Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.) [2005] 3 F.C. 530
Date: 20050218
Docket: IMM-9571-03
Citation: 2005 FC 262
BETWEEN:
BACHAN SINGH SOGI
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
[1] Following my Interim Reasons for Decision of June 11, 2004 (the "Interim Reasons"), the Minister's Delegate prepared an Addendum to his reasons. It is dated September 30, 2004 (the "Addendum"). These final reasons deal with the Applicant's application for judicial review of both the Deportation Decision made by the Minister's Delegate on December 3, 2003 and the Addendum.
[2] The Interim Reasons for Decision are attached hereto as Schedule "A". They should be read as the first part of these Final Reasons. The Interim Reasons include one amendment by way of update. It is shown in bold type in paragraph 2. Also by way of update, I should note that, although he is entitled to a detention review every thirty days, the Applicant has waived his reviews for some months pending this decision.
[3] At the final hearing on January 25, 2005, Counsel raised the following two preliminary matters:
(i) Counsel for the respondent advised, for information purposes only, that he had been told that, in this case, the Minister's Delegate, while offered the opportunity to do so, did not think it was necessary to look at the source documents referred to in the Secret Affidavit. Counsel felt that this fact should be on the record because it is being considered in other cases.
(ii) Counsel for the Applicant asked to make additional submissions about whether Canada could deport to torture in exceptional cases. However, since this issue was decided in the Interim Reasons after full argument, I did not entertain further submissions.
[4] The issues at the hearing on January 25 were:
(i) Whether the Minister's Delegate erred in law by not considering the current threat posed by the Babbar Khalsa or Babbar Khalsa International ("BKI")
(ii) Whether the finding by the Minister's Delegate about the Applicant's use of aliases was patently unreasonable.
(iii) Whether in relying on allegedly irrelevant factors such as Canada's response to terrorism, the Minister's Delegate erred in law in his assessment of the threat the Applicant posed to Canada.
(iv) Whether the Minister's Delegate erred in law by not considering the specific alternatives to deportation proposed by the Applicant and by not considering whether they were adequate, given the alleged absence of evidence about a current threat posed by the BKI.
(v) Whether the Minister's Delegate erred in law in his assessment of alternatives to deportation by concluding that he does not have the statutory authority to order or impose the alternatives to deportation sought by the Applicant.
(vi) Whether the Minister's Delegate erred in concluding that the Applicant misled immigration authorities when he failed to mention his UK refugee claim in his application for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment ("PRRA").
ISSUE I
[5] The Applicant alleges that there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the BKI poses a current threat and that the conclusion of the Minister's Delegate, in that regard, is unfounded and unsupported by the evidence.
[6] The Minister's Delegate says in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Addendum that the BKI is currently listed as a terrorist organization in Canada, the United Kingdom and in the United States. The U. S. Department of State added the BKI to its Terrorist Exclusion List as recently as April 29, 2004.
[7] In my view, this evidence demonstrates that the Minister's Delegate did address the current nature of the threat posed by the BKI.
ISSUE II
[8] The Applicant says that the Minister's Delegate's conclusion that the Applicant is untrustworthy due to his admitted use of aliases in the past and his use of fraudulent travel documentation is patently unreasonable. However, this submission is not persuasive because it relies on an incomplete description of the facts.
[9] The Minister's Delegate found the Applicant to be untrustworthy due in part to the piecemeal way in which he admitted having used certain aliases and the fact that he did not disclose until well into the immigration process that he used the name Gurbachan Singh for his refugee claim in the United Kingdon. The Minister's Delegate also found the Applicant's denial of having used the aliases Gurnam Singh and Piare Singh to be inconsistent with the open and closed source documentary evidence.
ISSUE III
[10] The Applicant says that Canada's response to terrorism is irrelevant and that the Minister's Delegate erred in considering it in his assessment of the threat posed by the Applicant. The Applicant says that the focus should have been on an individualized assessment of the risk he posed.
[11] While, in my view, the Minister's Delegate wrote at unnecessary length on Canada's Response to Terrorism, that does not constitute an error and does not detract from his individualized assessment of the Applicant. In that assessment, he said:
At paragraph 13 - . . . it is my view that the piecemeal admission of aliases used by the Applicant is a clear attempt to deceive Canadian Immigration authorities. . . . I view with particular seriousness the fact that the Applicant did not disclose until well into the Immigration process that he used the name Gurbachan Singh for his refugee claim in the United Kingdom. . . . It is also clear from his own admission that the Applicant has access to and is able to obtain fraudulent documentation in order to travel from India to the U. K. and later to Canada. I view this with a great deal of concern as this would enable him to immerse himself within the Sikh extremist community in order to commit illegal activities which may pose a danger to the public in Canada or to the security of Canada.
At paragraph 15 - Considering the Applicant's use of multiple aliases and his attempts to deceive Canadian Immigration officials, I conclude that the Applicant is not trustworthy and could not be relied upon to comply with any conditions relating to release from detention imposed. . . .I note that the CSIS document indicates that the [sic] he is trained in sophisticated weaponry and explosives. He has attempted to use these skill to assassinate several prominent political figures. . . . The BKI, to which he belongs, has been suspected of and has taken responsibility for the use of weapons and explosives in various terrorist activities. . . .I cannot rule out that the Applicant could use his training and expertise to assist the BKI in conducting further terrorist activities either in or from Canada.
At paragraph 19 - . . . Because of the risk posed by the Applicant, particularly the real and serious possibility that he may assist the BKI in conducting terrorist activity in Canada.
At paragraph 26 - . . . I find that detention is the only possible option that could address and perhaps reduce the threat posed by the Applicant.
At paragraph 32 - . . . I am of the view that there is a real, reasonable and serious possibility that he could re-establish contacts with the BKI or other terrorist groups in Canada to commit terrorist acts in Canada.
ISSUE IV
[12] In the Interim Reasons, I concluded that the Minister's Delegate erred in failing to address alternatives to deportation to torture. In my view, if an applicant makes proposals which could arguably reduce the risk he poses, they must be considered. However, I also concluded that the Applicant's proposals in this case had not been very precise. I therefore ordered counsel for the Applicant to send the Minister's Delegate a list of alternatives to deportation to which the Applicant would consent (the "Alternatives").
[13] The Alternatives are found in a letter from Mr. Waldman to Mr. Hicks of the Department of Justice (the "Letter"). They are listed in the Addendum at paragraph 2. As the Minister's Delegate notes at paragraph 3 of the Addendum, the list is expressed to be not exhaustive. However, for the purposes of this application for judicial review, I am treating it as exhaustive. The whole point of ordering preparation of the Letter was to obtain a clear understanding of the Alternatives proposed by the Applicant so that the Minister's Delegate could consider them in his assessment of risk.
[14] It is important to note that the Letter does not indicate that the Applicant is willing to consent to continued detention as one of the Alternatives. The possibility that he would choose detention over deportation to India had been mentioned in oral submissions but, when counsel was asked to put the Alternatives in writing, it did not appear. Accordingly, it will not be considered here.
[15] In paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Addendum, the Minister's Delegate concludes that, even if all the Alternatives were implemented they would not be sufficient to reduce the threat to Canada because the Applicant is untruthful. This means that he is unlikely to comply with any conditions attached to his release from detention. Given this conclusion, it is my view that the Minister's Delegate was not obliged to deal separately with each proposed Alternative.
ISSUE V
[16] Once the Minister's Delegate concluded that the Alternatives were not viable, the question of whether he had jurisdiction to implement them became hypothetical and need not be addressed here. However, I should add that, had the Alternatives been acceptable to the Minister's Delegate, I would have declined counsel's invitation to read numerous provisions into the IRPA. I would have taken this position because such a "reading in" would have created within the IRPA an awkward ad hoc regime for house arrest for an indefinite term in conjunction with monthly detention reviews. In my opinion, while the creation of a program to provide Canada with an alternative to deportation to torture is highly desirable, it should be the work of Parliament.
ISSUE VI
[17] The Applicant says that, because the earlier claim was disclosed in his Personal Information Form, it was patently unreasonable for the Minister's Delegate to conclude that the Applicant had attempted to mislead Immigration authorities when he failed to disclose on his PRRA form that he had made a refugee claim in the U.K.
[18] I can find no error in this regard. The Applicant clearly looked at the PRRA form and responded to the question about prior refugee claims by writing "NA" as the answer. In my view, it is entirely reasonable for the Minister's Delegate to have concluded that an incorrect answer had been supplied in the expectation that the PRRA officer would not read the Applicant's PIF.
CERTIFICATION
[19] The parties agreed that a question dealing with exceptional circumstances should be certified for the Federal Court of Appeal. I have reached the same conclusion because the Applicant is an accomplished explosives expert and an assassin for the BKI. It's objectives and violent methods potentially threaten the stability of the Punjab and surrounding areas. He is experienced in hiding his identity and concealing his travels and will be a danger for an indefinite period.
[20] The following question will be certified on consent:
Does this case involve exceptional circumstances in which the balancing required by section 113 of the IRPA could justify deportation to torture?
CONCLUSION
[21] For all these reasons the application for judicial review of the Deportation Decision and the Addendum will be dismissed.
"Sandra J. Simpson"
JUDGE
Ottawa, Ontario
February 18, 2005
SCHEDULE "A"
Date: 20040611
Docket: IMM-9571-03
Citation: 2004 FC 853
BETWEEN:
BACHAN SINGH SOGI
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
Interim Reasons for Decision on Judicial Review
Simpson J.
[1] On December 2, 2003, G. C. Alldridge (the "Minister's Delegate") denied an application made by Bachan Singh Sogi (the "Applicant") for protection under section 112 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the "IRPA"). These reasons deal with the application for judicial review of that decision.
The Procedural History
[2] The Applicant claimed refugee status on his arrival in Canada on May 8, 2001. However, he became the subject of a report made under subsection 44(1) of the IRPA. This report led to an admissibility hearing under subsection 44(2) of the IRPA. Thereafter, in a decision dated October 8, 2002, a member of the Immigration Division concluded that the Applicant's name is Gurnam Singh and that he is inadmissible because he is a member of a Sikh terrorist organization known as the Babbar Khalsa International (the "BKI"). Its objective is the establishment of a separate Sikh state called Khalistan in the area which is now the Punjab. The BKI is prepared to use violence to achieve its ends. The BKI is a "listed entity" under section 83.05 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S., c. C-34, s. 1. The finding of inadmissibility on security grounds under paragraphs 34(l)(b) and (c) of the IRPA was upheld on judicial review in a decision of MacKay J. dated December 8, 2003.
The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on May 28, 2004.
[3] Since the Applicant was found to be inadmissible, two assessments were prepared pursuant to subsection 172(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. The first was a pre-removal risk assessment (the "PRRA"). The PRRA was conducted under paragraphs 112(3)(a) and 113(d)(ii) of the IRPA. These paragraphs provide that applicants who are inadmissible on security grounds will have their PRRA applications considered based only on the factors in section 97 of the IRPA. The PRRA was dated June 26, 2003 and concluded that the Applicant would be at risk of torture if deported to India. The second assessment was a restriction assessment dated August 8, 2003, wherein it was determined that the Applicant represented a present and a future danger to the security of Canada. The Minister's Delegate balanced these two assessments and, in so doing, relied on submissions from the Applicant's counsel and on the secret evidence described below. On December 2, 2003 he decided to deport the Applicant to India, despite the likelihood that he would be tortured. This decision will be described as the "Deportation Decision".
[4] The Applicant was arrested on August 8, 2002 and, at the time this application was heard in May of 2004, he remained in detention.
The Secret Evidence - Procedural History
[5] At the admissibility hearing, the secret evidence (which is presently Exhibit A to a secret affidavit sworn on April 8, 2004) was the subject of a non-disclosure order pursuant to section 86 of the IRPA. However, the secret evidence was summarized and given to the Applicant in a document dated August 16, 2002. On the subsequent judicial review, Mr. Justice MacKay made a non-disclosure order dated May 8, 2003, under section 87 of the IRPA. The same secret evidence was before the Minister's Delegate when he made the Deportation Decision. In this application for judicial review of the Deportation Decision, a non-disclosure order dated May 20, 2004 was also made under section 87 of the IRPA. The secret evidence has not changed since it was summarized for the Applicant.
The Issues
[6] The issues are:
(i) In its decision in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 ("Suresh"), did the Supreme Court of Canada leave open the possibility that Canada could deport an inadmissible person to torture in exceptional circumstances?
(ii) If the answer to (i) is affirmative, is this a case in which the circumstances are exceptional?
(iii) In his Deportation Decision, did the Minister's Delegate err in failing to consider alternatives to removal and in failing to adequately explain his conclusion that the Applicant posed a threat to Canada's national security?
Issue I - Deportation to Torture
[7] The Applicant relied on the language in paragraphs 75 and 78 in Suresh to support his submission that removal to torture is not possible under any circumstances including those in which there is a risk to national security. He says that the fact that the Supreme Court indicated that there might be a case with exceptional circumstances did not mean that there would ever actually be such a case. He added that the issue of whether Canada can deport to torture in exceptional circumstances has not been decided and that this case is the first in which the issue is squarely before the Court.
[8] Mr. Suresh was from Sri Lanka and, unlike the Applicant in this case, Suresh was accepted as a convention refugee. However, he was refused permanent resident status and was eventually apprehended under a security certificate on the basis that he was a member of a terrorist organization called the Liberation Tiger. if Tamil Eelam (the "LTTE"). He was ordered deported and the Minister had to opine under subsection 53(1) of the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 about whether Suresh constituted a danger to the public in Canada. If so, he could have been removed to a country where his life or freedom was threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. The Minister concluded that Suresh was a threat and that he should be removed.
[9] The Supreme Court of Canada's decision turned on the failure to provide Suresh with a copy of the Minister's decision. The case is also distinguishable because Suresh was shown to be a supporter of and a fund-raiser for the LTTE. He was not shown to be an active participant in its terrorist activities.
[10] In spite of these conclusions, the Court took the opportunity to consider the lawfulness of a decision to deport to torture and, on my reading of the decision, concluded that, to satisfy the Charter, such a decision had to be the product of a balancing of the risk to the individual (the "Risk") and any threat to Canada (the "Threat"). The respondent, herein, says that Parliament met this requirement when it enacted section 97 and paragraph 113(d)(ii) of the IRPA. They provide as follows:
| 97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally |
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97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n'a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée : |
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| (a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or |
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a) soit au risque, s'il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d'être soumise à la torture au sens de l'article premier de la Convention contre la torture; |
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| (b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if |
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b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant : |
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| (i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country, |
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i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays, |
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| (ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country, |
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ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d'autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s'y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas, |
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| (iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and |
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iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes - sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales - et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles, |
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| (iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. |
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iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l'incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats. |
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| (2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection. |
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(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait partie d'une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection. |
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| 113. Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows: |
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113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit : |
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| (d) in the case of an applicant described in subsection 112(3), consideration shall be on the basis of the factors set out in section 97 and |
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d) s'agissant du demandeur visé au paragraphe 112(3), sur la base des éléments mentionnés à l'article 97 et, d'autre part : |
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| (ii) in the case of any other applicant, whether the application should be refused because of the nature and severity of acts committed by the applicant or because of the danger that the applicant constitutes to the security of Canada. |
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(ii) soit, dans le cas de tout autre demandeur, du fait que la demande devrait être rejetée en raison de la nature et de la gravité de ses actes passés ou du danger qu'il constitue pour la sécurité du Canada. |
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[11] I am satisfied that, in Suresh, the Supreme Court left open the possibility of a lawful deportation to torture in exceptional circumstances. In paragraph 25 of the decision, which sets out the issues, the Court asked, at paragraph 25(2)(a), whether the former Immigration Act permitted deportation to torture contrary to the Charter. There is no doubt that the issue was before the Court.
[12] The Court concluded that, in Canada, torture is seen as fundamentally unjust and that government sanctioned torture is rejected. In paragraph 58, the Court reached the following conclusion about the Canadian perspective:
Canadian jurisprudence does not suggest that Canada may never deport a person to face treatment elsewhere that would be unconstitutional if imposed by Canada directly, on Canadian soil. To repeat, the appropriate approach is essentially one of balancing. The outcome will depend not only on considerations inherent in the general context but also on considerations related to the circumstances and condition of the particular person whom the government seeks to expel. On the one hand stands the state's genuine interest in combatting terrorism, preventing Canada from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, and protecting public security. On the other hand stands Canada's constitutional commitment to liberty and fair process. This said, Canadian jurisprudence suggests that this balance will usually come down against expelling a person to face torture elsewhere.
[13] The Court held, in paragraph 65, that the prohibition against torture in international law is an emerging peremptory norm and, in paragraph 75, the Court noted that international law rejects deportation to torture even when national security is at stake.
[14] In paragraphs 76, 78 and 129, the Court concluded that:
...both domestic and international jurisprudence suggest that torture is so abhorrent that it will almost always be disproportionate to interests on the other side of the balance, even security interests. This suggests that, barring extraordinary circumstances, deportation to torture will generally violate the principles of fundamental justice protected by s. 7 of the Charter.
...because the fundamental justice balance under s. 7 of the Charter generally precludes deportation to torture when applied on a case-by-case basis. We may predict that it will rarely be struck in favour of expulsion where there is a serious risk of torture. However, as the matter is one of balance, precise prediction is elusive. The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any, must await future cases.
We conclude that generally to deport a refugee, where there are grounds to believe that this would subject the refugee to a substantial risk of torture, would unconstitutionally violate the Charter's s. 7 guarantee of life, liberty and security of the person. This said, we leave open the possibility that in an exceptional case such deportation might be justified either in the balancing approach under ss. 7 or 1 of the Charter.
[15] Based on this review, it is my conclusion that, in an exceptional/extraordinary case, it is open to the Minister to balance the Risk and the Threat and order a deportation to torture.
Issue II - Exceptional Circumstances
[16] The evidence before the Minister's Delegate showed that:
· the Applicant, on behalf of the BKI, used an alias to facilitate his plan to assassinate the Chief Minister of the Punjab (Prakash Singh), his son (Sukhbir Singh Badal) and the former Chief of Police of the Punjab
· a Times of India article dated June 9, 2001 described the assassination plot and said that, had it succeeded, it would have destabilised the Indian government
· information "corroborated by reliable sources" verified that the Applicant is the same person as the Gurnam Singh mentioned in the article
· the BKI is implicated in the bombing of Air India flight 182
· the secret evidence showed that the Applicant has used six aliases including the name Gurnam Singh
· the Applicant has failed to admit to the use of aliases
· the Applicant is skilled in the use of sophisticated weapons and explosives
· two letters were sent by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the UK Home Office to the Applicant's Montreal address stating that Gurbachan Singh (with other aliases) was excluded from the UK, on the basis that he was involved in international terrorist activities
these letters were found to be genuine and not the result of a conspiracy as the Applicant had alleged
the letters suggest that, contrary to the Applicant's statement in his PRRA application (that he had never claimed refugee status elsewhere), the Applicant is a failed UK refugee claimant
[17] These facts make it clear that this case is very different from Suresh. The Applicant is a skilled BKI assassin who will lie to protect himself However, because of the decision reached below with respect to issue number III, it is not necessary to decide, at this time, whether this is an exceptional case.
Issue III - The Deportation Decision
[18] It is my view that, in the Deportation Decision, the Minister's Delegate erred in two respects. Firstly, the decision does not address any alternatives to deportation to torture. Counsel for the Applicant indicated, in the submission he made in letters dated July 15 and August 18, 2003, that his client would observe curfews and reporting requirements in order to avoid deportation. In submissions before me, he said his client would wear a tracking device or consent to house arrest or even detention to avoid being returned to India. In my view, a decision to deport to torture must consider, in the balancing exercise, any alternatives proposed to reduce the Threat. I have concluded that, in the unusual circumstances of this case, it was patently unreasonable to decide to deport the Applicant without considering the Applicant's proposal.
[19] The second error concerns the analysis of the Threat. There is neither a description of the Threat nor a discussion of how and in what time frame it might be realized. The Minister's Delegate appears to have assumed that, given the Applicant's history and credentials, he is automatically a serious threat to national security. At pages 8 and 9 of the Deportation Decision he said:
There is no doubt that this is a difficult decision to make. However, in my view the circumstances in the case of Mr. Sogi fall within the exceptional provisions outlined by the Supreme Court. Mr. Sogi is a member of a terrorist organization that has used violence in order to establish a separate nation state of Khalistan carved out of India. He himself has been identified as the person who was to assassinate a Minister of the Government of India, his son and the former Chief of Police for the Indian State of Punjab. This fact plus his deliberate and secretive use of aliases makes Mr. Sogi a danger to the security of Canada. Mr. Sogi having accepted the task of assassinating these persons is an indication of a direct and intimate involvement in violent separatist politics. This goes far beyond mere membership. His participation in this violent group, Canada's commitment to fight terrorism by participating in international agreements, the objectives of IRPA to deny Canadian territory to persons who are security risks requires that he not be allowed to remain in Canada.
While acknowledging the principles outlined in the Supreme Court decision in Suresh, I feel that given the totality of the information outlined above, the overall interests of Canada and Canadian security must be given paramount consideration in this instance. In my view, the presence in Canada of terrorists, terrorist groups and terrorism in general is an anathema to the values and beliefs of Canadians. It would be unconscionable to allow him to remain in Canada.The request of Mr. Bachan Singh Sogi is refused.
[20] These conclusions may well be accurate but, in Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that, before deciding to return a refugee to torture, there must be evidence of a serious threat to national security. I see no reason why the test should be different for those who are inadmissible. That being said, the Deportation Decision does not adequately define and explain the Threat.
Conclusion
[21] With the consent of counsel for both parties, the Deportation Decision is referred back to the Minister's Delegate who is to prepare a revised version of the Deportation Decision which considers the alternatives to deportation suggested by the Applicant and which specifically defines and explains the Threat and how it might be realized. To facilitate this process, I have ordered counsel for the Applicant to provide Respondent's counsel with a letter setting out his proposals for alternatives to deportation.
[22] This application will be adjourned sine die so that the revised decision can be filed on or before September 30, 2004
Certification
[23] The Applicant has asked that I certify the question set out below. The respondent opposed certification on the basis that the question was answered in Suresh. I have decided that the proper course is to deal with this question at the continuation of the hearing of this application.
Are there circumstances where the balancing set out in section 113 of IRPA can justify deportation back to torture or is the deportation of a person to a country where he or she faces a substantial risk of torture always a violation of section 7?
"Sandra J. Simpson"
JUDGE
Ottawa, Ontario
June 11, 2004
FEDERAL COURT
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: IMM-9571-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: BACHAN SINGH SOGI
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: TUESDAY JANUARY 25 , 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: SIMPSON, J.
DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 2005
APPEARANCES BY:
Mr. Lorne Waldman / Brena Parnes For the Applicant
Mr. Ian Hicks For the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Mr. Lorne Waldman / Brena Parnes
Waldman & Associates
Barristers & Solicitors
281 Eglinton Avenue East
Toronto, Ontario
M4P 1L3 For the Applicant
John Sims
Deputy Attorney General of Canada For the Respondent
FEDERAL COURT
Date: 20050218
Docket: IMM-9571-03
BETWEEN:
BACHAN SINGH SOGI
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER