Date: 20000426
Docket: T-938-99
OTTAWA, ONTARIO, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2000
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE TEITELBAUM
BETWEEN:
CUPE LONGSHOREMEN"S UNION
LOCAL 375
Applicant
- and -
FEDERAL MARINE TERMINALS LTD.,
DIVISION OF FEDNAV LTD., MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
Respondent
O R D E R
For the reasons stated in the Reasons for Order, the application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.
| "Max M. Teitelbaum" |
| J. |
Certified true translation
Martine Brunet, LL.B.
Date: 20000426
Docket: T-938-99
BETWEEN:
CUPE LONGSHOREMEN"S UNION
LOCAL 375
Applicant
- and -
FEDERAL MARINE TERMINALS LTD.,
DIVISION OF FEDNAV LTD., MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
TEITELBAUM J.
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision rendered April 29, 1999 by Mr. Serge Cadieux, a regional safety officer ("the regional officer"), rescinding the following directions issued to the respondent by safety officer Alain [sic ]:
| [Translation] |
| - directions or items number one (1) to ten (10) inclusive of the direction of December 8, 1997 issued pursuant to paragraph 145(2)(a) of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 (hereinafter "C.L.C."); |
| - the direction of December 9, 1997 issued pursuant to paragraphs 145(2)(a) and (b) C.L.C.; and |
| - the direction of December 18, 1997 issued pursuant to paragraphs 145(2)(a) and (b) C.L.C. |
FACTS
[2] Federal Marine Terminals Ltd. ("FMT") is a forwarding firm that was operating in more than a dozen or so divisions of the Port of Montréal.
[3] On December 3, 1997, at about 10:30 a.m., Mr. Joseph Ronci, employed as a checker with FMT, died as a result of being crushed by an operating 25-ton lift truck.
[4] Following this accident, an investigation was opened almost immediately, conducted by Alain Messier, a safety officer, assisted by Yves Jégou, likewise a safety officer.
[5] On December 4, 1997, safety officer Messier issued an initial oral direction pursuant to paragraph 145(2)(a) of the C.L.C., comprising eleven (11) items. The direction was confirmed in writing on December 8, 1997.
[6] On December 9, 1997, safety officer Messier issued a second oral direction to FMT pursuant to paragraphs 145(2)(a) and (b) of the C.L.C. The direction, which was confirmed in writing on December 12, 1997, dealt with the tires of two FMT lift trucks.
[7] On December 17, 1997, safety officer Messier toured the FMT site in the Port of Montréal and noted that the employer had not implemented any remedial measures other than the one referred to in item eleven (11) of the direction of December 8, 1997. He then issued a new direction under paragraphs 145(2)(a) and (b) of the C.L.C., which was confirmed in writing on the following December 18.
[8] In a letter dated December 22, 1997, FMT requested a review, pursuant to section 146 of the C.L.C., of all of the directions issued by safety officer Messier.
[9] On March 20, 1998, FMT sent Human Resources Development Canada, through its solicitors, a letter explaining the reasons for its request for review.
[10] The parties reached an agreement that there would be no hearing but instead the transmission of written submissions by the parties. FMT served a copy of its submissions on December 23, 1998 while the Longshoremen"s Union, Local 375 of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (hereinafter the "CUPE") filed its submissions on December 2, 1998.
[11] On December 30, 1998, FMT sent a reply to the union"s submissions.
[12] On February 10, 1999, during a conference call, the regional officer asked the parties to present submissions in relation to the concept of "danger" as it is defined in the C.L.C.
[13] In response to the regional safety officer"s request, FMT forwarded its observations on March 10, 1999, while the CUPE forwarded its submissions in turn on March 18, 1999.
[14] On April 29, 1999, regional officer Cadieux rendered a decision, which is the subject of this application for judicial review filed by the CUPE.
