Date: 19971126
File: T-2728-96
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC, NOVEMBER 26, 1997
Before: RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
Between:
ROBERT CHÂTEAUNEUF,
| personally and as representative of all the natural persons who, as employees of the Singer company between December 31, 1946 and December 31, 1964, became entitled to and in fact received or subsequently bought back an annuity from the federal government Annuities Plan pursuant to group annuity policy G-522 of December 31, 1946, either as principal creditor or as a beneficiary of the principal creditor, and of such beneficiaries as may have succeeded to the said natural persons following their decease, |
Plaintiff,
AND
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Defendant.
ORDER
The defendant's motion is dismissed.
The composition of the group on which the parties agreed in a letter dated November 10, 1997 meets the requirements of an action under Rule 1711 and that composition shall henceforth replace that appearing on the style of cause herein.
Robert Châteauneuf is certified as representative of the general plaintiff.
The whole without costs.
Richard Morneau
Prothonotary
Traduction certifiée conforme
Bernard Olivier, B.A., LL.B.
Date: 19971126
Docket: T-2728-96
Between:
ROBERT CHÂTEAUNEUF,
| personally and as representative of all the natural persons who, as employees of the Singer company between December 31, 1946 and December 31, 1964, became entitled to and in fact received or subsequently bought back an annuity from the federal government Annuities Plan pursuant to group annuity policy G-522 of December 31, 1946, either as principal creditor or as a beneficiary of the principal creditor, and of such beneficiaries as may have succeeded to the said natural persons following their decease, |
Plaintiff,
AND
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Defendant.
REASONS FOR ORDER
RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
Introduction
[1] By her motion pursuant to Rules 5 and 1711 of the Federal Court Rules ("the Rules"), the defendant questions the right of the plaintiff Robert Châteauneuf ("the representative plaintiff") to bring a class action for and on behalf of the general plaintiff in this Court.
[2] This action was filed by the representative plaintiff (or the general plaintiff) to recover in contractual damages an amount representing the total repayments which the plaintiff said were due to former employees of Singer under a pension plan created by the latter.
[3] For a better understanding of the general plaintiff's action and the defendant's motion the essential background to these two proceedings must be considered.
Background
General plaintiff's action
[4] On December 12, 1996 the plaintiff, personally and on behalf of the group he wished to represent, filed in the record of this Court a highly detailed statement of claim ("the statement of claim"). The following may be noted in that document.
[5] On December 31, 1946 the Singer company at the time (henceforth "Singer", regardless of the period in question) introduced a pension plan for its Canadian employees, most of whom lived in Quebec. This plan ended on March 31, 1986.
[6] It should be noted that the said plan developed in two major stages, the first of which (December 31, 1946 to December 31, 1964) must for these purposes be divided into two, and it is part one of that first stage, from 1947 to 1957 (hereinafter passim "the relevant period"), which will occupy most of our attention.
[7] As indicated in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the statement of claim, during that period:
| [TRANSLATION] |
| 7. . . . At that time the plan was not a cash plan but a plan with guaranteed flat benefits. In a guaranteed plan, a surplus cannot develop as such as in a cash plan. However, there may be repayments (or "dividends" or "experience credits") which, unlike the surplus on a cash plan, are not allocated at the conclusion of the plan but are allocated during its existence; |
| 8. In a guaranteed plan it is possible for participants to be entitled not only to receive flat pension benefits but in addition to have the separate and cumulative right to receive repayments produced during the existence of the plan, which at the time of retirement means higher pension payments than anticipated. |
[8] Two separate rights thus exist: the right to receive flat pension benefits and the separate right to receive repayments produced during the plan.
