Ottawa, Ontario, December 1, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BEAUDRY
BETWEEN:
Applicant
and
AIR CANADA REGIONAL INC.
and
COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL
LANGUAGES OF CANADA
Intervener
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
BEAUDRY J.
[1] On August 24, 2005, the Court granted the applicant a remedy against Air Canada under subsection 77(1) of the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. 31 (4th Supp.) (OLA). The parties filed written submissions, and a hearing was held on October 26, 2005 to dispose of issues relating to non-monetary remedies, costs and disbursements.
ISSUES
[2] Is the applicant entitled to non-monetary remedies?
[3] Is the applicant entitled to his disbursements and costs?
ANALYSIS
[4] The relevant provisions of the OLA read as follows:
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76. In this Part, "Court" means the Federal Court.
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76. Le tribunal visé à la présente partie est la Cour fédérale. |
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77. (1) Any person who has made a complaint to the Commissioner in respect of a right or duty under sections 4 to 7, sections 10 to 13 or Part IV or V, or in respect of section 91, may apply to the Court for a remedy under this Part . . .
(4) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), the Court concludes that a federal institution has failed to comply with this Act, the Court may grant such remedy as it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(5) Nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from any right of action a person might have other than the right of action set out in this section. |
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77. (1) Quiconque a saisi le commissaire d'une plainte visant une obligation ou un droit prévus aux articles 4 à 7 et 10 à 13 ou aux parties IV ou V, ou fondée sur l'article 91 peut former un recours devant le tribunal sous le régime de la présente partie. […]
(4) Le tribunal peut, s'il estime qu'une institution fédérale ne s'est pas conformée à la présente loi, accorder la réparation qu'il estime convenable et juste eu égard aux circonstances.
(5) Le présent article ne porte atteinte à aucun autre droit d'action.
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81. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Court under this Act shall be in the discretion of the Court and shall follow the event unless the Court orders otherwise.
(2) Where the Court is of the opinion that an application under section 77 has raised an important new principle in relation to this Act, the Court shall order that costs be awarded to the applicant even if the applicant has not been successful in the result. |
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81. (1) Les frais et dépens sont laissés à l'appréciation du tribunal et suivent, sauf ordonnance contraire de celui-ci, le sort du principal.
(2) Cependant, dans les cas où il estime que l'objet du recours a soulevé un principe important et nouveau quant à la présente loi, le tribunal accorde les frais et dépens à l'auteur du recours, même s'il est débouté. |
1. Is the Applicant Entitled to Non-Monetary Remedies?
[5] In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court set out broad guidelines for judges assessing whether a remedy granted under subsection 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is worded similarly to subsection 77(4) of the OLA, is “appropriate and just”. As language rights are quasi-constitutional, our analysis will be guided by the same principles (paragraphs 55 to 59 of Doucet-Boudreau):
First, an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances of a Charter claim is one that meaningfully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the claimants. Naturally, this will take account of the nature of the right that has been violated and the situation of the claimant. A meaningful remedy must be relevant to the experience of the claimant and must address the circumstances in which the right was infringed or denied. An ineffective remedy, or one which was “smothered in procedural delays and difficulties”, is not a meaningful vindication of the right and therefore not appropriate and just (see Dunedin, supra, at para. 20, McLachlin C.J. citing Mills, supra, at p. 882, per Lamer J. (as he then was)).
Second, an appropriate and just remedy must employ means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy. As discussed above, a court ordering a Charter remedy must strive to respect the relationships with and separation of functions among the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. This is not to say that there is a bright line separating these functions in all cases. A remedy may be appropriate and just notwithstanding that it might touch on functions that are principally assigned to the executive. The essential point is that the courts must not, in making orders under s. 24(1), depart unduly or unnecessarily from their role of adjudicating disputes and granting remedies that address the matter of those disputes.
Third, an appropriate and just remedy is a judicial one which vindicates the right while invoking the function and powers of a court. It will not be appropriate for a court to leap into the kinds of decisions and functions for which its design and expertise are manifestly unsuited. The capacities and competence of courts can be inferred, in part, from the tasks with which they are normally charged and for which they have developed procedures and precedent.
Fourth, an appropriate and just remedy is one that, after ensuring that the right of the claimant is fully vindicated, is also fair to the party against whom the order is made. The remedy should not impose substantial hardships that are unrelated to securing the right.
Finally, it must be remembered that s. 24 is part of a constitutional scheme for the vindication of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. As such, s. 24, because of its broad language and the myriad of roles it may play in cases, should be allowed to evolve to meet the challenges and circumstances of those cases. That evolution may require novel and creative features when compared to traditional and historical remedial practice because tradition and history cannot be barriers to what reasoned and compelling notions of appropriate and just remedies demand. In short, the judicial approach to remedies must remain flexible and responsive to the needs of a given case
[6] The applicant is seeking the non-monetary remedies identified in bold hereinafter:
[translation]
I - THE APPLICATION seeks, first of all, a DECLARATION that:
(a) Air Canada and its subsidiary company Air Canada Regional Inc. are subject to the OLA, and more particularly Part IV, the Air Canada Public Participation Act (the ACPPA), and more particularly subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a), and the Official Languages (Communications with and Services to the Public) Regulations, SOR/92-48 (the Regulations);
[8] In his written submissions and at the hearing, the applicant indicated that he was satisfied with the order dated August 24, 2005 as a remedy to this application.
[translation]
(b) Air Canada and its subsidiary company Air Canada Regional Inc. are not complying with the language obligations under Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations;
[9] The morning of the hearing, the applicant withdrew this application, agreeing with the respondent that the application was too vague and went beyond the factual framework of the case.
[translation]
(c) the violation of the language rights under Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations is also a violation of the rights under sections 16 and 20 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter);
[10] Since this Court ruled in the order dated August 24, 2005 that the Charter did not apply to the respondent, the applicant withdrew the application.
[translation]
(d) Air Canada and its subsidiary company Air Canada Regional Inc. failed to comply with their language obligations under Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations on August 14, 2000 on flight AC 1347 between Montréal and Ottawa, and thereby breached the language rights of Michel Thibodeau guaranteed by the Charter;
[11] Since the order dated August 24, 2005 had determined that Air Canada was not subject to the Charter and that Air Canada and not its subsidiary had an obligation of result with respect to official languages, the applicant amended the application, stressing how important it was for him to obtain a formal statement that Air Canada had failed to comply with its language obligations in his own case. As this Court reached the same finding in paragraph 66 of the order dated August 24, 2005, there is no need to repeat it here.
[translation]
(e) The provisions of the OLA, the ACPPA and the Regulations prevail over the provisions of trade agreements or collective agreements and their enforcement and these agreements cannot effectively absolve Air Canada and Air Canada Regional Inc. of their language obligations under Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations;
[12] This issue has already been disposed of in paragraphs 97 and 101 of the order dated August 24, 2005:
We know that the OLA applies to Air Canada. The collective agreements under the aegis of the CLC must not be incompatible with the implementation of the OLA's purpose. If some incompatibility develops, the OLA will prevail over the provisions of the collective agreement.
. . .
In this case, Air Canada had a duty to ensure that its subsidiaries were providing services in both official languages on routes with a significant demand. The principle that statutes prevail over collective agreements applies in this case. Air Canada must make the necessary arrangements with its unions to ensure compliance with the OLA, bearing in mind that this statute is quasi-constitutional in nature.
[translation]
II - THE APPLICATION further seeks a mandatory ORDER against the respondents Air Canada and Air Canada Regional Inc. requiring them, within six months of the delivery of judgment in this proceeding, or within any other period determined by the Court:
(a) to take all the necessary steps to ensure that the public can communicate with and receive available services from the respondents in French, in accordance with Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations;
(b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing statements in the preceding paragraph, to take the following steps:
(i) to ensure that the respondents have an adequate bilingual capability and take all the other necessary steps to provide services to the public in French for in-flight services on routes with a significant demand;
(ii) to ensure, in the previously stated circumstances, that steps be taken by the respondents to actively offer service to the public, for example by making an active offer of service in French, entering into communication with it or by signage, notices or documentation in accordance with Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations;
(iii) to establish adequate procedures and a system of supervision designed to quickly identify, document and quantify potential violations of language rights, which rights are set out in Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations;
(iv) to ensure that language rights, as described in Part IV of the OLA, subsection 10(1) and paragraph 10(2)(a) of the ACPPA and the Regulations, prevail over any agreement executed by the respondents and any collective agreements that involve them;
[13] After considering the facts of this case and the applicable law, I do not believe that the order sought should be imposed here. Owing to the distinctive facts in the case under review, I hesitate to make the order and will explain why.
[14] Between the coming into force of the Air Canada Public Participation Act (R.S.C. (1985), c. 35 (4th supp.) (the ACPPA)—of which subsection 10(2) imposes on Air Canada an obligation of result in respect of its subsidiaries and the enforcement of the provisions of the OLA—and the flight of August 14, 2000, when the applicant was not served in French, just over one month had passed. Nevertheless, the evidence is silent on the subject of other breaches of the OLA between the two dates, or between the coming into force of the ACPPA and the date of the hearing in this case, October 26, 2005. I am therefore unable to find the existence of systemic breaches by Air Canada.
[15] Although it is lamentable that the respondent failed in its language obligations by not offering the applicant service in French, the seriousness of the breach of the latter’s rights and the harm that he suffered must be distinguished from the judicial precedents in which such orders were imposed. In Doucet-Boudreau, cited supra, the province failed to provide adequate French language instruction in schools to its Francophone minority. In Doucet v. Canada, 2004 FC 1444, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police communicated with the public in English only in a highway zone where there was considerable demand for service in both languages. In Forum des maires de la Péninsule acadienne v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2004 FCA 263, the issue was, in part, the right of Francophone employees to work in French. In Lavigne v. Canada (Human Resources Development), [1997] 1 F.C. 305 (T.D.), the breach related to the applicant’s right to work in the official language of his choice.
[16] Here, two judges have made their determination, referring to the breach of the applicant’s language rights on the August 14, 2000 flight as [TRANSLATION] “a relatively minor, unique breach”. I concur with this assessment and accordingly find that the imposition of the order sought by the applicant is not warranted under the circumstances of this case.
[17] Part III of the application deals with damages, an issue which was resolved by the decisions by Boudreault and Rouleau JJ.
[translation]
IV - THE APPLICATION further seeks a mandatory ORDER against the respondents, Air Canada and Air Canada Regional Inc., requiring them to give the applicant, Michel Thibodeau, a letter of apology, which shall be posted by the respondents in all the Air Canada and Air Canada Regional Inc. customer service counters. This letter should be visible to the public, easily readable, posted for a duration of two or more weeks and include, inter alia, the following:
(a) An acknowledgement that Air Canada and Air Canada Regional Inc. are legally required to provide services in French in accordance with the provisions of Part IV of the OLA, the ACPPA and the Regulations;
(b) An acknowledgement that Air Canada and Air Canada Regional Inc. have breached their duty to provide services in French to Francophone passengers;
(c) Apologies to Michel Thibodeau for the lack of service in French and for the lack of respect on the part of Air Canada and Air Canada Regional Inc. associated with the incident of August 14, 2000;
[18] The applicant stresses how important it is for him to receive a letter of apology from Air Canada. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that the order dated August 24, 2005, is in itself an appropriate and just remedy and that it would be unfair to be forced to apologize to the applicant. In addition, the respondent states that it has nothing to apologize for, since it demonstrated due diligence in complying with its language obligations. It also pleads force majeure, with the coming into force of the Act on July 5, 2000.
[19] With respect, I cannot endorse the respondent’s position. It could have overcome the constraints that it faced when the ACPPA came into force by, for example, hiring staff or subcontractors capable of communicating in French. The force majeure argument is, in my opinion, unacceptable, because the Act had been foreseeable since at least February 2000.
[20] A letter of apology is, in my view, fully justified and will serve the purposes of the OLA, given the circumstances and the perseverance required of the applicant in order to obtain judicial recognition that his rights had been violated: Lavigne, supra.
[21] At the hearing, the respondent submitted a draft letter of apology. After examining the letter, the applicant stated that neither the noun “apology,” nor the verb “apologize” was anywhere to be found in the letter. The Court agrees with the applicant; the respondent will have to send the applicant a formal letter of apology to the applicant.
[22] As for the demand that the letter be posted at the respondent’s customer service counters, since the breach of the applicant’s language rights in the present case is still less serious than the breaches established in Lavigne, supra, and since no evidence of other systemic breaches of language obligations has been offered, the Court will not force the respondent to post such notices.
2. Is the Applicant Entitled to His Disbursements and Costs?
[23] Section 400 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 reads as follows:
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400. (1) The Court shall have full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs and the determination of by whom they are to be paid.
(2) Costs may be awarded to or against the Crown
(3) In exercising its discretion under subsection (1), the Court may consider
(a) the result of the proceeding; (b) the amounts claimed and the amounts recovered; (c) the importance and complexity of the issues; (d) the apportionment of liability; (e) any written offer to settle; (f) any offer to contribute made under rule 421;
(g) the amount of work; (h) whether the public interest in having the proceeding litigated justifies a particular award of costs;
(i) any conduct of a party that tended to shorten or unnecessarily lengthen the duration of the proceeding; (j) the failure by a party to admit anything that should have been admitted or to serve a request to admit;
(k) whether any step in the proceeding was
(i) improper, vexatious or unnecessary, or (ii) taken through negligence, mistake or excessive caution;
(l) whether more than one set of costs should be allowed, where two or more parties were represented by different solicitors or were represented by the same solicitor but separated their defence unnecessarily;
(m) whether two or more parties, represented by the same solicitor, initiated separate proceedings unnecessarily; (n) whether a party who was successful in an action exaggerated a claim, including a counterclaim or third party claim, to avoid the operation of rules 292 to 299; and
(o) any other matter that it considers relevant.
(4) The Court may fix all or part of any costs by reference to Tariff B and may award a lump sum in lieu of, or in addition to, any assessed costs.
(5) Where the Court orders that costs be assessed in accordance with Tariff B, the Court may direct that the assessment be performed under a specific column or combination of columns of the table to that Tariff.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of these Rules, the Court may (a) award or refuse costs in respect of a particular issue or step in a proceeding; (b) award assessed costs or a percentage of assessed costs up to and including a specified step in a proceeding; (c) award all or part of costs on a solicitor-and-client basis; or (d) award costs against a successful party.
(7) Costs shall be awarded to the party who is entitled to receive the costs and not to the party's solicitor, but they may be paid to the party's solicitor in trust.
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400. (1) La Cour a le pouvoir discrétionnaire de déterminer le montant des dépens, de les répartir et de désigner les personnes qui doivent les payer.
(2) Les dépens peuvent être adjugés à la Couronne ou contre elle.
(3) Dans l'exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire en application du paragraphe (1), la Cour peut tenir compte de l'un ou l'autre des facteurs suivants :
a) le résultat de l'instance; b) les sommes réclamées et les sommes recouvrées; c) l'importance et la complexité des questions en litige; d) le partage de la responsabilité; e) toute offre écrite de règlement; f) toute offre de contribution faite en vertu de la règle 421; g) la charge de travail; h) le fait que l'intérêt public dans la résolution judiciaire de l'instance justifie une adjudication particulière des dépens; i) la conduite d'une partie qui a eu pour effet d'abréger ou de prolonger inutilement la durée de l'instance; j) le défaut de la part d'une partie de signifier une demande visée à la règle 255 ou de reconnaître ce qui aurait dû être admis; k) la question de savoir si une mesure prise au cours de l'instance, selon le cas i) était inappropriée, vexatoire ou inutile, (ii) a été entreprise de manière négligente, par erreur ou avec trop de circonspection;
l) la question de savoir si plus d'un mémoire de dépens devrait être accordé lorsque deux ou plusieurs parties sont représentées par différents avocats ou lorsque, étant représentées par le même avocat, elles ont scindé inutilement leur défense; m) la question de savoir si deux ou plusieurs parties représentées par le même avocat ont engagé inutilement des instances distinctes; n) la question de savoir si la partie qui a eu gain de cause dans une action a exagéré le montant de sa réclamation, notamment celle indiquée dans la demande reconventionnelle ou la mise en cause, pour éviter l'application des règles 292 à 299; o) toute autre question qu'elle juge pertinente.
(4) La Cour peut fixer tout ou partie des dépens en se reportant au tarif B et adjuger une somme globale au lieu ou en sus des dépens taxés.
(5) Dans le cas où la Cour ordonne que les dépens soient taxés conformément au tarif B, elle peut donner des directives prescrivant que la taxation soit faite selon une colonne déterminée ou une combinaison de colonnes du tableau de ce tarif.
(6) Malgré toute autre disposition des présentes règles, la Cour peut : a) adjuger ou refuser d'adjuger les dépens à l'égard d'une question litigieuse ou d'une procédure particulières; b) adjuger l'ensemble ou un pourcentage des dépens taxés, jusqu'à une étape précise de l'instance; c) adjuger tout ou partie des dépens sur une base avocat-client; d) condamner aux dépens la partie qui obtient gain de cause.
(7) Les dépens sont adjugés à la partie qui y a droit et non à son avocat, mais ils peuvent être payés en fiducie à celui-ci.
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[24] The applicant claims an amount of approximately $6,000 for disbursements and $5,000 for costs.
[25] Those amounts cover all the judicial proceedings before the Federal Court and the Ontario Superior Court.
[26] In respect of the 11 orders issued by our Court between June 12, 2002 and February 15, 2005, the applicant has received no favourable awards as to costs. Nine of the orders were issued without costs, and the other two were issued with “costs in the cause”:
· the applicant was not a party to the order by Prothonotary Morneau dated April 9, 2004, concerning the Commissioner of Official Languages’ application for leave to intervene in the case;
· the order by Noël J. dated June 2, 2004, dismissing the application to lift the stay of proceedings brought by the applicant, was set aside when the stay of proceedings was lifted, but without costs.
[27] With respect to the proceedings before the Ontario Superior Court, the respondent properly argued that that Court could not rely on subsection 77(4) of the OLA to extend its jurisdiction over disbursements and costs pursuant to section 81 of the OLA. It unfortunately appears that this legislative subtlety escaped the retired former judge, Mr. Boudreault, who wrote the following at paragraph 40 of his decision dated August 11, 2004:
[TRANSLATION]
Concerning the claimant's application for an order as to costs and disbursements, although Mr. Thibodeau, who is not a lawyer, is not entitled to counsel fees . . . subsection 400(4) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, might “to a certain extent . . . satisfy, what fairness could dictate in that respect”. . . . Absent any evidence, and since it appears that the case will continue in the Federal Court in regard to the other conclusions, I defer to that Court in this regard.
[28] Proceedings involving monetary claims before the Ontario Superior Court were governed by a Plan of Arrangement approved by the Superior Court. The definition of “claim” in the Plan of Arrangement includes claims for costs before the Ontario court:
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“Claim” means (i) any right of any Person against one or more of the Applicants in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind of one or more of the Applicants owed to such person and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, whether liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable . . . |
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« Réclamation » : (i) Droits d’une personne à l’égard d’une ou de plusieurs requérantes dans le cadre de dettes, de passif ou d’obligations (quelle qu’en soit la nature) dues à cette personne auxquels s’ajoutent l’intérêt couru y afférent ou les frais payables à leur égard, qu’ils soient liquidés, non liquidés, fixes, éventuels, échus, non échus, contestés, non contestés, issus de la loi ou de l’équité […]
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[29] The order by Farley J. of the Ontario Superior Court dated August 23, 2004 and approving the Plan of Arrangement, reads as follows:
THIS COURT ORDERS that, upon the Implementation Date, each Affected Unsecured Claim shall be settled, compromised and released in accordance with the Plan, and the ability of an Affected Unsecured Creditor to proceed against the Applicants in respect of an Affected Unsecured Claim shall be forever discharged and restrained, and all proceedings with respect to, in connection with or relating to such Affected Unsecured Claims are hereby permanently stayed, subject only to the right of Affected Unsecured Creditors to receive distributions in accordance with the Plan . . . .
[30] Whereas this application is final, and having compared the receipts submitted by the applicant against the list of disbursements submitted by the respondent, the Court accepts the respondents’s argument and grants the amount of $1,875.95 in disbursements.
[31] The issue of costs also raises certain problems, since the applicant represented himself, requested no assistance from counsel and is a lay litigant. According to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Lavigne v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [1998] F.C.J. No. 855 (F.C.A.) (QL), this renders him ineligible for any costs awarded in accordance with Tariff B under subsection 400(4).
[32] However, just because the applicant is a lay litigant does not mean that he is not entitled to compensation for the time dedicated to enforcing his language rights. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Kahn, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1542, Teitelbaum J. wrote at paragraphs 33 to 38:
I am satisfied that the case of Lavigne (supra) does not, in any way, limit my discretion to determine the appropriate sum to be awarded to the respondent for his out-of-pocket disbursements and for the time he spent in "defending" his interests.
Having said the above, what is an appropriate sum to be paid to the respondent for his costs?
I am bound to follow Mr. Justice Marceau when he states in Lavigne (supra) "that lay litigants cannot receive counsel's fees, under the Federal Court Rules, when they successfully represented themselves."
This does not mean to say, as I have said, that lay litigants who retain counsel for legal advice in order to defend their interests, cannot be reimbursed for this expense and be reimbursed for any other expense caused to the litigant as a result of the legal proceedings instigated, in this case, by the applicant . . .
Pursuant to Rule 3 which states:
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3. These Rules shall be interpreted and applied so as to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding on its merits. |
3. Les présentes règles sont interprétées et appliquées de façon à permettre d'apporter une solution au litige qui soit juste et la plus et économique possible. |
and Rule 400(4), I am satisfied that the respondent should be reimbursed a lump sum of $2,500.00 to cover his disbursements for Court attendance and for time spent in consultation with his legal counsel and for time spent in the photocopying of documents and service of documents.
[33] Exercising my discretion, I believe that the applicant is entitled to a lump sum of $3,500 for his review and analysis of the case law and various acts and regulations submitted by both himself and the other parties. In assigning a value to the lump sum, I have also taken into account the many hours spent preparing his case and writing his submissions, including this application, as well as the time spent compiling the information, evidence and documents filed.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS that:
1. The respondent send the applicant a formal letter of apology, within 30 days from the date of the present order, for its violation of the applicant’s language rights under the Official Languages Act during the flight on August 14, 2000.
2. The respondent pay the applicant a lump sum of $5,375.95 including disbursements.
“Michel Beaudry”
Judge
Certified true translation
Michael Palles
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-346-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: MICHEL THIBODEAU v.
AIR CANADA and AIR CANADA REGIONAL INC. and
COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF CANADA
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: October 25, 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: The Honourable Mr. Justice Beaudry
DATED: December 1, 2005
APPEARANCES:
Michel Thibodeau FOR THE APPLICANT
(representing himself)
René Cadieux
Louise-Hélne Sénécal FOR THE RESPONDENT
Amélie Lavictoire FOR THE INTERVENER
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Michel Thibodeau FOR THE APPLICANT
Ottawa, Ontario
(representing himself)
Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP FOR THE RESPONDENT
Montréal, Quebec
Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages FOR THE INTERVENER
Ottawa, Ontario