THE DECISION OF APRIL 29, 1999 THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPLICATION
[15] In the decision dated April 29, 1999, the regional safety officer determined the question he had to answer, as follows:
| [Translation] Do the situations described by the safety officer in the directions in SCHEDULES (A, B and C) constitute "dangers" within the meaning of the Code? Subsidiarily, should the regional safety officer decide that there is no "danger" within the meaning of the Code, what is the officer"s jurisdiction to vary a direction issued pursuant to subsection 145(2) of the Code for danger, to a direction issued pursuant to subsection 145(1) of the Code for a contravention? |
[16] Analyzing first the notion of "danger", the regional officer concluded that he should adopt the principles applicable to a refusal to work. At page 7 of his decision, he summarized these principles as follows:
| [Translation] The danger must be immediate and substantial (Montani v. Canadian National Railways, C.L.R.B. decision No. 1089). It must be present at the time of the investigation by the safety officer (Bonfa v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Docket A-138-89). Its realization must be more than hypothetical. Furthermore, as Mr. Benaroche noted, the safety officer must determine, after an investigation, that there is a danger within the meaning of the Code. The safety officer must not presume the existence of a danger in order to intervene but he should collect evidence in this regard (Mario Lavoie, 1998 F.C.J. No. 1285) and his decision must be based on objective criteria (Coulombe v. Empire Stevedoring Company Ltd., C.L.R.B. decision No. 747). The danger must be one that is contemplated by the Code. Accordingly, a danger that is inherent in the employee"s work or that constitutes a normal condition of employment may not serve as a reason for the right of refusal (Montani , supra). |
[17] The regional safety officer went on to analyze the eleven (11) items in the direction issued by safety officer Messier on December 8, 1997. Explaining that some of the directions had been issued for "danger" in the general meaning of the word, hazardous situations and offences to the Canada Occupational Safety and Health Regulations , SOR 94/264 [sic], s. 2(F) (the "Regulations"), the regional officer concluded that no "danger" within the meaning of the C.L.C. warranted the issuance of directions in this case. However, he upheld the safety officer"s decision in relation to item number 11, FMT having withdrawn its objection.
[18] For the purposes of this proceeding, I think it is necessary to summarize briefly the analysis made by the regional officer of each direction that was rescinded:
1. The operators of handling equipment do not have an unobstructed view of the area in which the equipment must move about and they are not directed by a signaller
[19] The regional safety officer first noted that the safety officer had observed a number of operators who were travelling with the forks of their machines lowered. He then wrote:
| [Translation ] There is no doubt that operating a 25-ton lift truck among the employees and other persons doing business on these premises with the forks one metre above the ground creates a risk of possible injuries to the persons located within the same work area as the machine, since the forks and the assembly thereof add numerous blind spots to the operator"s vision. I note, however, that the safety officer did not intervene forthwith to protect the employees when he observed this practice, simply because the risk of injury was not sufficiently acute to stop the operation. In other words, the safety officer did not intervene to protect pedestrians from the danger because he did not have any specific information or any evidence that the danger was immediate. |
[20] In the opinion of the regional officer, it was a hazardous practice but the danger was not immediate and was not, therefore, a danger contemplated by the Code.
2. Loads exceeding the width of the fork lifts are handled above the heads of pedestrians
[21] Like the safety officer, the regional officer thought this was an unacceptable practice. He concluded, however, that the danger observed by the safety officer was not covered by the C.L.C., since it was hypothetical and not immediate.
[22] In reaching his conclusion, the regional officer took into consideration the fact that the safety officer had not checked whether the load had to be or was attached as provided by subsection 14.34(2) of the Regulations, and had also not checked the physical conditions of the floor, the forks, the transportation or other conditions to determine whether the load was going to overturn.
3. The handling equipment is not cleared of snow and operators" view is obstructed when backing up
[23] According to the regional safety officer, the observation of a 22-centimetre accumulation of snow on the rear part of a lift truck was simply a static observation that failed to meet the criteria for danger within the C.L.C. meaning. Since no one had noticed a fork lift being backed up with an accumulation of snow behind, there could not, in his opinion, be any substantial and immediate danger at the time of the security officer"s investigation.
4. In the parking lot outside the barrier, some handling devices carry loads and the operators do not have an unobstructed view of the area and are not directed by a signaller while employees and persons having access to the handling area are walking toward their cars or the dock
[24] The regional officer was of the opinion that this observation by safety officer Messier, if justified, was an offence under the Regulations but not a danger within the meaning of the C.L.C., since it was hypothetical and not immediate.
5. The handling devices are not equipped with an audible warning device that functions automatically while backing up
[25] Acknowledging that not having an audible warning device on handling equipment constituted an offence under paragraph 14.16(1)(b) of the Regulations, the regional officer nevertheless concluded that there was no situation of danger within the meaning of the C.L.C. in this instance.
6. There is no provision for passages for the exclusive use of pedestrians
[26] While saying it was "[Translation ] extremely careless and even dangerous to allow employees who have to cross the handling area to move about within the same area as the motorized equipment while handling operations are under way", the regional officer concluded that this was not a danger within the C.L.C. meaning.
7. Most employees, managers and persons having access to the handling area do not wear high-visibility vests
[27] The regional officer was of the view, in the circumstances, that this was not a situation likely to result in injury to someone so exposed before it could be remedied, and thus could not be characterized as a dangerous situation within the C.L.C. meaning.
[28] Although section 12.13 of the Regulations requires that high-visibility vests be worn, the regional officer stated that not wearing a vest per se did not automatically constitute a danger within the meaning of the Code.
8. There is no procedure defining how handling equipment is to be moved safely
and
9. There is no procedure defining how pedestrians are to move about safely
[29] The regional officer stated in his decision that these directions "[Translation ] do not in any way identify a situation that might result in injury to one or more persons before it could be remedied. They [the directions] describe instead the measures the safety officer considered appropriate in the circumstances."
[30] In his opinion, therefore, these directions did not relate to any immediate danger.
10. The managers and employees use the running-boards of handling equipment to move from one place to another on the dock
[31] The regional officer noted that this method of moving about was contrary to subsection 14.30(1) of the Regulations and concluded that "[Translation ] clearly, this practice cannot be tolerated." He also reported that the safety officer "[Translation ] observed an employee using the running-board of a motorized device to move about". But in his opinion "[Translation ] if the safety officer was of the opinion that this practice was likely to injure the employee immediately, he should have intervened at the precise time when he observed the employee on the running-board and not later when he is giving a series of directions to the employer. The danger no longer existed at that point."
[32] Thus, in his view, such a practice occurring in the past could not constitute a danger within the meaning of the C.L.C. at the time when the safety officer issued his direction.
[33] Consequently, the regional officer rescinded items (1) to (10) inclusive of the direction of December 8, 1997 issued pursuant to paragraph 145(2)(a) of the C.L.C.
[34] The direction of December 12, 1997 issued pursuant to paragraphs 145(2)(a) and (b) of the C.L.C. read as follows:
| [Translation] The rear tires of handling machines no. 9560 and no. 1024 are excessively worn, which means they may blow, resulting in a loss of control of these machines. This represents a risk that employees will be crushed. |
[35] The regional officer rescinded this direction on the ground that a possibility of loss of control was only a hypothetical risk and did not correspond to the definition of danger under the C.L.C.
[36] The regional officer also rescinded the direction of December 18, 1997 issued pursuant to paragraphs 145(2)(a) and (b) of the C.L.C. on the ground that it was addressed solely to the directions already rescinded.
[37] Finally, relying on the decision of this Court in Vancouver Wharves Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), F.C.J. No. 943, the regional officer concluded that he was unable to consider the directions issued by safety officer Messier as applying subsection 145(1) of the C.L.C. In this regard, he stated:
| [Translation] |
| To convert a direction issued under subsection 145(2) for danger into a direction for an offence requires that a new direction be issued pursuant to subsection 145(1) of the Code, a power that I do not have at present under the Code. |
| Moreover, the Honourable Mr. Justice P. Rouleau of the Federal Court Trial Division has already had occasion to rule on this point, in Vancouver Wharves Ltd. v. The Attorney General of Canada, court docket T-1125-97. At page 8 of the judgment, where the applicant was challenging the jurisdiction of a regional officer to vary a direction to the interpretation that I had given concerning the limitations on my authority under section 146(3) of the Code, the judge wrote: |
| Applying these principles to the case at bar, I can find no fault with the regional Safety Officer"s determination of the jurisdictional issue before him. |
PARTIES" SUBMISSIONS
Applicant"s submissions
[38] The document [sic] submits, first, that the regional officer failed to take into account some distinctions between the exercise of a right of refusal under section 128 C.L.C. and a direction issued under subsection 145(2) C.L.C. in the application of the principles pertaining to the concept of danger as contemplated by the C.L.C.
[39] Secondly, the applicant argues that the regional officer committed an error of jurisdiction in deciding that he did not have the authority to vary a direction issued under subsection 145(2) to a direction issued in accordance with subsection 145(1) of the C.L.C.
