applicants) are refugee claimants from Sri Lanka. When their first claim for refugee status was rejected they took advantage of the "revolving door"[1] provided by subsections 46.01(1) (c) and 46.01(5) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 to slip into the United States for 90 days. This had the effect of making them eligible to make a fresh application for refugee status. The Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) dismissed their application again and found that it lacked a credible basis. They now seek judicial review of that decision.
[2] The male applicant left Sri Lanka in November 1995 and arrived in Canada in January 1996. The female applicant joined her husband in Canada in January 1998. Following the refusal of their claim for refugee status and the exhaustion of their other remedies, they both left Canada for the United States on November 23, 1999. They both re-entered Canada on February 23, 1999, 90 days to the day after their departure from Canada. Their infant daughter who had previously been sent to the United States with the female applicant's sister returned to Canada with them at that time. In support of their fresh refugee claim, they submitted the Personal Information Forms which they had submitted as part of their first claim, to which each of them appended the following paragraphs:
My father Nagamuthu Kanapathipillai was killed the during the shell bombeed attacked in Sri Lanka on 12-99. My mother was wounded during that time. My mother had problem with LTTE who threatened her at gun point 200.000 rupees money or some our family have to join the group. After this matter EPRLF became to know. EPRLF came and demanded money at Gunpoint from my mother and they asked where is your son Yogaratnam and his family. Because of that fear to stay in any part of Sri Lanka, they went to India and they sent me the letter LTTE or looking me and I lost my brother was disappeared by Torrest Group since 93. Oftenly they had threatened my mother and sisters for big amounts of money.
Oftenly LTTE and Sri Lankan Armed Forces fight each other we were innocent people affected fear by shell and bombed attacked, no food, medicals services LTTE suspected us that we were supporting and SLAF (Sri Lankan Armed Forces) who were suspecting harassed and tortured us badly Like this situation we cannot return to live in any part of Sri Lanka
I fear the Armed Forces, LTTE, EPRLF, ENDLF, PLOTE to return to any part Sri Lanka. Our life has been threatened by these people. We cannot safely live in any part of SriLanka So We cannot return to SriLanka anymore These groups of people would definitely kill us. I have no security in Sri Lanka. Please accept us as refugee to stay permanently in Canada.
[3] The Minister intervened in the applicants' hearing before the CRDD by filing certain material but did not take part in the hearing. The CRDD rejected the applicants' claim. While professing not address the applicants' credibility directly, the CRDD found that the applicants' were dishonest. It questioned them as to whether they made a claim in the United States. The applicants said they did not. The CRDD then confronted them with its knowledge that rejected claimants returning to the United States are given a hearing date before an Immigration Judge to show their fear of return to their country of origin. The male applicant testified that a hearing had been scheduled for April 2000 but that he did not attend.
[4] The Minister included in the material which he filed an undated affidavit which the applicants used to enable the female applicant's sister to take their infant to the United States with her. The affidavit set out that the child would remain in the United States for approximately three weeks but it became evident that the plan was for the child to return to Canada with her parents at the end of their 90 day stay in America. The CRDD characterized this as an act of deceit which went directly to the "heart of the credibility of their claims".
[5] The applicants were then questioned about events subsequent to the refusal of their original refugee claim. The male applicant referred to a letter dated April 14, 2000 from his sister who was in a camp in India in which she warns him about returning to Sri Lanka due to the civil war. The letter indicates that various terrorist groups and the army threatened, detained and beat the male applicant's mother and sister several times, so they moved to India. It goes on to indicate that if he were to return to Sri Lanka, all these groups would demand money and each would suspect him of working for the others.
[6] The CRDD found that this letter did not corroborate the information in the applicants' Personal Information Form. The CRDD also thought it significant that this letter, which was apparently the first written communication between the male applicant and his sister since his father's death, did not refer to his passing.
[7] The panel asked the male applicant if this was the letter referred to in his Personal Information Form which stated that the Tigers were looking for him. He confirmed that it was. When he was confronted with the fact that his Personal Information Form was dated March 25, 2000 and the letter was dated April 14, 2000, he recalled that the information had come to him in a telephone call rather than a letter.
