Federal Court Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content


Date: 19981019


Docket: T-146-98

BETWEEN:

OCCAM MARINE TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED


Applicant


- and -


THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA


Respondent


REASONS FOR ORDER

MacKAY J.

[1]      This is an application under s. 41 of the Access to Information Act1 (the "Act") for review of a decision, described by the Originating Notice of Motion as that of the Minister of Industry Canada, not to release certain information requested under the Act, and for an Order directing release of the information in question. In the applicant's written memorandum the review is described as concerned with "...a decision of the Access to Information Commission...rendered on December 10, 1997," and in the affidavit of Dan R. Pace sworn January 29, 1998, it is similarly described but is said to be dated December 3, 1997. I note that decision, following a complaint by the applicant, merely conveyed the result of the Information Commissioner's investigation, in effect upholding the decision of the respondent National Research Council, an agency reporting to the Minister of Industry, which had refused to release the information requested by the applicant.

[2]      It is the decision of the head of the agency responsible for maintenance of government information that is subject to review under s. 41 of the Act, not the decision of the Information Commissioner who has investigated a complaint about that decision.

[3]      The applicant is represented in these proceedings by Mr. Dan Pace, its director, owner and sole employee, who, though not a lawyer, was authorized by Order to represent his company. In written submissions, and orally when this application was heard, on behalf of the applicant he raised a number of issues and concerns arising from protracted efforts to obtain information from NRC and another government agency, and when dissatisfied, from his experience arising from complaints made to the Information Commissioner under the Act. Correspondence concerning a number of requests for information, and complaints about the manner in which these were dealt with by NRC and by the Information Commissioner, together with argument about these, comprise a substantial portion of the Applicant's Application Record, and of the Memorandum contained in that Record. In particular, the applicant reviews correspondence which Mr. Pace submits indicates debasement of a complaint made to the Commissioner, misrepresentation of another complaint by the Commissioner, refusal to investigate a complaint, and the permitting of obligations under the Act to be circumvented through introduction of a superfluous record. These are said to be background to the necessity, on behalf of the applicant, to make this application to the Court.

[4]      That background, in the applicant's view, warrants a broad approach by this Court in considering matters here raised, which, in the applicant's submissions in a Supplemental Application Record filed in response to that filed on behalf of NRC, include some eight questions that are said to arise on the facts in this case. Those eight questions are posed mostly as hypothetical questions based generally on facts alleged by the applicant in written argument, not in the affidavit of Dan Pace filed in support of the application for review pursuant to s. 41 of the Act. Allegations of fact not in a sworn affidavit are not in evidence before the Court. Even if they were, the Court's role is not to answer hypothetical questions, however important and interesting those may be to the applicant. Rather, pursuant to the Act, under s. 41 the Court's role is to review the matter of the refusal on behalf of the head of the government institution responsible for maintaining the information in question, precluding access to a record requested under the Act.

[5]      The general background of concern to Mr. Pace, as representative of the applicant, may explain, at least in part, a measure of disappointment and a lack of confidence on his part, in the integrity of the process followed by NRC in dealing with his requests for information and of the process followed by the Information Commissioner in dealing with his complaints. That background, however, is for the most part irrelevant to the issue here raised under s. 41 of the Act. That issue is whether the refusal by NRC to release certain information requested by the applicant is properly based upon exceptions specified in the Act to the general principle underlying the statute, that access to information is to be provided upon request.

[6]      The applicant is a company based in Halifax, incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act2. The applicant is involved in research and development activities and has forwarded various proposals for funding to the Industrial Research Assistance Program ("IRAP"), which is administered by the respondent, the National Research Council of Canada, an agency reporting to the Minister of Industry. For some time the applicant has been seeking to review and assess its experience in submitting proposals for funding to IRAP, and to another agency of government, and its requests to NRC under the Act which led to this application for review were made in the course of that review.

[7]      Part of the mandate under IRAP is to provide funding for projects designed to enhance a company's technical capability. In assessing funding requests, the respondent relies on information forwarded by applicants regarding their proposed projects. To protect applicants' financial and commercial positions, much of the information within or from the application documents is treated as confidential by those concerned with IRAP in NRC. When businesses apply for financial assistance from the program, they receive a document entitled "IRAP Confidentiality of Business Information", which assures an applicant that its trade secrets and confidential financial, commercial, scientific and technical information are protected from third party access.

The applicant's request for information

[8]      In its continuing review of its submissions to IRAP in recent years, in May 1997 the applicant requested records relating to two other corporations and on May 5, 1997 it requested, inter alia, "Minutes of the June, 1991 meeting of the IRAP-M Committee meeting at which each company's proposal was first considered." In response, at least in part, NRC forwarded on June 13, 1997 a copy of the Minutes of the IRAP-M Committee Meeting #78 on June 26, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as "Minutes #78"), consisting of two pages. The first of those pages was substantially excised, that is, the information contained on that page was severed, by covering by means of a black marker pen so that a portion was not legible on the face of the page. Written on the copy by hand was the notation "Access to Information Act 20(1)(b)(c)", referring to paragraphs of s. 20 of the Act. By a covering letter the Secretary General of NRC advised that "Information has been severed from one of the pages you are receiving under section 20 (Third Party Information) of the Access to Information Act".

[9]      From his examination of the copy of page 1 of Minutes #78, Mr. Pace suspected that the copy provided to him was not a true copy of the original document, and he addressed a number of questions to NRC about the process, the equipment and the personnel used in producing the copy of the minutes that had been sent to him. Before the questions were answered, on June 24, 1997 he wrote to the Information Commissioner, reviewing his requests for information, seeking assistance in investigating the authenticity of the copy of Minutes #78 sent to him, and suggesting the possibility that copies of that and other documents sent to him had been fabricated. Follow-up letters were sent to the Commissioner in July.

[10]      Before the matter was dealt with by the Information Commissioner, on July 31 NRC wrote to the applicant responding to earlier requests for information. Among information then provided to the applicant was a second copy of Minutes #78 said to be copied from Dr. Fraser's files. The copy provided contained excisions from page 1, by black marker pen, apparently the same as had been provided on June 13, 1997.

[11]      By letter of August 12, 1997 the Information Commissioner responded to the applicant dealing with matters raised by the applicant's letters of June 24 and subsequently, and in effect advised that the Commissioner, having set out his findings, considered the matters raised to be closed.

[12]      On August 27, 1997, pursuant to the Act, the applicant wrote to the respondent's Access to Information and Privacy Co-ordinator (the "A.T.I.P.C.") requesting "copies of all IRAP-M Committee Meetings #77 which took place in the months of June and July of 1991." The applicant amended its request on August 28, 1997 by asking to examine "the originals from the Ottawa files of all IRAP-M Committee Meetings #77 that occurred in Canada in June and July of 1991" and also to examine the original documents from which the copies of Minutes #78, forwarded to the applicant on June 13, 1997 and July 31, 1997, were made.

[13]      By letter dated September 8, 1997, the respondent's A.T.I.P.C. rejected the August 27 and August 28 requests. She denied the request for minutes from IRAP-M Committee Meeting #77 ("Meeting #77") because they contained third party confidential information and she refused the request to examine the originals of Minutes #78 because there were no documents considered as originals and, moreover, the applicant already had copies of that document, so far as it could be released. The applicant then filed a complaint with the Commissioner on September 15, 1997 alleging that the Act does not preclude him from examining originals and that there was no reason referred to from the Act to deny access to the original. The applicant also maintained his suspicion that the original may have revealed further information than the copies provided. As for the document withheld for the sake of confidentiality, the applicant argued that he was entitled to examine the non-confidential passages within it.

[14]      The Commissioner agreed to investigate the complaint and confirmed this in a letter to the applicant dated September 26, 1997, which also advised that the investigator would be a named staff member. Mr. Pace, for the applicant, had earlier experience in dealing with the named investigator and after further interrelations between them which Mr. Pace found less than satisfactory, he requested that the investigation be transferred to another investigator. The Commissioner denied that request.

[15]      An investigator from the Commissioner's Office contacted the respondent's A.T.I.P.C. to inform her of the applicant's complaint. On November 24, 1997 the A.T.I.P.C. wrote to the applicant, explaining the reasoning for refusing access to those documents requested by the applicant on August 27 and August 28. Three of the four pages from the minutes from Meeting #77 were said to have been withheld pursuant to paragraphs 20(1)(b) and (c) of the Act, they contained no information pertaining to the applicant and included only third party confidential information. The original of the fourth page of the minutes from Meeting #77 was enclosed with the letter. The original of the second page of Minutes #78 was also included, though the original of the first page of those minutes was still withheld pursuant to paragraphs 20(1)(b) and (c) in relation to the severed information. The respondent also relied on paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Access to Information Regulations3 (the "Regulations") to withhold access to the original of the first page of those minutes.

[16]      The letter of November 24 enclosed a further copy of page one with exempted third party information, considered exempt under paragraphs 20(1)(b) and (c), severed by blacking out portions of the document. This copy had more information severed by blacking out than had the earlier copies sent in June and July. Despite the respondent's attempt to excise the confidential information, the applicant was able to read the entire document by holding it up to light. He therefore requested on November 25, 1997, by letter to the Commissioner, access to the original copy of the first page of Minutes #78, claiming that the provision within the Regulations on which the respondent relied to deny the information was no longer applicable since the information had been released. The applicant also wrote to the Commissioner on December 3, 1997 suggesting that the Commissioner contact the third parties to whom the confidential information pertained, the other companies, to have them authorize the release of the original page 1 of Minutes #78.

[17]      On December 10, 1997, the Commissioner provided his decision on the availability of that information requested which had not yet been forwarded to the applicant, namely the original page 1 of Minutes #78. That letter stated in part:

    

                 As to the information which remains exempt and will not be made available for your inspection, my views are as follows:                 
                 Paragraph 20(1)(b)                 
                      My examination of the application of this exemption has satisfied me that the withheld information is, in fact confidential in nature, supplied to a government institution by a third party and is treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third party. In my view, the information qualifies for exemption under the Act.                 
                 Paragraph 20(1)(c)                 
                      Paragraph 20(1)(c) is a mandatory exemption which provides that government institutions shall refuse to disclose any record that contains information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in a material financial loss or gain to, or could be reasonably expected to prejudice the competitive position of a third party. After examination, I am satisfied that the information withheld under paragraph 20(1)(c) does in fact meet the requirements for exemption.                 
                      When a document is totally exempt or heavily severed, paragraph 8(2)(a) of the regulations to the Act comes into effect. Paragraph 8(2)(a) reads as follows:                 
                      "Where a person is given access to a record under the control of a          government institution, the head of the institution may require that the          person be given a copy of the record, rather than an opportunity to          examine it if,                 
                      (a)      the record forms a discloseable [sic] part of a record for which          disclosure may otherwise be refused under the Act and from          which it cannot reasonably be severed for examination."                 
                      Based on the above, I find that you have been given access to all the information to which you are entitled and I will record your complaint as resolved.                 
                      That said, I wish to address other issues raised in your letters received in this office on November 25 and December 3. First, I can assure you that the minute #77 forwarded to you by the NRC on November 24, 1997 and on which I reported in my letter of finding dated August 12, 1997 are one and the same minute. As per your request, this minute pertains to an IRAP-M committee meeting held in Alberta in September 1991.                 
                      Second, you state that because you can read the exempt portion of minute #78 provided to you in the NRC's response, that it has been released in its entirety and the institution can no longer claim the exemption. I must disagree with this argument. As stated above, in my view, the exemptions invoked to minute #78 have been properly applied and although you may be able to read through the blacked out portion of the document, I do not consider that it has been disclosed pursuant to the access law.                 

[18]      The applicant contacted the respondent by a December 12, 1997 letter, again seeking the original page 1 of Minutes #78, or access to it, claiming that it had been disclosed. The respondent replied that the applicant had been given all of the information to which it was entitled.

Issues

[19]      In assessing whether the respondent's refusal to release requested information was in accord with the exceptions to providing access that are set out in the Act, I turn to the principle arguments raised by Mr. Pace on behalf of the applicant. Those arguments concern:

1.      the respondent's refusal in light of s-ss. 4(1) and 35(2)(a) of the Act,

2.      the respondent's decision to exempt the information from disclosure pursuant to      paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Act,

3.      the respondent's decision to exempt the information from disclosure pursuant to      paragraph 20(1)(c) of the Act,

4.      the respondent's decision to refuse access to the original of the first page of Minutes      #78 pursuant to paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Regulations.

Paragraphs 4(1) and 35(2)(a) of the Act

[20]      The applicant refers to s. 4(1) of the Act, which states:


4.(1) Subject to this Act, but notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, every person who is

(a) a Canadian citizen, or

(b) a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration      Act,

has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to any record under the control of a government institution.

4.(1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi mais nonobstant toute autre loi fédérale, ont droit à l'accès aux documents des institutions fédérales et peuvent se les faire communiquer sur demande:

a) les citoyens canadiens;

b) les résidents permanents au sens de la Loi sur l'immigration.


The applicant argues that the refusal to provide access to the first page of Minutes #78 does not accord with s-s. 4(1). The only restrictions on access to records are those enumerated specifically within the Act. I note the respondent, and the Commissioner in upholding the decision, did rely on specified statutory provisions as the basis for refusal. Because Mr. Pace was able to read the blacked out portions by holding the document up to the light, the head of the institution, NRC, was not freed from the responsibility of considering whether access should be provided to the original of page 1 as the applicant requested.

[21]      The applicant also argues that the Commissioner's decision of December 10, 1997 violated the principles of procedural fairness because it was determined on the basis of findings about application of the Act which it is claimed the applicant did not have fair opportunity to address, in particular paragraphs 20(1)(b) and (c) of the Act and s. 8(2)(a) of the Regulations. This is said to be contrary to paragraph 35(2)(a) of the Act, which provides:


35.

...

(2) In the course of an investigation of a complaint under this Act by the Information Commissioner, a reasonable opportunity to make representations shall be given to

(a) the person who made the complaint,

35.

...

(2) Au cours de l'enquête, les personnes suivantes doivent avoir law possibilité de présenter leurs observations au Commissaire à l'information, nul n'ayant toutefois le droit absolu d'être présent lorsqu'une autre personne présente des observations au Commissaire à l'information, ni d'en recevoir ou de faire des commentaires à leur sujet:

a) la personne qui a déposé la plainte;

[22]      I note again that this review is concerned with the decision of NRC, not the decision of the Information Commissioner. But even if the Commissioner's decision were here in question, the applicant was not unaware, at least after November 24, 1997 of the full grounds relied upon by NRC in refusing access, and it made many representations to the Commission from the time of the complaint in September, when it was aware of the statutory provisions, paragraphs 20(1)(b) and (c), relied upon by NRC in refusing to provide information excised from page 1 of the minutes.

Paragraph 20(1)(b)

[23]      By letter of November 24, 1997 the A.T.I.P.C. of NRC confirmed that page 1 of Minutes #78 could not be examined by the applicant, in part because it contains exemptions under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Act, which states:


20.(1) Subject to this section, the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains

...

(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information      that is confidential information supplied to a government          institution by a third party and is treated consistently in a          confidential manner by the third party;

20.(1) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu, sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, de refuser la communication de documents contenant:

...

b) des renseignements financiers, commerciaux, scientifiques ou techniques fournis à une institution fédérale par un tiers, qui sont de nature confidentielle et qui sont traités comme tels de façon constante par ce tiers;

[24]      The applicant does not dispute that the information severed or excised is "financial, commercial, scientific or technical information" or that it was supplied to NRC by a third party or that it has been treated as confidential information by NRC. It is claimed that there was no basis for NRC to determine that the information was treated in a confidential manner by the third parties concerned because the respondent did not contact the third parties before refusing access to ask them whether the information was considered confidential. Indeed it was February 1998 after advice from NRC to third parties concerned about this application for review, then filed, before one of those parties wrote to support the decision to refuse access. Furthermore, the applicant maintains that some of the confidential information that the respondent sought to protect was in the public domain because it had been published on an Internat web page or released to the applicant in an earlier access to information request.

[25]      In Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Transport)4, I set out the criteria for information to be included within the exemption from disclosure pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b). The information must be:

1.      financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, given dictionary definitions          of "financial", "commercial", "scientific" and "technical";

2.      information determined to be confidential given an objective assessment of its content,                                              its purposes and the conditions under which it was prepared and communicated;

3.      supplied to a government institution by a third party; and

4.      treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third party.     

[26]      I have examined page 1 of Minutes #78, provided as an attachment to a Supplemental/Confidential Affidavit of NRC's A.T.I.P.C. As described in the written submissions of the respondent the severed information includes the name of the third party, a project name, technical information about the project, costs, an assessment and funding for the project. It is provided by a third party under assurance it will be maintained as confidential. In my opinion, the information withheld meets the criteria as set out in Air Atonabee and it falls within the exemption.

[27]      As earlier noted, each applicant for IRAP funds is advised of policy by which the respondent ensures the confidentiality of information within the application documents. In Information Commissioner of Canada v. Minister of External Affairs (MacKinnon)5, Mr. Justice Denault stated:

                 "I find that given the government's duty to act in good faith, there is a public interest in fostering the confidential nature of its relationship with the third party. This is not to say that government will always be bound by its undertaking to act in confidence, the Act expressly provides exceptions to this rule in subsection 20(6), but I am satisfied that s. 20(1)(b) does require that the government consider itself bound by its undertakings to act confidentially, in respect of financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, whenever the third party to whom the undertaking was given has consistently treated the information as confidential."                 

[28]      That NRC did not seek further assurance that the third parties consistently treated the information as confidential before refusing to disclose the information does not, in my opinion, undermine the respondent's grounds for considering that the confidential regime applicable by its policy, from the time information was received would continue to be applicable and relied upon by the third parties concerned, unless they were to advise otherwise. Indeed, one of the third parties confirmed that to be the case, albeit after the decision refusing access, but before this application was heard.

[29]      In my view, the fact that the applicant was able to discern the contents of the document that were intended to be severed but were inadequately obliterated does not relieve the respondent from its obligations under the Act in considering the applicant's request. The excised information was not released by intent. The applicant's claims, referred to in written argument but not included in any sworn affidavit, that the information pertaining to one of the third parties is available on its web page, suggests that party does not treat the information as confidential. There simply is no evidence of that before the court by any affidavit. The copy of text from that party's web page, included in the Applicant's Record, may pertain to the same product referred to as a project within the first page of Minutes #78, but the information on the web site simply advertises the product and its specifications without any reference to an application for funding to IRAP, or the IRAP committee's assessment of the funding proposal, and the Court has no basis to conclude that the information on the third party's project excised from page 1 of Minutes #78 is the same information published by that party, now some years later, on its web page.

[30]      I conclude that the severed information within the first page of Minutes #78 is treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third parties that provided the information on the understanding it would be maintained in confidence, and that it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to s. 20(1)(b).

[31]      It is urged that there is information within the first page of Minutes #78 regarding one of the third parties that had earlier been provided, in part, at least, by NRC in meeting an earlier request for other information. If information was disclosed by release of other documents, that does not vary the responsibility of the respondent NRC to consider the particular document here in question, page 1 of Minutes #78, in light of the Act. That it did, and I am not persuaded that it erred in severing information about that third party from the page in question on the basis of paragraph 20(1)(b).

Paragraph 20(1)(c)

[32]      NRC also held that information was severed from the copy of page 1 of the minutes pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(c) of the Act. That provision states that the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record that contains:


(c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably be      expected to prejudice the competitive position of, a third party...

c) des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de causer des pertes ou profits financiers appréciables à un tiers ou de nuire à sa compétitivité...

                                 

The applicant submits that s. 20(1)(c) does not apply to the withheld information because one of the third parties has experienced such financial success that releasing the information could not reasonably be seen to affect its competitive position or result in a material financial loss or gain. Furthermore, the applicant contends that one of the third parties implicitly risked the release of the information by court order because it failed to enter a proffered agreement with the applicant to safeguard the confidentiality of the information, thus precipitating this application for judicial review. Moreover, it is the applicant's view that the third parties would have agreed to disclose the information to the applicant if the respondent or applicant had approached the third party early in December as the applicant then suggested to the Information Commissioner.

[33]      In my view, the general financial success or lack of it, of any third party has no significance in relation to the decision to refuse to disclose requested information. Whether third parties would have agreed to release the information requested if they had been asked at an earlier time is a matter of sheer speculation, and so is a forecast that by failing to agree third parties risked disclosure of the information through this review process. In Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture)6, the Court of Appeal considered that in order to withhold information pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(c), there must be reasonable expectation of probable harm to a third party. Mr. Justice MacGuigan, writing for the Court, ruled that there need not be a direct causal connection between disclosing the information and the probable harm. Disclosing the information at issue in this application was considered by NRC to be expected to result in material financial loss or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of the third parties concerned. The information sought relates to those parties' past business strategies, their financial circumstances and it may reveal future tactics for funding applications. A competitor of the third parties could rely on the information to enhance its own funding proposals, thus adversely affecting the third parties in the marketplace. Ultimately this is a decision, based upon judgment, here on behalf of the head of NRC. Unless that decision can be said to be unreasonable in the circumstances, the Court should not intervene in the exercise of discretion. In my opinion the decision was not unreasonable that the severed information was exempt pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(c), and that its release should be refused.

Paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Regulations

[34]      Finally, I turn to paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Regulations, relied upon by the respondent to refuse the release of, or to provide access to, the original of page 1 of Minutes #78. That provision states:

8.

...

(2) Where a person is given access to a record under the control of      a government institution, the head of the institution may require that the person be given a copy of the record, rather than an opportunity to examine it if,

(a) the record forms a disclosable part of a record for which disclosure may otherwise be refused under theAct and from which it cannot reasonably be severed for examination;

8.

...

(2) Lorsqu'une personne est autorisée à consulter un document relevant d'une institution fédérale, le responsable de cette institution peut exiger qu'une copie du document soit remise à la personne, plutôt que de lui donner la possibilité d'examiner le document sur place, si

a) le document en cause constitue une partie pouvant être divulguée d'un document dont la communication peut par ailleurs être refusée en vertu de la Loi et duquel il ne peut raisonnablement être extrait pour examen;

                                      

[35]      The applicant contends that the respondent censored more of the information within page one of the minutes in the copy forwarded on November 24 in order to argue that the original was less easily severable than would have appeared on the basis of the copy provided in June 1997, thus favouring arguments for the application of paragraph 8(2)(a). At the hearing before this Court, the respondent urged that the copies were forwarded at different times by different individuals and one cannot fault the respondent because its staff did not sever the same information on those two separate occasions. Ultimately the respondent submits that paragraph 8(2)(a) applied because the source document from which the copy was obtained could not reasonably be severed for examination.

[36]      I have examined the two copies of the document that were forwarded to the applicant, and the respondent did indeed censor more information within the copy provided on November 24, 1997 than was done when copies were provided in June and July of 1997. In my opinion, however, paragraph 8(2)(a) does not depend upon the extent of information severed from a record. Rather it provides for the head of the institution to refuse access to a record, while providing access to a copy containing disclosable information, where disclosure of part of the record, the original, may be refused under the Act and that part cannot reasonably be severed for examination of the balance. Again the decision depends upon judgment exercised in discretion of or on behalf of the head of the institution concerned. Unless that decision is unreasonable in the circumstances, the Court will not intervene. I conclude that the respondent applied paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Regulations, in the exercise of discretion on behalf of the head of NRC, reasonably, to refuse access to the source document from which the copies were made.

Conclusion

[37]      In my opinion the information severed from the copy provided to the applicant of Minutes #78, by covering portions of that record using black marking ink, is information included within paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c) of the Act, which in accord with the Act, shall not be disclosed. Further, the decision to refuse to release, or to permit access for examination to, the source document requested, i.e., page 1 of Minutes #78 , was a reasonable decision within the discretion of the head of NRC, and no ground is here established for the Court to intervene in relation to that decision. Thus, an order goes dismissing this application for review.

                                     W. Andrew MacKay

    

                                         Judge

Ottawa, Ontario

October 19, 1998.

__________________

     1      R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 as amended.

     2      S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 33.

     3      SOR/83-507 as amended.

     4      (1989) 27 F.T.R. 194 (F.C.T.D.).

     5      (1990), 35 F.T.r. 177 at 183 (F.C.T.D.).

     6      [1989] 1 F.C. 47, 87 N.R. 81 (F.C.A.).

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.