[40] Finally, the applicant submits that the regional officer should have found there was a danger within the C.L.C. meaning in regard to each of the directions that were rescinded. In the alternative, where there was no danger, the applicant submits that the regional officer should have varied the directions issued for danger under subsection 145(2) C.L.C. to directions for an offence under subsection 145(1) C.L.C.
Respondent"s submissions
[41] The respondent argues that the regional officer did not err in interpreting the concept of danger under the C.L.C.
[42] The respondent also submits that the regional officer ruled correctly in deciding that it was not within his authority to convert a direction issued under subsection 145(2) C.L.C. into a direction for an offence under subsection 145(1) C.L.C.
[43] The respondent submits, finally, that the regional officer was justified in concluding that there was no danger within the meaning of the C.L.C. in regard to each of the directions of safety officer Messier submitted for review.
ANALYSIS
[44] Under subsection 145(2), the safety officer has the authority to issue directions in writing to an employer where a dangerous situation exists:
| 145. (2) Where a safety officer considers that the use or operation of a machine or thing or a condition in any place constitutes a danger to an employee while at work,
|
| 145. (2) S"il estime que l"utilisation d"une machine ou chose ou qu"une situation existant dans un lieu constitue un danger pour un employé au travail, l"agent de sécurité:
|
[45] "Danger" is defined in subsection 122(1) of the C.L.C.:
| 122. (1) ... "danger" means any hazard or condition that could reasonably be expected to cause injury or illness to a person exposed thereto before the hazard or condition can be corrected; |
122. (1) ... "danger" Risque ou situation susceptible de causer des blessures à une personne qui y est exposée, ou de la rendre malade, avant qu"il ne puisse y être remédié. |
[46] In the case at bar, the regional officer adopted the interpretation given by the Canada Labour Relations Board and by this Court of the notion of "danger" in the context of the exercise of a right of refusal within the meaning of section 128 of the C.L.C.
[47] In doing so, the regional officer did not err in law, in my opinion. He correctly assessed the notion of "danger" as set out in Part II of the C.L.C., considering in particular that there must be an immediate, substantial and present danger and not a hypothetical danger.
[48] Thus, the regional officer was right to state at page 15 of his decision that "[Translation ] [a] danger represents a dynamic situation of precise facts comprising some objective elements."
[49] Having correctly applied the notion of "danger", the regional officer then analyzed the facts at issue in order to determine, in relation to each of the directions, whether there really was a danger within the meaning of the C.L.C. These were questions of mixed fact and law within the range of his expertise.
[50] While not protected by a privative clause, a regional officer"s decisions emanate from a specialized decision-maker and are entitled to some form of judicial deference.
[51] I share the opinion of Cullen J. that the standard of review in the circumstances should be situated "somewhere between the standards of reasonableness and correctness", as he states in Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (Labour Code, Regional Safety Officer) , [1995] F.C.J. No. 1534 (F.C.T.D.), at paragraph 24:
| In the case at bar, the decision is not protected by a privative clause. However, as discussed in Pezim, supra, the non-existence of a privative clause is not alone determinative. I am also prepared to find that the regional safety officer is a specialized decision-maker and am willing to give those findings which rest squarely within his expertise a great deal of deference. However, where the regional safety officer was interpreting the law, the standard of review should, in my view, be stricter. Although counsel for the applicant urged this Court to accept that the standard of review was correctness or closer to correctness, I am not prepared to go so far in that the regional safety officer was not interpreting a provision of the statute limiting his jurisdiction. Rather, the standard of review applicable to questions of law in the case at bar, in my view, falls somewhere between the standards of reasonableness and correctness. |
[52] I have reviewed each of the directions rescinded by the regional officer and, in my opinion, he did not err in finding that safety officer Messier had not collected sufficient evidence of the existence of a danger as defined in the C.L.C. in regard to each of the directions.
[53] I am also of the opinion that the regional officer was justified in concluding that even if FMT and its employees had contravened the Regulatory procedures at the time of safety officer Messier"s investigation, that did not make the workplace dangerous within the meaning of the C.L.C.
[54] Like the regional officer, I think, therefore, that safety officer Messier failed to establish the presence of a single substantial and immediate danger within the meaning of subsection 145(2) C.L.C., although the safety officer did observe a danger within the general meaning of the word in regard to each of the directions.