[8] In the end, the CRDD gave no weight to any of the contents of the letter.
[9] The CRDD concluded that the applicants were not credible and that they had not discharged the burden upon them to show that they had a reasonable fear of persecution upon their return to Sri Lanka. In addition, the CRDD found that the applicants had no credible basis for their claim, a finding which has certain implications for their remedies.
[10] The applicants challenge the CRDD's decision by pointing out that there was no evidence before it as to U.S. immigration law or the procedures followed when a failed refugee claimant is returned to the United States. The applicants deny that the CRDD has any specialized knowledge of immigration procedures in the United States, citing Appau v. M.E.I. (1995), 91 F.T.R. 225. That case involved a claim by the CRDD to be familiar with security and screening procedures at Swiss airports. The applicants deny the relevance of any American proceedings on the merit of their claim for refugee status in Canada.
[11] The applicants also challenge the CRDD's analysis of the incident involving the entry of their child into the United States. They claim there is no evidence that the child stayed in the United States illegally, a matter which is beyond the CRDD's jurisdiction in any event.
[12] Finally, the applicants allege that the proper test to be applied on a repeat application for refugee status where the applicants have not returned to their country of origin, is an "objective" test. This test is articulated only to the extent of saying that claimants in the position of the applicants need only rely upon objective evidence and evidence of country conditions.
[13] As for the finding of "no credible basis", the applicants' say that the CRDD was bound to give reasons for coming to that conclusion. They allege that the CRDD confused credibility and "no credible basis". The applicants rely upon the text of subsection 69.1(9.1) of the Immigration Act, supra, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, to support this conclusion.
[14] The respondent takes the position that the CRDD's conclusion on the credibility of the applicants was well founded and is immune from judicial review. The respondent claims that the test in the case of a second refugee claim is the same as for the original claim, namely whether the claimant has a well founded fear of persecution in the country against which they claim. However, in the case of a second claim, the CRDD is entitled to consider only events which occurred after the rejection of the first claim.
[15] The respondent denies that the CRDD believed that the applicants made a refugee claim in the U.S. It supports the claim of the CRDD to specialized knowledge and notes that the applicants were represented by counsel at the hearing and that the statutory notice provisions were complied with.
[16] The respondent denies that a finding of "no credible basis" must be accompanied by reasons for such a finding. It relies upon the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Mathiyabaranam v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 1676, which dealt with requirement to give notice of an intention to make a finding of "no credible basis". It is clear from the court's reasoning, says the respondent, that no reasons are required for such a finding beyond those justifying a lack of credibility.
[17] As a preliminary matter, I am not entirely certain that I would agree that the members of the CRDD lack specialized knowledge with respect to American immigration procedures. Given the amount of traffic across our common border, it strikes me as reasonable that the members of the CRDD would acquire some familiarity with the workings of the American immigration system.
[18] Rothstein J. (as he then was) addressed the question of the evidence to be considered by the CRDD when it hears a repeat application for refugee status in Vasquez v. Canada, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1769 where he held that:
[para8] The principle is that a party, having received a final decision, is prevented from relitigating the matter notwithstanding that the party has found supplementary arguments that were available at the time of the original litigation. That is what the applicant was attempting before the CRDD.
[19] It would seem to flow from this that a refugee claimant pursuing a second claim is limited to grounds arising subsequent to the determination of the first refugee claim. This is the significance of the reference to "arguments that were available at the time of the original litigation". In this case, the applicants' original claim was disposed of in February 1999 (Tribunal Record p. 194). The only matters which were material to the second application were those which arose following that date. The supplementary information which the applicants attached to their Personal Information Forms referred to the death of the male applicant's father in December 1999, which was subsequent to the original hearing. However the balance of the information provided is vague and non-specific. To the extent that the CRDD considered events occurring after February 1999, it was dealing with the right time frame.
[20] The applicants' submissions suggests that where an applicant has not returned to his or her country of origin, the test of refugee status is one of country conditions since there cannot have been new instances of persecution if the applicant did not return home. This amounts to saying that all that an applicant need show is an objective basis for a fear of persecution. But since the definition of convention refugee has a subjective and an objective component, (A.G. Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689) a determination that a person was a refugee on the strength of evidence of objective conditions alone would do away with the subjective element of the definition. It would be an anomalous result if persons making their first claim for refugee status had to show both a subjective and an objective basis for their well founded fear of persecution, but after a 90 days sojourn in the United States, they could succeed in their second claim by showing only an objective basis for fearing persecution.
[21] The case of Yusuf v. Canada, [1992] 1 F.C. 629 is cited in support of the proposition advanced by the applicants. That case concerned a Somali woman claiming refugee status on the basis of her fear of persecution in Somalia. Before the Court of Appeal, it was alleged that the CRDD found, on the basis of country conditions, that there was an objective basis for fear but that the applicant had no subjective fear. Hugessen J.A. expressed some doubt as to the role of the subjective element where an objective basis was shown to exist:
For my part, I admit that I would find some merit in this challenge if the Division had actually concluded that the subjective fear did not exist while the objective fear was established beyond any doubt. It is true, of course, that the definition of a Convention refugee has always been interpreted as including a subjective and an objective aspect. The value of this dichotomy lies in the fact that a person may often subjectively fear persecution while that fear is not supported by fact, that is, it is objectively groundless. However, the reverse is much more doubtful. I find it hard to see in what circumstances it could be said that a person who, we must not forget, is by definition claiming refugee status could be right in fearing persecution and still be rejected because it is said that fear does not actually exist in his conscience. The definition of a refugee is certainly not designed to exclude brave or simply stupid persons in favour of those who are more timid or more intelligent. Moreover, I am loath to believe that a refugee status claim could be dismissed solely on the ground that as the claimant is a young child or a person suffering from a mental disability, he or she was incapable of experiencing fear the reasons for which clearly exist in objective terms.
[22] It ill behoves me to put a gloss on the words of such an eminent judge, but there is a rationale for insisting upon a subjective sensation of fear, even if it means that the stout and the stupid might thereby fall outside the definition of refugee. The reason is that the refugee system exists to protect those who are afraid of persecution and for whom there is no state protection. Those whose lack of fear is due to an inability to appreciate their surroundings may be entitled to protection on other grounds, whereas as those who are sufficiently robust to protect themselves need no protection from the international community. Individuals leave troubled regions for many reasons but only those who do so out of a well founded fear of persecution can claim international protection. Those who leave for other reasons are not entitled to appeal to the international community simply because they could or should have been fearful, even if they were not.
[23] In this case, the original panel which heard the applicants' claim found that they had no subjective fear of persecution and dismissed their claim. (Tribunal Record pp. 195-201). A re-assessment of country conditions does not supply the element of subjective fear. While the CRDD's reasons are not models of clarity, they address the issue of well founded fear of persecution on the basis of events occurring after the determination of the applicants' first claim was dismissed.
[24] The applicants's next ground of review is that the CRDD failed to give reasons for its finding that the applicants' claim had no credible basis. There are two schools of thought in the Trial Division as to whether distinct reasons are required where a finding of no credible basis is made. Examples of cases finding that no reasons need be given for a finding of "no credible basis" include Nizeyimana v. Canada, 2001 FCT 259, [2001] F.C.J. No. 472 (QL) at para. 9 (Pinard J.), Sarker v. Canada, 2001 FCT 526, [2001] F.C.J. No. 806 (QL) at para 58 (Blais J.). A lucid expose of the reasoning in support of reasons for a "no credible basis" finding appear in the reasons of Denault J. in Foyet v. Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1591. Blanchard J. came to the same conclusion in Geng v. Canada, 2001 FCT 257, [2001] F.C.J. No. 488 (QL). In Rahaman v. Canada, 2002FCA 89, [2002] F.C.J. No.302 (QL), the Federal Court of Appeal approved of Denault J.'s analysis of the basis upon which a finding of "no credible basis" can be made, but was silent on the question of whether reasons had to be given for such a finding.
[25] The argument of those who see no need to provide reasons for the "no credible basis" finding is that in order to establish a claim to refugee status, the applicant must provide a credible evidence in support of that claim. Consequently, reasons which show the basis for a funding of lack of credibility will necessarily show the basis of a finding of "no credible basis". Pinard J. put in this way in Nizeyimana, supra:
[para9] This provision of the Act [subsection 69.1(9.1)] clearly requires that a conclusion that there is no credible basis should be part of the same decision as that dealing with the refugee status claim. If a separate decision is not required on the question of a credible basis, it follows that separate reasons are not required either. As the duty imposed on the tribunal by s. 69.1(11) of the Act to give written reasons in support of a decision against a refugee status claimant was met, all that is required is to ensure that the reasons fully support the conclusions of the decision in question, including if necessary the conclusion that a credible basis was lacking.
[para10] In M.E.I. v. Mathiyabaranam (December 5, 1997), A-223-95, [[1997] F.C.J. No. 1676] Linden J.A., for the Federal Court of Appeal, wrote:
[10] Any claimant is aware or should be aware of the risk of a no credible basis finding even without any additional notice being given about this potential outcome. A refugee claimant must realize that he or shemust establish, as part of his or her claim, a credible basis for his or her claim. You cannot establish a claim for refugee status without first establishing a credible basis for that claim; the one is totally dependant [sic] upon and included in the other. I cannot image what a claimant, if given special notice, could possibly add to his or her case. All of the available evidence should already have been placed before the Board as part of the claim for refugee status.
[para11] In Gomez v. M.C.I., (April 29, 1999), IMM-1826-98, [[1999] F.C.J. No. 600 (Q.L.)] at para. [7], I had occasion to say the following:
... counsel for the applicant argued for the first time that the Board erred in law "in failing to motivate its finding of no credible basis". This new argument is set aside on the ground that the Board's finding of no credible basis is supported by the same sufficient reasons given in the decision in support of its finding that the applicant is not a Convention refugee. The principle of this ground is consistent with the following comments made by Linden J.A., in Mathiayabaranam v. M.E.I. (1997), 221 N.R. 351, at page 354:
... a credible basis determination is inherent in the definition of Convention refugee. It does not place upon the claimant an evidentiary burden separate from or additional to the primary one imposed by the definition itself.
[para12] Finally, in (October 27, 2000), IMM-5146-99,[[2000] F.C.J. No. 1744 (QL)] I also wrote:
[7] Additionally, as the applicant's testimony was not found to be credible, the tribunal was entitled to conclude that the minimum basis for the claim was absent. In Sheikh v. M.E.I. (1990), 112 N.R. 61, the FederalCourt of Appeal established that when such a tribunalfinds that a claimant is not credible it may conclude that there is no credible evidence on the basis of which the claimant could be regarded as a refugee. Further, in M.E.I. v.Mathiyabaranam (December 5, 1997), A-223-95, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that this rule is valid for subsection 69.1(9.1) of the Act, concerning the question of the minimum basis.
[para13] In Sheikh v. M.E.I., [1990] 3 C.F. 238, the Federal Court of Appeal per MacGuigan J.A., said at 244:
The concept of "credible evidence" is not, of course, the same as that of the credibility of the applicant, but it is obvious that where the only evidence before a tribunal linking the applicant to his claim is that of the applicant himself (in addition, perhaps, to "country reports" from which nothing about the applicant's claim can be directly deduced), a tribunal's perception that he is not a credible witness effectively amounts to a finding that there is no credible evidence on which the second-level tribunal could allow his claim.
[26] The argument in favour of reasons is summarized in the following passage from Foyet, supra:
[para21] In Mahanandan , [[1994] F.C.J. No. 1228] the Federal Court of Appeal as well affirmed that where documentary evidence which could affect the Board's appreciation of the claim is received in evidence at a hearing, the Board is required to indicate the impact that such evidence had upon the claim. Chief Justice Isaac stated:
Where, as here, documentary evidence of the kind in issue here is received in evidence at a hearing which could conceivably affect the Board's appreciation of an Appellant's claim to be a Convention refugee, it seems to us that the Board is required to go beyond a bare acknowledgment of its having been received and to indicate, in its reasons, the impact, if any, that such evidence had upon the Applicant's claim. As I have already said, the Board failed to do so in this case. This, in our view, was a fatal omission, as a result of which the decision cannot stand.
