Date: 20040603
Docket: T-1672-02
Citation: 2004 FC 775
Toronto, Ontario, June 3rd, 2004
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Campbell
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL TESSIER
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Almost two years ago, a panel of the National Parole Board (the "Board") denied the Applicant the opportunity to make an argument that he was entitled to "accelerated parole" under the provisions of the then and now current Corrections and Conditional Release Act, 1992, c.20 as amended, (the "Act") and Corrections and Conditional Release Act Regulations, SOR/92-620, (the "Regulations"). In the present application, the Applicant challenges that decision, but also argues that the provisions referred to worked to offend his s.7 rights under the Charter.
[2] While the legal issues in the present case can have no present practical effect on the Applicant, and while I do have the discretion to refuse to hear this application since the Applicant did not exhaust his appeal rights before the Appeal Division of the National Parole Board (see Condo v. Canada, [2003] F.C.J. No. 310, 2003 FCA 99, Docket A-55-03), Counsel for the Respondent has not argued that the issues are moot, and I choose to exercise my discretion in rendering a decision.
[3] For the reasons which follow, I find that the Board was correct in refusing to hear the argument and, while the Applicant's s.7 rights were engaged at that time, they were not breached.
A. Factual outline
[4] On September 13, 2001, the Applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 10 months imprisonment for the offence of conspiracy to commit robbery which occurred on October 1, 1999. On December 24, 2001, amendments to the Act came into effect which had the effect of creating a more stringent standard for the granting of parole for persons serving a sentence for this offence. On September 6, 2002, the Applicant appeared before the Board to be considered for day parole and full parole. At that time, Counsel for the Applicant made a request of the Board to consider an argument that the Applicant should be considered for parole under the Act as it read before the amendments came into effect. The Board refused this request on the jurisdictional point that, since it had not received a referral on the issue of accelerated parole from the Corrections Service of Canada, it was not prepared to get involved in the issue.
B. The Accelerated Parole Review (APR) provisions in issue
[5] The provisions which raise the Applicant's objection are ss.125 and 126 of the Act which read as follows:
| 125. (1) This section and section 126 apply to an offender sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary for the first time, otherwise than pursuant to an agreement entered into under paragraph 16(1)(b), other than an offender
(a) serving a sentence for one of the following offences, namely,
(i) murder,
(ii) an offence set out in Schedule I or a conspiracy to commit such an offence,
(ii.1) an offence under section 83.02 (providing or collecting property for certain activities), 83.03 (providing, making available, etc. property or services for terrorist purposes), 83.04 (using or possessing property for terrorist purposes), 83.18 (participation in activity of terrorist group), 83.19 (facilitating terrorist activity), 83.2 (to carry out activity for terrorist group), 83.21 (instructing to carry out activity for terrorist group), 83.22 (instructing to carry out terrorist activity) or 83.23 (harbouring or concealing) of the Criminal Code or a conspiracy to commit such an offence,
(iii) an offence under section 463 of the Criminal Code that was prosecuted by indictment in relation to an offence set out in Schedule I, other than the offence set out in paragraph (1)(q) of that Schedule,
(iv) an offence set out in Schedule II in respect of which an order has been made under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code,
(v) an offence contrary to section 130 of the National Defence Act where the offence is murder, an offence set out in Schedule I or an offence set out in Schedule II in respect of which an order has been made under section 140.4 of the National Defence Act, or
(vi) a criminal organization offence within the meaning of section 2 of the Criminal Code, including an offence under subsection 82(2);
(a.1) convicted of an offence under section 240 of the Criminal Code;
(b) serving a life sentence imposed otherwise than as a minimum punishment; or
(c) whose day parole has been revoked.
(1.1) For greater certainty, this section and section 126
(a) apply to an offender referred to in subsection (1) who, after being sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary for the first time, is sentenced in respect of an offence, other than an offence referred to in paragraph (1)(a), that was committed before the offender was sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary for the first time; and
(b) do not apply to an offender referred to in subsection (1) who, after being sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary for the first time, commits an offence under an Act of Parliament for which the offender receives an additional sentence.
(2) The Service shall, at the time prescribed by the regulations, review the case of an offender to whom this section applies for the purpose of referral of the case to the Board for a determination under section 126. (3) A review made pursuant to subsection (2) shall be based on all reasonably available information that is relevant, including
(a) the social and criminal history of the offender obtained pursuant to section 23;
(b) information relating to the performance and behaviour of the offender while under sentence; and
(c) any information that discloses a potential for violent behaviour by the offender.
(4) On completion of a review pursuant to subsection (2), the Service shall, within such period as is prescribed by the regulations preceding the offender's eligibility date for full parole, refer the case to the Board together with all information that, in its opinion, is relevant to the case.
(5) The Service may delegate to the correctional authorities of a province its powers under this section in relation to offenders who are serving their sentences in provincial correctional facilities in that province.
126. (1) The Board shall review without a hearing, at or before the time prescribed by the regulations, the case of an offender referred to it pursuant to section 125.
(2) Notwithstanding section 102, if the Board is satisfied that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the offender, if released, is likely to commit an offence involving violence before the expiration of the offender's sentence according to law, it shall direct that the offender be released on full parole.
(3) If the Board does not direct, pursuant to subsection (2), that the offender be released on full parole, it shall report its refusal to so direct, and its reasons, to the offender.
(4) The Board shall refer any refusal and reasons reported to the offender pursuant to subsection (3) to a panel of members other than those who reviewed the case under subsection (1), and the panel shall review the case at the time prescribed by the regulations.
(5) Notwithstanding section 102, if the panel reviewing a case pursuant to subsection (4) is satisfied as described in subsection (2), the panel shall direct that the offender be released on full parole.
(6) An offender who is not released on full parole pursuant to subsection (5) is entitled to subsequent reviews in accordance with subsection 123(5).
(7) In this section, "offence involving violence" means murder or any offence set out in Schedule I, but, in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offender is likely to commit an offence involving violence, it is not necessary to determine whether the offender is likely to commit any particular offence.
(8) Where the parole of an offender released pursuant to this section is terminated or revoked, the offender is not entitled to another review pursuant to this section.
126.1 Sections 125 and 126 apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to a review to determine if an offender referred to in subsection 119.1 should be released on day parole.
(Emphasis Added) |
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125. (1) Le présent article et l'article 126 s'appliquent aux délinquants condamnés ou transférés pour la première fois au pénitencier -- autrement qu'en vertu de l'accord visé au paragraphe 16(1) --, à l'exception de ceux :
a) qui y purgent une peine pour une des infractions suivantes :
(i) le meurtre,
(ii) une infraction mentionnée à l'annexe I ou un complot en vue d'en commettre une,
(ii.1) une infraction mentionnée aux articles 83.02 (fournir ou réunir des biens en vue de certains actes), 83.03 (fournir, rendre disponibles, etc. des biens ou services à des fins terroristes), 83.04 (utiliser ou avoir en sa possession des biens à des fins terroristes), 83.18 (participation à une activité d'un groupe terroriste), 83.19 (facilitation d'une activité terroriste), 83.2 (infraction au profit d'un groupe terroriste), 83.21 (charger une personne de se livrer à une activité pour un groupe terroriste), 83.22 (charger une personne de se livrer à une activité terroriste) ou 83.23 (héberger ou cacher) du Code criminel, ou un complot en vue d'en commettre une,
(iii) l'infraction prévue à l'article 463 du Code criminel et relative à une infraction mentionnée à l'annexe I -- sauf celle qui est prévue à l'alinéa (1)q) de celle-ci -- et ayant fait l'objet d'une poursuite par mise en accusation,
(iv) une infraction mentionnée à l'annexe II et sanctionnée par une peine ayant fait l'objet d'une ordonnance rendue en vertu de l'article 743.6 du Code criminel,
(v) le meurtre, lorsqu'il constitue une infraction à l'article 130 de la Loi sur la défense nationale, une infraction mentionnée à l'annexe I ou une infraction mentionnée à l'annexe II pour laquelle une ordonnance a été rendue en vertu de l'article 140.4 de la Loi sur la défense nationale,
(vi) un acte de gangstérisme, au sens de l'article 2 du Code criminel, y compris l'infraction visée au paragraphe 82(2);
a.1) qui ont été déclarés coupables de l'infraction visée à l'article 240 du Code criminel;
b) qui purgent une peine d'emprisonnement à perpétuité à condition que cette peine n'ait pas constitué un minimum en l'occurrence;
c) dont la semi-liberté a été révoquée.
(1.1) Il est entendu que le présent article et l'article 126 :
a) s'appliquent aux délinquants visés au paragraphe (1) et qui, après leur condamnation ou leur transfèrement au pénitencier pour la première fois, sont condamnés pour une infraction -- autre qu'une infraction visée à l'alinéa (1)a) -- commise avant cette condamnation ou ce transfert;
b) ne s'appliquent pas aux délinquants visés au paragraphe (1) et qui, après leur condamnation ou leur transfèrement au pénitencier pour la première fois, commettent une infraction à une loi fédérale pour laquelle une peine d'emprisonnement supplémentaire est infligée.
(2) Le Service procède, au cours de la période prévue par règlement, à l'étude des dossiers des délinquants visés par le présent article en vue de leur transmission à la Commission pour décision conformément à l'article 126. (3) L'étude du dossier se fonde sur tous les renseignements pertinents qui sont normalement disponibles, notamment :
a) les antécédents sociaux et criminels du délinquant obtenus en vertu de l'article 23;
b) l'information portant sur sa conduite pendant la détention;
c) tout autre renseignement révélant une propension à la violence de sa part.
(4) Au terme de l'étude, le Service transmet à la Commission, dans les délais réglementaires impartis mais avant la date d'admissibilité du délinquant à la libération conditionnelle totale, les renseignements qu'il juge utiles.
(5) Le Service peut déléguer aux autorités correctionnelles d'une province les pouvoirs que lui confère le présent article en ce qui concerne les délinquants qui purgent leur peine dans un établissement correctionnel de la province.
126. (1) La Commission procède sans audience, au cours de la période prévue par règlement ou antérieurement, à l'examen des dossiers transmis par le Service ou les autorités correctionnelles d'une province.
(2) Par dérogation à l'article 102, quand elle est convaincue qu'il n'existe aucun motif raisonnable de croire que le délinquant commettra une infraction accompagnée de violence s'il est remis en liberté avant l'expiration légale de sa peine, la Commission ordonne sa libération conditionnelle totale.
(3) Si elle est convaincue du contraire, la Commission communique au délinquant ses conclusions et motifs.
(4) La Commission transmet ses conclusions et motifs à un comité constitué de commissaires n'ayant pas déjà examiné le cas et chargé, au cours de la période prévue par règlement, du réexamen du dossier.
(5) Si le réexamen lui apporte la conviction précisée au paragraphe (2), le comité ordonne la libération conditionnelle totale du délinquant.
(6) Dans le cas contraire, la libération conditionnelle totale est refusée, le délinquant continuant toutefois d'avoir droit au réexamen de son dossier selon les modalités prévues au paragraphe 123(5).
(7) Pour l'application du présent article, une infraction accompagnée de violence s'entend du meurtre ou de toute infraction mentionnée à l'annexe I; toutefois, il n'est pas nécessaire, en déterminant s'il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire que le délinquant en commettra une, de préciser laquelle.
(8) En cas de révocation ou de cessation de la libération conditionnelle, le délinquant perd le bénéfice de la procédure expéditive.