[55] In regard to the regional officer"s authority to vary a direction issued pursuant to subsection 145(2) C.L.C. to a direction issued pursuant to subsection 145(1) C.L.C., it is necessary first to refer to section 146 C.L.C., which sets out the powers of the regional officer:
| 146. (1) Any employer, employee or trade union that considers himself or itself aggrieved by any direction issued by a safety officer under this Part may, within fourteen days of the date of the direction, request that the direction be reviewed by a regional safety officer for the region in which the place, machine or thing in respect of which the direction was issued is situated. (2) The regional safety officer may require that an oral request for a review under subsection (1) be made as well in writing. (3) The regional safety officer shall in a summary way inquire into the circumstances of the direction to be reviewed and the need therefor and may vary, rescind or confirm the direction and thereupon shall in writing notify the employee, employer or trade union concerned of the decision taken. [...] |
146. (1) Tout employeur, employé ou syndicat qui se sent lésé par des instructions données par l"agent de sécurité en vertu de la présente partie peut, dans les quatorze jours qui suivent, en demander la révision par un agent régional de sécurité dans le ressort duquel se trouve le lieu, la machine ou la chose en cause. (2) L"agent régional de sécurité peut exiger que toute demande verbale de révision soit également présentée par écrit. (3) L"agent régional de sécurité mène une enquête sommaire sur les circonstances ayant donné lieu aux instructions et sur la justification de celles-ci. Il peut les modifier, annuler ou confirmer et avise par écrit de sa décision l"employeur, l"employé ou le syndicat en cause. [...] |
[56] As mentioned previously, the regional officer concluded that subsection 146(3) of the C.L.C. limited his jurisdiction and that he therefore did not have jurisdiction to convert a direction issued under subsection 145(2) into a direction issued under subsection 145(1).
[57] In thus analyzing the scope of subsection 146(3), the regional officer was determining a question of law that was not within his expertise. His decision is therefore reviewable for correctness.
[58] In my opinion, the regional officer did not commit any error in making the decision he did.
[59] Subsection 145(1) provides that the safety officer may issue directions to an employer for a contravention of Part II of the C.L.C.:
| 145. (1) Where a safety officer is of the opinion that any provision of this Part is being contravened, the officer may direct the employer or employee concerned to terminate the contravention within such time as the officer may specify and the officer shall, if requested by the employer or employee concerned, confirm the direction in writing if the direction was given orally. |
145. (1) S"il est d"avis qu"il y a contravention à la présente partie, l"agent de sécurité peut ordonner à l"employeur ou à l"employé en cause d"y mettre fin dans le délai qu"il précise et, sur demande de l"un ou l"autre, confirme par écrit toute instruction verbale en ce sens. |
[60] As indicated, the safety officer"s power of intervention in this subsection is limited: he is allowed only to order compliance with the Act within some time frame.
[61] By way of comparison, the safety officer"s powers under subsection 145(2) are enormous. He may shut down a company if he so decides. And that is because there is a danger within the meaning of the C.L.C.
[62] Parliament thus deliberately chose to divide these two powers into two distinct subsections, and this should be kept in mind when determining the scope of the power of review Parliament wished to give the regional officer in subsection 146(3). The Act is so constructed that the regional officer hearing a request under subsection 146(1) is reviewing a direction issued under the authority of one subsection, and it is a review of that direction that he must conduct.
[63] Thus, in the context of his duties, the regional officer is led to analyze the statutory authority relied on by the safety officer and that authority, in the instant case, is subsection 145(2).
[64] Now, if, in the exercise of his power of review, he decides to vary a direction issued by the safety officer, I am of the opinion that the regional officer must remain with the boundaries of the statutory authority under which the safety officer acted.
[65] In Vancouver Wharves Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, the regional officer had decided to vary a direction given to Vancouver Wharves by a safety officer because the officer had, in the regional officer"s opinion, erred in determining the provisions the company had contravened. In his reasons, the regional officer stated that he was authorized to do so given that he remained within the limits of the authority underlying the direction he was reviewing, i.e. the authority prescribed in subsection 145(1):
| Hence, we must ask ourselves: what was the purpose of Parliament when it entrusted the Regional Safety Officer with the power to vary a direction. Under section 146 of the Code, the Regional Safety Officer already has the power to rescind or confirm a direction. Surely then, the power to vary a direction meant that if the safety Officer references the wrong regulation in the direction, the Regional Safety Officer can redress the error as long as the correction accords with the facts reported by the safety officer. The Regional Safety Officer, like the safety officer before him, is guided in his responsibilities by the purpose clause. |
| The power to review a direction requires that the Regional Safety Officer look at the same circumstances investigated by the safety officer and, if needed, vary the content of the direction. This does not mean that if the safety officer looked at whether the employer contravened subsection 145(1) of the Code, I could conclude that the safety officer purported to look at whether a danger existed and issue a direction under subsection 145(2) of the Code. That, in my opinion, would amount to exceeding my jurisdiction because it would require that I issue a new direction for danger, a power that was not given to the Regional Safety Officer. The direction that I varied was issued under the authority of subsection 145(1) of the Code and the variance that I made to the direction is also made under the same authority on the basis of the same facts considered by the safety officer. |
[66] Rouleau J., hearing the application for judicial review of Vancouver Wharves Ltd., upheld the regional officer"s decision and stated:
| Applying these principles to the case at bar, I can find no fault with the Regional Safety Officer"s determination of the jurisdictional issue before him. |
[67] In the case at bar, I think the regional officer once again correctly judged the scope of his power of review. If Parliament had intended to allow the regional officer to issue new directions, it could have indicated this expressly in subsection 146(3) of the C.L.C. It did not do so. I note, for example, that on a reference to the Canada Labour Relations Board in a case where an employee refuses to work on the ground there is a danger, paragraph 130(1)(b) of the C.L.C. authorizes the Board to issue the directions it considers appropriate in respect of the machine, thing or place in respect of which the decision was made that a safety officer is required or entitled to give under subsection 145(2):
| 130. (1) Where a decision of a safety officer is referred to the Board pursuant to subsection 129(5), the Board shall, without delay and in a summary way, inquire into the circumstances of the decision and the reasons therefor and may
[emphasis added] |
130. (1) Le Conseil procède sans retard et de façon sommaire à l"examen des faits et des motifs de la décision dont il a été saisi en vertu du paragraphe 129(5) et peut:
[emphase ajoutée] |
[68] Other legislation contains different formulations used by Parliament when it grants the type of authority the applicant would like to have acknowledged here in the regional officer. See, for example, the powers given the Appeal Division in paragraph 74(3)(a) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-7, on an appeal from a removal order or a conditional removal order:
| 74. (3) Where the Appeal Division has disposed of an appeal by directing that execution of a removal order or conditional removal order be stayed, the Appeal Division may, at any time,
[emphasis added] |
74. (3) Dans le cas visé au paragraphe (2), la section d"appel peut, à tout moment:
[emphase ajoutée] |
[69] Or see the powers that were given the Veterans Appeal Board under section 42 of the Veterans Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1987, c. 25, repealed by the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1995, c. 18, section 105:
| 42. The Veterans Appeal Board may, under section 12, reconsider and confirm, rescind or amend any decision of the Pension Review Board or the War Veterans Allowance Board, or substitute a new decision therefor, as if the decision were a decision of the Veterans Appeal Board. [emphasis added] |
42. Le Tribunal est habileté, au titre de l"article 12, à réexaminer et confirmer, annuler ou modifier toute décision du Conseil de révision des pensions ou de la Commission des allocations aux anciens combattants ou à y substituer une nouvelle décision comme s"il avait lui-même rendu la décision en cause. [emphase ajoutée] |
[70] Consequently, I conclude that the review authority contemplated by Parliament in subsection 146(3) of the C.L.C. cannot allow the issuance of new directions under subsection 145(1) when the directions under review were issued under subsection 145(2).
[71] For these reasons, I dismiss the application for judicial review, with costs.
| "Max M. Teitelbaum" |
| J. |
Ottawa, Ontario
April 26, 2000
Certified true translation
Martine Brunet, LL.B.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
| DOCKET NO: T-938-99 |
| STYLE: CUPE Longshoremen"s Union Local 375 v. Federal Marine Terminals Ltd., Division of Fednav Ltd., Montréal, Quebec |
| PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec |
| DATE OF HEARING: March 30, 2000 |
REASONS FOR ORDER OF TEITELBAUM J.
DATED: April 26, 2000
APPEARANCES:
Laurent Roy FOR THE APPLICANT
Patrick L. Benaroche FOR THE RESPONDENT
Barbara Duguay
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Trudel, Nadeau, Lesage, Larivière et Associés FOR THE APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
Stikeman Elliott FOR THE RESPONDENT
Montréal, Quebec