[para22] In my view, before making a no credible basis finding, the panel must always consider all the evidence. A broad interpretation of Sheikh is not consistent with subsection 69.1(9.1) of the Immigration Act.
[para23] Certainly. the panel need not expressly evaluate each piece of evidence in its reasons; however, given the significance of the provision at issue which, we would point out, was enacted some years after Sheikh, the context in which Sheikh was decided must be taken into account. In my view, a panel should exercise caution in following Sheikh when it decides to refer to that decision in making a no credible basis finding. The fact that a panel finds an applicant's testimony not credible does not, de facto, bring subsection 69.1(9.1) of the Immigration Act into play. As Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer stated in Seevaratnam:
In my opinion. the Board failed to consider all of the evidence before it and simply denied the Applicant's claim because it did not find her credible. In the circumstances of this case, there was still evidence remaining which could have affected the assessment of the claim. Therefore, this evidence should have been expressly assessed.
[para24] Therefore, in every case, a thorough analysis must be carried out to establish whether the documentary evidence is relevant. If it is, the panel is required to state express reasons, having regard to the objective evidence, to explain why subsection 69.1(9.1) of the Immigration Act is being applied. As Mr. Justice Evans wrote in Cepeda-Gutierrez
However. the more important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the agency's reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact "without regard to the evidence": Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993). 63 F.T.R. 312 (F.C.T.D.). In other words, the agency's burden of explanation increases with the relevance of the evidence in question to the disputed facts. Thus, a blanket statement that the agency has considered all the evidence will not suffice when the evidence omitted from any discussion in the reasons appears squarely to contradict the agency's finding of fact. Moreover, when the agency refers in some detail to evidence supporting its finding, but is silent on evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion, it may be easier to infer that the agency overlooked the contradictory evidence when making its finding of fact.
[para25] In this case. the panel found that the applicant failed to establish a credible basis for his claim, in accordance with subsection 69.1(9.1), after concluding that the applicant had adduced no credible or trustworthy evidence at the hearing on which it could have determined that the applicant was a Convention refugee.
[para26] In order to make such a finding, the Refugee Division had an obligation to assess all the evidence and to expressly state the reasons that led to its no credible basis finding. By failing to expressly assess all the evidence, both subjective and objective, and by focusing exclusively on the applicant's testimony, the panel committed an error that is subject to judicial review. Accordingly, its decision regarding the application of subsection 69.1(9.1) of the Immigration Act must be set aside.
[27] These lengthy excerpts lay out the justification for the differing conclusions to which my colleagues have arrived on this issue. As mentioned above, in Rahaman, supra, the Federal Court of Appeal approved of Denault J.'s analysis of the basis upon which the CRDD might come to the conclusion that there was no credible basis for a particular claim, but it did not specifically deal with the issue of whether the CRDD must give reasons for that conclusion. The issue in Rahaman was the basis for a finding of the "no credible basis"; the applicant argued that it should be limited to cases which might be said to be "manifestly unfounded" as opposed to cases in which the CRDD found that there was no credible evidence to support an applicant's claim.
[28] Those who favour the argument that the CRDD be required to give reasons for making a finding of "no credible basis" refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, and more specifically, the following passage where L'Heureux-Dubé J. discusses the functions served by written reasons:
¶ 39 Reasons, it has been argued, foster better decision making by ensuring that issues and reasoning are well articulated and, therefore, more carefully thought out. The process of writing reasons for decision by itself may be a guarantee of a better decision. Reasons also allow parties to see that the applicable issues have been carefully considered, and are invaluable if a decision is to be appealed, questioned, or considered on judicial review: R. A. Macdonald and D. Lametti, "Reasons for Decision in Administrative Law" (1990), 3 C.J.A.L.P. 123, at p. 146; Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 F.C. 646 (C.A.), at para. 38. Those affected may [page846] be more likely to feel they were treated fairly and appropriately if reasons are given: de Smith, Woolf, & Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed. 1995), at pp. 459-60. I agree that these are significant benefits of written reasons.