126.1 Les articles 125 et 126 s'appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, à la procédure d'examen expéditif visant à déterminer si la semi-liberté sera accordée au délinquant visé à l'article 119.1. |
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[6] The terms of s.102 referred to in s.126(2) are important to note:
| 102. The Board or a provincial parole board may grant parole to an offender if, in its opinion,
(a) the offender will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society before the expiration according to law of the sentence the offender is serving; and
(b) the release of the offender will contribute to the protection of society by facilitating the reintegration of the offender into society as a law-abiding citizen. |
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102. La Commission et les commissions provinciales peuvent autoriser la libération conditionnelle si elles sont d'avis qu'une récidive du délinquant avant l'expiration légale de la peine qu'il purge ne présentera pas un risque inacceptable pour la société et que cette libération contribuera à la protection de celle-ci en favorisant sa réinsertion sociale en tant que citoyen respectueux des lois. |
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[7] Thus, reading s.102, together with ss.125 and 126, the tests for granting parole eligibility are as follows: by s.102, without qualifying for accelerated parole under ss.125 and 126, the test for granting parole is proof that an offender will not present "an undue risk to society"; however, under the accelerated parole provisions, by s.126(2), a first time offender can be released on accelerated parole, if not excluded by operation of s.125(1)(a), (b) or (c), on the less stringent test of absence of reasonable grounds to believe that, if released, he or she is likely to commit an offence involving violence.
[8] The process for placing an Accelerated Parole Review before the Board is set out in s.159 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations (the "Regulations"):
| 159. (1) The Service shall review the case of an offender to whom section 125 of the Act applies within one month after the offender's admission to a penitentiary, or to a provincial correctional facility where the sentence is to be served in such a facility.
(2) The Service shall refer the case of an offender to the Board pursuant to subsection 125(4) of the Act not later than three months before the offender's eligibility date for full parole.
(3) The Board shall, pursuant to subsection 126(1) of the Act, review the case of an offender not later than seven weeks before the offender's eligibility date for full parole.
(4) A panel shall, pursuant to subsection 126(4) of the Act, review the case of an offender before the offender's eligibility date for full parole.
(Emphasis added) |
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159. (1) Le Service doit examiner le cas du délinquant visé à l'article 125 de la Loi dans le mois qui suit son admission dans un pénitencier ou dans un établissement correctionnel provincial lorsqu'il doit purger sa peine dans cet établissement.
(2) Le Service doit, conformément au paragraphe 125(4) de la Loi, transmettre à la Commission le cas du délinquant au plus tard trois mois avant la date de son admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle totale.
(3) La Commission doit, conformément au paragraphe 126(1) de la Loi, examiner le cas du délinquant au plus tard sept semaines avant la date de son admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle totale.
(4) Le comité doit, conformément au paragraphe 126(4) de la Loi, réexaminer le cas du délinquant avant la date de son admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle totale. |
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[9] The Applicant's complaint is that, even though he was a first time offender, since he was sentenced on a Schedule 1 offence he was excluded from taking advantage of the accelerated parole provisions by operation of s.125(1)(a)(ii). It is agreed that, if the Applicant was not excluded, apart from the issue of the test to be met, he would have been considered for parole some three months earlier than, in fact, he was.
C. The Charter challenge
[10] In his Notice of Constitutional Question dated February 4, 2003, the Applicant "questions the constitutional validity of S.C. 2001, c.41, s.94." The act cited is the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the provision cited amends the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to have s.125 read as cited above. As I understand it, at its essence, the Applicant's complaint is that the exclusion provisions in s.125, when read with s.126(2), are unfair in that they create a more stringent standard for parole for him. As a result, it is argued that the amending provision is invalid as it offends the Applicant's rights under s.7 of the Charter.
[11] Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Liberties, Constitution Act, 1982 reads as follows:
| 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. |
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7. Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu'en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale. |
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[12] The content of the Applicant's complaint is as follows:
At the time the Applicant was sentenced the offence of which he was convicted was one that would not disqualify him from APR status. On December 24th, 2001, The Parliament of Canada, via Bill C-36, changed the law, such that the commission of that offence would disqualify an offender from being considered an APR candidate. It is respectfully submitted that the Applicant and the state entered into an agreement whereby the Applicant would plead guilty and he would be sentenced according to the law; it is unfair for the state to now say: "We've changed our side of the bargain, you now have this sentence."