[9] The general plaintiff explained as follows, in paragraphs 25 and 26 of its statement of claim, how returns may be created from employer contributions to the plan:
| [TRANSLATION] |
| 25. . . . In order to be entitled to receive an annuity for future service purchased not only with his own contributions but also those of the employer, a participant must have reached age 45 and have accumulated at least 15 years' service at the time his employment ceases. If, again at the time the employment ceases (due among other things to death, dismissal, lay-off or resignation), the participant has not reached the age of 45 and has not accumulated 15 years' service, he will only be entitled to a return of his own contributions (with interest) but will not then be entitled to the employer's contributions (it is not "vested"); |
| 26. As the employer's contributions and interest thereon accumulated in his personal account cannot be used by the participant they are provided in the form of repayments. The same is true for past service: participants will only be entitled to employer contributions in this regard if they have reached age 45 and accumulated 20 years' service at the time their employment ceases, and this is another source of creation of repayments . . . |
[10] During the relevant period the plan was insured with the Government Annuities Branch of the federal government of Canada ("Government Annuities") through group annuity policy G-522.
[11] Accordingly, the general plaintiff argued that the defendant, represented over the years by various Ministers of Labour and acting through Government Annuities, contravened policy G-522 by paying the repayments to Singer to reduce the company's liability accounts, that is, to be used by the latter as credits or advances on its future employer contributions, rather than transferring the said repayments to individual accounts of other participants in policy G-522.
[12] To date the repayments thus paid to Singer represent some $8,200,000. (As noted in paragraphs 67 et seq. of the statement of claim, this amount may be less since at the time the action was brought it applied to 1947 to 1964, not merely 1947 to 1957).
[13] It may be noted here that the representative plaintiff arrived at this amount by adding up surpluses produced each year in the relevant period and adding to those amounts interest accumulated to date.
[14] The information on the surpluses produced in accordance with policy G-522 - like much other information used to identify the class constituting the general plaintiff - was supplied by the defendant in response to research done by the representative plaintiff (Exhibit ARC-7 attached to the affidavit of Robert Châteauneuf, submitted by the general plaintiff in opposition to the subject application).
Defendant's motion
[15] The defendant's motion [TRANSLATION] "for directions" is made essentially pursuant to Rule 1711, only the first paragraph of which needs to be reproduced here:
| 1711. (1) Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceeding, the proceeding may be begun, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of them as representing all or as representing all except one or more of them. |
| (My emphasis.) |
[16] In the instant case the defendant is undoubtedly seeking an order against the plaintiff Châteauneuf's wish to make the action a group action. In her notice of motion the defendant asked the Court, principally, to:
| [TRANSLATION] |
| DENY the plaintiff [Robert Châteauneuf] the representative capacity which he seeks; |
| STRIKE from the style of cause any reference to other persons whom he wishes to represent . . . |
[17] Although the defendant is asking to have material struck out, she did not choose to proceed by a motion to strike under Rule 419 as she has done in the past, for example in Harbans Singh Pawar v. Her Majesty the Queen, an unreported decision of December 2, 1996, Prothonotary Hargrave, case T-1407-96 (Pawar No. 1); Mountain Institution (Native Transfer Committee) v. Canada, an unreported decision of January 6, 1997, Prothonotary Hargrave, case T-1940-96 (Mountain).
[18] This approach is understandable if we recall that counsel for the defendant stated in argument that the defendant was not opposed a priori to the class action in question. If the Court has correctly understood the defendant's arguments, she is objecting to the plaintiff Châteauneuf as a valid representative of the general plaintiff for two reasons - to which we will return - namely that he cannot claim to have a common complaint with the other participants in policy G-522 and that there is in the record to date no evidence, or even a shadow of evidence, as to the personal identity of each individual making up the class, namely the general plaintiff.