[29] Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé's conclusion as to the need for written reasons in the case of H & C decisions resonates in the context of "no credible basis" decisions.
¶ 43 In my opinion, it is now appropriate to recognize that, in certain circumstances, the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision. The strong arguments demonstrating the advantages of written reasons suggest that, in cases such as this where the decision has important significance for the individual, when there is a statutory right of appeal, or in other circumstances, some form of reasons should be required. This requirement has been developing in the common law elsewhere. The circumstances of the case at bar, in my opinion, constitute one of the situations where reasons are necessary. The profound importance of an H & C decision to those affected, as with those at issue in Orlowski, Cunningham, and Doody, militates in favour of a requirement that reasons be provided. It would be unfair for a person subject to a decision such as this one which is so critical to their future not to be told why the result was reached.
[30] On the other hand, the significance of "no credible basis" decisions was reviewed in Rahanam where the Federal Court of Appeal came to the following conclusion:
[para33] In other words, while a "no credible basis" finding undoubtedly exposes the person concerned to a relatively expeditious removal, removal in fact may be delayed. Legal and administrative safeguards against the removal of those likely to face persecution on their refoulement do exist, even though they are not as favourable as those available to unsuccessful refugee claimants in respect of whom each member of the Board has not made a "no credible basis" finding under subsection 69.1(9.1).
[31] One should also take note of the Court's response to the certified question:
Whether a finding that a refugee claimant is not a credible witness triggers the application of subsection 69.1(9.1) depends on an assessment of all the evidence in the case, both oral and documentary. In the absence of any credible or trustworthy evidence on which each Board member could have determined that the claimant was a Convention refugee, a finding that the claimant was not a credible witness will justify the conclusion that the claim lacks any credible basis.
[32] In my view, the Court of Appeal's opinion as to the significance of a "no credible basis" decision, as well as its decision as to basis upon which the CRDD could come to such a conclusion militate against the provision of distinct reasons justifying a finding of "no credible basis". The consequences of such a decision are significant but are bounded by procedural and legal safeguards against deportation to a place where there is a real risk of inhumane treatment. Where a panel of the CRDD assesses all of the evidence in a case, including oral and documentary, it's reasons for concluding that there is no trust worthy evidence supporting the applicants' claim will necessarily disclose the basis of its conclusion as to "no credible basis". Consequently, I conclude that adherence to the test set out by the Court of Appeal as to the basis upon which the CRDD may make a finding of "no credible basis" for a claim will obviate the need for distinct reasons justifying such a finding.
[33] As a result, the applicants fail on both grounds raised in their application, which will therefore be dismissed. If the parties wish to suggest a question for certification, they must submit it to the Registry within 10 days of the date of these reasons. An order dismissing the application will issue at the end of that period.
"J.D. Denis Pelletier"
Judge
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF SOLICITORS AND SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD
COURT FILE NO.: IMM-4509-00
STYLE OF CAUSE: Yogaratnam Kanvathipillai and Boongothai Yogaratnam
v. The Minister of Citizenship & Immigration
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: June 12, 2001
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER OF: The Honorable Mr. Pelletier
DATED: August 16, 2002
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Joyce Yedid FOR APPLICANT
Mr. Daniel Latulippe FOR RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Mr. Joyce Yedid FOR APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
Mr. Morris Rosenberg FOR RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario
[1]McGillis J. commented as follows on this procedure in Jmakina v. Canada,
[1999] F.C.J. No. 1680 at para. 29:
The revolving door approach to refugee claims casts a dark shadow over our immigration system, places an unnecessary burden on Canadian taxpayers, delays the hearing of meritorious refugee claims and constitutes a scandalous abuse of our border.