Federal Court Cour fédérale

Date: 20130822

Docket: T-13-12

Citation: 2013 FC 895

[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]

Ottawa, Ontario, August 22, 2013

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Roy

BETWEEN:

MARTIN LAPOSTOLLE

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

[1] This is an application for judicial review, pursuant to section 18.1 of the *Federal Courts Act*, RSC 1985, c F-7, of a decision of a Public Service Labour Relations Board adjudicator (the adjudicator) dated December 5, 2011, 2011 PSLRB 138, in which the adjudicator dismissed the grievance of Martin Lapostolle (the applicant) and upheld his termination.

[2] The applicant, Martin Lapostolle, was terminated by his employer. The Treasury Board is the employer under the *Financial Administration Act,* RSC, 1985, c F-11; Martin Lapostolle worked for the Correctional Service of Canada. He filed a grievance over his termination; the grievance was dismissed by the Public Service Labour Relations Board, in a decision dated December 5, 2011. It is this decision for which a judicial review is being sought.

[3] At the time of his termination, the applicant was a correctional officer at the CX-02 level at the Regional Reception Centre in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec.

[4] The termination was ordered as a result of the individuals the applicant associated with, including a sponsorship he failed to declare to the employer, in spite of warnings that had led to another disciplinary measure.

[5] As for the applicant, he adopted a "musket" approach before this Court: scattering buckshot in all directions. He tried to minimize the seriousness of the facts, alleged he had not received sufficient warning and claimed numerous errors and omissions on the adjudicator's part, in addition to claiming that his privacy rights had been breached.

[6] Furthermore, there are no indications that would point to a standard of review. Without saying so, the applicant argued as if the applicable standard was correctness, or, when he acknowledged that the appropriate standard was reasonableness, he was content to note alleged errors or omissions, no matter how minimal. By piling on alleged errors and omissions, he was

probably trying to achieve some sort of critical mass that would show the decision to have been unreasonable.

[7] The respondent argues that the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness, which commands deference from a reviewing court. What the applicant is complaining of, submits the respondent, is the adjudicator's assessment of the evidence. Mere disagreement with that assessment is not sufficient.

Standard of Review

[8] There is no doubt in my mind that matters of termination are reviewable on a reasonableness standard. In *Payne v Bank of Montreal*, 2013 FCA 33, [2013] FCJ No 123 (QL), it was determined that issues of whether a dismissal was unjust are reviewable on a standard of reasonableness (see also *King v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2013 FCA 131, [2013] FCJ No 551 (QL)).

[9] It follows that a Court conducting a judicial review must show deference toward the adjudicator's decision. As a result, there may be more than one possible solution and the Court is not permitted to choose the one that it prefers. In *Dunsmuir v New Brunswick*, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190, the Court described the parameters of reasonableness. Paragraph 47 reads as follows:

> [47] Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the

> qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

[10] The applicant must therefore show, on a balance of probabilities, that the adjudicator's decision was unreasonable, having regard to the facts and law. It is not enough to argue that there is another possible solution or interpretation that should be favoured. If the impugned decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes, after having been reviewed for justification in a transparent and intelligible decision-making process, it shall not be overturned. As the Court noted in *Dunsmuir*, above, at paragraph 48, courts of law "(cannot) be content to pay lip service to the concept of reasonableness…while in fact imposing their own view".

Decision

[11] After reviewing the record, I have found that the applicant has not discharged his burden of showing that the adjudicator's decision was unreasonable. This application for judicial review must therefore fail.

[12] This matter was argued throughout an entire day, during which the applicant chose to impugn the decision under judicial review by claiming that the adjudicator had made no less than 64 errors or omissions with respect to the evidence. The respondent replied by arguing that the applicant was submitting new and untested evidence, by means of a 445-paragraph affidavit personally submitted by the applicant. This claim by the respondent was itself supported by a

long affidavit of an employee of the Correctional Service of Canada who had attended hearings held by the adjudicator between August 29 and September 1, 2011.

[13] The Court's task was made particularly difficult by the fact that the allegations from both parties could not be examined in light of the evidence. In fact, the record does not contain the transcripts from those hearings. Counsel for the parties confirmed this and did not offer copies of them. The docket, as filed, is limited to that which is before the Court.

[14] As such, the allegations regarding the adjudicator's assessment of the evidence, which was erroneous according to the applicant, cannot be examined with any thoroughness because the evidence adduced before the adjudicator in not available. Similarly, the respondent's allegations to the effect that the applicant attempted to introduce new evidence also cannot be examined in detail due to the same problem.

[15] The applicant's memorandum of fact and law alone was 47 pages in length, or 50% more than what the Rules of our Court allow. After hearing the parties, the respective theories of the case, given the dispersed arguments, remained somewhat uncertain. Ultimately, the applicant tried to find holes and to create breaches in the adjudicator's decision. The respondent challenged these attempts at creating breaches and argued that the decision was reasonable within the meaning of the Act. I examined the applicant's allegations as thoroughly as I could, in order to determine whether, light of the adjudicator's decision and having regard to the available evidence, the decision was reasonable.

Facts

[16] Martin Lapostolle was employed at the Correctional Service of Canada until January 19, 2010. He was terminated on that date, following a decision made in that regard on January 18, 2010.

[17] The factual backdrop can be summarized as follows. The applicant was subject to disciplinary action on February 28, 2008. The applicant and respondent do not agree on the scope of this measure. The respondent contends that the suspension was imposed as a result of the applicant's acquaintances. This factor also, to a large degree, led to his termination.

[18] For the applicant's part, he maintains that he was suspended without pay for one day for having gained unauthorized access to privileged information. By privileged information, I mean information that is protected by the employer and to which access is limited.

[19] The applicant's position does not correspond to the wording of the disciplinary action report. On its face, the disciplinary action report deals with two different subjects. The second subject, which the applicant claims was what the disciplinary action was based on, was apparently the access to privileged information. Yet this incident is presented in the report as being secondary. It reads as follows:

> [TRANSLATION]
> 2. The report also establishes that in the six months prior to the investigation, you looked at a number of inmates' files that, by all appearances, were not under your responsibility or whose consultation was not directly related to your specific functions as an AC-II

The section of the report in which the employee's version appears shows that the applicant checked inmates' files for his own personal reasons on at least three occasions.

[20] The report also contains a much lengthier description of the first incident that led to a disciplinary action. This incident occurred on November 3, 2007. I feel it is important to reproduce the excerpt describing the facts:

> [TRANSLATION]
> 1. On November 3, 2007, you were seen in public in the company of the owners of the *Le Garage* strip club and getting into a limousine with the logo of the *Le Garage* bar and subsequently going to eat at a restaurant with them. This incident was brought to our attention during a briefing meeting of various police corps' and attended by the CSC. During that outing, an intervention by the police was necessary and you were found to be linked to an incident that required a police report to be filled out due to the conduct of certain individuals in the group. By publicly associating with persons who could be involved with criminal elements, you place yourself in a vulnerable position, exposing yourself to risks such as blackmail and corruption (influence peddling, extortion, loan sharking, etc.). The investigation report also reveals that you sought funding for ball hockey league jerseys from the owner of the same bar, reinforcing the dangers of extortion and corrupt dealings. By associating with individuals known to police and identified as being persons of interest, you were likely to tarnish the image of the Correctional Service. ...

In the part reserved for the employee's comments, it states that the other passengers in the limousine were the manager and the owner of the said bar, a third person who would later be involved in an incident that would result in the applicant's termination, and other persons unknown. In the report the applicant indicates that he has changed his behaviour and avoids [TRANSLATION] "going to the Le Garage bar and refusing offers to go out 'with the manager of the establishment' because you could not predict whom he might be with."

[21] In the part of the report describing the disciplinary action taken, namely, the one-day suspension without pay, there are two elements that stand out:

> [TRANSLATION]
> - Considering that you acknowledged that your conduct was likely to tarnish the service's image du service and that you stated that you had changed your behaviour since then;
>
> - Considering that you continue to defend having looked at offenders' files for personal purposes, and refuse to acknowledge the seriousness of your actions in this regard.

[22] In my opinion, there is no doubt that the disciplinary measure covered the applicant's associations. And there was also no doubt about the warning issued to him. The report states: [TRANSLATION] "any recidivism on your part could result in more severe disciplinary action, including termination of employment".

[23] Moreover, the applicant's subsequent conduct confirms that the measure included acquaintances. In fact, it is not disputed that the applicant sought to clarify which persons were to be excluded. The testimony of the Associate Warden of the Regional Reception Centre and the president of the union local confirm this. What remains less clear is the subject matter of the conversation.

[24] The Court does not have access to the testimony that was given. We have only the adjudicator's brief summary. In addition, the respondent submitted an affidavit of an employee who attended the hearings before the adjudicator. In it, she states that at the hearing, the Assistant Warden [TRANSLATION] "testified that he had warned the applicant not to associate with individuals who were known to police or go to places that were known to police". The

testimony of the president of the union local, as reported by the adjudicator, confirms that clarifications were sought as to whom the applicant could associate with outside of working hours. I will cite a few paragraphs 26 of the decision under review:

> ... One person in the St-Janvier bar limousine was a long-time friend. The grievor wanted to know if he could go out for lunch with him and continue to see him. [The witness] and the grievor met with [the Assistant Warden] for about a half-hour to discuss the matter. [The Assistant Warden] would not clarify the conditions for the grievor's association with friends but did state that it would not be wise to associate with them in a public place. No mention was made of excluding anyone else from the grievor's associations. ...

[25] The summaries of the testimony of the Assistant Warden and the applicant in this regard, as presented by the adjudicator, do not strike me as diverging from the adjudicator's later finding. In fact, the applicant apparently characterized the Assistant Warden's answer as being vague. One can understand why. The disciplinary measure speaks for itself and it was not up to the Assistant Warden to change its scope. In fact, the Assistant Warden's testimony is presented as specifically warning the applicant about "mixing with people associated with organized crime": that it would harm the Correctional Service of Canada's image and would also put him at risk of threats and blackmail.

[26] The applicant's position is that he was not warned to avoid the individuals who are named and who were in the limousine on November 3, 2007. With respect, upon reviewing the testimony before the adjudicator as thoroughly as I could, the only logical inference I could make was that it was not unreasonable to conclude that the applicant had been forewarned about the occupants of the said limousine. That he tried to limit the number of people he was supposed to avoid seems entirely plausible to me. That he was given this kind of assurance seems much less

plausible. Indeed, the summary of the testimony of the three individuals present and that of another person who attended the hearings lead to the same conclusion. The report detailing the disciplinary measure on February 28, 2008 clearly refers to the operators of the establishment. It is difficult to imagine that this would not include the owner of the establishment.

[27] Therefore, the applicant knew he was supposed to refrain from associating with certain individuals. At least that is the conclusion that should be made based on the balance of the evidence. This leads to an examination of the evidence with regard to the incidents leading up to the termination of employment in January 2010.

[28] Having already been sanctioned, the applicant was criticized by his employer for two incidents in 2009 in which he was involved. First, the applicant was stopped by police on two occasions, June 11 and 17, 2009, in the company of a passenger in the limousine who also happened to be the bar owner. Later, the applicant was sponsored by another passenger in the said limousine to enable him to participate in a poker tournament for which the entry fee was $10,000. The applicant was to collect 40% of the winnings, to reflect his financial contribution, while his partner's share was 60%.

[29] The applicant was suspended without pay on November 5, 2009, while the allegations in relation to the incidents of June 11 and 17, 2009, were subject to an internal disciplinary investigation. Reference was made the damaging effect on the reputation of the Correctional Service of Canada.

[30] The investigation concluded with a report on December 7, 2009. The report found that the applicant was in the company of a specifically named person he was not to associate with. In response to this, the applicant sought to minimize the seriousness of the matter by pleading ignorance about the consequences and the coincidental nature of the June 2009 encounters.

[31] The same investigation also dealt with the sponsorship. Two issues emerged from this. First, the report criticizes the applicant for having missed work, without prior authorization, to attend the said poker tournament in Las Vegas, between July 2 and 16, 2009. The report acknowledges a certain amount of confusion about the applicant's status for some of the days during this period, but concludes that for a number of those days he had not received prior authorization for leave, whether sick leave or annual leave, as was required. Second, the applicant is criticized for his ties to the sponsor for the poker tournament, as that person was one of the individuals identified in the February 26, 2008, disciplinary measure. The report also notes that the measure warned of the risk of termination of employment in the event of a repeated incident. In addition to this, the inherent financial advantage gained by the sponsorship, which ultimately resulted in winnings of $179,000, was never disclosed to the employer.

[32] It was on the basis of this report that the termination of employment was ordered on January 18, 2010. The termination letter provides few details: it lists his inappropriate associations on June 11 and 17, 2009. It states that the image of the Correctional Service of Canada having been tarnished, the relationship of trust with the employer was irreparably broken, and that both the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector and the Corrections

Service of Canada's Standards of Professional Conduct and Code of Discipline had been breached. The letter also refers to the disciplinary record.

[33] The report on disciplinary measures goes into rather more explicit detail. The entire issue of the confusion surrounding leave resulted in no disciplinary measures being applied. However, the report does note that the applicant's disciplinary record worsened in 2009 (attendance, abusive language towards a Correctional manger, inappropriate and sexual remarks in the workplace, playing card games with tokens in view of inmates). The incidents on June 11 and 17, 2009, and [TRANSLATION] "your two-year contractual relationship," referring to the sponsorship by one of the individuals identified as being someone a correctional officer should not have any connection with, were those which were used as a basis for terminating the applicant's employment.

<u>The Adjudicator</u>

[34] In light of these entanglements, the adjudicator was to conclude that the dismissal was justified.

[35] After having gone over the evidence adduced, the adjudicator determined that the incidents on June 11 and 17, 2009, and the two-year sponsorship involving individuals the applicant was to avoid under the February 26, 2008, disciplinary sanction were sufficient to warrant dismissal. A correctional officer is a peace officer, and is therefore a public official, which requires integrity and fairness. These are constraints that come with the job, and they are necessary for maintaining the image of integrity of the Correctional Service of Canada.

[36] The adjudicator determined that the February 2008 disciplinary measure constituted a direct warning that went so far as to threaten termination of employment. Furthermore, the adjudicator did not believe the explanation that the June 2009 incidents involving the bar owner were coincidences (paragraph 73 of the decision). She found that the applicant had demonstrated wilful ignorance about the individual who sponsored him for the poker tournament. With regard to the issue of whether leave had been authorized to go to Las Vegas for the poker tournament, she ruled that this was irrelevant. It was only the non-disclosed sponsorship that was sanctioned. The adjudicator was clearly concerned about the applicant's having placed himself in a position of vulnerability and the fact that his behaviour tarnished the image of the employer, whose integrity must remain beyond reproach. Paragraph 93 of the decision reads as follows:

> By associating publicly with individuals involved in organized crime, the grievor tarnished the CSC's image. Given all the circumstances, the conduct of which the employer accused him renders him unable to perform his duties with integrity. The evidence is sufficient to convince me that the relationship of trust with the employer has been irreparably broken end that, given the mandate of the Regional Reception Centre, the grievor would pose a risk to its security were he reinstated. The grievor's years of service and rank do not mitigate my findings. [Emphasis added.]

Analysis

[37] The only issue before a reviewing judge in a case such as this is whether the decision is reasonable, in other words, whether it is justified, and whether the decision-making process was transparent and intelligible. The burden on the applicant entails demonstrating that the decision is unreasonable, on a balance of probabilities. While criminal law requires the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in this case the onus is on the applicant to prove that the decision was not reasonable.

[38] The applicant has been busy in his search for often insignificant or imaginary factual errors or omissions. To illustrate one such example, the applicant describes, at great length, the adjudicator's errors regarding the July 2009 leave. As was previously noted, the adjudicator dismissed this issue as being irrelevant (paragraph 75 of the decision). In a similar vein, the applicant is adamant that the arrangement is not a sponsorship but a partnership. What difference there exists between the two is never explained, nor what the significance of any such distinction would be, in the event that one could be made.

[39] At other times, the errors or omissions conjured up by the applicant are no more than disagreements over inferences drawn from the evidence. Here again, to illustrate an example of this, the applicant places much emphasis on alleged errors or omissions in the testimony of an investigator from the Sûreté du Québec, whose credibility is called into question because he provided hearsay evidence or because he was unable to answer certain questions. Not only are these allegations impossible to confirm by this Court, which has no access to the evidence submitted, they are immaterial to the question before the adjudicator.

[40] It is worth recalling the words of Justice Abella, writing on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada, in *Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland-and-Labrador (Treasury Board)*, 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708:

> [14] Read as a whole, I do not see *Dunsmuir* as standing for the proposition that the "adequacy" of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses — one for the reasons and a separate one for the result (Donald J. M. Brown and John M. Evans, *Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada* (loose-leaf), at §§12:5330 and 12:5510). It is a more organic exercise — the reasons must be read together with

> the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes. This, it seems to me, is what the Court was saying in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing courts to look at "the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes" (para 47).
>
> ...
>
> [16] Reasons may not include all the arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing judge would have preferred, but that does not impugn the validity of either the reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis. A decision-maker is not required to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however subordinate, leading to its final conclusion (*Service Employees' International Union, Local No 333 v Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn*, [1975] 1 SCR 382, at p 391). In other words, if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes, the *Dunsmuir* criteria are met.
>
> ...
>
> [18] Evans J.A. *in Canada Post Corp. v. Public Service Alliance of Canada*, 2010 FCA 56, [2011] 2 F.C.R. 221, explained in reasons upheld by this Court (2011 SCC 57) that Dunsmuir seeks to "avoid an unduly formalistic approach to judicial review" (para. 164). He notes that "perfection is not the standard" and suggests that reviewing courts should ask whether "when read in light of the evidence before it and the nature of its statutory task, the Tribunal's reasons adequately explain the bases of its decision" (para. 163). I found the description by the Respondents in their Factum particularly helpful in explaining the nature of the exercise:
>
> > When reviewing a decision of an administrative body on the reasonableness standard, the guiding principle is deference. Reasons are not to be reviewed in a vacuum – the result is to be looked at in the context of the evidence, the parties' submissions and the process. Reasons do not have to be perfect. They do not have to be comprehensive. [para. 44]

[41] The kind of attack launched by the applicant can possibly succeed in cases where one need only demonstrate reasonable doubt. However, in judicial review, not only is the onus on the applicant, who does not benefit from any presumption, but he or she must satisfy the Court on a balance of probabilities.

[42] Upon reviewing the 64 errors and omissions alleged by the applicant, it is of note that none attacks the heart of the decision. One would have thought that this kind of challenge would require a direct reference to the evidence before the adjudicator, evidence that was not available to the Court. That in itself, in my opinion, would suffice to dismiss the application for judicial review, given the applicant's heavy burden of proof. But there is more to it than that. The examination of the 64 errors or omissions convinces me that, when considered individually, they lead nowhere when measured against the reasonableness test. Their cumulative effect, in terms of the quality of the allegations of errors or omissions (or lack thereof), is equally pointless.

[43] The adjudicator's decision, as far as the applicant's factual questions are concerned, cannot be successfully challenged on a reasonableness standard, which dictates that a decision fall within "a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law" (*Dunsmuir*, above at para 47). In my opinion, the applicant also fails to propose any other possible outcome than the one arrived at by the adjudicator. Perhaps it bears repeating: the 2008 disciplinary measure directly warned the applicant that associating with certain individuals would not be tolerated. The adjudicator reasonably concluded that, in spite of this, the applicant chose to ignore the warning on June 11 and 17, 2009. The coincidences claimed by the applicant are difficult to believe and it was reasonably open to the adjudicator to make the determination she did. It was also open to the adjudicator to infer that the applicant had demonstrated wilful ignorance about his sponsor (or partner). The adjudicator clearly stated that this was the crux of the matter (paragraph 67 of the decision). The errors or omissions, even if they were to exist, would in no way undermine the decision as such. At best, the allegations are tangential. The

reasons given to justify the decision are unassailable in terms of their reasonableness within the meaning of *Dunsmuir*, above. The adjudicator chose from a range of possible, acceptable outcomes in respect of the facts and law.

[44] At errors 59, 65, 67 (which brings the total number of alleged errors to 67), the applicant raises what would appear to be questions of law. But he does not flesh out any of these questions, and they are akin to generalizations. Therefore, there is no reason for dwelling upon them any further.

[45] Additional evidence, involving incidents that occurred after the termination of January 18, 2010, but which occurred around the same time, having taken place in 2010, was admitted by the adjudicator. That evidence, which tended to link the applicant with individuals involved in organized crime, seemed ambiguous to me, as far as I could tell. In my opinion it had little probative value; but at any rate, the adjudicator did not make much of it, stating that it was relevant because it "tends to show that the employer's fears about breach of trust are justified" (paragraph 94 of the decision). Such usage is consistent with the law (*Cie minière Québec Cartier v Quebec (Grievances arbitrator)*, [1995] 2 SCR 1095). In any event, the adjudicator had already determined that the dismissal was justified in the circumstances and her decision was not shown to have been unreasonable (*Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association*, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 SCR 654).

[46] The applicant's behaviour was a serious problem in the adjudicator's view. The Court must show deference as well as "a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision" (*Dunsmuir*, above at para 48).

[47] At the end of the day, the applicant failed to discharge his burden. A reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the decision-maker. It will seek only to determine whether it was reasonable. The approach adopted by the applicant of attacking alleged errors and omissions would have had a better chance of success if those errors could have been proved and if they had compromised the integrity of the process.

[48] In this case, not only could the alleged errors and omissions not be demonstrated, but they involved subjects that were, at best, tangential. As for what was at the crux of the matter, the adjudicator's decisions all bear the imprimatur of reasonableness. The applicant, who held a position for which integrity was an essential requirement, had received a clear warning that some of his associations were inappropriate. If he had been unaware of this at the beginning of his career, which would be surprising, he was clearly warned in 2008 that the dubious character of the company he kept could lead to his dismissal. He was even issued a disciplinary sanction in this regard. The adjudicator reasonably found that, in spite of this, he chose to maintain contact with certain individuals who were nonetheless identified, while at the very same time his disciplinary file was growing thicker. Yet he entered into a two-year sponsorship deal, or partnership, without informing his superiors or his employer; a sponsorship that, on top of everything, involved one of the occupants of the limousine in the incident that had given rise to the February 2008 disciplinary measure. It was up to the adjudicator to weigh the evidence, to

draw inferences from it and to make a determination with regard to the penalty of dismissal. The applicant failed to demonstrate that the adjudicator was unreasonable. As a result, the application for judicial review fails.

JUDGMENT

THE COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the application for judicial review be dismissed. With costs to the respondent.

"Yvan Roy"
Judge

Certified true translation
Sebastian Desbarats, Translator

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	T-13-12
STYLE OF CAUSE:	Martin Lapostolle v. Attorney General of Canada
PLACE OF HEARING:	Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING:	June 10, 2013
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DATED:	August 20, 2013

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