Date: 20040429
Ottawa, Ontario this 29th day of April, 2004
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE von FINCKENSTEIN
BETWEEN:
CLAYTON CHARLES RUBY
Applicant
and
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] In June 1988, the applicant requested that the Department of External Affairs (DEA), since renamed Department of Foreign Affairs Canada, provide him with information about himself which he alleged was being held in DEA/P-PU-040 (Bank 40). This bank contains personal information about certain individuals disclosed to DEA from federal bodies about their ongoing investigations. In a letter dated July 8th, 1988, the Department refused to confirm or deny that such information existed and stated that, regardless, it would be exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 22(1)(a) of the Privacy Act, R.S. 1985, c. P-21 (Act).
[2] Previously, in March 1988, the applicant had also sought disclosure of personal information held by the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) which is now held by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS).
[3] In a letter dated August 12th, 1988, CSIS refused to confirm or deny that it held information about the applicant in SIS/P-PU-015 (Bank 10), which relates to its most current and sensitive investigations. If such information did exist, CSIS informed the applicant that it would be exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 22(1)(a) of the Act. The applicant was further informed that CSIS held information about him in SIS/P-PU-015 (Bank 15), which relates to its older and less sensitive investigations. Forty-two pages of this information was disclosed while the rest was withheld pursuant to sections 19, 21, 22(1)(a)(iii), 22(1)(b) and 26 of the Act.
[4] The applicant sought judicial review to the Federal Court of the merits of the exceptions claimed by the DEA and CSIS. In support of its Response to the application as it related to Bank 40, the DEA filed a public affidavit by Mr. Johnson, which generally outlined the department's concerns as to the effects which disclosure might have on its ongoing investigations. In a private affidavit, Mr. Johnson also informed the court as to whether or not personal information existed and, if it existed, why it should be protected pursuant to section 22(1)(a) of the Act.
[5] In support of its Response as it related to Banks 10 and 15, a public affidavit from Mr. MacEwan of CSIS was filed in which a similar rationale for non-disclosure was set out. In a private affidavit, Mr. MacEwan also advised the Court of the nature of any information held by CSIS in Bank 15 and provided specific submissions as to why it should be exempt from disclosure. In this affidavit, Mr. MacEwan also informed the court as to whether or not personal information existed in Bank 10 and if it existed, why it should be protected pursuant to various sections of the Act including, inter alia, section 22(1)(a). After Mr. MacEwan's retirement from CSIS, a Supplementary Affidavit was filed by Mr. Gordon who adopted all of Mr. MacEwan's opinions. Additional public and private affidavits by Ms. Jalbert were filed on behalf of the Solicitor General of Canada in September 2003 with regards to the Banks 10 and 15 requests.
[6] In a decision dated February 3rd, 1997, Ruby v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), [1998] 2 F.C. 351, MacKay J. concluded that the applications should be dismissed because the exemptions had validity been claimed by the DEA and CSIS. The applicant appealed this judgement to the Federal Court of Appeal.
[7] In a decision dated June 8th, 2000, Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2000] 3 F.C. 589 the Federal Court of Appeal referred the two files back for redetermination:
in accordance with the reasons of this Court, of whether the exemptions claimed pursuant to section 19, paragraph 22(1)(b) and section 26 of the Privacy Act with respect to banks 010 and 015 were properly applied by the Canadian Security Intelligence, and whether the Department of External Affairs properly applied with respect to bank 040 the exemptions it claimed pursuant to paragraphs 22(1)(a) and (b) of said Act.
[8] Parallel proceedings challenging the constitutional validity of certain sections of the Privacy Act together with cross appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeal regarding section 22(1)(b) were appealed to the Supreme Court. The constitutional issues were finally settled by the Supreme Court in a decision released on November 21st, 2002, Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3. In addition, on the cross appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and upheld the ruling of MacKay J. in respect of section 22(1)(b) of the Act.
ISSUES
[9] Accordingly, it is now for this court to decide the following issues:
I. Was the exemption claimed pursuant to paragraph 22(1)(a) of the Act with respect to Bank 40 of the DEA properly applied?
II. Was the exemption claimed pursuant to section 19 of the Act with respect to Banks 10 and 15 of CSIS properly applied?
III. Was the exemption claimed pursuant to section of 26 the Act with respect to Banks 10 and 15 of CSIS properly applied?
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Sections 8, 16, 19, 21, 22 and 26 of the Act which are relevant to these Reasons are set out in the attached Annex A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW and BURDEN OF PROOF
[10] Section 41 of the Act states that:
Any individual who has been refused access to personal information requested under subsection 12(1) may, if a complaint has been made to the Privacy Commissioner in respect of the refusal, apply to the Court for a review of the matter within forty-five days after the time the results of an investigation of the complaint by the Privacy Commissioner are reported to the complainant under subsection 35(2) or within such further time as the Court may, either before or after the expiration of those forty-five days, fix or allow.