[19] The defendant filed her motion on October 22, 1997. Between that date and the date on which it was heard, the parties agreed on the alternative points made by the defendant in the notice of motion. In a joint letter dated November 10, 1997, counsel for the parties indicated the following to the Court:
| [TRANSLATION] |
| Further to our recent telephone conversation, we wish to confirm that an agreement has been reached between counsel of record for the parties on the first two points made in our submissions enclosed in our notice of application for directions under Rule 1711 of the Federal Court Rules in the aforementioned case. |
| Consequently, only the third point regarding the absence of a common complaint and the representative nature of the plaintiff will be the subject of argument in court on November 17 next. |
| Accordingly, subject to the decision to be made on this last point and any directions which the Court may give, the group described as general plaintiff should read as follows: |
| Robert Châteauneuf, personally and as representative of all the natural persons who, as employees of the Singer company, registered to group annuity policy G-522, became and remained entitled, as of December 12, 1966 or after, to the right to receive from the Canadian federal government Annuities Plan an annuity composed of their own contributions and those of their employer, and of such beneficiairies as may have succeeded to the said natural persons following their decease. |
[20] It will at once be seen that if the Court dismisses the defendant's challenge to the plaintiff Châteauneuf's right to bring the class action in question, it must sanction the fact that the parties have agreed on the designation of the foregoing group.
[21] Finally, it should be noted that this designation would be made in conjunction with a more general certification of the class action as brought, since I think that dismissal of the defendant"s motion would inevitably lead the Court to that stage. It is this further stage which counsel for the general plaintiff is seeking as a defence to the motion in question. Additionally, this is what my brother Hargrave said about this institution of certification on page 1 of Harbans Singh Pawar v. Her Majesty the Queen , an unreported decision of May 26, 1997, Prothonotary Hargrave, case T-1407-96 (Pawar No. 2):
| In my view, certification is a flexible procedural mechanism to assist the parties and the Court in dealing with particular concerns that may arise in class actions. |
[22] This "certification" stage is not expressly provided for as such by Rule 1711. However, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court in conjunction with Rule 1711 certainly authorizes it (see Pawar No. 2, at 4).
[23] Further, if the motion at issue is dismissed it would seem highly desirable here for all parties - and in particular everyone making up the general plaintiff - to know that the latter can no longer be challenged in its group capacity.
[24] Additionally, although it appears from Pawar No. 2, at 1, that the initiative for certification should come from the general plaintiff, the comments of Reed J. in Harbans Singh Pawar v. Her Majesty the Queen, an unreported judgment of September 10, 1997, per Reed J., case T-1407-96 (Pawar No. 3), at 3, lead me to conclude that the opportunity should be taken here to proceed with this certification.
Analysis
[25] Before considering the grounds for the defendant's challenge any further, it seems useful first to recall the purposes of a class action and its minimum requirements.
Purposes of a class action
[26] In Pawar No. 3, at 2, the Court adopted the following comments, with I think implicit approval.
| Counsel for the respondent argues that the history of class actions demonstrates that they are appropriate for reasons of judicial economy and efficiency, finality of dispute resolution, and to ensure that all those affected by the decision have an opportunity to put their position to the Court. |
[27] I think this is what the representative plaintiff Châteauneuf was trying to achieve when he said in his affidavit that the average age of the pensioners is 82 and many of them do not have the financial resources to oppose the federal government in the courts individually.
[28] In addition, the evidence in the record (Exhibit ARC-8) showed that the plaintiff Châteauneuf was told in the past by the defendant that policy G-522 might cover a large number of people. He was also told about that same time (Exhibit ARC-9) that the addresses of participants at that time were private information and that he therefore could not obtain them. That is why in paragraphs 74 and 75 of the statement of claim the general plaintiff concluded it would be impossible to proceed other than by a class action.
[29] However, even if a party thinks in principle that he or she has met the purposes of a class action, certain minimum requirements must still be observed.
Minimum requirements of class action
[30] In this connection I consider that we should be guided first by the comments of the Supreme Court in G.M. (Canada) v. Naken, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 72 (Naken). In that case the Supreme Court had to examine the advisability of allowing a class action by a group of people who had all individually purchased a car of a given make. The Court undertook this analysis in terms of the application and interpretation of Rule 75 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ontario. This rule, which was similar to Rule 1711 of this Court, contained at the outset only one test to be met, that of having the same interest in the proceeding. Rule 75 read as follows:
| 75. Where there are numerous persons having the same interest, one or more may sue or be sued or may be authorized by the Court to defend on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all. |
[31] At pp. 103 and 104 of its reasons the Court clarified what having the same interest in a proceeding might mean in a class action. The Court said the following:
| . . . it is the judgment or the proceeds of the action in which the plaintiffs must have the same interest. In the context of a conventional class action this would mean the same generic interest being shared amongst the plaintiffs and their constituents so as to entitle each of them to some indeterminate share of the defined or to be defined property, fund or pool . . . Indeed it is difficult to extend the rule beyond that conventional class action where the contest concerns a discernible fund or asset, and only two things remain to be determined, firstly the right in the plaintiffs to the asset in whole or in part, and secondly, the right of the individual members of the plaintiff class to a part of the class' total entitlement. |
| (My emphasis.) |
[32] In my view these passages provide a simple statement of what the Supreme Court regards as the minimum requirements of a class action.
[33] Both in her notice of motion and in argument, the defendant sought to show that the test under Rule 1711 consisted of three points, namely:
1. the members of the class should have a common interest;
2. the members of the class should have a common complaint;
3. the judgment should apply to everyone.
[34] The Court was referred to several of its judgments, including Pawar No. 2 (supra) and Mountain (supra), in which this detailed approach appears to have been taken. I do not think the outcome is affected by whether one uses this test or the one ultimately applied by the Supreme Court in Naken (supra).
[35] In fact, this three-part test was developed in Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1, a case in which the Court was interpreting the ancestor of Ontario's Rule 75 and so of Rule 1711 of this Court. The Supreme Court was fully aware of all this in Naken (supra), since it began its analysis at 79 and 80 by citing Ellis (supra). It nevertheless concluded as follows regarding this ancestor of Rule 75, at 80, referring to Lord Shand:
| In the end, Lord Shand found that the sole test to be applied is that of "the same interest" in one cause or matter. That is the same test under Rule 75 . . . |
[36] It follows, in my opinion, that the same interest and common complaint tests overlap and it will suffice to consider whether there is a similar interest and then examine whether all will benefit from the common fund.
[37] This observation should lead us back to the defendant's notice of motion and the realization, bearing in mind also the agreement between the parties of November 10, 1997, that the question of the same interest among all members of the class no longer presents problems between the parties. If this question is similar to or includes the common complaint, how can the class action be challenged here on the basis that there is no common complaint?
[38] In any case, the Court must now consider the defendant's motion and recall the reasons for her challenge.
Defendant's motion
[39] As mentioned earlier (see paragraph 18, supra), the defendant argued that the representative plaintiff Châteauneuf could not claim to have a common complaint with the other participants in policy G-522.
[40] She further argued that he had not to date entered in the record any evidence or shadow of evidence as to the personal identity of each individual making up the class, namely the general plaintiff. In her submission, the plaintiff had to do this in order to establish that he was representative, that is, that he represented a specific class.
[41] The defendant's first ground of challenge may be stated as follows. The representative plaintiff Châteauneuf could not claim to have a common complaint with other members of the class because the common complaint was a claim for repayments in 1947 to 1957 and the plaintiff was not entered on policy G-522 until June 1, 1954.
[42] In my opinion, this ground cannot stand. Allowing it would mean using a much too strict and rigorous approach to the interpretation of Rule 1711.
[43] The Supreme Court never indicated in Naken, supra, that each member should have an equal share in the common fund.
[44] What matters is that there was initially a common fund. On this point, I conclude that the general plaintiff has shown that there was in fact a common fund determined or determinable from accounting data supplied to the representative plaintiff by the defendant herself (see Exhibit ARC-7).
[45] Second, all members of the general plaintiff, including the representative plaintiff Châteauneuf, certainly have the same general interest in obtaining a share in the fund. At the moment, all shares remain unspecified. In the event the action succeeds the representative plaintiff Châteauneuf, and possibly other members, will be entitled to a share that will vary depending, among other things, on the year they happened to join. This variation, however, does not preclude use of Rule 1711.
[46] In Pawar No. 1, supra, at 8 and 9, my brother Hargrave made the following observations:
| Our Rule 1711 refers to persons having the same interest in the proceeding. This does not mean the claims need all be for the same amount, for the Rule is more flexible than that. In addition to the view of Mr. Justice of Appeal Bull, in the Shaw case [supra], I would also refer to The "Irish Rowan", [1989] 2 Lloyd's 144 (C.A.), in which representative defendants, each of whom would have owed a different amount, unsuccessfully sought to have the action against them stayed. Sir John Megaw, who wrote one of the three concurring judgments, conceded there might be instances in which disputes as to quantum of liability, by persons coming into the action by representation, might make the case unsuitable as a representative action, but that the Court could always exercise discretion and forbid the continuance of a representative action (p. 156). Lord Justice Purchas, in considering the requirement of a similar interest in the proceedings, raised an interesting rhetorical question as to whether or not the Court should approach the problem in a pragmatic manner. |
| Bearing in mind that the operation of O.15, r.12 takes place at an early stage in the development of proceedings, should the Court have in contemplation all possible, even hypothetical, circumstances when considering whether the proposed class of defendants or plaintiffs fulfils the criterion of having the same interest, or should the Court approach the problem in a more pragmatic manner? |
| the "Irish Rowan" [supra] at p. 158) |
| From his reasons and the cases to which he refers, it is clear a court should approach the issue of whether the parties have the same interest in the proceedings in a practical way. Indeed it is the view of our Court of Appeal that the class action rule should not be construed in a strict and rigorous sense, but rather should be applied in a broad and permissive manner: see Canada v. Perry (1982) 41 N.R. 91 at 102. |
| (My emphasis.) |
[47] These observations were one reason why my brother prothonotary dismissed the motion to strike made by the Crown in that case. It is true that in Pawar No. 2, supra, when the plaintiff asked the same issue to be certified, the plaintiff received the certification requested for the action but was denied the same benefit for the remedy. However, this outcome did not result from the fact that individual claims might have been different but the fact that the statement of claim did not contain the allegations required in law to support an action for damages. The divided result of Pawar No. 2 was affirmed on appeal in Pawar No. 3.
[48] Counsel for the defendant also referred to the fact that, as in Pawar No. 2, the Court might wish to certify the general plaintiff in the action but deny certification of the remedy. If the Court understood correctly, this solution was based on the fact that as the amounts might differ between members and some members might receive nothing as they had already obtained the maximum pension, the defendant might have to put forward a large number of different defences.
[49] As the Court held in Pawar No. 1, supra, I have difficulty understanding how such a situation - like the result which concerned the Supreme Court in Naken, supra - could really occur here.
[50] It seems to the Court here that the assessment of damage suffered by each member, if the general plaintiff is successful, and based on the information that the defendant already has, will be "a formula and bookkeeping exercise", to use the language of my brother prothonotary at p. 15 of Pawar No. 1.
[51] Further, it is far from clear that, unlike the position of Singer in Châteauneuf v. Cie Singer du Canada Ltée, an unreported decision of September 23, 1988, per Guy Arsenault J., Iberville S.C., case 755-06-000001-871, the defendant could believe here that she is unconnected with any process of distribution to each member. Essentially, it is she who has all the information needed to facilitate the exercise of distributing money which, in the event of success, she will provide.
[52] What is more, we are at a preliminary stage of this action. It seems to the Court that the action should be in two stages. Indeed, the general plaintiff itself considers that the action should take this form, first establishing the general plaintiff's entitlement to all or part of the fund, and then there would be a second stage in which the fund would be distributed proportionally between members of the class.
[53] The defendant's concern at present is, I think, with this second stage. As things stand, I do not think that this concern is warranted for the moment. However, if the general plaintiff completes the first stage it seems to me that the judge hearing the case will be in a much better position to determine whether the second stage should take place on a class basis. In Pawar No. 1, the Court itself considered such a possibility, at 14:
| Second, any limitations which might apply, in this instance, appear quite mechanical and may be dealt with by the trial judge in further delineating the class, if that becomes necessary. |
[54] The defendant's second ground of challenge must now be examined.
[55] It will be recalled that this ground was that the representative plaintiff Châteauneuf had not to date provided any evidence or shadow of evidence as to the personal identity of each individual in the class, namely the general plaintiff. In the defendant's view, the representative plaintiff had to do this in order to establish that he was representative, that is, that he represented a specific class.
[56] I feel that the defendant is also in error on this last point.
[57] The defendant appears to derive this requirement of personal identification from Pawar No. 1, supra.
[58] In that case, Mr. Pawar wished to challenge on behalf of a class the constitutionality of a section of the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. c. O-9, which made residence in Canada for 10 years prior to the date the pension application was approved one of the conditions of eligibility. As Mr. Pawar had not accumulated these 10 years of residence when he made his pension application, his pension was denied.
[59] In his statement of claim Mr. Pawar defined the group of people he wished to represent as follows:
| [TRANSLATION] |
| The Plaintiff is seeking to represent all individuals in the same situation, whether citizens or permanent residents of Canada, who have been unfairly deprived of pensions by the requirement of ten years of residence in Canada laid down by the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. c. 0-9. |
[60] The defendant drew the Court's attention to various short passages from the reasons of the Court in that case and argued that the Court had acknowledged that it was necessary to obtain a list of persons in the class.
[61] However, it should be recalled that in that case the Court had before it an application to strike by the defendant, pleading as reasons for striking inter alia both Mr. Pawar's authority to represent any class and the actual composition of the class he represented.
[62] In answer to the challenge as to Mr. Pawar's status, the Court sought from time to time to show that Mr. Pawar had obtained the support of several individuals by signatures and other means and could not therefore be regarded as representing a fictitious class. At the conclusion of its analysis the Court held that Mr. Pawar was in a position to fairly and properly represent the class which he said he wished to represent.
[63] So far as I am aware the Court never in that case - or indeed in any other case - sought to make it a requirement of any class action that the representative who puts himself forward must have a list of signatures.
[64] In my opinion, the focus should be on the composition of the class. Here this composition is sufficient and acceptable, as indicated in the parties' joint letter of November 10, 1997. Its parameters are sufficiently specific and there is no need to require that members of the class be individually identified by name in a list or affidavit of any kind.
[65] That is the conclusion one must come to if one applies to this situation the following observations found at pp. 11 and 12 of Pawar No. 1:
| An Identifiable Class |
| The next substantial issue the Defendant raises is whether the class, which counsel submits is an overly large class, is identifiable. As noted earlier it consists of Canadian Citizens or permanent residents, who are 65 years of age, but who have not resided in Canada for the required 10 consecutive years leading up to pensionability. |
| The size of a class is not a bar to a representative proceeding. In Bendall v. McGhan Medical Corporation (1993), 16 C.P.C. (3rd) 156 (Ont.) the plaintiffs successfully sought certification, as representatives of 150,000 persons, as a class proceeding. Indeed, a very large number of individuals would not realistically be able to have access to the judicial system other than through a class action. |
| There are many cases which touch on the identification of the class to be represented. At one end of the scale there have been intended class actions which proposed a nebulous or a vague class, for example, "those who suffer discrimination on the basis of race, and the number are known to the defendant", which was a class proposed in the Mayrhofer proceeding [supra]. Mr. Justice Teitelbaum pointed out it was insufficient to simply identify the members as those who were discriminated against by reason of race and then to say those persons are known to the defendant. In the present instance the class is much more tightly defined. Granted, while the Plaintiff does not say so, the Defendant may be the only entity with records to show all who fall into this class. However that does not detract from the certain parameters of the class which the Plaintiff has set. Further, that the class is a very large one does not detract from its identification. |
| At the other end of the scale are cases such as Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v. Swift Canadian Co. Ltd. (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 411 in which the class was tightly delineated as being hog producers who by reason of a tortious conspiracy by the defendants received an artificially contrived low price. The class consisted of persons engaged in the same enterprise and who had sold under the same conditions. |
| The Supreme Court of Canada had to deal with the identity of the group in the Naken case [supra] in which the class action was to be by a group of persons with reference to ownership of an identifiable property, a Firenza vehicle owned by each at the commencement of action. The Court felt the identification required some further determinative process as there was a difference between the type of proceedings which Ms. Naken wished to bring and, for example, a simple shareholder type proceeding in which the class might be easily and unambiguously defined. In the present instance the class proposed by Mr. Pawar, if it falls somewhere between, is certainly closer to the shareholder example, for it is unambiguous in the sense that an individual's date of arrival in Canada, the individual's status and the individual's age are all part of easily accessible records. There should be no difficulty with any of this, particularly in that the Plaintiff appears to be taking steps to bring in more of the class. Further, the Plaintiff quite correctly points out that much of the information needed to define the class is clearly in the hands of the Defendant. |
| (My emphasis.) |
[66] Finally, if it must be said here, it seems to me that the general plaintiff's statement of claim and the affidavit filed by the representative plaintiff Châteauneuf clearly establish that Robert Châteauneuf through his past action is in a position to provide adequate representation for and fully defend the rights of members of the general plaintiff.
Conclusion
[67] Accordingly, in an order accompanying these reasons, the Court must:
- dismiss the defendant's motion;
| - find that the composition of the class agreed upon by the parties in a letter dated November 10, 1997 meets the requirements of an action pursuant to Rule 1711 and that this composition will now replace that appearing in the style of cause hereof; |
| - certify Robert Châteauneuf as representative of the general plaintiff. |
[68] However, I do not consider there is any reason to make a formal order forthwith that the instant action will take place in two stages.
[69] As to costs on the instant motion, it may be noted that the general plaintiff did not request them. Further, it must be admitted that the filing of the subject motion by the defendant appears to have led the parties to agreement on the composition of the class. There will thus be no costs on the instant motion.
Richard Morneau
Prothonotary
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
November 26, 1997
Traduction certifiée conforme
Martine Brunet, LL.B.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Court No.: T-2728-96
Between:
ROBERT CHÂTEAUNEUF,
| personally and as representative of all the natural persons who, as employees of the Singer company between December 31, 1946 and December 31, 1964, became entitled to and in fact received or subsequently bought back an annuity from the federal government Annuities Plan pursuant to group annuity policy G-522 of December 31, 1946, either as principal creditor or as a beneficiary of the principal creditor, and of such beneficiaries as may have succeeded to the said natural persons following their decease, |
Plaintiff,
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Defendant.
REASONS FOR ORDER
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT FILE NO.: T-2728-96
| STYLE OF CAUSE: ROBERT CHÂTEAUNEUF, |
| personally and as representative of all the natural persons who, as employees of the Singer company between December 31, 1946 and December 31, 1964, became entitled to and in fact received or subsequently bought back an annuity from the federal government Annuities Plan pursuant to group annuity policy G-522 of December 31, 1946, either as principal creditor or as a beneficiary of the principal creditor, and of such beneficiaries as may have succeeded to the said natural persons following their decease, |
Plaintiff,
AND
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Defendant.
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: November 17, 1997
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: Richard Morneau, Prothonotary
DATE OF REASONS FOR ORDER: November 26, 1997
APPEARANCES:
Guy Désautels for the plaintiff
Carole Bureau and Linda Mercier for the defendant
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Guy Désautels for the plaintiff
Rivest Schmidt
Montréal, Quebec
George Thomson for the defendant
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec