Ottawa, Ontario, June 19, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
BETWEEN:
BARRY APPLETON
and
THE CLERK OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator of the Privy Council Office (PCO). The Coordinator, after receiving a request for access to documents that mentioned the applicants and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), determined that certain documents in PCO’s possession could be released, notwithstanding the applicants’ objections. The applicants argue on numerous grounds that the Coordinator’s decision was incorrect and ask me to set it aside.
[2] I have found that the Coordinator’s decision was largely correct.
I. Issues
1. Must the respondent prove that the person requesting the documents was eligible to do so?
2. Are some of the documents outside the scope of the request?
3. Is disclosure of the documents contrary to international law?
4. Do the documents come within exemptions at common law and in the Access to Information Act (ATIA), R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, namely, s. 19, and s. 20(1)? (relevant enactments are set out in an Annex).
[3] The parties agree that the Court’s task is to review the documents and the parties’ submissions and make a fresh determination whether the documents can be disclosed.
II. Factual Background
[4] The applicant Mr. Barry Appleton and his law firm, Appleton & Associates, represent United Parcel Service (UPS) in an arbitration in which UPS alleges that Canada has violated NAFTA by allowing Canada Post’s courier service to compete in the private sector. The arbitration hearing took place in Washington D.C. in 2005 and the panel’s decision is under reserve.
[5] The Coordinator received a request for documents in which the applicants and NAFTA (Chapter 11) were mentioned. The Coordinator notified the applicants of the request and allowed them to make submissions. After considering the applicant’s objections, the Coordinator decided that the documents could be disclosed. In turn, the applicants brought this application under s. 44(1) of the ATIA. The number of documents in dispute has been reduced in number by agreement between the parties, both before and after the hearing.
III. Analysis
1. Must the respondent prove that the person requesting the documents was eligible to do so?
[6] The applicants argue that access to government records can be granted only to persons who are eligible under the ATIA. The Act provides that persons who are Canadian citizens or permanent residents have a right of access to government records (s. 4(1)). Regulations extend that right to all persons and corporations present in Canada (Extension Order, No. I, SOR/89-207, s. 2). The applicants contend that these enactments forbid PCO from responding to access requests from ineligible persons and require PCO to provide proof of the requestor’s eligibility. They cite the following cases in their favour: Glaxo Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1990), 113 N.R. 399 (F.C.A.); Cyanamid Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health and Welfare) (1992), 45 C.P.R. (3d) 390 (F.C.A.).
[7] The respondent does not dispute the correctness of the applicants’ position. However, the respondent notes that the applicants did not raise this issue in their notice of application and, accordingly, failed to comply with Rule 301(e) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106. As a consequence, the respondent did not anticipate the need the provide evidence on the point. At the hearing of this application, the respondent asked for an opportunity to supply a supplementary affidavit, if I concluded that the issue was properly before the Court.
[8] I am not persuaded that the applicants have properly raised this threshold issue. Had it merely been a simple legal argument, one to which the respondent could respond on comparatively short notice, I might view the issue differently, especially since the applicants did raise the question in their memorandum of fact and law. However, this can only be dealt with on the basis of evidence and the applicants did not provide the respondent with adequate notice that it should prepare and supply that evidence. Accordingly, I decline to deal with the question of the eligibility of the requestor.
2. Are some of the documents outside the scope of the request?
[9] The applicants argue that some of the documents PCO intends to disclose do not come within the parameters of the original request and, therefore, that they should not be disclosed.
[10] The Respondent notes, once again, that the applicants did not raise this issue in their notice of application. Unlike the issue discussed above, where evidence was required, this question is purely a matter of law. The respondent addressed it in its memorandum of fact and law and counsel had a further opportunity to argue it at the hearing. As such, the respondent does not appear to have been prejudiced by inadequate notice.
[11] The respondent argues that the applicants are incorrect in their characterization of the Coordinator’s response to the access request. Further, it submits that the applicants simply do not have standing to dispute the breadth of the Coordinator’s response. The law favours the respondent’s position on this point. Indeed, the issue appears to be well-settled - “a third party cannot object that the government institution is prepared to give more than was asked for” (Mead Johnson Nutritionals, a division of Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 235; see also Canadian Pacific Hotels Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 444). I note that there is some suggestion to the contrary in Cistel Technology Inc. v. Canada (Correctional Service), 2002 FCT 253. However, the issue does not appear to have been fully argued in that case. In my view, the applicants cannot argue that the Coordinator made any error in deciding to disclose more than was asked for.
3. Is disclosure of the documents contrary to international law?
[12] The applicants argue that international law, not the ATIA, governs the disclosure of documents in the context of an international arbitration. They point to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1115 U.N.T.S. 331, Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37, entered into force January 27, 1980), which provides that Canada cannot invoke domestic law as a justification for failing to honour a treaty commitment. Accordingly, Canada cannot rely on the ATIA to justify a failure to respect its duty of confidentiality under NAFTA. In particular, the panel dealing with the ongoing arbitration between UPS and Canada Post issued a confidentiality order, which governs the release of documents related to that arbitration, not the ATIA.
[13] The NAFTA arbitration is governed by rules promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Those rules accord tribunals discretionary powers to conduct arbitrations in an appropriate manner, while ensuring that the parties are treated equally and have an opportunity to present their case (Article 15). Within that broad discretion, a panel can issue a confidentiality order, as it did here.
[14] The panel’s confidentiality order of April 4, 2003 allows for public disclosure of many documents, but not the sort that are in issue here – mainly correspondence between the parties. Therefore, the applicants suggest that Canada cannot use the ATIA to release documents that it is bound to keep confidential according to that order.
[15] The respondent argues that the order on which the applicants rely actually contemplates the application of the ATIA to issues of disclosure and, therefore, that there is no conflict between Canada’s domestic law and its international commitments. I agree.
[16] The confidentiality order states in paragraph 11:
Any request to the Government of Canada for documents under the Access to Information Act, including documents produced to Canada in these proceedings, will be governed by the provisions of that Act, except that no information designated by United Parcel Service of America, Inc. as confidential shall be disclosed to any requestor unless prompt notice of such request has been made, and United Parcel Service of America, Inc. has been afforded the opportunity to make representations concerning disclosure.
[17] The applicants argue that this paragraph serves merely to create a duty to notify UPS of access requests. It does not say that the ATIA will govern the issue of disclosure. The applicants suggest that this issue was settled in another arbitration under similar rules: Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Decision and Order of the Tribunal (March 11, 2002). The respondent says that Pope and Talbot does not apply because there was no express reference to the ATIA in the governing order in that case.
[18] The order that was the subject of the tribunal’s decision in Pope and Talbot merely created a notification procedure. It left the issue of disclosure in the hands of the tribunal:
If any person . . . receives a request pursuant to law to disclose a Protected Document or Third Party Protected Document of information contained therein, that person shall give prompt written notice to the party that claimed confidentiality over the document and to the person to whom the confidential information relates so that such party may seek a protective Order or other appropriate remedy.
[19] In that case, Canada argued that its domestic law should apply to the disclosure of documents. The tribunal rejected that argument given that Canada had previously proposed that express recognition of its responsibilities under the ATIA be included in the tribunal’s procedural orders and the tribunal had refused to do so. That situation is completely different from this case. Here, the tribunal’s orders do recognize the provisions of the ATIA.
[20] Further, in this case, the tribunal noted that the parties did not agree on the content of paragraph 11 of the confidentiality order. It stated:
[T]he Tribunal has considered the submissions made by the parties, relevant rulings made by NAFTA Tribunals in the S.D. Myers and Pope and Talbot arbitrations and the Interpretation adopted by the Free Trade Commission on 31 July 2001. It concluded that the better way forward was to provide a procedure to address the issue if and when it arose . . . The notification procedure in paragraph 11 parallels in a general way the notification provisions in the relevant Canadian legislation and in the context of the present proceedings should not cause confusion.
[21] As mentioned, the applicants argue that the purpose of paragraph 11 is simply to give notice to affected persons of access requests. It does not suggest that the ATIA will actually govern how those requests are disposed of. Again, I disagree. The tribunal obviously understood the issue that had arisen in Pope and Talbot, where the panel’s orders included a notification requirement but did not recognize the application of ATIA. Had it wished to take the same approach, it would not have stated in paragraph 11 that requests for documents “will be governed by the provisions of that Act”. It would have included an order along the lines of that which has been issued in Pope and Talbot.
4. Do the documents come within the exemptions at common law and in the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, namely, s. 19, and s. 20(1)?
[22]
There are three categories of documents in issue. The first category
includes correspondence between UPS and PCO regarding a possible settlement.
The second comprises correspondence between the parties about procedural
matters. The third category involves correspondence about potential members of
the tribunal.
[23] After the hearing, the respondent has conceded that many of the documents in the third category contain personal information and should not be disclosed. There are only a few documents remaining in issue.
(a) Category one documents
[24] The applicants argue that the documents in category one are exempt from disclosure under the common law settlement privilege, as well as s. 20(1)(b) of the ATIA. Regarding settlement privilege, this is not a free-standing exemption in the context of proceedings under the ATIA. Rather, settlement negotiations “sit readily within paragraph 20(1)(d) of the Act” (Blood Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 2003 FC 1397, at para. 50). In order to rely on that exemption, an applicant must do more than “simply assert the privilege of settlement negotiation”; the applicant “must bring evidence that disclosure of the requested records could reasonably be expected to interfere with settlement negotiations” (Blood Band, at para. 56). Here, the applicants have conceded that they cannot satisfy that test and withdrew their reliance on s. 20(1)(d).
[25] Regarding s. 20(1)(b), the applicants submit that the category one documents contain confidential financial or commercial information which was disclosed by a third party (UPS) to a government institution and, therefore, that these documents come within the terms of s. 20(1)(b). They suggest that NAFTA proceedings are, in essence, commercial in nature and their outcome will have financial implications for the parties. Therefore, all correspondence related to NAFTA proceedings come within the s. 20(1)(b) exemption.
[26] In my view, the applicants interpret s. 20(1)(b) too broadly. It states that “the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record” that contains “financial, commercial, scientific or technical information” . . . In other words, the document must itself contain financial or commercial information. It is not enough that the document was created in the context of a proceeding that may have financial or commercial implications.
[27] I have reviewed the documents in category one and none contains any financial or commercial information. Therefore, s. 20(1)(b) does not apply to them.
(b) Category two documents
[28] The applicants argue that s. 20(1)(b) also applies to documents in this category, which includes correspondence between the parties about procedural issues relating to the arbitration. Again, they suggest that the NAFTA proceedings are commercial in nature and, therefore, that discussions between the parties about those proceedings are, by definition, also commercial in nature. The applicants also urge me to consider the public interest in keeping this kind of correspondence confidential and the potential harm that might result if the tribunal itself became aware of the respective parties’ pre-hearing postures.
[29] I have reviewed the documents in issue. They do not contain any commercial or financial information and, therefore, do not fall within the exemption in s. 20(1)(b). As for the policy issues the applicants raise, I agree that in some circumstances disclosure could be harmful. However, the exemptions in ss. 20(1)(c) and 20(1)(d) might well apply in those circumstances. This is a question I need not decide in this case.
(c) Category three documents
[30] The parties agree that most of the documents in category three contain personal information and, therefore, fall under the exemption in s. 19 of the ATIA. Only a few documents remain in issue. Three of those documents are published articles about tribunal members. Accordingly, pursuant to s. 19(2)(b) of the ATIA, these documents can be disclosed as “the information is publicly available”. Two other documents do contain personal information (i.e. name and place of employment) as defined in s. 3 of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 and, therefore, fall under the exemption in s. 19 of the ATIA (documents 000574 and 000596). The final document in issue (000446) contains neither personal information nor financial or commercial information. It is not exempted under s. 19 or s. 20(1)(b) of the ATIA and, therefore, may be disclosed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT IS THAT:
1.
The
application for judicial review is allowed in part;
2.
Documents
000574 and 000596 are exempt from disclosure pursuant to s. 19 of the Access
to Information Act (ATIA), R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1; and
3. The parties shall bear their own costs.
Annex
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Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1
4. (1) Subject to this Act, but notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, every person who is (a) a Canadian citizen, or (b) a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to any record under the control of a government institution.
19. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act.
(2) The head of a government institution may disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information if (a) the individual to whom it relates consents to the disclosure; (b) the information is publicly available; or (c) the disclosure is in accordance with section 8 of the Privacy Act. 20. (1) Subject to this section, the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains … (b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that is confidential information supplied to a government institution by a third party and is treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third party; (c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of, a third party; or (d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third party.
21.(1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains (a) advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister of the Crown, (b) an account of consultations or deliberations in which directors, officers or employees of a government institution, a minister of the Crown or the staff of a minister participate, Third party may apply for a review 44. (1) Any third party to whom the head of a government institution is required under paragraph 28(1)(b) or subsection 29(1) to give a notice of a decision to disclose a record or a part thereof under this Act may, within twenty days after the notice is given, apply to the Court for a review of the matter.
Access to Information Act Extension Order, No. I, SOR/89-207
2. The right to be given access under subsection 4(1) of the Access to Information Act to records under the control of a government institution is hereby extended to include all individuals who are present in Canada but who are not Canadian citizens or permanent residents within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and all corporations that are present in Canada. 2001, c. 27, s. 273.
Federal Courts Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106
301. An application shall be commenced by a notice of application in Form 301, setting out … (e) a complete and concise statement of the grounds intended to be argued, including a reference to any statutory provision or rule to be relied on; and
Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21
3. In this Act, "personal information" means information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, (a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age or marital status of the individual, (b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved, (c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, (d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, (e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they are about another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to another individual by a government institution or a part of a government institution specified in the regulations, (f) correspondence sent to a government institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to such correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence, (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, (h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to the individual by an institution or a part of an institution referred to in paragraph (e), but excluding the name of the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual, and (i) the name of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the individual, but, for the purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and section 19 of the Access to Information Act, does not include (j) information about an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government institution that relates to the position or functions of the individual including, (i) the fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the government institution, (ii) the title, business address and telephone number of the individual, (iii) the classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position held by the individual, (iv) the name of the individual on a document prepared by the individual in the course of employment, and (v) the personal opinions or views of the individual given in the course of employment, (k) information about an individual who is or was performing services under contract for a government institution that relates to the services performed, including the terms of the contract, the name of the individual and the opinions or views of the individual given in the course of the performance of those services, (l) information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature, including the granting of a licence or permit, conferred on an individual, including the name of the individual and the exact nature of the benefit, and (m) information about an individual who has been dead for more than twenty years;
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Loi sur l'accès à l'information , L.R., 1985, ch. A-1
4. (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi mais nonobstant toute autre loi fédérale, ont droit à l’accès aux documents relevant d’une institution fédérale et peuvent se les faire communiquer sur demande : a) les citoyens canadiens; b) les résidents permanents au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés.
19. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le responsable d’une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication de documents contenant les renseignements personnels visés à l’article 3 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels.
Cas où la divulgation est autorisée (2) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut donner communication de documents contenant des renseignements personnels dans les cas où : a) l’individu qu’ils concernent y consent; b) le public y a accès; c) la communication est conforme à l’article 8 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels.
20. (1) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale est tenu, sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, de refuser la communication de documents contenant : […] b) des renseignements financiers, commerciaux, scientifiques ou techniques fournis à une institution fédérale par un tiers, qui sont de nature confidentielle et qui sont traités comme tels de façon constante par ce tiers; c) des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de causer des pertes ou profits financiers appréciables à un tiers ou de nuire à sa compétitivité; d) des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement d’entraver des négociations menées par un tiers en vue de contrats ou à d’autres fins.
21.(1) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de documents datés de moins de vingt ans lors de la demande et contenant : a) des avis ou recommandations élaborés par ou pour une institution fédérale ou un ministre; b) des comptes rendus de consultations ou délibérations auxquelles ont participé des administrateurs, dirigeants ou employés d’une institution fédérale, un ministre ou son personnel; 44. (1) Le tiers que le responsable d’une institution fédérale est tenu, en vertu de l’alinéa 28(1)b) ou du paragraphe 29(1), d’aviser de la communication totale ou partielle d’un document peut, dans les vingt jours suivant la transmission de l’avis, exercer un recours en révision devant la Cour.
Loi sur l’accès à l’information, Décret d'extension no 1, D.O.R.S./89-207
2. Le droit d'accès aux documents des institutions fédérales que prévoit le paragraphe 4(1) de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information est étendu à toute personne physique présente au Canada qui n'est pas un citoyen canadien ou un résident permanent au sens de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés et à toute personne morale qui est présente au Canada. 2001, ch. 27, art. 273.
Règles des Cours fédérales, DORS/98-106
Avis de demande — forme et contenu 301. La demande est introduite par un avis de demande, établi selon la formule 301, qui contient les renseignements suivants : […]
e) un énoncé complet et concis des motifs invoqués, avec mention de toute disposition législative ou règle applicable;
Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels, L.R., 1985, ch. P-21
3. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. «renseignements personnels » Les renseignements, quels que soient leur forme et leur support, concernant un individu identifiable, notamment : a) les renseignements relatifs à sa race, à son origine nationale ou ethnique, à sa couleur, à sa religion, à son âge ou à sa situation de famille; b) les renseignements relatifs à son éducation, à son dossier médical, à son casier judiciaire, à ses antécédents professionnels ou à des opérations financières auxquelles il a participé; c) tout numéro ou symbole, ou toute autre indication identificatrice, qui lui est propre; d) son adresse, ses empreintes digitales ou son groupe sanguin; e) ses opinions ou ses idées personnelles, à l’exclusion de celles qui portent sur un autre individu ou sur une proposition de subvention, de récompense ou de prix à octroyer à un autre individu par une institution fédérale, ou subdivision de celle-ci visée par règlement; f) toute correspondance de nature, implicitement ou explicitement, privée ou confidentielle envoyée par lui à une institution fédérale, ainsi que les réponses de l’institution dans la mesure où elles révèlent le contenu de la correspondance de l’expéditeur; g) les idées ou opinions d’autrui sur lui; h) les idées ou opinions d’un autre individu qui portent sur une proposition de subvention, de récompense ou de prix à lui octroyer par une institution, ou subdivision de celle-ci, visée à l’alinéa e), à l’exclusion du nom de cet autre individu si ce nom est mentionné avec les idées ou opinions; i) son nom lorsque celui-ci est mentionné avec d’autres renseignements personnels le concernant ou lorsque la seule divulgation du nom révélerait des renseignements à son sujet; toutefois, il demeure entendu que, pour l’application des articles 7, 8 et 26, et de l’article 19 de la Loi sur l’accès à l’information, les renseignements personnels ne comprennent pas les renseignements concernant : j) un cadre ou employé, actuel ou ancien, d’une institution fédérale et portant sur son poste ou ses fonctions, notamment : (i) le fait même qu’il est ou a été employé par l’institution, (ii) son titre et les adresse et numéro de téléphone de son lieu de travail, (iii) la classification, l’éventail des salaires et les attributions de son poste, (iv) son nom lorsque celui-ci figure sur un document qu’il a établi au cours de son emploi, (v) les idées et opinions personnelles qu’il a exprimées au cours de son emploi; k) un individu qui, au titre d’un contrat, assure ou a assuré la prestation de services à une institution fédérale et portant sur la nature de la prestation, notamment les conditions du contrat, le nom de l’individu ainsi que les idées et opinions personnelles qu’il a exprimées au cours de la prestation; l) des avantages financiers facultatifs, notamment la délivrance d’un permis ou d’une licence accordés à un individu, y compris le nom de celui-ci et la nature précise de ces avantages; m) un individu décédé depuis plus de vingt ans
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FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-579-06
STYLE OF CAUSE: APPLETON & ASSOCIATES et al v. THE CLERK OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: April 11, 2007
APPEARANCES:
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Tamara L. Hunder Asha Kaushal |
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Christopher Rupar
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FOR THE RESPONDENT |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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APPLETON & ASSOCIATES Toronto, ON
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JOHN SIMS, Q.C. DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL Toronto, ON |