[11] In its decision, the Court of Appeal considered extensively the nature of this review. It stated at paragraph 30:
....(S)ection 47 of the Act puts on the head of a government institution the burden of proving an exemption. We shall come back to the scope of this burden later on. Suffice it to say for the time being that, in our view, it encompasses both the burden of proving that the conditions of the exemptions are met and that the discretion conferred on the head of a government institution was properly exercised.....
It further remarked at paragraphs 38 and 39:
In our view, in these peculiar circumstances-- where accessibility to personal information is the rule and confidentiality the exception, where an applicant has no knowledge of the personal information withheld, no access to the record before the court and no adequate means of verifying how the discretion to refuse disclosure was exercised by the authorities, and where section 47 of the Act clearly puts on the head of a government institution the burden of establishing that it was authorized to refuse to disclose the personal information requested and, therefore, that it properly exercised its discretion in respect of a specific exemption it invoked--an applicant cannot be made to assume an evidential burden of proof. As this Court said in Rubin v. Canada (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp.) [See Note 9 below] in relation to closely related legislation, the Access to Information Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1, which contains a provision similar, if not identical, [See Note 10 below] to section 47 of the Act:
This section places the onus of proving an exemption squarely upon the government institution which claims that exemption.
The general rule is disclosure, the exception is exemption and the onus of proving the entitlement to the benefit of the exception rests upon those who claim it.
It is the Court's function on an application for review under section 41 of the Act to ensure that the discretion given to the administrative authorities "has been exercised within proper limits and on proper principles." [See Note 11 below] This is why the reviewing Court is given access to the material in issue by section 45 of the Act. In our view, an applicant who, pursuant to section 41 of the Act, applies for judicial review of an institution's refusal to disclose the personal information requested, by definition, questions the validity of the exercise of discretion by that institution and nothing more is required from him or her. In such circumstances, this is the best an applicant can do. This is the most an applicant should be held to.
[12] Clearly, then, the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness and the burden of proof is on the party invoking an exemption to justify its actions when faced with a request for disclosure.
Issue 1: Was the exemption claimed pursuant to paragraph 22(1)(a) of the Act with respect to Bank 40 of the DEA properly applied?
[13] The Court of Appeal in its decision established that section 16(2) is not self sustaining but can only be invoked if there is another section of the Act that provides authority to refuse disclosure. As the court stated in paragraph 80:
We believe that the Judge understood that the exercise by the DEA of its power under subsection 16(2) did not relieve him of his duty to review whether the exemptions pursuant to paragraphs 22(1)(a) and (b) were properly applied, although he appears to have seen in it little significance for the result of the review. As we have already mentioned, a refusal to indicate under subsection 16(2) the fact of the existence of personal information in a bank is not an absolute bar to releasing that information if, at the outset, it has not been properly exempted or the [page631] institution's discretion not to release has been improperly exercised.
[14] It also found that section 16(2) had been properly invoked as a matter of policy. As it stated at paragraphs 65-67:
The factual context we are dealing with in the present instance is that of requests for personal information concerning lawful investigations. Given the nature of the bank in question, the mere revealing of the existence or non-existence of information is in itself an act of disclosure: a disclosure that the requesting party is or is not the subject of an investigation.
In these factual circumstances, the particular nature and purpose of the Act and subsection 16(2) indicate that it was a reasonable exercise of discretion to adopt a general policy of never confirming the existence of information in the bank in question. Elsewhere in the Act, the government has been given a wide scope for protecting secrecy of law enforcement related banks where secrecy is deemed appropriate. By providing the option under subsection 16(2) of refusing to confirm or deny the existence of personal information, Parliament offered one more such mechanism, allowing government institutions the possibility of maintaining not just the content but also the existence of records confidential. In the cat-and-mouse games that spies and criminals play with law enforcement agencies, for the agency to feel bound to reveal information in certain circumstances could create opportunities for educated guesses as to the contents of information banks based on a pattern of responses. To adopt a generalized policy of always refusing to confirm the existence of personal information eliminates this threat.
Given the particular context and legislative intent we are dealing with here, it seems appropriate that discretion not be exercised on a case-by-case basis in relation to the bank in question.
[1] However, the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the trial judge had properly considered if section 22(1)(a) had been properly invoked. As it stated at paragraph 83:
In fairness to the reviewing Judge, there were many exemptions claimed by three federal authorities. He managed remarkably well to regroup them and avoid repetitions. His failure to mention paragraph 22(1)(a) is most likely an oversight. However, his conclusions as stated leave us with a lingering doubt as to whether he has in fact gone to the second step of reviewing the exercise of discretion by the DEA with respect to the paragraph 22(1)(a) exemption. In these circumstances and in view of the objectives of the Act, a paramount one being to provide access to a citizen to personal information held by the government, we believe a new review should be conducted with respect to the paragraph 22(1)(a) exemption.
[2] As can be seen from the quote in paragraph 11 above, the Court of Appeal established that the determination as to whether an exemption has been properly invoked involves a two stage test.
[3] The first question that needs to be answered is: was it reasonable for the head of the DEA to conclude that the information in question fell within section 22(1)(a) of the Act?
[4] The description of Bank 40 held by the DEA as published in the Personal Information Index pursuant to section 11 of the Act reads as follows:
Personal Information Disclosed to Federal Investigative Bodies
Description: In accordance with subsection 8(4) of the Privacy Act this bank has been established to retain copies of request received from authorized federal investigative bodies for personal information pursuant to paragraph 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act, for the purpose of enforcing a law of Canada or a province or carrying out a lawful investigation.
Class of Individuals: Individuals about whom requests for personal information have been received pursuant to paragraph 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act from federal investigative bodies for the purpose of enforcing a law of Canada or a province or carrying out a lawful investigation.
Purpose: The purpose of this bank is to permit the Privacy Commissioner to review disclosures made under paragraph 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act to federal investigative bodies for the purpose of enforcing a law of Canada or a province or carrying out a lawful investigation.
Retention and Disposal Standards: Records are retained for two years after completion of the request.
[5] The DEA has consistently followed a policy of refusing to disclose whether or not information about an applicant is contained in its Bank 40. The rationale for this policy was set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the public affidavit of Mr. Johnson, the Access to Information Coordinator of the DEA, where he stated:
It is my belief, based on my discussions with the coordinators at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, that disclosure of whether a record exists or not in Personal Information Bank DEA/P-PU-040 could jeopardize the conduct of sensitive ongoing investigations by alerting the Requester to the fact that he is the subject of an investigation. Therefore, like my predecessors, I have concluded that unless the Department of External Affairs consistently refuses to confirm whether or not information exists in Personal Information Bank DEA/P-PU-040, it would be a simple exercise through a series of Privacy Act requests to determine whether or not information exists by looking for a pattern to the responses.
More simplistically, if a group of individuals were to make the same request for access to Personal Information Bank DEA/P-PU-040, and if the Department was to respond to each requester differently according to whether personal information exists in the bank or not, then a comparison by the individuals of responses received from the Department would reveal to the group which individuals have a record with Bank DEA/P-PU-040. For example, if the Department's response to those individuals where no record exists was that no record about the individual exists in that bank and, to those individuals where a record does exist, was that the Department is not prepared to confirm or deny the existence of the information requested, a comparison o the different Department responses would reveal which individuals have a record in Bank DEA/P-PU-040.
[6] Given the nature of the information contained in Bank 40, the sources from which such information is obtained and the compelling logic the department's policy as set out by Mr. Johnson, it was reasonable for the head of DEA to invoke the exemption set out in section 22(1)(a) of the Act.
[7] The second question that needs to be answered is: did the head of the DEA properly exercise his discretion given all of the circumstances of the case?
[8] To review this exercise of discretion, the court needs to consider:
a) whether the information comes from an investigative body specified in the regulations,
b) whether it meets the three criteria set out in clauses (i) to (iii) of subparagraph 22(1)(a) of the Act, and
c) the age of the information.
[9] I have examined the secret affidavit of Mr. Johnson and listened to the ex parte submissions of counsel for the DEA. There is nothing in the evidence that gives me grounds to find that conditions a) and b) of the foregoing paragraph have not been met.
[10] The relevant time for consideration is the date when the Head of the DEA made his decision, namely 1990. It would be absurd to review his decision from today's perspective i.e. 14 years later. The head of a department can only exercise his discretion on the facts and circumstances that are known to him as of the date he makes his decision. Again, there is nothing in the evidence that gives me grounds to find that condition c) of the foregoing paragraph 24 was not considered.
[11] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the conditions for invoking section 22(1)(a) of the Act were met and that the Head of the DEA properly exercised his discretion.
Issue 2: Was the exemption claimed pursuant to section 19 of the Act with respect to Banks 10 and 15 of CSIS properly applied?
[12] Pursuant to section 19 of the Act, the head of a department is obliged to refuse to disclose information obtained from another government unless it obtains their consent to disclosure. In its decision, the Court of Appeal directed a new review of whether or not this section was properly invoked by CSIS at paragraphs 110-111 by stating:
...a request by an applicant to the head of a government institution to have access to personal information about him includes a request to the head of that government institution to make reasonable efforts to seek the consent of the third party who provided the information... Political and practical considerations pertaining, among others, to the nature and volume of the information may make it impractical to seek consent on a case-by-case basis and lead to the establishment of protocols which respect the spirit and the letter of the Act and the exemptions...
... we believe that the respondent's claim under section 19 of the Act to a valid exemption from disclosure of the personal information requested by the appellant in banks 010 and 015 should be reviewed in accordance with our interpretation of subsection 19(2). This means that the reviewing judge ought to ensure that CSIS has made reasonable efforts to seek the consent of the third party who provided the requested information. If need be, a reasonable period of time should be given by the reviewing Judge to CSIS to comply with the consent requirement of paragraph 19(2)(a).
[13] To establish whether or not reasonable efforts were made to seek the required consent, the respondent furnished affidavits by CSIS employees Mr. MacEwan and Ms. Jalbert. The public affidavit of Mr. MacEwan states in paragraph 38 that some of the information in Bank 15 was obtained in confidence from the government or institution of foreign states. Ms. Jalbert's Public Affidavit in paragraph 10 states that these bodies were consulted in a manner consistent with established protocols but refused to grant the applicant disclosure of the information. Further, I carefully examined Ms. Jalbert's Supplementary Confidential Affidavit which confirms the names of the bodies in question and sets out the nature of the consultations which occurred.
[14] On the basis of this evidence, I am satisfied that reasonable efforts were made to seek the consent of the third party who provided the requested information.
[15] Parenthetically, it should be noted that for all the information exempted under section 19 more than one exemption provision of the Act was also claimed. Thus, even if I had found that consent was not properly sought (which I did not), this would still not have resulted in disclosure of information as other grounds were also applicable and had been upheld by MacKay J.
Issue 3. Was the exemption claimed pursuant to section of 26 the Act with respect to Banks 10 and 15 of CSIS properly applied?
[16] Sections 26 and 8 of the Act prohibit the disclosure of information relating to a third party unless the third party consents to the disclosure or such disclosure is otherwise justified. Subclause 8(2)(m)(i) describes one circumstance in which disclosure without consent may be justified, namely:
for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head of the institution,
(i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure
[17] The Court of Appeal found that section 26 and subclause 8(2)(m)(i) require the head of a government institution to engage in a discretionary balancing of the public interest and privacy. The term "privacy" as set out in subclause 8(2)(m)(i) may be understood in a specific, individualized manner or as a general broadly conceived policy goal. In this regard, the Court of Appeal found at paragraph 123 that:
The two ways of conceiving of privacy create some flexibility in the manner of exercising discretion under subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i). Generally, the most obvious way for the institutions head to exercise his or hr discretion will be by inquiring into the impact of disclosure upon the privacy of those individual third parties specifically named in the requested information. At other times, it might be appropriate to deal with the privacy interest at a more abstract level so as to weigh it against the public's interest in disclosure. The latter approach may at times be an equally valid exercise of the broad discretion conferred upon the head of a government institution. The extent to which the privacy interest ought to be considered in a more or less specific form will depend largely on the facts surrounding each request.
[18] The Court of Appeal concluded that it was unclear from the decision of MacKay J. whether or not he had conducted the required balancing exercise and mandated in paragraph 125 that:
there should be a new review of the personal information requested in Banks 010 and 015 for the purpose of determining whether the exemption in s. 26 of the Act had been properly applied by CSIS.
[19] By its nature, Bank 10 contains such sensitive information about current investigations that CSIS has refused to confirm or deny, pursuant to section 16 of the Act, whether or not the Bank contains any information about the applicant. Given the sensitivity of this information, which was not questioned by either Mackay J. or the Court of Appeal, it would be quite illogical, if not perverse, to come to the conclusion that 'the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy' (in the sense of a general, broadly conceived policy goal).
[20] With respect to Bank 15 the situation is different. This bank contains information on non-current investigations. Four batches of information from this bank, consisting of 41, 71, 4 and 211 pages, some information blacked out, were released to the applicant. According to the affidavit of Mr. MacEwan, the balance was not disclosed because it would reveal:
(a) the names or identities of current and former human sources utilized by the RCMP and CSIS as well as any information from which the identity of human sources could be derived;
(b) technical sources used by the RCMP and CSIS;
(c) identification of both groups and individuals who were investigated by the RCMP and, in some cases, who continue to be investigated by CSIS;
(d) information which would clearly reveal the extent to which the RCMP was, and CSIS is now, aware of the activities of targets and the scope of its interest in them;
(e) the depth, development and sophistication of the resources employed, as well as the degree of expertise of the RCMP or of CSIS;
(f) the effectiveness fo RCMP and CSIS investigations; and,
(g) internal procedures used by the RCMP and those now used by CSIS to maintain, correlate and transmit information such as: file numbers and categories; cross-referencing methods; extracting methods; methods of constructing reports; process of assessing raw information; and cryptographic systems used for communication.
MacEwan Public Affidavit, paragraphs 54,
[21] The MacEwan public affidavit also points out:
- Most of the information which has not been disclosed to the applicant is not in fact personal information about the applicant and is therefore not information to which he has a prima facie right of access under the Privacy Act.
MacEwan Public Affidavit, paragraphs 40, 43.
- Most of the information is personal information about other individuals.
MacEwan Public Affidavit, paragraphs 40, 43.
- All of the information is exempt by virtue of a number of other exemptions, including sections 19 (information received from a foreign government, international organization of states or provincial or municipal government in confidence), 21 (information injurious to international affairs or defence, preventing or suppressing subversive or hostile activities, 22(1)(1) (information pertaining to activities suspected of constituting threats tot he security of Canada) and 22(1)(b) (information injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or to the conduct of lawful investigations).
MacEwan Public Affidavit, paragraphs 14, 16, 17, 19.
- The potential and probability for injury, together with expectation of privacy and the sensitivity of the information, support the decision not to disclose the personal information which is not about the Applicant.
MacEwan Public Affidavit, paragraph 40.
[22] A supplementary secret affidavit by Mr. MacEwan provides copies of all documents in Bank 15 which were not disclosed, a correlation between the documents and the injury anticipated if such information were to be released, as well as an explanation as to why the information was exempt from disclosure.
[23] I examined the supplementary secret affidavit and its appended information carefully. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 35 and 36 above, and on the basis of the evidence contained in the secret affidavit of Mr. MacEwan, I am satisfied that all of the information either partially excised from the pages released to the applicant or exempted from disclosure is of such a nature that it cannot be said that 'the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy' (in the sense of a general, broadly conceived policy goal).
[24]To the extend that non personal information was appended to the secret affidavit, it contained no reference to Mr.Ruby and therefore, quite properly, was also not disclosed in response to this request under the Privacy Act.
CONCLUSION
[25] Accordingly, this application is denied. I am not convinced that this review raised any new principles within the meaning of section 52(2) of the Act. However, given that this was a rehearing mandated by the Court of Appeal, I feel it would be unfair to award costs against the losing party. Consequently, there will be no order as to costs.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the application be dismissed.
"K. von Finckenstein"
Judge
| ANNEX A
Disclosure of personal information
8. (1) Personal information under the control of a government institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates, be disclosed by the institution except in accordance with this section.
Where personal information may be disclosed
(2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the control of a government institution may be disclosed
(a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose;
(b) for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any regulation made thereunder that authorizes its disclosure;
(c) for the purpose of complying with a subpoena or warrant issued or order made by a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information or for the purpose of complying with rules of court relating to the production of information;
(d) to the Attorney General of Canada for use in legal proceedings involving the Crown in right of Canada or the Government of Canada;
(e) to an investigative body specified in the regulations, on the written request of the body, for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada or a province or carrying out a lawful investigation, if the request specifies the purpose and describes the information to be disclosed;
(f) under an agreement or arrangement between the Government of Canada or an institution thereof and the government of a province, the government of a foreign state, an international organization of states or an international organization established by the governments of states, or any institution of any such government or organization, for the purpose of administering or enforcing any law or carrying out a lawful investigation;
(g) to a member of Parliament for the purpose of assisting the individual to whom the information relates in resolving a problem;
(h) to officers or employees of the institution for internal audit purposes, or to the office of the Comptroller General or any other person or body specified in the regulations for audit purposes;
(i) to the National Archives of Canada for archival purposes;
(j) to any person or body for research or statistical purposes if the head of the government institution
(i) is satisfied that the purpose for which the information is disclosed cannot reasonably be accomplished unless the information is provided in a form that would identify the individual to whom it relates, and
(ii) obtains from the person or body a written undertaking that no subsequent disclosure of the information will be made in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual to whom it relates;
(k) to any aboriginal government, association of aboriginal people, Indian band, government institution or part thereof, or to any person acting on behalf of such government, association, band, institution or part thereof, for the purpose of researching or validating the claims, disputes or grievances of any of the aboriginal peoples of Canada;
(l) to any government institution for the purpose of locating an individual in order to collect a debt owing to Her Majesty in right of Canada by that individual or make a payment owing to that individual by Her Majesty in right of Canada; and
(m) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head of the institution,
(i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure, or
(ii) disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates.
Personal information disclosed by National Archives
(3) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the custody or control of the National Archivist of Canada that has been transferred to the National Archivist by a government institution for archival or historical purposes may be disclosed in accordance with the regulations to any person or body for research or statistical purposes.
Copies of requests under paragraph (2)(e) to be retained
(4) The head of a government institution shall retain a copy of every request received by the government institution under paragraph (2)(e) for such period of time as may be prescribed by regulation, shall keep a record of any information disclosed pursuant to the request for such period of time as may be prescribed by regulation and shall, on the request of the Privacy Commissioner, make those copies and records available to the Privacy Commissioner.
Notice of disclosure under paragraph (2)(m)
(5) The head of a government institution shall notify the Privacy Commissioner in writing of any disclosure of personal information under paragraph (2)(m) prior to the disclosure where reasonably practicable or in any other case forthwith on the disclosure, and the Privacy Commissioner may, if the Commissioner deems it appropriate, notify the individual to whom the information relates of the disclosure.
Definition of "Indian band"
(6) In paragraph (2)(k), "Indian band" means
(a) a band, as defined in the Indian Act;
(b) a band, as defined in the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, chapter 18 of the Statutes of Canada, 1984;
(c) the Band, as defined in the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, chapter 27 of the Statutes of Canada, 1986; or
(d) a first nation named in Schedule II to the Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act.
Definition of "aboriginal government"
(7) The expression "aboriginal government" in paragraph (2)(k) means Nisga'a Government, as defined in the Nisga'a Final Agreement given effect by the Nisga'a Final Agreement Act.
Where access is refused
16. (1) Where the head of a government institution refuses to give access to any personal information requested under subsection 12(1), the head of the institution shall state in the notice given under paragraph 14(a)
(a) that the personal information does not exist, or
(b) the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal was based or the provision on which a refusal could reasonably be expected to be based if the information existed, and shall state in the notice that the individual who made the request has a right to make a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner about the refusal.
Existence not required to be disclosed
(2) The head of a government institution may but is not required to indicate under subsection (1) whether personal information exists.
Deemed refusal to give access
(3) Where the head of a government institution fails to give access to any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) within the time limits set out in this Act, the head of the institution shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have refused to give access.
Personal information obtained in confidence
19. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) that was obtained in confidence from
(a) the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof;
(b) an international organization of states or an institution thereof;
(c) the government of a province or an institution thereof; or
(d) a municipal or regional government established by or pursuant to an Act of the legislature of a province or an institution of such a government.
Where disclosure authorized
(2) The head of a government institution may disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) that was obtained from any government, organization or institution described in subsection (1) if the government, organization or institution from which the information was obtained
(a) consents to the disclosure; or
(b) makes the information public.
International affairs and defence
21. The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, as defined in subsection 15(2) of the Access to Information Act, or the efforts of Canada toward detecting, preventing or suppressing subversive or hostile activities, as defined in subsection 15(2) of the Access to Information Act, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information listed in paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (i) of the Access to Information Act.
Law enforcement and investigation
22. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1)
(a) that was obtained or prepared by any government institution, or part of any government institution, that is an investigative body specified in the regulations in the course of lawful investigations pertaining to
(i) the detection, prevention or suppression of crime,
(ii) the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province, or
(iii) activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada within the meaning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, if the information came into existence less than twenty years prior to the request;
(b) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information
(i) relating to the existence or nature of a particular investigation,
(ii) that would reveal the identity of a confidential source of information, or
(iii) that was obtained or prepared in the course of an investigation; or
(c) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the security of penal institutions.
Policing services for provinces or municipalities
(2) The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) that was obtained or prepared by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while performing policing services for a province or municipality pursuant to an arrangement made under section 20 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, where the Government of Canada has, on the request of the province or municipality, agreed not to disclose such information.
Definition of "investigation"
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), "investigation" means an investigation that
(a) pertains to the administration or enforcement of an Act of Parliament;
(b) is authorized by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament; or
(c) is within a class of investigations specified in the regulations.
Information about another individual
26. The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) about an individual other than the individual who made the request, and shall refuse to disclose such information where the disclosure is prohibited under section 8.
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Communication des renseignements personnels
8. (1) Les renseignements personnels qui relèvent d'une institution fédérale ne peuvent être communiqués, à défaut du consentement de l'individu qu'ils concernent, que conformément au présent article.
Cas d'autorisation
(2) Sous réserve d'autres lois fédérales, la communication des renseignements personnels qui relèvent d'une institution fédérale est autorisée dans les cas suivants_:
a) communication aux fins auxquelles ils ont été recueillis ou préparés par l'institution ou pour les usages qui sont compatibles avec ces fins;
b) communication aux fins qui sont conformes avec les lois fédérales ou ceux de leurs règlements qui autorisent cette communication; c) communication exigée par subpoena, mandat ou ordonnance d'un tribunal, d'une personne ou d'un organisme ayant le pouvoir de contraindre à la production de renseignements ou exigée par des règles de procédure se rapportant à la production de renseignements;
d) communication au procureur général du Canada pour usage dans des poursuites judiciaires intéressant la Couronne du chef du Canada ou le gouvernement fédéral;
e) communication à un organisme d'enquête déterminé par règlement et qui en fait la demande par écrit, en vue de faire respecter des lois fédérales ou provinciales ou pour la tenue d'enquêtes licites, pourvu que la demande précise les fins auxquelles les renseignements sont destinés et la nature des renseignements demandés;
f) communication aux termes d'accords ou d'ententes conclus d'une part entre le gouvernement du Canada ou un de ses organismes et, d'autre part, le gouvernement d'une province ou d'un État étranger, une organisation internationale d'États ou de gouvernements, ou un de leurs organismes, en vue de l'application des lois ou pour la tenue d'enquêtes licites;
g) communication à un parlementaire fédéral en vue d'aider l'individu concerné par les renseignements à résoudre un problème;
h) communication pour vérification interne au personnel de l'institution ou pour vérification comptable au bureau du contrôleur général ou à toute personne ou tout organisme déterminé par règlement;
i) communication aux Archives nationales du Canada pour dépôt;
j) communication à toute personne ou à tout organisme, pour des travaux de recherche ou de statistique, pourvu que soient réalisées les deux conditions suivantes_:
(i) le responsable de l'institution est convaincu que les fins auxquelles les renseignements sont communiqués ne peuvent être normalement atteintes que si les renseignements sont donnés sous une forme qui permette d'identifier l'individu qu'ils concernent,
(ii) la personne ou l'organisme s'engagent par écrit auprès du responsable de l'institution à s'abstenir de toute communication ultérieure des renseignements tant que leur forme risque vraisemblablement de permettre l'identification de l'individu qu'ils concernent;
k) communication à tout gouvernement autochtone, association d'autochtones, bande d'Indiens, institution fédérale ou subdivision de celle-ci, ou à leur représentant, en vue de l'établissement des droits des peuples autochtones ou du règlement de leurs griefs;
l) communication à toute institution fédérale en vue de joindre un débiteur ou un créancier de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada et de recouvrer ou d'acquitter la créance;
m) communication à toute autre fin dans les cas où, de l'avis du responsable de l'institution_:
(i) des raisons d'intérêt public justifieraient nettement une éventuelle violation de la vie privée,
(ii) l'individu concerné en tirerait un avantage certain.
Communication de renseignements personnels par les Archives nationales
(3) Sous réserve des autres lois fédérales, les renseignements personnels qui relèvent des Archives nationales du Canada et qui y ont été versés pour dépôt ou à des fins historiques par une institution fédérale peuvent être communiqués conformément aux règlements pour des travaux de recherche ou de statistique.
Copie des demandes faites en vertu de l'al. (2)e)
(4) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale conserve, pendant la période prévue par les règlements, une copie des demandes reçues par l'institution en vertu de l'alinéa (2)e) ainsi qu'une mention des renseignements communiqués et, sur demande, met cette copie et cette mention à la disposition du Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée.
Avis de communication dans le cas de l'al. (2)m)
(5) Dans le cas prévu à l'alinéa (2)m), le responsable de l'institution fédérale concernée donne un préavis écrit de la communication des renseignements personnels au Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée si les circonstances le justifient; sinon, il en avise par écrit le Commissaire immédiatement après la communication. La décision de mettre au courant l'individu concerné est laissée à l'appréciation du Commissaire.
Définition de « bande d'Indiens »
(6) L'expression « bande d'Indiens » à l'alinéa (2)k) désigne_: a) soit une bande au sens de la Loi sur les Indiens;
b) soit une bande au sens de la Loi sur les Cris et les Naskapis du Québec, chapitre 18 des Statuts du Canada de 1984;
c) soit la bande au sens de la Loi sur l'autonomie gouvernementale de la bande indienne sechelte, chapitre 27 des Statuts du Canada de 1986;
d) la première nation dont le nom figure à l'annexe II de la Loi sur l'autonomie gouvernementale des premières nations du Yukon.
Définition de « _gouvernement autochtone_ »
(7) L'expression « _gouvernement autochtone_ » à l'alinéa (2)k) s'entend du gouvernement nisga'a, au sens de l'Accord définitif nisga'a mis en vigueur par la Loi sur l'Accord définitif nisga'a.
Refus de communication
16. (1) En cas de refus de communication de renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1), l'avis prévu à l'alinéa 14a) doit mentionner, d'une part, le droit de la personne qui a fait la demande de déposer une plainte auprès du Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée et, d'autre part_:
a) soit le fait que le dossier n'existe pas;
b) soit la disposition précise de la présente loi sur laquelle se fonde le refus ou sur laquelle il pourrait vraisemblablement se fonder si les renseignements existaient.
Dispense de divulgation de l'existence du document
(2) Le paragraphe (1) n'oblige pas le responsable de l'institution fédérale à faire état de l'existence des renseignements personnels demandés.
Présomption de refus
(3) Le défaut de communication de renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) dans les délais prévus par la présente loi vaut décision de refus de communication.
Renseignements personnels obtenus à titre confidentiel
19. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication des renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) qui ont été obtenus à titre confidentiel_:
a) des gouvernements des États étrangers ou de leurs organismes;
b) des organisations internationales d'États ou de leurs organismes;
c) des gouvernements provinciaux ou de leurs organismes;
d) des administrations municipales ou régionales constituées en vertu de lois provinciales ou de leurs organismes.
Cas où la divulgation est autorisée
(2) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut donner communication des renseignements personnels visés au paragraphe (1) si le gouvernement, l'organisation, l'administration ou l'organisme qui les a fournis_:
a) consent à la communication;
b) rend les renseignements publics.
Affaires internationales et défense
21. Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication des renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de porter préjudice à la conduite des affaires internationales, à la défense du Canada ou d'États alliés ou associés avec le Canada, au sens du paragraphe 15(2) de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information, ou à ses efforts de détection, de prévention ou de répression d'activités hostiles ou subversives, au sens du paragraphe 15(2) de la même loi, notamment les renseignements visés à ses alinéas 15(1)a) à i).
Enquêtes
22. (1) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication des renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1)_:
a) soit qui remontent à moins de vingt ans lors de la demande et qui ont été obtenus ou préparés par une institution fédérale, ou par une subdivision d'une institution, qui constitue un organisme d'enquête déterminé par règlement, au cours d'enquêtes licites ayant trait_:
(i) à la détection, la prévention et la répression du crime,
(ii) aux activités destinées à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales,
(iii) aux activités soupçonnées de constituer des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada au sens de la Loi sur le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité;
b) soit dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de nuire aux activités destinées à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales ou au déroulement d'enquêtes licites, notamment_:
(i) des renseignements relatifs à l'existence ou à la nature d'une enquête déterminée,
(ii) des renseignements qui permettraient de remonter à une source de renseignements confidentielle,
(iii) des renseignements obtenus ou préparés au cours d'une enquête; c) soit dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de nuire à la sécurité des établissements pénitentiaires.
Fonctions de police provinciale ou municipale
(2) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication des renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) qui ont été obtenus ou préparés par la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, dans l'exercice de fonctions de police provinciale ou municipale, qui lui sont conférées par une entente conclue sous le régime de l'article 20 de la Loi sur la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, si, à la demande de la province ou de la municipalité, le gouvernement du Canada a consenti à ne pas divulguer ces renseignements.
Définition de « enquête »
(3) Pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)b), « enquête » s'entend de celle qui_:
a) se rapporte à l'application d'une loi fédérale;
b) est autorisée sous le régime d'une loi fédérale;
c) fait partie d'une catégorie d'enquêtes précisée dans les règlements.
Renseignements concernant un autre individu
26. Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication des renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) qui portent sur un autre individu que celui qui fait la demande et il est tenu de refuser cette communication dans les cas où elle est interdite en vertu de l'article 8.
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FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-638-91
STYLE OF CAUSE: Clayton Charles Ruby v. The Solicitor General of Canada
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: Wednesday, April 14, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER and ORDER : The Honourable Mr. Justice von Finckenstein
DATED: April 29, 2004
APPEARANCES:
Ms. Breese Davies FOR APPLICANT
Ms. Barbara McIsaac, Q.C. FOR RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Ruby & Edwardh FOR APPLICANT
Toronto, Ontario
McCarthy Tétrault LLP FOR RESPONDENT
Ottawa, Ontario