The Applicant argues that the law that governs his sentence is the law as it was when he committed the offence. The amendments that came about after that should not apply to him.
In the alternative, the Applicant argues that the law that governs is the law as it existed at the time of sentencing. (Applicant's Memorandum of Fact and Law, paras. 14, 15, and 16)
[13] Section 125 of the Act stipulates that its provisions apply to person's who are sentenced. Therefore, if s.125 survives the Charter challenge, the argument just quoted fails.
1. The arguments
[14] With respect to the question, the Applicant makes the following argument:
The Applicant submits that the amendment of the CCRA was a substantive change in the law and not a procedural change. As such a substantive change in the law the amendment to the CCRA is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.
Further the Applicant respectfully submits that he has suffered a deprivation of liberty sufficiently serious to warrant Charter protection. The Applicant submits that amendments to the CCRA changes his sentence beyond a mere change in how his sentence is to served but constitutes a fundamental change in the sentence itself such that the change is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. (Applicant's Memorandum of Fact and Law, paras. 17 and 18)
[15] In response, Counsel for the Respondent argues that Chief Justice McLachlin's decision in Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 is compelling authority and completely answers the Applicant's argument.
[16] In Cunningham, at the noted paragraphs, the Chief Justice outlines the facts and gives the s.7 analysis:
¶ 1 On February 14, 1981, the appellant was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for manslaughter following a brutal slaying in Chatham Head, New Brunswick. Under the Parole Act in force at the time of his sentencing, he was entitled to be released on mandatory supervision after serving approximately two-thirds of his sentence, on April 8, 1989, provided that he was of good behaviour.
¶ 2 In 1986 the Parole Act was amended to allow the Commissioner of Corrections, within six months of the "presumptive release date", to refer a case to the National Parole Board where he has reason to believe, on the basis of information obtained within those six months, that the inmate is likely, prior to the expiration of his sentence, to commit an offence causing death or serious harm: Parole Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-2, s. 21.3(3)(a)(ii) (ad. c. 34 (2nd Supp.), s. 5). The Parole Board may, if it sees fit, deny release of the inmate.
...
¶ 4 This, however, was not to be. Shortly before his release date, the appellant received a notice that the Commissioner had decided to seek the continued detention of the appellant under the 1986 amendments to the Parole Act. ...
¶ 5 Following a detention hearing, the appellant was ordered to be detained until his sentence expired on February 13, 1993, subject to annual reviews. ...
¶ 12 I do not find it useful to ask whether the liberty interest was "vested" or "not vested". The only questions which arise under the Charter are whether a protected liberty interest is limited, and if so, whether that limitation accords with the principles of fundamental justice. ...
...
¶ 15 I conclude that the appellant has suffered deprivation of liberty. The next question is whether the deprivation is sufficiently serious to warrant Charter protection. The Charter does not protect against insignificant or "trivial" limitations of rights: R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at p. 759 (per Dickson C.J.); R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at p. 314; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, at p. 259; Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at pp. 168-69. It follows that qualification of a prisoner's expectation of liberty does not necessarily bring the matter within the purview of s. 7 of the Charter. The qualification must be significant enough to warrant constitutional protection. To require that all changes to the manner in which a sentence is served be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice would trivialize the protections under the Charter. To quote Lamer J. in Dumas, supra, at p. 464, there must be a "substantial change in conditions amounting to a further deprivation of liberty".
...
¶ 17 Having concluded that the appellant has been deprived of a liberty interest protected by s. 7 of the Charter, we must determine whether this is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter. In my view, while the amendment of the Parole Act to eliminate automatic release on mandatory supervision restricted the appellant's liberty interest, it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice. The principles of fundamental justice are concerned not only with the interest of the person who claims his liberty [page152] has been limited, but with the protection of society. Fundamental justice requires that a fair balance be struck between these interests, both substantively and procedurally (see Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at pp. 502-3, per Lamer J.; Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at p. 212, per Wilson J.; Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 869, at p. 882, per Iacobucci J.). In my view the balance struck in this case conforms to this requirement.
¶ 18 The first question is whether, from a substantive point of view, the change in the law strikes the right balance between the accused's interests and the interests of society. The interest of society in being protected against the violence that may be perpetrated as a consequence of the early release of inmates whose sentence has not been fully served needs no elaboration. On the other side of the balance lies the prisoner's interest in an early conditional release.
¶ 19 The balance is struck by qualifying the prisoner's expectation regarding the form in which the sentence would be served. The expectation of mandatory release is modified by the amendment permitting a discretion to prevent early release where society's interests are endangered. A change in the form in which a sentence is served, whether it be favourable or unfavourable to the prisoner, is not, in itself, contrary to any principle of fundamental justice. Indeed, our system of justice has always permitted correctional authorities to make appropriate changes in how a sentence is served, whether the changes relate to place, conditions, training facilities, or treatment. Many changes in the conditions under which sentences are served occur on an administrative basis in response to the prisoner's immediate needs or behaviour. Other changes are more general. From time to time, for example, new approaches in correctional law are introduced by legislation or regulation. These initiatives [page153] change the manner in which some of the prisoners in the system serve their sentences.
¶ 20 The next question is whether the nature of this particular change in the rules as to the form in which the sentence would be served violates the Charter. In my view, it does not. The change is directly related to the public interest in protecting society from persons who may commit serious harm if released on mandatory supervision. Only if the Commissioner is satisfied on the facts before him that this may be the case can he refer the matter to the Parole Board for a hearing. And only if the Board is satisfied that there is a significant danger of recidivism can it order the prisoner's continued incarceration. Thus the prisoner's liberty interest is limited only to the extent that this is shown to be necessary for the protection of the public. It is difficult to dispute that it is just to afford a limited discretion for the review of parole applicants who may commit an offence causing serious harm or death. Substantively, the balance is fairly struck.
2. Conclusion
[17] In the present case, in the course of the oral hearing, Counsel for the Respondent admitted that by the challenged amendment, which introduced the exclusion which affected the Applicant's accelerated parole opportunity, the Applicant had been deprived of a liberty interest protected under s.7 of the Charter. However, the Respondent argues that the deprivation is not contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.
[18] In the present case, as in Cunningham, the balance to be considered is between the interest of the person who claims his liberty has been limited, and the protection of the public. In the present case, prior to the December 2001 amendments, the Applicant qualified for accelerated parole consideration. However, by the amendments to the Act, as he was placed in a category of persons, who, apparently in Parliament's opinion, are a danger to the public, the Applicant was excluded from accelerated parole consideration and, thereby, the benefit of a less stringent test for parole. As found in Cunningham, I find that the change is directly related to the public interest in protecting society from persons who may commit serious harm.
[19] In my opinion, the statutory change complained of does not violate the principles of fundamental justice. In the present case the balance tips in favour of society's interest in being satisfied that, even as first time offenders, persons who are potentially a danger to the public should not be given the concessions that the accelerated parole provisions provide.
[20] As a result, I dismiss the Charter challenge.
D. The Board's rejection
[21] There is no question that with the amendments in place, since the Applicant was sentenced on a Schedule 1 offence, the Applicant cannot take the benefits of accelerated parol provided in ss.125 and 126. In addition, by it's terms, the process in s.159 of the Regulations does not apply. Therefore, in my opinion, the Board was correct in its refusal to consider the argument placed before it.
ORDER
For the reasons provided, the present application is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.
"Douglas R. Campbell"
J.F.C.
FEDERAL COURT
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: T-1672-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: MICHAEL TESSIER
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: KINGSTON, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: MAY 17, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: CAMPBELL J.
APPEARANCES BY:
Mr. John D. Dillon
FOR THE APPLICANT
Mr. Jeff Anderson
FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
O'CONNOR LAW OFFICE
Kingston, Ontario
FOR THE APPLICANT
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, Ontario
FOR THE RESPONDENT
FEDERAL COURT
Date: 20040603
Docket: IMM-1672-02
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL TESSIER
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER